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A b s tra c t
This Thesis is concerned with the broad area of the evaluation of regional 
development policy. The Thesis provides the theoretical context and contributes to 
evaluation of policies based on provision of organised industrial infrastructure and 
support systems to national peripheries. It mainly focuses on the Industrial Areas 
Programme in Greece. The purpose of the research is to measure the effectiveness 
of the Programme as a lever for regional economic development. Specific interest is 
paid to the effects of the policy on the regional productivity and the necessity for 
technological advancement.
Basic characteristics, the administrative structure of the country and the 
setting for the regional development problem are presented early in the Thesis. The 
institutional and legal framework for development and the emergence of the 
Industrial Areas Programme follow. In the theoretical part an analysis of the range 
of regional development theories and their connection with the Industrial Areas 
Programme is made. This is followed by more recent theories of development based 
on the implementation of modern technology and the conditions needed for this.
An analysis of regional productivity is undertaken utilising the total factor 
productivity methodology. A productivity typology emerges and first linkages are 
made to the Industrial Areas Programme. The typology then becomes the base for a 
field study that surveyed the administration of the Industrial Areas of Greece and 
firms established therein. Information collected includes the range, infrastructure 
and facilities of these projects, the technological levels of the participant firms and 
the efforts made to advance such levels. The survey provides a most useful 
attitudinal framework for the evaluation of the Programme's effectiveness. Finally, 
a multi-faceted evaluation is made based first on analysis of employment growth and 
second on monetary flows in the form of a cost-benefit analysis. The latter provides 
a generalised methodology, utilising both a pay-back and a full-life evaluation 
procedure. Analyses in general ascribe some positive effects of the policy but of 
variable intensity across the projects.
The final part resumes the theoretical evaluation, outlines the empirical 
measurements and findings and proceeds to discuss the policy implications of the 
Thesis.
2
Table of Contents
Thesis title: Regional development in Greece: an evaluation Page
of the effectiveness of the Industrial Areas Programme 1
A b s tra c t 2
Table of Contents 3
List of Tables 8
List of Figures 11
Acknowledgements 16
Chapter 1: The Greek State and the setting for Page
the regional development problem
1.0 Introduction 17
1.1 The physical characteristics of Greece 1 9
1.2 The administrative structure of the country 1 9
1.3 A historical synopsis of the modern Greek State 23
1.3.1 From the formation of Greek State to World War II 24
1.3.2 The period 1944-1974 24
1.3.3 The period after 1975 26
1.3.4 Conclusion of the historical synopsis 27
1.4 The economic and population background 27
1.4.1 The patterns of economic development 27
1.4.2 Population trends and cumulative centralisation 33
1.5 Centralisation problems and the need for regional development 38
1.5.1 Over-concentration in Athens 38
1.5.2 The desertion in the periphery 39
1.6 Conclusion 40
Chapter 2: The institutional and legal framework for Page
development in Greece and the formation of the Industrial Areas
2.1 The general regional development policies 44
2.1.1 The regional development agencies 44
2.1.2 The development programmes 45
2.1.3 The current administrative structure for development 46
2.1.4 Legislation for development based on private activity 49
3
Page
2.1.5 The role of the European Communities in development 51
2.2 The case for the Industrial Areas: objectives and studies 57
2.2.1 The initial conceptualisation 57
2.2.2 The aims of the Industrial Areas 58
2.2.3 The institutional framework of the Industrial Areas in Greece 59
2.3 The legal framework for the Industrial Areas 60
2.3.1 Foundation and organisation of the Industrial Areas 60
2.3.2 Special incentives for establishment in the Industrial Areas 62
2.3.3 Regulations for the administration of the Industrial Areas 63
2.4 The Industrial Areas created 64
Chapter 3: Regional development: a conceptualisation of Page
the processes
3.1 Some theoretical background to the Industrial Areas of Greece 68
3.2 Contemporary theories of technology and development 73
3.2.1 Development in modern world structures 73
3.2.2 The structures of development and technology 77
3.2.3 Information, a prerequisite for development through technology 81
3.2.4 New technology : transfer and match 84
3.3 Policy questions arising from the conceptualisation of regional 
development 87
3.3.1 Central development policies and the regional tools 87
3.3.2 Policies for development through technology 89
3.3.3 Alternative development patterns: endogenous development 93
3.4 Conclusion 96
Chapter 4: Regional employment and productivity performance Page
4.1 Introduction 97
4.2 Analysing regional economic performance 101
4.3 Regional employment change in Greece 104
4.3.1 Operationalising the shift share analysis 104
4.3.2 The shift share results 1 05
4.4 Regional productivity change in Greece 112
4.4.1 Measurement of productivity growth and the total factor
productivity models 112
4
Page
4.4.2 Operationalising the total factor productivity analysis
for Greece 11 5
4.4.3 Some technical issues on measuring and modelling of total
factor productivity 1 20
4.4.4 Total factor productivity results 123
4.4.5 The technological frontier model results 139
4.5 Technological efficiency and agglomeration 144
4.5.1 Urbanisation as a factor for technological efficiency 144
4.5.2 Technological efficiency, urbanisation and regional development 
policy in Greece 145
4.6 Conclusions 153
Chapter 5: The selection and characteristics of the sample Page
of Industrial Areas and the structure of the survey
5.1 The context and purpose of the survey 1 55
5.2 The selection of the Industrial Areas to be surveyed 1 56
5.3 The characteristics and industrial specialisations of the selected
regions 162
5.4 The field study procedure 1 69
5.5 The field study as carried out 173
Chapter 6: A survey of the provisions and operation of Page
the Industrial Areas Programme
6.1 Administration and range of the Industrial Areas Programme,
firms' participation and the employment effect 17 6
6.1.1 The administrative setup for the Industrial Areas
Programme, strengths and weaknesses 176
6.1.2 The range and provisions of the Industrial Areas Programme 178
6.1.3 The Industrial Areas Programme's finances 1 83
6.1.4 Employment and participation of firms in the Programme 1 87
6.2 Perceptions of infrastructure provision and views on satisfactory 
operating environments 1 89
6.2.1 Perceptions for the land values and transportation 
infrastructure 189
6.2.2 Telecommunications and power infrastructure 195
6.2.3 Site safety and security, work safety, landscape, environment 1 98
5
Page
6.3 Encouraging technological change and deployment of new technology
by the participating firms 202
6.3.1 The efforts and limitations of administration in promotion
of new technology 202
6.3.2 Technological levels and innovation in practice 205
6.4 Target markets of the Industrial Area businesses and their needs
for assistance 216
6.4.1 The range of target markets in the surveyed Industrial Areas 216
6.4.2 Assistance provided for marketing 218
6.4.3 The firms' preferences for assistance 219
6.5 Local economic linkages and effects 222
6.5.1 Perception and support to the Industrial Areas by the local
actors 222
6.5.2 Perceptions of local labour productivity and attractiveness 223
6.5.3 Perceptions of economic and social effects of the Industrial
Areas at the local level 227
6.6 Perceptions of success or failure, operational and efficiency issues 233
6.7 Conclusion 237
Chapter 7 : Evaluation of the effectiveness and the costs Page
of the Industrial Areas Programme
7.1 Outline of the evaluation procedure 239
7.2 Evaluation using time-series models 240
7.2.1 The main approaches of the time-series evaluation 240
7.2.2 Basic assumptions for the time-series procedure 242
7.2.3 Evaluation using two classic time-series arrangements 243
7.2.4 A sectorally weighed time-series method 248
7.2.5 Conclusion from the time-series procedures 253
7.3 A cross-sectional evaluation procedure 254
7.3.1 Description of the method 254
7.3.2 Application of the cross-sectional (clustering) procedure
for five regions 256
7.3.3 Application of the cross-sectional (clustering) procedure for 
sixteen regions 261
7.3.4 Conclusion from the cross-sectional analysis 263
7.4 An evaluation based on industrial specialisations 264
6
Page
7.5 A benefit-cost appraisal of the Industrial Areas Programme 269
7.5.1 The objectives and the context of cost-benefit analysis 269
7.5.2 Data sources and basic assumptions underlying the methodology 270
7.5.3 Definitions of the central and the social/regional costs
and benefits 272
7.5.4 The settings for the costs and benefits calibrations 281
7.5.5 The balance procedures 285
7.5.6 Evaluation of Industrial Areas using the pay-back of the
first ‘x’ operational years 286
7.5.7 The full life-cycle evaluation of the Industrial Areas 293
7.5.8 Conclusions from the benefit-cost appraisal 31 3
7.6 Conclusions on the evaluation of the effects of the Industrial Areas
Policy 31 4
Chapter 8 : An overview of the Industrial Areas Policy, Page
evaluation and suggestions
8.1 Overview of the policy in the light of regional development theory 317
8.1.1 On the theoretical foundations of the Industrial Areas setup 31 7
8.1.2 A theoretical evaluation of the scheme 31 8
8.2 Evaluation of the policy through measurements of effectiveness 320
8.2.1 The employment impact of the Programme 320
8.2.2 The total factor productivity results 323
8.2.3 The field study results 324
8.2.4 The costs and benefits of the Industrial Areas Programme 326
8.3 Views and suggestions deriving from the evaluation 328
8.3.1 On the general planning of the Programme 328
8.3.2 Restructuring and specialisation 329
8.3.3 Local interaction 331
8.3.4 Orientation to technology and efficiency 332
8.3.5 Resources and environment 333
8.4 Final conclusion 334
References 337
Appendix One: The research questionnaires 349
Appendix Two: The result data from the firms' questionnaire 370
7
List of Tables
Chapter 1 Page
Table 1-1: The four tier administrative structure in Greece 21
Table 1-2: Telephone lines in operation in Greece, 1968 - 1988 28
Table 1-3: Merchant shipping volume of Greece and other selected
countries, 1964 - 1988 30
Table 1-4: Gross domestic product per economic sector in Greece,
1964-1988 34
Table 1-5: Evolution of population in five regions housing the major
urban centres in Greece, 1961 - 1991 36
Table 1-6: Quantity and age of stock of buildings in Athens, 1946-1989 37
Chapter 2 Page
Table 2-1 : The basic components of the budgets of local government in
Greece, 1984-1988 48
Table 2-2: The European Regional Development Fund support payments,
1978-1988, and patterns of support for Greece, 1986-1988 53
Table 2-3: The national investments' budget expenditures in Greece and
the support from the EC, 1980-1990 55
Table 2-4: The five-year European Community support structure
for Greece, 1989-1993 56
Table 2-5: The Industrial Areas and their area, by date of operation 65
Chapter 4 Page
Table 4-1: Basic employment magnitudes for all Industrial Area Regions 98
Table 4-2: Greece: Changing employment, 1978-1988 106
Table 4-3: Greece: Shift-share analysis of employment in seven
sectors, 1978 - 1988 107
Table 4-4: A typology regarding contribution of manufacturing
employment to regional competitiveness 109
Table 4-5: Regression coefficients of the value added production
function 11 8
Table 4-6: Greece: Total factor productivity for 1981-1988 124
Table 4-7: Greece: Total factor productivity typology (1981-1988) 131
8
Table 4-8:
Table 4-9: 
Table 4-10:
Table 4-11:
Table 4-12:
Chapter 5 
Table 5-1:
Table 5-2:
Table 5-3:
Chapter 6 
Table 6-1:
Table 6-2:
Table 6-3:
Table 6-4:
Table 6-5:
Table 6-6:
Table 6-7:
Table 6-8:
Table 6-9:
Greece: Total factor productivity and types of assisted 
area status
Greece: Technical change and types of assisted area status 
Greece: A summary of the combined results of employment 
and productivity analysis
The technological indices for the regions: the TFP model's TEC
and the frontier models F-TEC, 1981-1988
The results of the technological frontier model, 1981-1988
Comparative attributes of the geographical departments
of the five sample Industrial Areas
Sectoral allocation of establishments in the selected
Industrial Areas and the survey coverage
Outline of the field study questionnaires
Some features of the provision levels in a selection of 
Industrial Areas
Area, industrial space and land sales in a selection of 
Industrial Areas
Structure of the running expenses (1991) of three 
selected Industrial Areas and their sources of finance 
Priorities in the selection of firms for the sample Industrial 
Areas
Rejections of applicant firms by reason, for the sample 
Industrial Areas, 1990-1992
Total employment and firms' participation in the full Industrial 
Areas Programme, 1982-1992
Local administration efforts and perceptions about technology 
in the sample Industrial Areas
Renewal periods of technology used in the various sections
of Firms in the sample Industrial Areas, in years
Effects of the Industrial Areas to the local communities as
Page
133
135
138
140
141
Page
164
170
174
Page
180
182
185
185
185
188
204
210
9
Chapter 7 
Table 7-1:
Table 7-2:
Table 7-3:
Table 7-4:
Table 7-5:
Table 7-6:
Table 7-7:
Table 7-8:
Table 7-9:
Table 7-10:
Table 7-11:
perceived by the local administrations of the sample Industrial 
Areas
Regional employment in manufacturing of selected regions 
of Greece, 1969 - 1988
Regional growth rates in manufacturing of selected regions 
of Greece, 1969-1988
Average annual growth in manufacturing of regional samples 
weighed for Industrial Areas specialisations 
Participation of Industrial Areas in regional employment 
and their effect on regional growth rates 
Specialisation of Industrial Areas among manufacturing 
sub- sectors, 1988
The settings and assumptions for the cost-benefit analysis 
of the Industrial Areas
Pay-back of costs from start to eighth year of operation 
of each Industrial Area
Full life-cycle costs and benefits of each Industrial Area, 
using zero discount rate
Full life-cycle costs and benefits of each Industrial Area, 
using a social discount rate of 2%
Full life-cycle costs and benefits of each Industrial Area, 
using a social discount rate of 6%
Break-even year and present values of net benefit of the 
Industrial Areas, at various periods and SRD
Page
226
Page
244
244
252
257
266
282
288
307
308
309 
312
10
Chapter 1 
Figure 1-1: 
Figure 1-2: 
Figure 1-3:
Figure 1-4: 
Figure 1-5:
Figure 1-6:
Figure 1-7: 
Figure 1-8:
Chapter 2 
Figure 2-1:
Figure 2-2:
Figure 2-3: 
Figure 2-4:
Chapter A 
Figure 4-1:
Figure 4-2:
Figure 4-3:
Figure 4-4:
Figure 4-5: 
Figure 4-6:
List of Figures
The thirteen administrative and development regions of Greece 
Electricity consumption in Greece, 1955-1989 
The shares of selected economic activities in Gross 
National Investment
Gross Domestic Product per capita in Greece, 1964 -1988 
Concentration of population in the Capital compared to the 
rest of Greece, 1961 - 1991
Concentration of population in five regions housing major 
urban centres compared to the rest of Greece, 1961-1991 
Out migration from Greece, 1950-1977 
Participation of economic sectors in Gross Domestic Product 
in Greece, 1964 and 1988
Comparison of payments by ERDF to Greece and all EC 
Members, 1978 - 1988
Trends of national investments' budget expenditures and 
and support from the EC, 1980 - 1990 
Evolution of gross space in the Industrial Areas Programme 
The locations of the twenty Industrial Areas in Greece
A comparison of variation in Industrial Area characteristics 
in relation to regional manufacturing contexts 
A comparison of variation in firm size in the Industrial 
Area - regions
Higher than expected performance in manufacturing 
employment growth (Rman) in regions having Industrial 
Areas, 1978-1988
The role of technological effects in the productivity of the 
regions of Greece, 1981-1988
Total factor productivity in the regions of Greece, 1981-1988 
Total factor productivity in the regions of Greece having
Page
22
28
31
34
36
36
37
41
Page
53
55
65
67
Page
100
102
111
129
130
11
an Industrial Area, 1981-1988 
Figure 4-7: The role of technological effects in the productivity of
the regions of Greece having an Industrial Area, 1981-1988 
Figure 4-8: The frontier model of technological efficiency in the 
regions of Greece, 1981-1988 
Figure 4-9: The levels of urbanisation in the regions of Greece, 1981 
Figure 4-10:The state assistance in manufacturing, by region, under 
Law 1262/1982, 1982-1993
Chapter 5
Figure 5-1: Increased productivity and employment growth (group 1) 
among geographical departments having an Industrial 
Area, 1981-1988 
Figure 5-2: Increased productivity but reduced employment growth 
(group 2) among geographical departments having an 
Industrial Area, 1981-1988 
Figure 5-3: Reduced productivity but increased employment growth 
(group 3) among geographical departments having an 
Industrial Area, 1981-1988 
Figure 5-4: Reduced productivity and employment growth (group 4) 
among geographical departments having an Industrial 
Area, 1981-1988
Figure 5-5: The sample of the five selected Industrial Areas for the survey 
Figure 5-6: Activity in the selected Industrial Areas relative to the country 
Figure 5-7: Sectoral allocation of establishments in the selected five 
Industrial Areas and the coverage by the survey
Chapter 6
Figure 6-1: Sales of Industrial space in a selection of Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-2: Employment, number and size of firms in the full Industrial 
Areas Programme, 1982-1992 
Figure 6-3: Land prices in the sample Industrial Areas as perceived 
by the established firms 
Figure 6-4: Evaluation of the public transportation serving the Industrial 
Areas by firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-5: Modes of employees transportation to the sample Industrial 
Areas
136
137
143
147
148 
Page
158
159
160
161
163
168
171
Page
182
188
190
190
192
12
Figure 6-6: Modes of products transportation from the sample Industrial 
Areas
Figure 6-7: Evaluation of roads by firms established in the sample 
Industrial Areas
Figure 6-8: hypothetical future spending on road and rail by firms 
established in four of the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-9: Use and quality of telephones, as perceived by firms 
established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-10: Electricity consumption and reliability of provision, as perceived 
by firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-11:Site safety and security, as perceived by firms established in 
the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-12: Efficiency of First Aid/ Flealth Centre, as perceived by firms 
in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-13:Firms willing to share costs of seminars on safety of work 
in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-14: Local conferences on technology, as perceived by established 
firms in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-15:Necessities for use of latest technology perceived by all 
sampled firms
Figure 6-16: Necessities for use of latest technology in the sample 
Industrial Areas
Figure 6-17: Reasons for use of more advanced technology by competitors 
perceived by fifteen of the sampled firms 
Figure 6-18: Use of domestic technology, improvements, research and
development by firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-19:Proportion of established firms that perceive faster spread 
of innovations within the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-20: Proportion of established firms declaring cooperation with 
other established firms in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-21 :The destination markets of the firms established in the sample 
Industrial Areas, based on sales value 
Figure 6-22:Assistance preferences of firms established in the sample 
Industrial Areas
Figure 6-23: Preferences on potential state subsidies of firms in the sample 
Industrial Areas
Page
192
194
194
197
197
200
200
200
204
207
207
210
212
215
215
217
217
221
13
Figure 6-24: Favourite delivery system of state financial support for firms 
established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-25:Local support to the Industrial Area as perceived by firms 
established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-26: Advanced labour productivity in the region as perceived by 
firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-27: Attractiveness of Industrial Areas to local and external capital 
as perceived by firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-28:The location of the Industrial Area of Patra and the road 
connections to Athens and the rest of Greece 
Figure 6-29: Percentage of local-origin employees in the Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-30:Regional benefits due to the Industrial Areas, as perceived by 
firms established in the sample Industrial Areas 
Figure 6-31: Proportion of firms attracted to the regions by the 
Industrial Areas
Figure 6-32: Locational and operational advantage in the Industrial Areas, 
as perceived by firms established in the sample Industrial Areas
Chapter 7
Figure 7-1: Regional manufacturing employment; annual growth rates 
in different periods 
Figure 7-2: Regional manufacturing; growth rates in different periods, 
net of unweighted expected growth 
Figure 7-3: Regional manufacturing; growth rates in different periods, 
net of subsectorally weighted expected growth 
Figure 7-4: Average annual growth rates for five Industrial Area 
regions, 1978 - 1988 
Figure 7-5: Average annual growth rates for sixteen Industrial Area 
regions, 1984 - 1988 
Figure 7-6: Sub-sectors of manufacturing in Greece: average annual 
employment growth for 1978 - 1988 
Figure 7-7: The locations of the six Industrial Areas selected for the 
cost benefit analysis 
Figure 7-8: Diagrammatic indication of the components of the cost- 
benefit analysis
Figure 7-9: The structure of costs in the Industrial Areas from start
Page
221
224
224
226
228
230
230
236
236
Page
245
247
249
258
262
268
271
273
14
to 1991
Figure 7-10: A costs profile over time of the Industrial Area of Thessaloniki
Figure 7-11: A costs profile over time of the Industrial Area of Volos
Figure 7-12: A comparison of cumulative costs in the Industrial Areas 
from start to 1991
Figure 7-13:The sources of funding of the Industrial Areas from start 
to 1991
Figure 7-14: Pay-back year sensitivities to variations in the social discount 
rate for Industrial Areas, using full salaries and social salaries
Figure 7-15: Diagrammatic indication of the timing of the flows of costs and 
benefits
Figure 7-16:The composition over time of the central development cost 
for each Industrial Area, 1968-1991
Figure 7-17:The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Thessaloniki
Figure 7-18:The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Volos
Figure 7-19:The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Iraklio
Figure 7-20:The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Patra
Figure 7-21 :The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Komotini
Figure 7-22:The composition over time of a. the net central cost and 
b. the net regional/social benefits for the Industrial Area 
of Xanthi
Figure 7-23:Net present value sensitivity to social discount rate for 
each Industrial Area
Page
275
276
277
278 
280 
292
295
296
300
301
302
303
304
305 
311
15
Acknowledgem ents
I would like to express my gratitude to the Greek State and the State 
Scholarships Foundation ( IKY ) for bearing the costs that made this Doctoral 
Thesis possible. I also thank the Director and staff of IKY for their excellent 
cooperation.
I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor at the London School of 
Economics, Dr. Nigel Spence, for his industrious help and ingenious guidance. Also, to 
my review supervisor Dr. Michael Hebbert, for his constructive comments on earlier 
drafts of this Thesis. I consider myself privileged to have had the opportunity to 
study with them.
I wish to thank Professor C. G. Athanassopoulos, of Panteion University, 
Athens, for his invaluable moral support and his help with material regarding legal 
and historic matters.
I wish to acknowledge and thank Mrs Vicky Pagoulaki, head of the Regional 
Development and Industrial Infrastructure ( nABY ) direction of the ETBA bank in 
Greece, for facilitating my field research in various Industrial Areas and providing 
fundamental data for the Industrial Areas Programme.
I also want to thank the Administrators of the Industrial Areas selected for 
the field research and additionally Mr. George Mamoutos of Komotini and Mr. 
Michael Koutroubelas of Patra.
I must also acknowledge the understanding owners or managers of the fifty 
five industrial enterprises that answered the lengthy questionnaire of this study.
I want to thank Mrs Varvara Karathanassi of the National Statistical Service 
of Greece for her help.
Finally I have to thank my wife Alexandra Komninou for her moral support 
and courageous patience during the course of this study.
16
Chapter 1: The Greek State and the setting for the 
regional development problem
1.0  In tro d u c tio n
European peripheries, such as Greece, have suffered from problems of 
centralisation and dualism. The former takes the form of concentration of economic 
activity and power in few major cities or the capital; the latter may prove a distinct 
diversity in productivity between the traditional and modern clusters of the 
economy, together with a spatial polarisation of such clusters. The fundamental 
question of this thesis is to what extent can regional development policies with 
emphasis on new technology, innovation, infrastructure and support systems be 
fruitful in restoring the situation.
After examining the theoretical underpinnings of such development policies, 
this study proceeds to the effects of such policies in Greece focusing more 
specifically on the Industrial Areas Programme. The Programme is in operation in 
several, mainly peripheral, geographical departments of the country and can be 
thought of as an integrated state - driven regional economic development support 
system. The aim of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Programme 
and further to understand the conditions under which these Industrial Areas, and 
the new ones that are planned, can effectively provide the stimuli and prove an 
important lever for economic development and well being of their respective 
regions.
In this first chapter, basic geographical, historical, economic and population 
aspects of the Greek State will be outlined, which provide the reasons for the 
necessity of regional development in Greece. Given this framework, the regional 
development efforts shall be presented in the following second chapter of this 
thesis, to set the frame of operation of the Industrial Areas Programme. In chapter 
three the theoretical underpinning of the Programme is layed out. In addition other 
theories of development are presented aiming to show the necessity of orientation
17
of the Industrial Areas Programme to one of new technology utilisation and 
promotion.
Evaluation of the Industrial Areas starts with the analysis in chapter four. 
There, a shift share analysis is used to show the importance of manufacturing in the 
competitive effect of the various regions of Greece. Relation is also found between 
increased rates of employment in manufacturing and existence of Industrial Areas. 
Given that, a total factor productivity analysis shows the varying effects of the 
Industrial Areas Programme to the productivity of the recipient regions. 
Consequently in chapter five the design of the field research in five Industrial Areas 
is given and also the profiles of these regions. The results are analysed in chapter 
six, where signs of better technology utilisation are found within the Industrial 
Areas, but also, in cases serious infrastructure deficiencies and operational 
complications are found. A further evaluation of the Industrial Areas Programme is 
undertaken in chapter seven based on classic time series methodology utilising 
policy 'on' and 'off* periods. This is followed by a more specific cross-sectional 
employment analysis focusing on the Industrial Areas. In the same chapter an 
application of a cost-benefit analysis is made on six projects of the Programme. The 
CBA analysis is twofold, one of a pay-back type and one of a full life type. The 
method gives an evaluation of the projects that is consistent to the employment, 
the productivity and the field survey findings as regards their impact.
Finally, in the conclusive chapter eight an overview of the theoretical issues 
tied to the operation of the Industrial Areas Programme is made. A synopsis of the 
results of evaluations on regional productivity, on site conditions and on cost- 
effectiveness of the projects allows for conclusions and suggestions on the 
orientation of the Programme.
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1.1 The physical characteristics of Greece
Greece is strategically situated in the southeastern part of Europe, 
neighbouring with the continents of Asia and Africa. The northern border of the 
country from west to east is with Albania, with the southern provinces of former 
Yugoslavia and with Bulgaria. The country also has a short border in the east with 
Turkey. The total length of the land border is 1,181 km. Additionally Greece has a 
15,021 km coastline. This is spread among the western, southern and eastern 
parts of the mainland and among over 1,000 islands. Some two hundred of these 
islands are permanently inhabited. The country's area is 131,957 sq.km, and of 
this some 25,042 sq.km or 19% of the national territory is made up of the islands. 
Some 80% of the land can be classified as mountainous. The fragmentation of the 
land and its mountainous morphology are traditionally considered as characteristics 
which make the comprehensive provision of infrastructure more difficult.
In land use terms, the National Statistical Service of Greece (E2YE-1, 1989)
estimates that 29,800 sq.km or 22.6% of the national territory is covered by 
forests; 52,157 sq.km or 39.5% is made up of pasture; other agricultural land 
amounts to 39,340 sq.km or 29.8%; and the rest which includes developed land 
comprises 10,660 sq.km or 8.1% of the country.
The total population of Greece according to the General Census of 1981 
(EZYE-2) was 9,740,417 producing a density of 74 persons per sq.km. The highest
density is found in Greater Athens, where over the 427 sq.km a density of 7,090 
inhabitants per sq.km is recorded. The minimum density is found in the geographical 
department of Evritania, with 14 people per sq.km. Provisional, unpublished yet 
(1993) data of the 1991 General Census bring the population of the country to
10,256,000 , that rises the average density to 78 inhabitants per sq.km.
1.2 The administrative structure of the country
Greece is a republic according to the current Constitution of 1975/1986  
and current legislation provides for a four tier administrative structure. Central 
government authority is delegated by laws as regards many of its functions to the 
regional and prefectural level. The Constitution also provides for an administratively 
independent local government. A synopsis of the administrative structure of the
19
country, that will be analysed in this part, is given in Table 1-1.
In Greece, as provided for in the Constitution, the political authority stems 
from the people. Thus the people of Greece elect their 300 representatives for the 
Parliament by direct, compulsory, secret ballot elections, held every four years. The 
head of the state is the President of the Democracy, elected every five years. The 
elections for the President are by secret ballot and held among the members of the 
Parliament. The National Government is formed by one or more of the groups of the 
members of the Parliament, the political parties or alliances. A new Government has 
to be approved by the President and consequently to gain support via a vote of 
confidence within the Parliament. The authority of the central government is 
exercised through a structure of some twenty ministries, eighteen of which are 
based in Athens.
Under the provisions of Law 1622/1986, with the Presidential Decree 51 of 
6.3.1987, Greece is divided in thirteen Regions (Figure 1-1). The Regions were 
created for the planning, the programming and coordination of regional 
development (Athanassopoulos 1987,1992a; Vagionis 1987). The main elements of 
the regional government are the General Secretary of the region and the Regional 
Council. The General Secretary of the region is head of all political government 
departments and the police at the regional level. Regional elections for the 
establishment of directly elected regional governments were provided for by the 
law, but to the present date this provision has not been activated.
At the moment, each region has its own Regional Government that consists 
of a mixture of centrally appointed and indirectly elected members. The General 
Secretary is appointed by the central government. The decision is made by the 
Council of Ministers and the person appointed is responsible for the application of 
the central government's policies. The Regional Council consists of a. the General 
Secretary of the Region, as president; b. the centrally appointed Prefects of the 
geographical departments making up the region; c. the Presidents of the 
Prefectural Governments (councils) of the geographical departments; and d. one 
delegate of the local Union of Communes and Municipalities from each geographical 
department of the region. Exceptionally, the Regional Council of Attiki (the region of 
Athens) is enlarged by more delegates of interested parties. The degree of political 
autonomy of these regional governments from the central government is low as 
currently practiced.
Greece is divided into some 51 geographical departments or prefectures. 
Government at prefectural level is also termed as local government of second 
degree. Under the provisions of regionalisation Law 1622/1986, the elements of
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Table 1-1: The fo u r-tie r admlnistratiue structure In Greece
V______________________________________________  )
V
S'
Tier Territory Number o f Gouernment Number of
.......  -  . . . . . .
Entities Seats
President of Democracy 1
7 Greek State 1 Parliament 300 Seats
Central Government 20 Ministries
2 Regions 13 General Secretary 1
Regional Council 7-22 seats
3 Prefectures 51 Prefect 1
Prefectural Council 27-51 seats
Municipalities 304 Mayor & Municipal Council variable
4
Communities 5696 President & Community Council variable
K>
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the Prefectural Government are the Prefectural Council, the Prefect, as president 
of the Prefectural Council and the Commission of the Prefecture. The Prefectural 
Governments are entities of public law and their name and territory are those of 
their geographical department. Prefects are appointed by the central government. 
The Prefectural Council should consist of majority of directly elected members (25 
to 46) and joined by a smaller number of centrally designated members (2 to 5). 
The direct election of the members of the prefectural council has not yet been 
activated. The Prefectural Governments have responsibilities over a broad 
spectrum of areas such as democratic planning (Athanassopoulos 1989), social 
welfare, health, transportation, urban and regional planning, economic activity, 
education, tourism and issues of the ’new generation’. The latter include cultural 
events, sports and vocational training.
Greece includes a total of 304 municipalities and some 5,696 communities 
(EZYE-1, 1989). According to the current Constitution (1975/1986), article 102,
the local government of first degree consisting of the municipalities and 
communities is responsible for local affairs. This tier of government is provided by 
the constitution and has administrative independence. Communities directly elect 
their presidents and municipalities their mayors, every four years, in simultaneous, 
compulsory, direct, secret ballot elections, organised nationwide. The central 
government is responsible for allocating funds to the local government of first 
degree to facilitate its purposes. Other laws provide for the participation of 
members of the local government of first degree in the higher tiers governments 
(prefectural or regional).
All tiers of government, that is local, prefectural, regional and central, are 
involved with the policy for development as shall be described in detail in chapter 
two of this thesis.
1.3 A historical synopsis of the modern Greek State
The purpose of this short presentation is to highlight the main causes of 
centralisation in the government functions in the country. It will be shown that the 
prolonged periods of unrest and instability that characterised even recent years 
were the main causes for the reluctance of governments to deconcentrate power. 
The above reasons led to a centralisation of the economic activity with serious 
consequences for contemporary Greece.
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1.3.1 From the formation of Greek State to World War II
Greece exists as a free country in modern history from March 25th, 1821,
when the national War of Independence against the Ottoman occupation 
commenced. The exceptional cultural, linguistic and religious coherence of the 
Greek nation has kept the historical ties with the Byzantium and Ancient Greece 
alive and strong. Modern Greece was first organised as a State at the First National 
Congress at Astros (Peloponnissos), on 30.4.1822. The sequence of regaining the 
occupied territories that today comprise the Greek State lasted well over one 
hundred years until 1947, and went through much conflict and subsequent political 
treaties (Finlay 1861, Dontas 1966, Vasdravelis 1968).
A synopsis of the territorial annexations of modern Greece is as follows. By 
1832 Central Greece, the Peloponnissos and the Kyclades islands were free and 
united. In 1864 the Ionian islands joined Greece, after a period of being 
independent, following their previous dominance by Venice. By 1881 Greece 
regained Thessalia. In 1913 Greece once again included Macedonia and the 
northern Aegean islands. In the same year the newly formed independent state of 
Crete (Kriti), after being liberated by the Ottomans, joined Greece. In 1922 Greece 
gained western Thrace (Thraki) and in the same year was forced to retreat from 
the previously (1920) liberated Ionian coast of Asia minor. Eventually the bo rders 
were settled by the international Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Finally in 1947 the 
Dodecanissos islands, previously dominated by Italy, become part of the Greek 
State.
1.3.2 The period 1944 - 1974
Towards the end of the Nazi occupation of Greece the country portrayed a 
complicated political situation. Such complications led in fact to a four - year civil 
war, which was responsible in large measure for the subsequent development. The 
National Liberation Front, (EAM), with other cooperating forces formed on the 
freed territories, in March 1944 a Provisional Government, (PEEA). Consequently 
the marionette government supported by the Nazi occupants collapsed (Byford- 
Jones 1945). In September 1944, the PEEA in the meeting of Kazerta, Lebanon, 
was compelled to accept a presence of the British army in Athens, under General 
Scobie, as a stabilising force. The result was that Greek Popular Liberative Army 
(ELAS) the army of EAM, victorious against the Germans and having control on most 
provinces, invaded Athens. British ministers Churchill and Eden visited Athens on 
Christmas Day 1944 in an attempt to stop these developments (Alexander 1982).
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Eventually ELAS retreated according to the arrangements of the Varkiza treaty, 
February 1945, and disarmed. As a result of the escalation of right wing para­
military terrorism, the democratic parties abstained in the elections of March 
1946, and a referendum in September 1946 made it possible for the king to re­
establish in Greece, form a government, and raise the National Army.
National government made EAM and ELAS illegal and the latter established 
the Democratic Army in October 1946, to start a civil war (Leeper 1950, 
O'Ballance 1966). In February 1947, the British terminated their intervention and 
withdrew, allowing US president Truman to undertake the situation in March 1947 
(Truman Doctrine) (Stavrianos 1952, Xydis 1963a, 1963b). By December 1947 
the Democratic Army had re-established the 'Provisional Government of Free 
Greece’ in most provinces. But the civil war ended in December 1949, in fact with 
the retreat of the Democratic Army. Retribution was then taken by the National 
Army and the paramilitary organisations against the remains of the socio-political 
framework of the Democratic Army. The social and economic results of this war are 
still reflected in the conditions of contemporary Greece ( Svoronos 1972).
The situation of instability after the civil war was not conducive for the 
development of the devastated country. There was a dominance of governments 
that maintained the climate of war. More than 2% of the population became 
political refugees in the East. Political trials and executions continued during the 
fifties. Over 100,000 were sent to concentration camps, set up on several islands 
of the country (Margaris 1966). People that were thought to be in the past 
supporters of EAM, were seriously discriminated against as regards jobs, 
unemployment benefits, or even marriage licenses. The murder of the socialist M.P. 
G. Lambrakis, in May 1963, resurrected unrest and the popular demand was for 
the resignation of the government. The king was forced to hold elections. In 
February 1964, the liberal G. Papandreou collected 52.7% of the votes and 171 of 
the 300 parliamentary seats to form the first liberal government since 1928.
The G. Papandreou government tried to redistribute the national income, to 
challenge the privileges of foreign capital in Greece, to restructure the education 
system and protect individual freedom. But being accused by the US of following the 
Nasher's paradigm in Egypt, G. Papandreou was forced in December 1966 to form a 
coalition government with the right. New unrest emerged under these pressures. 
The king decided to dissolve this government in April 1967, intending in a palace 
controlled coup based on the army leaders. Instead, for a variety of reasons a 
military dictatorship based on colonels was established on April 21st, 1967. 
(Rousseas 1968, Papandreou 1970, Clogg 1972)
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The military regime, carried out a neo-fascist and nationalist ideology, and 
actively served the US military and economic interests in the area. The financial 
programming was tailored to the necessities of capital and the military elites that 
spent the tax revenues and the american financial support without any control, as 
there was no Parliament. Nepotism was the rule for the military and civil service 
positions. The regime was never accepted in the conscience of Greeks but the army 
and the police controlled everything but the people's thoughts. (Williams 1967, 
Theodorakis 1971, Nikolinakos 1975)
In 1973 resistance to the regime increased to such an extent that the 
army and police were forced to quell student demonstrations in Athens on 17th 
November, 1973 resulting in many deaths. The regime fell. Power then fell to 
another military regime, that led to July 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus.
On December 8th, 1974 a referendum in Greece decided that the state 
would be Democracy, thus ending the period of intervention and unrest that 
started with the biased referendum of March 1946. Dictatorship proved to be 
costly in many respects other than those of regional development.
1.3.3 The period after 1975
From 1975 on, democracy was established and Greece has enjoyed its 
longest period of stability in modern history. It has become a safe European country 
and tries to develop and overcome the handicap of so many past social and political 
misfortunes. Eventually on 1.1.1981 Greece joined the European Communities (EC) 
and since then has made making efforts to establish itself in the European forum.
In 1981-1982 comprehensive legislation providing for financial incentives for 
industrial development was produced. Subsequently in 1986-1987, in order to 
meet the necessities of development for its lagging peripheral regions, a 
regionalisation of the country and legislation for government deconcentration was 
produced. In the main, as stated before, the legislation provides for a four tier 
governmental structure but its full implementation is still incomplete. The Industrial 
Areas Programme, the major regional development project related to industrial 
policy having produced three Industrial Areas from 1965 to 1974, added a further 
fourteen by 1983 and reached twenty by 1988.
Hence, deconcentration, in conjunction with the development efforts such 
as the Industrial Areas, have only recently started producing tangible results. 
These will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
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1 .3 .4  Conclusion of the historical synopsis
Overall, this historical synopsis shows first, that the annexations of occupied 
Greek territories during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century 
retarded economic development and created a need for a strong centralised 
government. Trade was the main national economic activity rather than 
manufacturing or services. Second, that the unstable political situation and the 
economic mishandlings of the period 1945-74 had serious negative economic and 
social consequences and also maintained and favoured centralisation. Finally, that 
regional development efforts were only put forward after 1974 and relevant 
legislation emerged in 1982 and 1987. It is a gigantic task for modern Greece to 
restore the past situation and set the bases for a new development.
1.4 The economic and population background
1.4.1 The patterns of economic development
A first fact characterising the period 1950 - 1970 was the low levels of 
provision of the physical infrastructure in the country and its almost total 
centralisation around Athens. The fifties found the Greek provinces and especially 
the rural populations in unsatisfactory built environment. Housing conditions were 
poor, road and railways conditions were worse and many bridges had been 
destroyed, all to some extent due to the damages caused by the occupation and 
the civil war. Telecommunication facilities in rural areas were almost non-existent 
even until the eighties; remote villages had just a single telephone for common use, 
and certain islands were without any. For example by 1968 Athens alone had 
double the telephones than in the rest of the country. Even in 1985 Athens still 
had half the telephone lines of all Greece (Table 1-2). Electricity production was 
very low in the fifties and sixties and consumption was mainly a privilege of Athens 
and much less of few other cities. There was no nationwide electricity supply 
network until the seventies and remote areas and certain islands did not have 
electricity until the eighties. Illustration of the relevant consumption patterns and 
magnitudes are given in Figure 1-2.
The second characteristic of the economy in the period 1950 - 1970 was 
that Greece was seriously short of capital. Strategic industries were especially 
deficient in capital investment. These were industries that should have created 
national specialisation, agglomeration economies and long run positive effects. Given
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Table 1-2: Telephone lines in operation in Greece, 1968 -  1988
A T H E N S REST OF GREECE ALL GREECE
Years % % %
1968 406000 64.8% 221000 35.2% 627000 100%
1978 1070000 53.5% 930000 46.5% 2000000 100%
1988 1600000 44.4% 2000000 55.6% 3600000 100%
Figure 1-2: Electricity consumption in Greece,
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the above infrastructure conditions reflecting a shortage of public capital, private 
capital in the period injected only small amounts of investments into manufacturing 
(some 10% of all investment) (Figure 1-3). Greek capital instead sought 
enterprises producing a fast return, such as in speculative housing (Emmanuel 
1981), and in trade and services provision such as tourism and shipping. As regards 
the latter, as shown in Table 1-3, in the sixties the Greek flag already accounted 
for the third largest merchant shipping volume in Europe, after UK and Norway. 
Greek interests in general had managed to command much larger tonnage, but this 
volume was only in part under the Greek flag, besides a variety of convenience flags. 
Thus, and also due to the global character of this type of business, returns of this 
noteworthy enterprise only to a modest extent entered the Greek economy.
After 1974 though, and for most part of the eighties Greek-flag shipping 
became the largest worldwide (Table 1-3). Also, investment in manufacturing 
increased its share a lot (Figure 1-3).
Any manufacturing enterprises which did find the capital to start or expand 
in 1950-1970, did enjoy serious tax reliefs, low wage payments, and fiscal 
protection from foreign competitors. Thus some Greek owned manufacturing 
enterprises grew and became rapidly large ones. For example cement companies 
(Iraklis, Titan), oil refineries (Aspropirgos refinery), steel industry (Chalivourgiki), 
aluminium (Aluminium of Greece) food processing companies (Elais, Ion), tobacco 
(Papastratos) and other companies.
The government's economic activity mainly concentrated on the provision of 
electricity, telecommunications, the largest part of public transportation, as well as 
other infrastructure with the creation of relevant national enterprises. They used 
the very limited tax revenues which were available and some of the external 
financial help. It should be noted that from the large foreign capital transfers of the 
Marshall Plan in the fifties, Greece received from the US over 4 billion dollars as 
financial support. But from this, some 53% was used to satisfy military goals with 
only 21% going towards national public investments (Svoronos 1972). It was 
beyond the government's abilities and aspirations to expand in further 
entrepreneurial activities. Instead, the various governments of the period were 
keen to attract inward foreign investments into the country in productive sectors. 
Regional development was a non-issue at the above period.
As regards foreign private capital, the socio-political situation was such, at 
least during the early period, that would not inspire international capital to invest. 
The physical infrastructure conditions were not satisfactory as described and 
additionally skilled labour was not up to the standard required to attract
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Table 1-3 : Merchant shipping uolume of Greece and other selected countries
( in thousand Gross Registered Tons )
r 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988
G r e e c e 6 8 8 8 7 4 1 6 1 5 2 3 9 2 5 0 3 5 3 9 4 7 2 3 5 0 5 9 2 1 9 7 9
U.K. 21490 21921 28625 32923 27135 15874 8260
U.S.S.R. n/a 12062 16774 20668 23444 24492 25784
Norway 14447 19667 23507 27944 22007 17663 9350
U.S.A. 22430 19668 15024 14908 18464 19292 20832
France 5116 5796 7420 11278 11925 8945 4506
F.R. Germany 5159 6528 8516 9265 8536 6242 3917
Spain 2048 2821 4300 6028 8112 7005 4415
Sweden 4308 4865 5632 7971 4234 3520 2116
Cyprus n/a 653 2015 3114 2091 6728 18390
v
Figure 1 -3  : Greece: The shares o f  selected economic actiui t ies  in Gross Nat iona l  In u e s t m e n t
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international investments. The limited interest of international capital made the 
governments of the period to resort to desperate measures. Often foreign capital 
was given ’colonial1 privileges in order to invest in heavy industrial sectors.
These agreements with foreign capital resulted in some employment 
creation, but it was quite often that the domestically occurring added value was 
kept to a minimum. Associated with such developments, uncontrolled exploitation of 
non renewable resources and the export of raw materials also took place. But 
perhaps most important such agreements in fact eliminated any later opportunity 
for domestic investments in these fields, due to either lack of the resources 
themselves, or to unfair competition created by the privileges that were offered by 
the agreements. To a lesser extent valuable land in tourist resorts was sold, and 
not leased as it might have been, to foreign capital for development at prices even 
below those of pasture land. The local factor missed relevant future development 
opportunities. In addition, the non-tourist development prospects for these local 
economies were bound to be constrained in the long term.
It is important to note that all economic activity, except that which is raw 
materials oriented would naturally want to establish in and around the Capital to 
take advantage of the existing, even though limited, infrastructure. The other 
urban centres proved less attractive for investments, also due to a centralised 
government pattern. During the sixties, industry was also attracted to the Capital 
to take advantage of the large pools of unemployed people concentrating there. 
Besides, due to these circumstances, and to the political situation described earlier, 
workers unions were either non-existent or non - effective, or controlled by the 
industrialists. As a consequence conditions of work were poor and the wages low. 
The state at the time offered the industrial sector substantial tax reliefs, but 
unfortunately there was no regulation or regional policy or any other financial or 
infrastructural incentives that would effectively go with them.
The third characteristic of the economy of Greece in the period 1950 to 
1970 was the lack of industrial specialisations and the associated unemployment. In 
the provinces the main specialisation was agriculture and stock farming. But after 
over ten years of war and unrest, much of the older cultivated land was 
unproductive and the stocks exhausted. Additionally, since trade of relevant 
products was either prohibited during the occupation period, or carried out under 
extremely difficult conditions during the civil war, most family enterprises ran 
serious economic risks and worked merely to serve their debts to the Agricultural 
Bank. A common characteristic was the underemployment of rural populations, the 
undercapitalisation of the enterprises and the extremely low wages for the
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workers of land. In the larger peripheral urban centres, the reconstruction of the 
bombed or damaged areas and public infrastructure created some jobs for 
construction workers and related activities, but lack of manufacturing and services 
enterprises did not provide for other normal industrial specialisations. Of course, 
the attraction of these cities, compared to Athens, was many times smaller.
Unemployment in the whole country was in 1951 over 20% of the 
economically active. Even so, the GDP per capita grew from $ 112 in 1951 to $ 
250 in 1956. During the short period of 1963-1965, under the G.Papandreou 
reforms, the GDP per capita rose in 1964 in excess of $ 600 and for the first time 
in 1965 the value of the industrial production became greater than the agricultural 
(Table 1-4). On this base, production and the GDP per capita in fact doubled 
within the seventies to top the $4000 mark in 1980, but it was reduced below this 
in the eighties (Figure 1-4). The lack of international competitiveness became 
apparent in the eighties during which time the country ceased to be 'industrial 
paradise1 for many local unproductive industries after Greece joined EEC in 1981.
Given the above characteristics of the national economy a growing national 
debt was formed. One reason was the poor handling of the large external financial 
support as mentioned. The other was the lack of adequate taxation. The growing 
manufacturing and other sectors of the period enjoyed large tax allowances, and 
the suffering agricultural populations did not pay income tax. The tax system, 
based by 75% on indirect taxes, hit mainly the economically weak and the 
unemployed and did not provide enough revenues for the state.
The effects of this growth in social well-being were limited, since within the 
described power structures the salaries did not follow the increases in productivity. 
Under these conditions, profitability of manufacturing was viable, without any 
necessity for technological advance or skilling of workforce. Economic activity was 
concentrated in and around Athens and much of the country was backward. The 
development that did occur in and around Athens was substantial, but almost 
totally uncontrolled. It will be shown in chapter two that the first regional 
development efforts were designed in the mid-sixties but in fact only really began to 
be effective in the eighties.
1.4.2 Population trends and cumulative centralisation
Rural populations in the fifties preferred not to stay in their villages where 
often political and social discriminations affected their ability to work. Besides, 
urban centres and especially Athens attracted the young population. However 
there were several important differences between Athens and the other urban
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f  Table 1-4: Gross Domestic Product per economic sector in Greece, 1964 -  1988
( in million drachmas at 1970 constant prices )
f  Years 
Sectors
1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 198&
Agriculture-Fishing 44620 44817 51543 55971 60499 59394 63152
Mining 1976 2969 4495 5242 6245 7827 8790
Manufacturing 32590 48614 58892 78029 89125 86475 91206
Electric.Gas.Water 3136 5171 7389 9753 13724 16022 19543
Construction 13131 18983 31179 24576 26392 21890 22528
T ransport.T elecom 13144 19495 24447 31270 39898 45936 51054
Trade Tourism 36689 48417 60383 75606 88730 96868 108644
Financial Services 3478 4982 7372 9714 11037 12074 13960
Other Services 30482 41648 58273 70238 81860 88210 95049
I T O T A L 179245 235098 303973 360399 417510 434696 473926)
Figure 1-4: Gross Domestic Product per capita in Greece, 1964 -  1988
( in current U.S. dollars )
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centres. Athens was not bombed during the war, and the subsequent civil war was 
mainly carried out in the provinces. Thus the housing conditions in Athens were not 
unsatisfactory, and capacity was growing rapidly. This, together with the hope of 
finding a regular job, and the cultural life and entertainment, so much missed over 
previous years, were the main attractions of Athens for the disadvantaged rural 
population, especially the young.
The above situation stimulated a secondary migration movement towards 
Athens in the sixties. Eventually the young migrants brought other members of 
their families to Athens or received guests from their villages and kept them until 
they could find some job of their own.
Every fifth person not living in Athens in 1956, was in Athens by 1981 
(Figure 1 -5). If Thessaloniki is added to this type of calculation every two out of 
seven people living anywhere but in these cities in 1956, eventually were there by 
1981. This simply means that almost all young males of rural families were attracted 
to the urban centres, in addition to other categories of migrants (Table 1-5 and 
Figure 1-6).
Of course Athens, however fast it grew, could not offer jobs and amenities 
to all of this incoming population. Thus, incidentally a large out-migration stream to 
international destinations formulated from 1955 to 1974. Target countries were, 
in order of importance, West Germany, US, Canada, Australia, Rest of Europe, 
Central Africa and South America. Greece lost, during this time, a large part of the 
most dynamic and productive population. This population and brain drain had serious 
negative effects for the development of the society and the economy (Figure 1 - 
7). With the political stability after 1974 the trend diminished.
The effects of the urbanisation trends outlined, initiated a circular process 
of development. The more housing was demanded, the more construction related 
jobs were created; the more job opportunities were created, the more young rural 
people decided to come in Athens and eventually needed more housing. Developers 
re-invested their profits in housing and some 50% of what is Athens today was built 
from 1950 to 1970 (Table 1-6). Agglomeration economies and the plentiful supply 
of labour attracted large industries to Athens during the fifties and sixties in a 
circular and cumulative way. The inherent entrepreneurial spirit stimulated by the 
increasing demand acted in a way that many hundreds of new small manufacturing 
and services provision enterprises were also created seeking for space in and 
around Athens.
The massive urbanisation trend which occurred from 1951 to 1971 meant 
that Athens' share of the total country's population rose from one sixth to one
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Figure 1-5 Concentration of population in the Capital, 
compared to the Rest of Greece, 1961 -  1991
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Table 1-5: Euolution of population in regions housing the major urban 
centres in Greece, 1961 -  1991
/  Regions Attiki Thessaloniki Achaia Iraklio Magnisia Rest of Greece
Years
(in thousands)
Greece
1961 2057 546 240 208 163 5171 8385
1971 2797 711 240 209 161 4646 8764
1981 3369 871 275 243 162 4798 9718
1 991* 3523 969 297 264 198 5005 10256
V  J
Figure 1-6: Concentration of population in fiue regions housing 
the major urban centres compared to the Rest of Greece, 1961 -  1991
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Figure 1-7: Out migration from Greece, 1950 -  1977
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(Ministerial Decision 9768/1977, Government Gazette 391/1977)
Table 1-6: Quantity and age of stock of buildings in Rthens, 1946-1989
Years 1946 1965 1980 1989*
Number of existing buildings 77754 247022 419064 449430
Increase % from 1946 - + 218% + 438% + 478%
from 1965 - - + 70 % + 82%
from 1980 - - - + 7%
* Figures for 1989 are estimations.
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third. This was but only one manifestation of the of the problems that these 
developments would cause.
1.5 Centralisation problems and the need for regional 
development
1 .5 .1  Over-concentration in Athens
Athens was built up quickly in the fifties and sixties, without any land use 
master plan. Inner city development legislation was minimal. Every privately owned 
patch of land was developed with detached blocks of flats following practically a full 
land coverage. Speculation on housing was such, (Emmanuel 1981) that not only 
was non-developed land built upon, but also already built-up areas with one or two 
storey houses were redeveloped. Under a special agreement typical for tens of 
thousands cases in Athens (antiparochi), developers were building usually five or six 
floor, full coverage blocks of flats, offering the owners footage equal to or larger 
than the old. This way, most of the traditional and neo-classical housing was 
demolished and Athens lost much of its precious architectural character.
The lack of a land use master plan resulted in excessive population densities 
in residential areas, often above 50,000 and in some clusters above 100,000 
inhabitants per sq.km. These districts were without recreation spaces, parks, or 
purpose built buildings such as hospitals, supermarkets, car-repair shops, filling 
stations and schools. The blocks of flats of that period in their vast majority did not 
provide car parking places, instead flats were allocated on the ground floors as well 
as in the basements as a result of the large demand for housing. Only in the mid­
sixties, when demand for professional-use space was rising, as described earlier, 
were block of flats designed to have shop or workshop space in the ground floor, 
without any other change in the blocks' typical characteristics.
The consequences of this last type of development were, and still are, 
reducing the quality of life in central Athens, with car-repairs and filling stations 
under blocks of flats, with clinics and even schools in the same ubiquitous blocks of 
flats. Parking spaces along the streets became totally inadequate for the rising car 
ownership of the seventies and eighties and in too many cases the viability of the 
narrow streets of the residential areas is obstructed. Many of these inadequacies 
were given drastic solutions, such as huge schools with morning and evening shifts 
serving the large compacted residential areas that had been created. The
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important issues of transportation, sewage treatment, waste disposal and the 
aftermath of increased water consumption and lack of green recreational space 
are still largely unsolved.
As mentioned, much of private capital was speculating in housing provision 
during the period to 1970. Even so , small manufacturing enterprises were created 
by the new comers. These enterprises were initially home-based, and when their 
size could not be accommodated within the urban area they relocated to the urban 
fringe. But this in turn was of course moving outwards fast, year by year. When 
less capital was re-invested in housing from 1970 onwards the small manufacture 
began to attract the attention of capital. Thus these companies expanded and 
created growth and employment which was reflected in the more than doubling of 
the GDP within the seventies. But by that time, the urban fringe of the late sixties, 
had already become clearly inner city.
This lack of a land use plan and the lack of an industrial decentralisation 
policy during this crucial expansion seems to be one of the most serious causes of 
pollution, transportational inadequacies and the low quality of life of the capital's 
population. It is the very same infrastructural inadequacy, together with the lack of 
space and related problems, that has plagued the further expansion of these 
companies. In economic terms this meant that often such firms' competitiveness fell 
further behind year after year as a result of the generated diseconomies. Thus it 
led to a considerable slowdown in economic activity in the eighties.
But why did these agglomeration diseconomies of Athens not lead to a 
spontaneous relocation of economic activity to the periphery? This did not occur 
for two main reasons. First, because the physical infrastructure in the periphery 
and the available skilled labour were even more unsatisfactory there, due to the 
lack of a consistent regional development programme. Second, because the existing 
political centralisation strongly attracted in practice, though not in words, the 
centralisation of the economic life.
1 .5 .2  The desertion of the periphery
The most serious problem of the periphery has been the population loss and 
drain of skills. Indeed it can be said that the main cause of the decreased migration 
trend towards Athens after the mid seventies was the lack of available young, 
dynamic and ambitious population in the periphery. The rural areas experienced in 
the sixties and seventies a dramatic decrease in their population, especially the 
active, in some cases directly towards foreign countries but mainly towards Athens 
and other large urban centers. The effects on the agricultural sector can be seen
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in Figure 1-8.
The mechanisation of agriculture slowly but constantly made the former 
land-workers redundant, in turn migrating to Athens after any construction jobs 
available. Even the large land owners moved to urban areas and administered their 
holdings from there. Whole villages were abandoned. For small landowners it was not 
so economical to live in the nearby cities and to mechanise their production. Many 
sold up and moved to settle in Athens and few more large cities, becoming 
entrepreneurs, or the younger perhaps white collar workers.
In relevance to the above, it can be seen that during the period from 1964 
to 1988 the sector that experienced the main decrease in its share in national GDP 
was agriculture, while gains were mainly experienced in transportation- 
telecommunication, tourism, financial and other services and manufacturing 
(Figure 1-8).
In this climate of lack of infrastructure and human resources minimal 
industrial investments were made in the peripheries. Desertification of peripheral 
land was taking place pushing land values ever lower and communities and social 
structure to dissolve. By the mid-seventies the need of some effective regional 
development policy dynamically emerged. The young Industrial Areas Programme in 
Greece was perceived as one which'would provide such much needed scarce 
industrial infrastructure to the peripheries. In the eighties capital support and 
transfer policies were also developed and consequently the long awaited first steps 
towards deconcentration of political power were made as will be further discussed 
in the next chapter.
1.6 Conclusion
The fragmentation of the Greek territory and its mountainous character 
makes adequate provision of infrastructure difficult and naturally leads to 
centralisation in convenient locations. The prolonged periods of the territorial 
annexations of the country was a further important force maintaining 
centralisation of the administration and also made capital reluctant to invest in 
peripheral regions. The occupation of 1941 - 1944, the civil war that followed and 
the political instability during the subsequent period played decisive role in the 
concentration of political and economic power in the capital, Athens.
The lack of an integrated development regulation also played a critical role in
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Figure 1-8: Participation of economic sectors in Gross Domestic 
Product in Greece, 1964 and 1988
percent
tel 1964 IB 1988
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the centralised development pattern. It created two large problems undermining 
the future economic development of the country. First, the over-centralisation of 
economic activity mainly around the capital city and the desertification of the 
peripheries. Second the inadequate technological levels achieved in manufacturing.
The massive urbanisation trend leading to the concentration of most of the 
young and dynamic population in Athens, together with the industrial 
concentration, caused a series of problems in both the peripheral regions and 
Athens itself. This centralised growth gave to the country an unhelpful and over 
optimistic understanding of fast development. Economic power was established in 
Athens, and economic development decisions were taken almost exclusively in 
Athens, where the government, the headquarters of most national and all 
international firms and financial institutions are still established. Information flows 
towards the regions were also all via Athens. Political decisions and power were 
strictly centralised and before 1987 there was practically no development decision 
making power outside Athens.
The industrial base created this way was not technologically advanced 
enough, to be ready to cope with international competition. The policy of fast, 
almost tax free, industrial development and protection (1955-1974), in addition to 
the lack of any land use or regional development plans, was one of the main causes 
of the industrial over-concentration in Athens (and to a lesser extend in 
Thessaloniki). This undermined the future functionality and competitiveness of 
manufacturing clustered in the central areas and diminished the attractiveness of 
the peripheral areas in the later years.
After 1975, and especially towards 1981, the year of Greek entrance to 
EEC, the regional development issue was much more seriously considered. Firms 
were offered wider locational choice combined with financial support. By 1982 a 
regional development legislation based on financial incentives had emerged, the 
Industrial Areas Programme was accelerated and an administrative 
deconcentration was attempted in 1987. Several new multi-national and trans­
national companies began to establish in Greece. As regards manufacturing these 
specialised in electrical engineering (AEG, Siemens), car assembly (Nissan, 
Mercedes), metal products (Pechiney, Alcatel), chemicals (Lever, Ciba-Geigy, 
Hoechst, Flenkel), foods (Shuchard, Nestle, Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola), printing and 
photographic products, among others, and they have created some growth and 
income. Some of the domestic competing firms were forced to decline and fail, some 
merged with the newcomers and some have survived competition and expanded.
In this chapter a description of the political and economic conditions in
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Greece revealed the centralisation and dualistic characteristics that were 
mentioned in the introduction and the problems related to them,and made the need 
for a regional development policy obvious. The emergence of regional development 
policy, especially in manufacturing related aspects, and its subsequent effects will 
be analysed in various ways in the consequent chapters. The integral and important 
part of this policy is the Industrial Areas Programme of Greece - the prime focus of 
this Thesis.
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Chapter 2: The institutional and legal framework for 
development in Greece and the formation of the 
Industrial Areas
2.1 The general regional development policies
2.1.1 The regional development agencies
The first efforts to promote regional development in Greece started after 
the second world war. These attempts were small in scale and were of an 
experimental character. Several 'Regional Conferences for Restoration of the 
Country' were held in 1949-1950 in main peripheral cities. These were coupled 
with the 'Programme of Works for Agricultural Mobilisation', 1952-1953. All these 
efforts lacked continuity and had limited results (Athanasopoulos 1992b).
The first more serious effort that took place was the 'Programme for 
Development of the Region of Ipiros', in 1958. It was undertaken in cooperation with 
the European Productivity Agency of the Organisation for European Economic Co­
operation, and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
This programme resulted in the establishment of the Regional Development Agency 
of Ipiros, the first of its kind in Greece. In 1961 the Regional Development Agency of 
Peloponnissos was established in a programme with cooperation of Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The same year saw the start of the Regional 
Development Agency of Kriti, with the cooperation of private consultants (Agridev 
and Frank Basil).
By year 1965 regional development agencies were founded in all regions of 
Greece. In the years between 1967 and 1974 they were all merged in the Ministry 
of Interior. In 1977 they were transferred to the Ministry of Coordination which is 
now called Ministry of National Economy. The thirteen regional development 
agencies in Greece are to the present date operating within the frame of this 
ministry, implementing the central and regional development programmes.
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2.1.2 The development programmes
The former Ministry of Coordination undertook immediately after the second 
world war the task of restructuring of the economy. The funds used were from 
various sources, such as the Marshall Plan, internal and international loans, but at 
least in the fifties funds were spent without any programming or master plan, and 
quite ineffectively as described earlier.
The first academic organisation on subjects of regional development was the 
'Association for Research of Regional Economy' founded in 1962 under professor I. 
Pintos. In this frame of efforts, the state supported Centre of Planning and 
Economic Research (KEPE) produced the first 'Five-year Programme of Economic 
Development, 1960 - 1964' and other that followed (MOC, various). The important 
words of that first development programme were the following: "Provision is to be 
taken so that the national investments be allocated to the various regions 
according to their needs..". The government was requested by KEPE to show its 
interest, beyond infrastructure provision, by either reinforcing the private 
initiatives, or by undertaking state investments in the sectors of industry and 
tourism. The programme concluded that the results of the process of economic 
development would only begin to appear after a long period of time.
The first development programme was followed by another, for the period 
1966-1970, aiming mainly at the "acceleration of the development of the 
economically lagging regions of the country". This programme also recognised the 
problem of the lack of a suitable institutional framework in the regions for the 
efficient implementation of the national policies. The range and effectiveness of 
these programmes was mainly exhausted in their wording. The overlapping 
programme for the period 1968-1972 comes to the conclusion that "the size of 
the regional problem is reflected in the largely differential population evolution 
within the country". The capital at the period was growing three times faster than 
the whole country, and most peripheral regions had absolute population losses. 
Regional Development programmes were subsequently produced quite often by 
KEPE Institute. Thus, programmes for 1973-1977, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1983- 
1987 and 1987-1992 have been produced. Nevertheless, none of them became a 
Law mainly because of the inadequacy of governments of the period and their 
unwillingness to proceed to a full scale regional development policy and the 
decentralised administrative structure that this required. The only exception was 
the 1983-1987 initiative.
The 'Five-year Economic and Social Development Programme 1983-1987' 
became a Law after acceptance by the Parliament. Basic to that programme were
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a decentralised administrative structure and increased public participation. This 
necessitated democratic programming and the transfer of initiatives to the local 
government. Decentralisation in a four-tier governmental framework - national, 
regional, prefectural and local - was proposed and adopted. Additionally the basis 
for a long-awaited national land registry was formulated.
2.1 .3  The current administrative structure for development
Within the provisions of the 'Five-year Economic and Social Development 
Programme 1983-1987' came the Law 1622 /1986  under the title 'Local 
Government, Regional Development and Democratic Planning'. It was created to 
structure any previous not well organised and administered bodies concerned with 
the task of regional development into four above mentioned tiers of government in 
Greece. With laws that followed, each of the four tiers of government has relevant 
tasks for planning for development.
For development at the national level the Ministry of National Economy 
formulates the 'Long Term National Development Programme' (equivalent to the five- 
year programmes of KEPE) . This refers to the national territory, the regions, the 
prefectures and the local level. This programme is made more specific by the 
'Annual National Development Programme’. Each of the latter is accompanied by its 
'Finance Programme', allocating funds from the 'National Investments Programme', 
and from other state sources and also utilising the funds of the lower tier 
governments. All above programmes are centrally formulated, considering though 
the suggestions of the lower tiers of government and other agents of the 
administrative sector.
As it was stated in chapter one, Greece is divided into 13 regions each 
having its own regional government consisting of the 'General Secretary' of the 
region and the 'Regional Council'. The regional councils have various tasks as 
regards regional development. Activity regarding planning for development includes 
the formation and submission at an early stage to the central government of 
suggestions for works and projects of importance to the region. These are to be 
included in the long term national development programme. Additionally within the 
framework of the current national development programme, the regional councils 
create the 'Regional Development Programmes'. Consequently they create the 
conditions in which the lower tier prefectural development programmes are to be 
formulated.
As regards other development activities, the regional councils allocate the 
regional allowance from the National Investments Programme to projects of
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prefectural or local importance and also cooperate: with other central government 
departments, established at regional level, such as the regional development 
agencies for any of the other development programmes. The regional development 
programmes are constructed on annual, medium and long term bases. The degree 
of freedom in the planning of the regional councils is constrained by their 
composition, consisting of non-directly elected and centrally appointed members.
Development at prefectural level is administered by the local government of 
second degree. As was seen, this government is aiming for the economic and social 
development of its territory with the active participation of the citizens of the local 
area.
The prefectural government planning is operationalised through the 
’Prefectural Development Programme*. This is undertaken in consideration of the 
suggestions of the local government of first degree (municipalities and 
communities), and other interest groups. Planning includes economic activity of all 
kinds but also involves social issues. The prefectural development programmes are 
constructed within the framework of their respective regional development 
programme. Such development programmes are planned for every year and for the 
medium term. Prefectural governments are still to a considerable extent centrally 
controlled; the responsibilities of the prefectural governments do not interfere with 
the responsibilities of local governments.
The development at the local level is administered by the local government of 
first degree, that is the level of municipalities and communities. It is provided by the 
constitution, has administrative independence and is responsible for all local affairs. 
The central government is responsible for allocating funds for the local government 
of first degree to facilitate its purposes.
The local councils plan and finance most projects of local importance. To the 
extent they get support by central agencies they jointly finance investments that 
belong to the local development programmes. As regards planning for development, 
they formulate the ’Local Development Programmes' within the frame of their 
respective prefectural programmes. Feedback on the latter is maintained by 
suggestions flowing from the local to prefectural councils, regarding investments or 
policy measures of local importance.
As it was mentioned, the local government of first degree do possess 
administrative autonomy. They have their own budgets and they get central 
financial support provided for in the constitution. Elements from the local 
government budgets are given in Table 2 -1 , for the years 1984 to 1988, 
representative of the eighties. It can be seen that on average the budget of this
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Table 2 - 1: The basic components o f the budgets o f local gouernment 
 ^ in Greece, 1984-1988  J
^ln Billion Drachmas, at constant 1984 prices A
Average
Years : 1984 1985 1986 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1984-88
Total Revenues 118.2 120.5 105.3 97.8 114.1 1 1 1 .2
Drachmas per capita.. 12184 12418 10852 10086 11760 1 14 60
of which,
Central Government Aid 25.0 28.3 22.8 21.1 25.2 2 4 .5
Drachmas per capita.. 2576 2917 2352 2180 2598 2 5 2 5
Central Government Aid % 21% 23% 22% 22% 22% 2 2 %
Total Expenditures 102.9 106.5 92.5 86.0 100.3 9 7 .6
Drachmas per capita.. 10612 10979 9540 8862 10338 1 00 66
of which, new Investment 37.9 39.1 31.5 22.6 26.6 3 1 .5
Drachmas per capita.. 3903 4035 3246 2333 2745 3 2 5 2
Investment as % in
Local Expenditure Budgets 37% 37% 34% 26% 27% 3 2 %
Central Government
Investments Budget 182.2 191.6 181.3 165.5 171.5 1 7 8 .4
Drachmas per capita.. 18780 19756 18686 17058 17680 18392
Aid to Local Government
as % of the Central Government
Investments Budget 14% 15% 13% 13% 15% 14%
Local Investment as %
of Central Government 21% 20% 17% 14% 16% 18%
Vlnvestment 7
Deflators : 1.00 1.20 1.47 1.71 1.94
One billion drachmas = £ 6.7 million ( 1984)
Source : Public Funds
tier of government is some 111 billion drachmas annually at 1984 constant prices. 
This is equivalent to about 11.5 thousand drachmas, per capita of population 
annually. The local government spends on average some 31.5 billions annually on 
new investment, excluding maintenance costs. This is some 3.2 thousand drachmas 
per capita annually, which may appear little but it is some 32% of their budget. 
Finances come from the property of the local government, from municipal 
enterprises, from local dues and fines, from loans and from the central support.
As apparent from the budgets, the local government receives support from 
the central that on average amounts to some 24.5 billions, equivalent to 2.5 
thousand drachmas per capita annually. It works out that it is 22% of the local 
government revenues. It proves that local government invests more funds than it 
receives from central government, thus being efficient in this respect. But the 
income of this government tier is low and its importance in development is high as it 
is the only truly decentralised development agent. The low central support is not 
enough to change the underfinancing of this tier of government.
To make a comparison, the state budget provides in its investments 
component some 178.4 billion drachmas on average per annum for such purposes, 
from which only 24.5 reach the local governments, that is about 14%. The rest is 
administered by the state controlled upper tiers. The investments though, that are 
made through the local government would amount to some 18% if compared to all 
investments in the state budget. A more development oriented attitude can be 
found in the local government of first degree (Vagionis 1991).
2 .1 .4 Legislation for development based on private activity
As mentioned in chapter one, private investments were keenly wanted by 
the post war governments. A multiplicity of laws for the protection and expansion 
of industry were issued before 1981, but with little or if any late attention to the 
spatial planning of development. Briefly, the following laws can be mentioned.
The Law 942/1949 provided accelerated depreciation and tax allowances 
for large scale manufacturing. The Law 2176/1952 was the first to offer 
preferential taxing and depreciation treatment to the manufacturing in the 
periphery. The Law 4171/1961 defined the term 'productive investment1 as one 
that would seriously increase production and employment, or one that would bring 
into the country a large amount (150 million drachmas) of foreign exchange; these 
would be assisted by the state. The Law 4458/1965 was important because it 
gave the Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development (ETBA ) the right to establish and 
operate the Industrial Areas in regions of Greece. The Law 89/1967 offered
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protection to foreign trading and manufacturing enterprises established in the 
country. The Laws 997 and 1078/1971 restructured the preferential treatment 
of peripheral manufacturing. The Law 1313/1972 was the first to divide the 
country in three types of assistance classes, A, for central areas, B for developed 
and C for the rest of Greece. But it also introduced decreased employer's 
contribution to the employee's insurance boards according to area assistance. Law 
159/1975 restructured preferential treatment by the state to enterprises that 
brought into the country more than 2 million US dollars, or equivalent foreign 
currency, annually. The Law 289/1976 introduced enhanced incentives for six 
specified borderline prefectures. The same Law made the various regional 
development agencies created become part of the Ministry of Coordination (now 
Ministry of National Economy), under a 'Central Agency for Regional Development’.
Eventually, the Law 1116/1981 attempted a comprehensive arrangement 
of industrial incentives, in the three assistance groups of regions, aiming to promote 
regional development. The incentives include grants, that is money that firms 
receive from the state that is not returnable; subsidised interest rates, that is 
money that the state pays to banks to cover part of the firms' loans interest; tax 
redemptions, that is allowance from the tax obligation of the firm of amounts 
relevant to the investments carried out, and accelerated depreciation rates. The 
above was the legislative background for Law 1262/1982.
Law 1262/1982 was the basic development Law for the eighties. Under 
this law some 11,024 investment projects amounting to 593 billion drachmas have 
been completed by 1993 in all sectors of the economy, of which 218 billions has 
been direct state support in the form of grants. (MNE 1993). This Law 
comprehensively administered regional development and its basic lines remained 
unchanged, with the addition of Law 1892/1990, until the present date.
Law 1262/1982 defines the parts of the investments to be covered, called 
'productive1, as the ones being orientated to new and permanent premises 
construction and use of new machinery. The economic activities covered are as 
follows: manufacturing of all kinds; agriculture using modern technology; mining; 
technical and scientific support to manufacturing; refuse treatment; shipbuilding 
and maintenance; liquid fuels (safety); conversion to soft energy sources; tourism; 
community or local government enterprises; services of high technology. The 
country is divided into four assistance classes. The central regions belong to Class A 
which generally involves no assistance, except specified high-technology projects; 
Class B consists of developed regions and has limited assistance; Class C consists of 
most other regions, while Class D is designed for lagging or peripheral regions and
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provides maximum assistance. Regions are assigned to these groups by 
'geographical department1 or prefecture units. An exception to the use of the 
above spatial scheme is made by a clause giving D status to all borderline areas to a 
depth of twenty kilometers from the border, but with some exceptions (city of 
Rhodes, city of Corfu, etc.). Additionally some more deviations exist as regards 
tourist investments.
The Law maintains the basic assistance schemes introduced by 1116/1981, 
namely grants, interest rates subsidies for loans and tax redemptions in the form of 
accelerated depreciation. Special provision is made for firms establishing in the 
Industrial Areas, offering enhanced incentives, above the ones that are provided 
from the assistance class of each area. For large projects (above £40 million) state 
participation is an option offered to the project. To safeguard public money the 
Law gives its support only after expenses have been incurred by the investor. The 
Ministry of National Economy that administers this Law has central and prefectural 
bodies auditing the progress of the assisted investments, but reports are kept 
internal. The ministry also has a central appeal committee for cases that create 
implications. The Law 1892/1990 mainly introduced regional quotas in the amounts 
of regional assistance of the basic Law 1262/1982.
2.1.5 The role of the European Communities in development
Greece entered the European Communities (now European Union) as a full 
member on 1st January 1981. From then on, Greece, tried to align its 
administrative structure as regards the issue of regional development to that of 
the Community. In addition the country has been bidding for the community support 
through the various funds and programmes that it operates.
All Funds of the European Communities (EC) relate to some extent to 
development in Greece. The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
supports private or public projects in remote and lagging areas. Its main aim is to 
support regions that are hit by the application of the common agricultural policy. 
The fund plays a role in agriculture, that in Greece is lately decreasing in 
importance. The European Social Fund finances projects that aim to improve 
vocational training, reduce unemployment, and to increase mobility of labour. In 
Greece, this fund is gaining importance of late. Greece has received limited finances 
from the European Coal and Steel Community. The steel industry in Greece is 
comparatively small, while the coal industry is much state controlled through the 
National Electricity Enterprise and no closures are recorded.
The European Investment Bank (EIB), is an important community institution
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for Greece. It provides loans complementing to support received from other EC 
funds for the development programmes of lagging regions. These may be for 
manufacturing, new technology projects, or infrastructure projects that have 
economic importance for lagging regions, or for the cohesion of the european 
states. These loans have low interest and are negotiated on favourable terms. The 
new Community Instrument is one that provides the Commission with the power to 
offer such loans to integrated regional efforts through the EIB. For Greece, the 
largest loans have been dealt for infrastructure projects and more specifically in 
the fields of transportation and energy.
But the most important fund for regional development in Greece is the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) . This supports private investments 
that are also integrated and supported through various national support schemes. 
It also supports state or regional government investments, mainly in the form of 
infrastructure. Support through ERDF is provided through grants, and not tax 
allowances.
The payments of the ERDF to Greece started from the first year that 
Greece joined the EC. Table 2-2 shows in its first part that Greece received some 
122 millions ECU in 1981, rising to a maximum of 309 millions in 1985, and a little 
under 300 millions for the following years to 1988. In these eight years Greece 
managed to over-double the support that it receives annually from ERDF. Still, 
though, if it is seen as a percentage of the ERDF capacity, the percentage of 
Greece started at some 15% of the ERDF capacity, to rise to 19% in 1985 and 
falling sharply during the following years to reach 10% in 1988. Figure 2-1 
illustrates the situation. This effect shows certain deficiencies of the investing 
entities in Greece, involving a lack of continuity and longer term planning.
It is possible to have information on the separate activities that are 
supported by the ERDF in Greece (EC 1989). For example, detailed sums are given 
in part b. of Table 2-2, for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. The main categories 
of support are first the ’programmes', Community or national programmes of 
Community interest, second the 'projects’, in industry or in services, in 
infrastructure, or in internal development, and third the 'studies'. It can be seen 
that in Greece only 0.12 million ECU were forwarded for studies, showing the low 
levels of such undertakings in the country. Similarly, the support for industry and 
services projects seem to be minimal, with 3.55 million ECU over the three years 
which is less than 1% of the Fund’s support. This means low levels of private 
investments, but also a persisting lack of information for the possibilities of support 
by the Community. From the 952 million ECU of the total ERDF support over the
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Table 2-2: a. The European Regional Development Fund support 
payments, 1978 -  1988; b. patterns of support for Greece, 1986-1988
a. Payments of ERDF to EC Member-States, and Greece, in current prices
T o  G r e e c e To all Members Greece %
million Drachmas million E C U
1978 0 0.00 254.89 0%
1979 0 0.00 513.10 0%
1980 0 0.00 726.70 0%
1981 7531 122.00 791.41 15%
1982 9939 152.35 950.67 16%
1983 16770 214.59 1246.60 17%
1984 18824 212.63 1325.98 16%
1985 32669 309.04 1590.65 19%
1986 41636 302.87 2394.16 13%
1987 44883 287.40 2444.59 12%
1988 48069 286.84 2903.18 10%
b. The patterns of ERDF support for Greece, 1986-1988
In millions of current ECU
PROGRAMMES PROJECTS STUDIES TOTAL
CP NPCI TOTAL Industry & Infra­ Internal TOTAL ERDF
Services structure Development
1986 0.0 17.6 17.6 1.7 290.4 0.0 292.1 0.0 309.7
1987 13.0 94.8 107.8 1.5 192.5 0.0 194.0 0.0 301.7
1988 0.0 138.0 138.0 0.4 202.1 0.0 202.5 0.1 340.6
TOTAL
1986-88 13.0 250.4 263.4 3.6 684.9 0.0 688.5 0.1 952.0
% 1% 26% 28% 0% 72% 0% 72% 0% 7 00%
CP = Community Programmes NPCI = National Programmes of Community Interest
Figure 2-1: Comparison of payments by ERDF to Greece and all EC members 1978-88
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three years, some 98% is channelled through central or local government 
infrastructure projects and programmes. The serious lack of infrastructure in the 
country, also described in chapter one, absorbed the greatest part of the 
Community support in the period.
To what extent have the above Funds promoted the development effort in 
Greece in the eighties? From the money flows presented next, it appears that it 
was more the economic conditions in the early eighties and the political orientation 
in the country that really led to intensive regional development measures. The 
actual money transfers from the EC however were at the time low. When they did 
increase towards the end of the period total investment did not. The levels of 
national investments budget of the country and the support from the EC are given 
in Table 2-3, for 1980 to 1990 in constant 1984 prices, and the trends are 
illustrated in Figure 2-2 . Public investment in 1980 was some 103 billion 
drachmas, or about 10.6 thousands per capita of population. This was gradually 
increased, and almost doubled by the year 1985 when it reached the 192 billion 
drachmas level, or 19.8 thousands per capita. This remained below this level, at 
around 175 billion drachmas annually, to 1990. During the first half of the period 
(1981-1985) the receipts from the various funds of the EC for investments, were 
at about 7 billion drachmas annually, or about 7 thousands per capita, representing 
a coverage of around 5% of the actual government investments plan. During the 
second half of the period though, (1986-1990), the EC support rose to above 20 
billion drachmas annually to peak to a 31 billion level in 1990. This covered an 
increasing range from 11 % to 18% of the government investments programme.
It can be said that, immediately after joining in 1981 the governments 
although taking regional development more seriously, they were unprepared and 
slow to explore the EC potential. The delegations to the various bodies of the EC 
were perhaps too inexperienced to have had serious leverage in the european 
regional competition. Eventually, the financial flows from the EC to Greece were 
higher in the second half of the period examined, but as shown, the total 
investments stagnated and did not manage to exceed the 1984-1985 level.
Overall, the EC support percentages were not high in the period from 1981 
to 1990, but the incentives were there. On average, the EC support covered some 
9% of the investments the government undertook. The role of the EC support in 
the eighties was small, but increasing and of course not negligible.
The recent five year support structure for the years 1989-1993 shows 
that Greece has managed increased receipts from multiple EC instruments. This can 
be seen in detail in Table 2-4. The total Community support for the five years
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Table 2-3 : The national investments' budget expenditures in Greece and 
the support from the EC, 1980-199B
Years: 1980 1981
In billion Drachmas, at 1984 constant prices 
Investments Budget 102.78 125.66
of which EC support 0.00 10.05
% EC coverage 0% 8%
In Drachmas per capita, 1984 constant prices 
Investment per capita 10596 12954
v EC support per capita 0 1036
1982
118.66
6.42
5%
12233
662
1983
152.74
6.60
4%
15746
680
1984
182.17
7.43
4%
18780
766
1985
191.64
6.48
3%
19756
668
1986
181.25
20.37
11%
18686
2100
1987
165.46
19.73
12%
17058
2035
1988
171.50
22.15
13%
17680
2283
1989
185.86
21.75
12%
19161
2242
1990 '81
168.81
30.79
18%
1643.7
151.8
9%
17403 169458  
3174 15646
Source: State Budgets 1980 - 1990
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Figure 2-2: Trends of national investments budget and support from the EC, 1980 -  1990
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Table 2-4: The fiv e -y e a r European Community support structure fo r Greece, fo r 1989-1993
In million ECU (1989 prices)
Regional Social Agricultural Main Extra
Development Fund Fund TOTAL ( I.M.P. (*1 ))
Fund
Objective 1
1. Basic Infrastructure 1562.0 40.3 0.0 1602.3 28.3 (*2)
2. Primary Sector 50.0 0.0 289.4 339.4 0.0
3. Indusrty and Services 254.0 178.8 0.0 432.8 40.0 (*3)
4. Tourism 40.0 45.0 0.0 85.0 0.0
5. Human Potential 43.0 460.5 0.0 503.5 0.0
6. Technical Support 15.0 10.0 0.0 25.0 0.0
Sub-Total 1 (National Level) 1964.0 734.6 289.4 2988.0 68.3
Sub-Total 2 (Regional Level) 1698.0 363.5 310.6 2372.1 458.0 (*4)
Total Objective 1 3662.0 1098.0 600.0 5360.0 526.3
Objectives 3 and 4 0.0 630.0 0.0 630.0 0.0
(Vocational Trainning, Mobility)
Objective 5a 0.0 0.0 677.0 677.0 0.0
(Agricultural)
Total E.C. Support 1989-93 3662.0 1728.0 1277.0 6667.0 526.3
Commitments 1989: 648.0 290.0 225.0 1163.0 annual
1990: 600.0 330.0 290.0 1220.0 commitments
1991: 726.0 339.0 262.0 1327.0 not
1992: 792.0 364.0 263.0 1419.0 published
1993: 896.0 405.0 237.0 1538.0
(*1): Integrated Mediterannean Programmes, (*2):IMP Informatics, (*3):IMP Competitiveness, (*4): Six Regional IMP 
Source: Community Support Structure 1989-93, Greece.
amounts to over 7 billion ECU, ranging from some 1.16 billion in 1989 to 1.54 billion 
in 1993. The annual support from the ERDF ranges around 700 million ECU annually 
for 1989 to 1993, that is more than two times the relevant 1984-1988 levels. It is 
important that in the recent period the aid in basic infrastructure is only a part of 
the total support, while a variety of other programmes have been developed in the 
country. Still, steps to further decentralisation of the recipient bodies of this aid 
need to be done. One third of the total support to the country is directed to the 
regional level, while the six current regional Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
account for only some 6.5% of the total support by the EC.
2.2  The case for the Industrial Areas: objectives and 
s tu d ies
2.2.1 The initial conceptualisation
For a long period, the situation in the country as a whole, even with the 
social problems of migration, political discrimination and some loss of cultural 
identity, was quite favourable to industrial development. But the overcrowding of 
Athens set limitations on further development and the deserted hinterlands were 
not at all attractive for new investments by the domestic private capital. The 
investments on basic infrastructure through the National Investments Programme 
alone were not enough to stimulate and sustain growth in peripheries. The efforts 
for restoration of the economic, political and demographic postwar conditions that 
were analysed earlier, throw some light on the reasoning upon which the strategy 
of the Industrial Areas was based in Greece.
The Industrial Areas were conceived at the period as the only possible, 
feasible and comprehensive policy to stimulate and simultaneously control growth in 
the lagging regions, mainly based on private capital. N.Konsolas a leading academic 
of spatial economics and one helping to formulate the theoretical framework for 
the Industrial Areas in Greece, describes them as follows: "An Industrial Area is a 
space acquired by a developing agent, organised according to a land use plan, 
provided with all infrastructural networks and being available in form of delimited 
industrial spaces, and/or buildings, to manufacturing firms; the Industrial Area also 
provides additional services and location incentives" (Konsolas 1970). Thus, the 
state was intending to allocate money to few peripheral regions, with the provision
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of space with adequate industrial infrastructure, in the anticipation of having some 
fast and substantial economic results.
2.2.2 The aims of the Industrial Areas
The Industrial Areas were ambitiously planned to fullfil all of the following: 
provision of the physical, social and economic infrastructure, needed by 
manufacturing for its development. Both urban and regional physical and economic 
development were to be promoted by the Industrial Areas.
The following aims and objectives stem from a wide ranging review of 
research. As regards industrial space, the Industrial Areas should help regional 
development by means of provision of space and infrastructure for manufacturing. 
Industrialists should be provided with 'affordable1 land in proximity to urban 
complexes. The Industrial Areas are planned to offer facilitation of scale and 
agglomeration economies, better use of raw materials and reduced transportation 
costs. Economies of scale were expected to occur with the concentration of 
industries. Sharing of costs for certain services would lower the cost per unit 
produced by the concentrated industries. The Industrial Areas would stimulate 
external economies due to proximity, due to information spread among firms, trade 
possibilities, possible common research or cooperation in certain production stages. 
As regards state intervention, the Industrial Areas enable the state to provide 
infrastructure more economically, when industries were spatially concentrated 
within the Industrial Areas, rather than when they were dispersed. The State can 
more easily offer enhanced incentives for industry within the Industrial Areas.
In later literature, (Kottis 1980, Konsolas,et.al.l985) the Industrial Areas 
are set to work for industrial deconcentration. It is stressed that to the extent 
that these Areas would be spread in the country, they would help in the 
demographic balance, since they would attract population to the recipient regions 
and counterbalance the trend for internal and external migration. National defence 
reasons were also put forward. If national industry is spread into many different 
regions, it would be less vulnerable and total loss would be more difficult to occur. 
But also, since it would be locally concentrated it would be more easily protected. 
The natural resources of any region would also be expected to receive value added 
within the region, and thus the area's income would increase. The reorientation of 
the Industrial Areas project from a growth poles oriented to an integrated 
development plan Industrial Areas was about to emerge.
In recent literature, the Industrial Areas are considered to help innovation, 
specialisation and development of the various manufacturing branches. The
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suggested measures though to achieve such important targets have not been 
clearly described and of course little information is given on this context by the 
current set-up of the Programme (ETBA 1992). However, it is suggested by the 
Industrial Areas administration that the Industrial Areas target on employment and 
productivity increases and also on the augmentation of profits of established firms. 
Later in their development, the Industrial Areas are also expected to preserve the 
natural and improve the urban environment.
A distinct contribution to the above -late- conceptualisation is a 
reorientation of the objectives of the Industrial Areas, attempted by Vliamos 
(1988). His perception is based on the Presidential Decree 136/1986, by which 
any of the 51 geographical departments may have its own Industrial Area. The new 
perception suggests that these projects should be constructed nationwide and 
help the regional spatial planning and the protection of environment, serving as a 
"nationwide network of spatial receivers of industry" (Vliamos 1988).
This proposal for a nationwide expansion of the Industrial Areas Programme 
may have serious implications on its impact and cost effectiveness as a regional 
development policy instrument, especially under their present organisational 
structure as shall be discussed at a later stage. It is usefull, though, that an 
integral part of the suggested reorientation is the provision of variable sizes of 
Industrial Areas to address to variable regional capacities and objectives.
Finally, on social grounds the Industrial Areas are supposed to improve the 
employment conditions of the employees and provide them with more adequate 
services. In regions where local specialisations exist but are carried out in local 
workshops, they would have the chance with these zones to concentrate into 
larger more modern units. The control of land uses would be achieved more 
efficiently if new industries were established, and old ones offered the incentives to 
relocate to them. Changes in the master plan it was anticipated would be more 
flexible.
2 .2 .3  The institutional framework of the Industrial Areas in
G reece
The establishment of Industrial Areas in Greece was the plan of the 
pioneering Industrial Development Organisation in 1962. The agency in cooperation 
with Stanford Research Institute, under W. Bredo, made the first feasibility study
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suggesting an Industrial Area in Thessaloniki. The rationale was based on the 
development orientations of the period (Bredo 1960) and the absolute necessity to 
counterbalance the industrial centralisation around Athens.
Consequently, in 1963 the Ministry of Coordination (now Ministry of National 
Economy), within an international technical assistance programme assigned the 
French agency SCET (Societe Centrale pour I' Equipment du Territoire) to carry 
out a study for a development framework of Industrial Areas in Greece. SCET later 
suggested the establishment of Industrial Areas in the five cities of Thessaloniki, 
Volos, Patra, Iraklio and Kavala.
In 1964, the above mentioned Industrial Development Organisation merged 
with two other credit institutions ( Finance Organisation for Economic Development 
and the Tourist Credit Organisation) and formed, under Law 4366/1964 the 
Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, ETBA, as a public enterprise. In 1973 ETBA 
became a banking public limited company belonging to the state and operating 
under the banking and pic legislation. The main aim of ETBA is to support industrial, 
shipping and tourist investment projects ( ETBA 1992).
The Law 4458/1965 marked the commencement and set the legal 
framework for the Industrial Areas Programme. ETBA was to be the sole agent for 
provision of the Industrial Areas. In 1966 there was cooperation with UNIDO in 
training of specialist personnel and in formulating and organising the project- In 
1979 ETBA founded VIP-ETBA, an affiliated company that undertakes the carrying 
out of the technical studies and the infrastructure works for the Industrial Areas.
2.3  The legal framework for the Industrial Areas
The main Laws that refer to the foundation, organisation and operation of 
the Industrial Areas and financial incentives to establishing firms are the following: a. 
Law 4458/1965, for the Industrial Areas; b. Law 1078/1971 for the regional 
development; c. Law 742 /1977  amending the Law 4458 /1965; d. Law 
1116/1981 for regional development incentives, e. Law 1262/1982 for 
integrated development incentives, f. Presidential Decree 136/1986 for Industrial 
Areas foundation, and g. Law 1892/1990 amending the Law 1262/1982.
2.3.1 Foundation and organisation of the Industrial Areas
As regards the justification of the Industrial Areas, the Law 742/1977
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states that "target of the Industrial Areas is the support of the industrial and 
economic development of the country" (article 1). For the foundation of any new 
Industrial Area a Presidential Decree was needed, after suggestion by the Ministers 
of National Economy, of Industry and Energy. But in 1986, the Presidential Decree 
136/1986, under the provisions of the 'Development Programme of 1983-1987' 
that became a Law, gives ETBA the right to organise Industrial Areas in every 
geographical department (prefecture).
The agent of the Industrial Areas Programme is set by Law 4458/1965  
stating that "the right for the organisation and running of the Industrial Areas in 
Greece is held by ETBA; at its discretion ETBA can cede this right to other entities 
of public Law, bearing adequate qualifications, and to municipalities or communities". 
For this concession of right an approval by the Ministry of National Economy has to 
be obtained. In the existing legislation there is no definition of any precise type of 
industrial area, thus ETBA has the freedom to organise any type that "supports 
the industrial and economic development of the country" (Law 742/1977, article 
1).
The planning of the Industrial Areas is founded on the following two stage 
theoretical framework of procedures. At the first stage studies are to be carried 
out as regards the physical planning and economic feasibility of the Industrial Areas, 
these set their location and size, and indicate the relevant costs. The establishment 
procedures include the land selection, delimitation and acquisition. These have to be 
followed by technical studies of soil and hydrodynamics besides the infrastructure 
provision studies.
The Presidential Decree 851/1978 under the provisions of Law 742/1977  
regulates the procedures regarding the assignment, carrying out and delivery of 
the mentioned studies regarding Industrial Areas. The assignment procedure can be 
either through public announcement, or with selection among five researchers. The 
studies can be assigned to foreign researchers if, at the discretion of ETBA, there 
are no suitable domestic researchers able to undertake the study required. The 
researcher should normally not concede part(s) of the study to other researchers.
The procedures for the delimitation of an Industrial Area are set by Law 
742/1977 stating that the precise location, area and limits, are settled by decision 
of the Ministers of National Economy, Industry and Energy, and Public Works, after 
suggestion by ETBA. The land so designated is excluded from any existing town 
plans or green belts. Regarding the acquisition of land, Law 4458/1965 provides 
that ETBA can acquire land that belongs to the state on the basis of a common 
decision of the Ministers of Economics, of Industry and Energy and of the Minister
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who is involved with the ownership of the specific land. Where this is not feasible 
there is the option of expropriation. For this, after the proposal of ETBA, the 
Ministers of Economics and Industry and Energy declare the land to be 
expropriated, but ETBA have to provide the expenses. ETBA is excluded from any 
local or state taxes on this matter.
At a second phase, given the above studies and assessments the 
construction takes place, where speed, efficacy and quality levels have to be 
audited. The operational stage includes creation of the Industrial Areas 
administration, maintenance programmes, and of course the linking with any other 
development programmes and local social processes for the more efficient supply of 
the industrial spaces and fulfillment of the Areas' aims.
Infrastructure provision in the Industrial Areas is set by Law 4458/1965  
stating that these Areas have internal streets, water supply, sewage, electricity 
supply, telecommunications and other facilities. It was also provided for that the 
Industrial Areas should offer specially built premises for manufacturing companies, 
upon request by the latter; the premises could either be bought or rented by the 
applicant company. But Law 742/1977 amended the above, in that for such 
premises provision a presidential decree was also needed. No such presidential 
decree has been issued to date. As regards other infrastructure, Law 1116/1981 
states that all maintenance and all rights of operation of infrastructure systems in 
the Industrial Areas are held by ETBA, to the extent they are independent of those 
of local municipalities.
The firms that are eligible to establish in these Areas are all manufacturing, 
small craft industry and agricultural processing companies, and additionally 
companies providing certain services such as personnel training, research, banks 
and post offices. Firms can establish in the Industrial Areas either by buying land or 
by, either renting or buying standard buildings, where they are provided. ETBA also 
has the right to lease pieces of Industrial Areas land to third parties, but further 
sublet is not allowed without the bank's concession. ETBA has the right to set the 
prices for land of all or parts of the Industrial Areas, at levels below or above its 
cost of acquisition and development.
2 .3 .2  Special incentives for establishment in the Industrial
Areas
Several Laws have made provisions that make it more attractive for firms to 
establish or relocate in the Industrial Areas.
Initially incentives were rather low key. The Law 4458/1965 provided that
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firms relocating to these Areas do not have to pay taxes for the amount they 
received from the sale of their old premises, provided they use the full amount for 
their new establishment.
But later incentives became stronger; the Law 1312/1972 provides 2 to 
2.5 percent interest support to be paid by the state to Industrial Areas established 
firms having issued bonds for their finance, 3.5% for their bank loans and 4 to 5 
percent for bond loans with public subscription. Later the Law 1377/1973  
increased the above percentages by one percent. Law 849/1978 introduced loans 
by the state to establishing companies, covering 25 percent of their relocation 
costs, under certain conditions. Law 1116/1981 gave the right to firms to be 
exempt from taxation by an amount equivalent to the 60% of their relocation cost, 
again under certain conditions.
Finally, the comprehensive Law 1262/1982 that provides grants, interest 
rates subsidies, tax redemptions and accelerated depreciation of investments, to 
four distinct assistance classes of regions, (A,B,C or D), makes special provision for 
the Industrial Areas offering the established firms higher assistance than the 
respective regional assistance status.
2.3.3 Regulations for the administration of the Industrial Areas
The Industrial Areas, whether established by ETBA or by other entities of 
public Law after concession of the right by ETBA, have to operate according to an 
internal code of operation as Law 1116/1981 provides. This is submitted by ETBA 
to the Ministry of National Economy, is approved by the Minister, and published in 
the Government Gazette. If another entity has created the code, it is first 
submitted to, and approved by, ETBA and then the above procedure is followed.
The code of operation has to include the terms and conditions for supply of 
land, the modes of administration and finance of the Industrial Areas, an account of 
the rights and obligations of the established firms, and the auditing and control 
procedures by the administration (Laws 4458/1965, 1116/1981, 1262/1982). 
As mentioned before, all Industrial Areas to the present date are organised by 
ETBA, thus the code of operation is similar for all the Areas.
The main features of the code are the following: As regards establishment, 
the firms have to make an application to ETBA, together with a feasibility and 
technical study. ETBA is bound to answer within three months. Later, and provided 
the firm has all relevant licenses needed by Law for operation, a contract leasing or 
selling the land is made. Subletting is only allowed after permission by ETBA. Retailing 
is forbidden (articles 1 and 2 of the code). The land coverage terms for built
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premises and green spaces within the sold lots are also defined, for both industrial 
premises and supporting services, but architectural style and orientation is 
unrestricted (articles 3 and 4).
The administration of each Industrial Area is undertaken through an office, 
inside or out of the site, having economic and technical staff and an administrator 
who belongs to ETBA and is accountable to the bank for the good operation of the 
Area. The administration of the Industrial Areas may have contacts with the local 
chambers of commerce or manufacturing for attracting new industry and 
optimising land allocation (articles 5 to 7). According to Law 4458/1965 ETBA has 
to carry out an annual inspection to the firms to check if all contractual obligations 
are being fulfilled (article 8). Some special arrangements are made for especially 
large firms (article 15).
The established firms have to accept the provided services of lighting, 
cleaning, land care, etc., provided within the Industrial Areas and pay their share. 
Maintenance expenses for the infrastructure are covered by the established firms 
and ETBA. Firms pay their own bills for water and energy, (articles 9 to 14). 
Arbitration between firms and the Industrial Areas administration is provided by 
articles 16 and 17 of the code, but this does not replace any current obligations of 
the firms.
2 .4  The Industrial Areas created
As it was described above, the allocation of Industrial Areas among the 
geographical departments took place within changing legal framework and 
perception of planning for regional development. The process of the creation of the 
twenty Industrial Areas in operation today lasted over twenty years.
In year 1969 the Industrial Areas of Thessaloniki and Volos started to 
operate. Iraklio followed in 1971. The Industrial Area of loannina was ready by 
1974. These of Drama, Preveza and Komotini (in the region of Rothopi) have 
operated since 1978. The ones at Patra and Kavala started in 1979. In Xanthi, 
Serres, Tripolis (in Arcadia), Larissa and Lamia (in Fthiotis) the Industrial Areas were 
ready by 1981. In Fiorina, Kilkis and Alexandroupolis (in Evros) they began 
operations in 1983. Finally in Kalamata, Rhodos (in Dodecanissos) and Pella were all 
started before 1988. Thus, by 1974 there were four Industrial Areas in operation, 
by 1983 there were seventeen and by 1988 there were twenty in operation. The
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Table 2 -5 :  In d u s tr ia l  Rreas and th e ir  a re a ,  by d a te  o f  o p e ra t io n
Geographical
department
Capital city, and 
Industrial Area
Year of 
operation
Gross area 
in sq.km
Net industrial 
space (sq.km)
Thessaloniki Thessaloniki 1969 s S 9.69 6.27
Magnissia Volos 1969 4.44 3.00
Iraklio Iraklio 1971 1.47 1.10
loannina loannina 1974 2.04 1.51
Industrial Areas Programme by 1974: 17.64 11.88
Rothopi Komotini 1978 4.33 2.84
Preveza Preveza 1978 2.14 1.56
Drama Drama 1978 2.23 1.71
Kavala Kavala 1979 2.08 1.49
Achaia Patra 1979 4.05 2.80
Fthiotis Lamia 1981 1.60 1.18
Xanthi Xanthi 1981 2.00 1.20
Serres Serres 1981 1.20 0.88
Larissa Larissa 1981 2.50 1.78
Arcadia Tripolis 1981 1.62 1.06
Fiorina Fiorina 1983 1.09 0.75
Kilkis Kilkis 1983 0.96 0.69
Evros Alexandrupolis 1983 2.10 1.46
Subtotal: New Industrial Areas 1 97 5 -19 83 ; 27 .90 19.40
Industrial Areas Programme by 1983 : 45.54 31.27
Messinia Kalamata 1986 1.09 0.80
Pella Edessa 1987 1.67 1.04
Dodecanissos Rhodos 1987 0.02 0.19
Subtotal: New Industrial Areas 1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 7 2.78 2.03
Full Industrial Areas Programme by 1987: ) v 48.32 33.30
Figure 2-3: Evolution of gross space in the Industrial Rreas ProgrammeSquare km
50.00
40.00
_l I__  I__30.00
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names, area and dates of operation of the Industrial Areas are summarised in Table 
2-5. These dates vary from 1969 for Thessaloniki and Volos, to 1987 for Rhodos. 
What should be noted is that this date is only indicative of the first firms' 
establishment, rather than the completion of the infrastructure works by ETBA. 
The net industrial space of the Industrial Areas generally varies from over six 
square kilometers (Thessaloniki) to less than one (Fiorina, Kilkis, Serres). It is 
understood that sizes vary according to the size of the regional manufacturing and 
the expectations for firms' concentration. The evolution of space in the Full 
Industrial Areas Programme is illustrated in Figure 2-3. The geographical locations 
of the Industrial Areas in Greece are illustrated in Figure 2-4. Detailed data and 
measurements of the performance of the Industrial Areas are given in the analytical 
parts, later in this Thesis.
It is remarkable that the ’national threat from north' obsession that typified 
the period of dictatorship between 1967 and 1974, cost Patra a delay of ten 
years as regards the setting up of its Industrial Area, compared with Thessaloniki 
and Volos. This was some 17 years from the early suggestions by Stanford in 1962 
and SCEP in 1963. Drama, Komotini and Preveza with a total population smaller 
than Patra also operated earlier. For similar reasons, Kalamata, the largest city on 
the south of the Athens-Patra axis mainland, had to wait until 1986 and Rhodos to 
1987. From this development pattern it can be seen that the initial theoretical 
frame of the growth poles development, to be discussed in the following chapter, 
was not followed in practice. Instead, a dispersion - oriented policy focusing on the 
north, of a rather opportune nature, was attempted, and did not follow any 
accredited national master plan. This had various effects on national productivity 
and patterns of development as will be discussed further in this research.
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Chapter 3: Regional development: a conceptualisation of 
the processes
3.1 Some theoretical background to the Industrial Areas 
of Greece
In the fifties and early sixties the conceptual economic underpinning for 
development was based on the two sector neoclassical model. Subsequently, the 
foundation of the Industrial Areas Programme as a whole was based on the growth 
pole model of regional development. In order discuss the theoretical context for the 
Industrial Areas of Greece, the above models have to be outlined. As pointed out 
earlier, (chapter one), Greece has suffered from extreme centralisation of 
economic and industrial activities. It was understood then, as it is now, that it was 
of vital importance to keep the peripheral areas economically alive.
Neo-classical economic theory was initially employed to serve this objective. 
The neo-classical model regards regions as areas making products according mainly 
to their disposal of labour (working population) and capital (total stock of capital 
goods). The central ideas of the neo-classical theory are the issues of utility, profits 
and equilibrium, (Schumpeter 1954, Henry 1990). Theory suggests that profits 
only exist temporarily in any industrial sector and after some period profits become 
non-existent. On spatial context, a basic principle in neo-classical economics is one 
suggested by Samuelson (1948), that based on the Factor Price Equalisation 
Theorem for the various trading regions.
According to the assumptions of the Two Sector Neo-classical Model, a 
region is considered to have two production sectors (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). 
The first is a 'domestic' one with low labour productivity. The second is a 'modern' 
one with higher labour productivity and export potential. The propensity to shift 
from the domestic sector to the modern one is regarded as determining a region's 
economic growth (Richardson 1979, Armstrong and Taylor 1985). According to 
the model, to the extent that the high productivity sector is capable of exporting, 
increased profits tend to be realised from capital invested in the sector. With the 
assumption of free mobility of capital, a net inflow of capital from other regions is
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expected to take place. Increase of demand for labour in the modern sector will be 
experienced and higher wages will be paid. As a result a net inflow of labour into the 
region will take place, accompanied by an intra-regional labour shift towards the 
modern sector. The inflow of labour into the region will equalise wages to inter­
regional wage levels, and these may or may not be higher than the initial regional 
ones. But still, the increased employment in the region itself will increase regional 
income and have positive effects on the domestic sector as well. This is a result of 
increased demand for its products, itself leading the domestic sector to demand 
more labour and/or capital.
Thus, before the innovation of the Industrial Areas Programme, regional 
development policy in Greece was instead based on the described two-sector neo­
classical model. The assumption made for the Greek peripheral areas, was that the 
agricultural and stockfarming sector was beyond doubt thfe 'domestic* and low 
productivity sector in the model, while the manufacturing sector would be the 
'modern', high productivity and exporting one. It was thought that what was 
needed was just support of the high productivity sector, for the development 
process to begin. Support to serve this development pattern was given by the 
state via incentives for regional industrial development, mainly tax free allowances 
and increased depreciation rates (Athanassopoulos 1990). Notwithstanding the 
policy, centralisation of economic activity continued at steady rates instead. 
Labrianidis and Papamichos (1990) suggest that policy simply facilitated the 
existing locational trends.
Since practice often did not justify the two-sector neoclassical model of 
development, a new school of economic thought emerged, through the theory of 
the Circular and Cumulative Causation, suggested by Myrdal (1957), and the 
Growth Poles strategy, described by Boudeville's work (1966) but having origins in 
Perroux's work (1955). Hirshman's writings (1958) also represent one phase of 
this conceptualisation which has been developed considerably by more recent 
researches (Klaassen 1972, Gokham et.al. 1972, Buttler 1975). The new model's 
critique of the neoclassical theory was that inequalities between regions tend to 
grow rather than diminish with free trade.
Three main reasons were advanced to account for this divergence. The first 
is the result of external economies. These are made up of localisation economies, 
which occur because of geographical concentration of plants and cooperation, 
especially between the same or complementary industries, and agglomeration 
economies (Kaldor 1970), which result from the supply of infrastructure and the 
availability pools of skilled labour (Pred 1965). The second is a consequence of
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economies of scale which arise because of diminishing costs of mass production. 
Third, and last, are the internal economies due to endogenous technical progress. In 
the later theories introducing polarised growth it was also stressed and 
demonstrated (Friedman 1972, Berry 1974, Klaassen 1987) that the volume of 
innovations and inventions increased with the size of urban and economic 
agglomerations, and indeed were much more easily diffused.
The size of an urban /  regional agglomeration that is required for full 
development potential was assessed after empirical studies by Clark (1945) to be 
some 200,000 inhabitants and to be somewhat larger, at 275,000 in a later 1961 
study for West Germany (Klaassen 1972). These sizes offer a 'full grown' services 
sector, which is regarded an important precondition for the so-called 'take off1, 
into the process of accelerated cumulative growth.
In this form of theorisation, the cumulative effect is based on the 
comparative advantage of an agglomeration, which once stimulated and started 
growing, develops its advantage cumulatively and becomes steadily more efficient, 
due to the above mentioned economies. The greater the number of the existing 
firms and production sectors, the higher the regional multiplier becomes and 
therefore the higher is the regional income. Consequently, the growth pole 
development policy suggests that after selected agglomerations or growth poles 
develop, the remaining intra-regional areas will benefit by the 'spread' effects from 
the pole, i.e. from income transfers or subcontracting, etc. But in the short run, 
while the pole is assisted and developing, 'backwash' effects of centripetal forces 
are also likely to be experienced and hinterlands would be deprived from a 
substantial part of their mobile factors of production, i.e. capital and skilled labour.
Considering the number of the agglomerations to be selected to serve as 
growth poles for a country, Klaassen (1972) suggests that from all possible 
potential 'nuclei' those should be selected which are most likely to react rapidly. 
However, the greater the number of centres selected the weaker will be the 
impact, for two main reasons. First, it is that the necessarily limited financial 
assistance from the centre has to be divided to more places. The second and more 
subtle reservation is that there are only a limited number of industries in search of 
a new location at any one time.
As a result of the perceived and supposed inefficiency of the two-sector 
neoclassical development model of regional development in Greece, the Industrial 
Areas Programme was conceived. It was based upon the described theoretical 
framework of the growth poles strategy. International consultants made the first 
study in 1963 (SCES) with an initial target of five Industrial Areas adjacent to
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respective cities that would serve as growth poles. These were efficiently selected 
and according to the theory. Following designation the Greek state proceeded in 
providing land, infrastructure and locational and technological incentives to 
industry. However the actual implementation of the growth poles strategy through 
the designation of Industrial Areas was much different in practice from what was 
initially planned. Local and regional spin-offs were, and in some cases still are, a long 
time coming.
Contemporary economic thought has made a detailed critique of the growth 
pole strategy. Indeed a similarity of the growth pole theory and the two sector 
neoclassical model has been observed, in that the growth pole can be thought of as 
playing the role of the 'modern exporting sector'. In both cases, after the spatial or 
sectoral growth, equity or justice is expected in the region, either by spread 
effects from the pole, or by increased domestic demand for thte domestic sector's 
products, respectively.
But Skott (1985), criticises the Myrdal-Kaldor model also of not leading to 
the neoclassical equalisation of factors incomes principle. The principle of cumulative 
causation, he argues, emphasises the existence of dual characteristics in the 
economy, producing endogenous tendencies for growth rates to diverge. The short- 
run sequential patterns followed in the model do not lead to long term stability or 
the relevant predictions. According to Skott a narrow economic analysis taking 
institutions and sociopolitical factors as given is misleading. The causes of stagnancy 
are the 'vicious cycles' caused by unfavourable institutional and sociopolitical 
situations. Growth differentials are said to be due to the impact of the socio­
economic system of each region.
A further critique of the growth poles strategy has been made on the 
grounds that the spatially polarised growth, itself, comes about from the fact that 
the individual growth determinants are completely or partially immobile. This 
immobility is explained (Friedman 1972) by the authority-dependency relationships 
between nations and regions and increased 'communication costs'. The latter refer 
to socio-institutional and economic-structural barriers and include the 
transportation cost, which is not particularly significant in itself. Thus, any 
activity's profit function is influenced by the supply and demand of inputs and 
outputs in spatial proximity. These 'communication costs' create by themselves 
cumulative effects (Bulmer 1975), not only due to the agglomeration advantages, 
indivisibility of consumption and production, increasing returns to scale and 
monopolistic distortions, but also due to the control by central elites of activities 
and institutions.
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The beneficial diffusion or 'spread' effects to the periphery, suggested by 
Myrdal, derive from Hecksher-Ohlin (Ohlin 1933) specialisation and trade theory. 
This suggests that regions will specialise in the production and export of 
commodities that use their abundant production factors intensively. But, Hecksher- 
Ohlin assume immobile factors of production. Thus, any improved 'communications' 
created by regional policy may, due to the authority-dependency relations, only 
speed up an inverse, core-oriented polarisation process, owing to the immobility of 
the complementary regional growth determinants. On this Dicken (1992) argues 
that the cumulative effects mainly derive from the division of labour, which is a 
global rather than a regional phenomenon, following complex economic-structural 
and sociopolitical patterns of production fragmentation and geographical 
relocation.
Given the above reservations, it can be understood why the Industrial Areas 
in Greece, designed in the sixties as national growth poles, and implemented in the 
seventies and eighties, had moderate and varying results. The 'vicious cycles' of 
Skott, and the 'elites’ of Bulmer are probably j r & p o n s u  b l e .  The partial immobility of 
production factors of Friedman was only partially counterbalanced by the role of 
the financial incentives. Improved communications and the entrance of the country 
to the EC in the eighties made it difficult for these old concept growth poles to 
compete even in a european not to mention a global arena.
At a later stage in 1988 (Vliamos 1988), a theoretical reorientation of the 
development model that the Industrial Areas would serve occurred. The new plans, 
not yet implemented, follow a generalised industrial space provision policy. A related 
theoretical rationale for development at local level is that proposed by Robert 
(1985). He suggests that development strategies based mainly on the transfer of 
industry may prove to be out of date. It is a question, he argues, whether activities 
which are artificially deviated from their 'normal' location will remain strong and 
expand. Thus, and due in part to the recent periods of economic crisis, it is 
questionable if the redistribution of productive activities among regions is an 
adequate means of balancing regional inequalities. Of course, the issue of developing 
the internal resources and infrastructure of the less developed regions in 
withstanding the current difficulties is challenging. But the possible set-up and 
implementation of such provision remains to be tested.
This is the up to date theoretical background of the Industrial Areas 
development programme in Greece. What has been little stressed is the technology 
component of development, besides the social and political, and all seem to be 
crucial. Theoretical advances on this context are discussed in the following part.
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3.2  C ontem porary  th eo ries  o f d ev e lo p m e n t and 
technology
3.2.1 Development in modern world structures 
Older theories proposed that regional development and growth would occur 
if the appropriate policies were applied, and if the population accepted the relevant 
political and social changes. Their main limitations were the simplicity of their 
assumptions and their over-deterministic character. Older theories proved unable 
to include in their modelling the rapid changes in transportation, communications, 
technology and information flows and production organisation on a world scale that 
has characterised the last two decades. They also did not take account of cultural 
and socio-institutional issues operating sub-nationally, nationally and internationally 
and the economic-political power structures involved.
Thus, current theoretical trends suggest that economic and socio-political 
phenomena, especially in developing countries, have to be analysed under the 
conditions of these countries’ structural connections with the advanced capitalist 
societies, while the key factor for their development is often the level of technology 
they command. To assess the development problem of Greece, one first necessity is 
to define types of regions in a world structure and their characteristics.
The Core and Periphery theories (Wallerstein 1979, 1989; Friedman 1986b, 
Castells 1987, Henderson 1987 ) see the world as a tripartite structure of core, 
semi-periphery and periphery. Through the process of capitalist development, 
regions can be characterised within the international division of labour.
The core metropolises are world level magnets attracting money, minds, 
information, materials and energy. There is an abundance of skilled flexible labour, 
high wages, advanced technology and diversified product-mix. In the periphery, 
according to the theory, there is unskilled inflexible or coerced labour, under 
colonial or state power, simple product-mix, dominant primary and services sectors, 
fragmentation of cultural and political patterns and ageing technology. Between 
the two there is the semi-periphery, including the dynamic categories of either de­
industrialising ex-core states or regions, or industrialising ex-periphery ones; or 
even static ones such as many regions of Greece, resting uneasily between the 
core of Athens and Western Europe and the periphery of the Third World.
The theory argues that in the international arena the core economies 
attempt to control these world structures and protect disparities that have
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arisen. They control the transfer of information and know-how, as well as the prices 
of raw materials and energy using multiplicity of means, thereby ensuring the 
stability of the system. Backwardness is tied with the hierarchical capitalist 
development, where one part of the surplus of the periphery is transferred to the 
core, while another is held back by local oligarchies and spent in luxury 
consumption. Giaoutzi (1990) suggests that similar core-periphery structural 
discrepancy can be found between regions within a national economy as well. This is 
one characteristic that is evident in regions of Greece and thus characterises the 
country as a semi-peripheral type.
Further, and on socio-economic grounds, the phenomenon of Dualism is the 
concept of the traditional and modern economic sectors’ marked separation. It is 
less evident in the developed metropolises, but nonetheless present, as evidenced 
by growth of an underground social component. It is striking, though in the large 
cities of underdeveloped nations (Santos 1979). The new technologies are light, 
flexible and user-friendly, changing not only the organisational structure of 
production, but also the geographical location of employment in the production 
process. This internationalisation of the economy reinforces the spatial polarisation 
between sectors, especially between peripheral regions and their metropolitan 
areas. In Greece such dualistic characteristics are also evident.
Modern dualism has also social effects. As regards the employment patterns, 
the job-ladder climbing within the firm's internal labour market was the common 
pattern during the past phases of industrial growth. The development of 
information technologies, however, has generated a demand for highly specialised 
personnel, which is much less industry-specific. Thus, firms tend to externalise the 
training costs and to rely more on the external labour market. Quality of labour 
becomes important and labour pools become qualitatively stratified, (Noyelle 1987). 
This further enhances dualism. This is a case for a developing country to pay serious 
attention to its educational system and of course this no less applies for Greece.
As regards the control of the new technologies and the new information 
system, in general, if power is undemocratically exercised by a certain group, 
(political or economic), then the country may not have development or peace. This 
feature is also likely to widen rather than close the gap in the dualistic economy 
(Saito 1988). It appears that the more open administrative structures a country 
can ensure the better chances it has for development. In Greece the efforts as 
regards availability of informatics to the country's lower tier governments and 
peripheries are not as evident.
Having given an account of the type and characteristics of some main
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aspects of the economic and political situation the designation relation of a country 
to its external environment should follow. Castells (1987) notes that dualism on the 
one hand separates activities, social groups and cultures, which on the other hand 
are tied in a wider interdependency of structural relations.
The Dependency theories explain why underdevelopment persists and in 
many cases worsens for less developed countries (Brookfield 1975). Santos (1973) 
characterises dependency as the conditioning situation in which the economies of a 
group of countries are tied up to the development and expansion of others. The 
dependent countries can only reflect the expansion of their dominant countries 
and this may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development 
potential. Frank (1971) though was adamant that development of metropolises 
necessitates the underdevelopment of their satellites.
The perpetuation of underdevelopment arises from the fact that capital, 
seen as a commodity, is transferred from peripheral areas to the core of the world 
system on the basis of an unequal exchange. (Henderson 1989). If surplus value is 
the difference of production value minus the capital used, depreciation and the 
actual labour remuneration for the period, then the issue of unequal exchange is 
based on the fact that the rate of labour surplus value extraction is much lower in 
the centre than in the periphery. This means that labour remuneration is 
considerably higher in the core, if it is assumed that capital depreciation rates are 
about the same. Amin(1977) sets out the issue as being the exchange of products 
whose production involves wage differentials greater than differentials in 
productivity. This is also true for Greece, since salaries of equally skilled workers or 
professionals tend to be lower than those of their colleagues in the European core.
The Dependency conceptualisation expands in the fields of high technology. 
The capitalisation of information will result in the national economic strength being 
cumulatively more dependent on information (Steward 1978). It is suggested that 
the increasing volume of information flows that are generated across national 
frontiers lead the world towards a global community (Haq 1988) and it is 
understood that information networks of developed and developing countries will be 
integrated into a worldwide network. It is questionable, as Saito (1988) wonders, if 
the above mutual dependence can be one of equality or of subordination.
But, dependency theories, while featuring the asymmetrical 
interdependency of economic functions across national boundaries, do not succeed 
in tackling the intra-regional and intra-metropolitan divergence, restructuring and 
dualism says Castells (1987). He explains that it is more a matter of availability of 
resources that are different in different social groups. These are transformed to
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skills and become again resources that traditionally belong to certain social classes.
More recently, the Globalisation of Production theories stress that the 
technological revolution is one of the main driving forces in the worldwide trend for 
the restructuring of capitalism (Henderson 1989, Simai 1990, Sadler 1991, Dicken 
1992). This creates the contemporary global, structural, economic change. High 
technology is something more than simply a new technique of production. It is a new 
form of production, based on information, and following the theory it also reflects a 
new social organisation. Castells (1987) suggests that structural disturbances and 
global or regional imbalances seem to be permanent characteristic features of 
world economic development.
The economic structure of the developed industrial countries is generally 
characterised by increasing international specialisation that also has spatial 
repercussions. In the new international division of labour the core is specialising in 
the services and information economy. To a large extent firms in developed 
countries, and the multinationals on world scale, while keeping headquarters and 
research branches relatively fixed, disengage their high skilled labour and 
technology from one product and shift mass-production facilities from urban /  core 
locations where labour is unionised and demanding, to peripheral areas, where 
salaries, fringe benefits and workplace practices are more advantageous. The 
spatial life cycle model (Giaoutzi 1990) suggests that when mechanisation of 
production emerges, productive capacity shifts from centralisation to geographical 
dispersal. Thus, core economies themselves may transfer technology and 
production of certain products to developing countries. This dichotomy in use of 
new technologies appears both in large scale internationalisation, but also in small 
scale localisation within nations (Giaoutzi 1990).
Thus would it be a solution for the Industrial Areas of Greece to try to 
attract industry of this kind, based mainly on the lower wages and benefits? Saito 
(1988) argues that it will not be long before the 'steel collar' workers (robots) will 
be replacing the blue collar workers. In many cases the modern mass-production 
technology requires less specialised labour, and as a result the industry-receiving 
regions do not necessarily benefit from salaries higher than other specialisations. 
Automated production systems and routine tasks, that are often undertaken in 
such locations offer a generally low propensity for regional spread of innovations 
within the receiving underdeveloped regions.
Is growth of any type and development similar concepts? In some cases it 
may not be. Growth, i.e. increase in population and output in some area, may not 
lead to qualitative improvement in the quality of life for its inhabitants. The
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phenomena of the newly industrialised countries of the Third World are explained on 
the basis of reallocation of activities in low cost areas as a result of the new 
international division of labour. But economic development is associated with 
increases in quality of life, nature and quality of local jobs, goods and services 
provided locally and environment quality and conservation. Development as a 
qualitative change also involves changes in cultural and social orientation towards 
adaptability, flexibility and new specialisation in order to achieve capacity.
What type of development strategy should a semi-peripheral, or mixed type 
economy like that of Greece follow? What would this mean for the regional tools for 
development, and in this case the Industrial Areas? How can the dualistic 
phenomena in spatial polarisation and in labour stratification be relieved? How can 
the unequal exchange be counterbalanced?-Is a low wage and cheap land 
deregulated policy guaranteeing development?
Today the single, maybe, way to growth is through new and high technology. 
The Industrial Areas have a role to play in the development of their respective 
regions and the country as a whole if there is a persistent turn towards 
technology. But the likely development and technology structures required should 
be analysed and understood before any policy can be properly planned.
3.2.2 The structures of development and technology
All industrialised countries are in process of economic change from an 
industrial society to an information-based, services society. This structural 
economic change is to a great extent caused by technological change. New 
technology creates an unequal global interdependency, where countries with large' 
shares in worldwide information systems tend to have more power than others and 
vice versa.
A theory relevant to the above hypothesis is the Technological Gap theory. 
It argues that there is a technology gap between the rich and the poor countries 
(Posner 1961, Hufbauer 1966) which allows only the rich to produce new goods. 
Vernon (1966) argues that comparative costs between developed and 
underdeveloped countries for new products are irrelevant, since new products are 
only developed in proximity to large markets of sophisticated demand. But also, the 
production of new goods requires significant quantities of skilled labour and 
research which tends to be available only in rich countries (Hirsch 1967) and thus 
the technology gap is sustained since new goods cannot be instantly produced in 
other countries. Thus the necessity of adoption of the new technology for a 
developing or semi peripheral country comes up. There is some debate, however,
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about whether technological advanced cores can keep their distance from other 
potential competitors.
Malecki (1991) questions the capability of a region to sustain its advantage 
in producing a new innovative product. He suggests that other regions will try to 
imitate the innovation. Thus, the initial advantage lasts only for a certain period 
(imitation lag). Additionally, part of this period is not going to be wholly 
advantageous to the innovative region, due to a demand lag, i.e. until demand 
adapts consumption necessities to the new product. The remaining period of the 
imitation lag, called reaction lag, may not be so long due to rapid diffusion of 
information.
But the diffusion of information is not perfect and by no means instant. 
Between 90 and 95 percent of world's research and development is generated in 
the developed countries. In many cases developing countries may lack the financial 
resources or the political support (Banerjee 1982) to adopt new technologies. The 
brain drain from the developing countries is one more built-in factor to the 
technological gap theme. Additionally, the technological gap in issues of 'potential 
military significance' (Simai 1990), and other similar activities, is perpetuated and 
enlarged due to the embargo lists and legal prohibitions by the producing countries. 
Besides, such products are never constant and unchanging, even when in mass 
production.
As a conclusion it would appear that if an industrialising country is 
determined to compete, it has to overcome political instabilities and economic 
shortages to bridge the technological gap. It should invest seriously in the matter of 
new technology and the supporting infrastructure. This seems to be the way for 
the Industrial Areas of Greece, if fruitful results are to be expected. But for how 
long should the effort go on?
Relevant to the above question are the Product Cycle theories (Vernon 
1966, 1979; Hirsch 1975, Thomas 1986), which stress the importance of the 
imitation effect. The basic theory argues that intensive research and skills capacity 
concentrated in the more favourable regions lead to the emergence of new 
products in these regions. Initially, the increased production costs pose few 
problems as there are no rivals for these innovative, leading-edge technology-based 
products. Further on, after the new product establishes its contribution, it 
becomes standardised and widely demanded and mass production begins. In this 
phase other regions may start competing (imitation). Over time the new producers 
become favoured using less skilled labour and mass production methods and as a 
result, in the end, the initiating region may not be able to compete even in its own
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local market. In the long run, innovative firms are pressed to divest from the 
product and the initial innovating region becomes a net importer of the product in 
question and thus, suggests the theory, the cycle is completed.
A further variation of the rather deterministic product cycle theory above 
is the Profit Cycle model suggested by Markusen (1985). The model assumes that in 
the initial phase of a new product there are zero profits due to the demand lag and 
the high production costs. Later, super profits are experienced due to the high 
demand and the monopolistic situation of the developer, underpinned by patents or 
just maintained by the reaction lag of the competitors. By the time the competitors 
enter there are low profits, due to the competition. Here, it is suggested that 
either an oligopoly is formed and profits are sustained, or large corporations divest 
and the sector remains the domain of small and /  or peripheral firms.
The product and profit cycle phenomenon is also described by Malecki 
(1991) who stresses the importance of continuous innovation. He suggests that, as 
the modern products' life cycles shorten, only the constantly innovating firms are 
likely to sustain large profits, creating successive life cycles of improved product 
versions.
Some empirical approaches comparing the situation in developed countries 
suggest that product cycles are rather theoretical. Gagnon and Rose (1991), 
after research on American and Japanese trade flows from 1962 to 1988, 
conclude that there is little empirical evidence of product cycles. They suggest that 
their findings rather support the standard factor proportion theories (Hecksher- 
Ohlin), i.e. that goods being exports one year, tend to be exports the following 
years too, due to each country's standard factor proportions. In another 
research, Dollar (1990) confirms this pattern as regards the trade between the 
south and the north, in America.
How can the divergence between theory and empirical findings be explained? 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest that developed countries will continuously 
produce and export the higher quality versions of a good and besides at the same 
time may import the lower quality versions, while the quality of a given good 
increases stochastically over time. Large product cycles do not seem to appear in 
the mentioned study, possibly due to the incremental cycles' successive 
sustainability that actually took place. Malecki's continuous innovation seems to be 
justified by these findings.
The life-cycles debate should not be discouraging for a development policy 
that aims to lead a country, here Greece, to a competing position. It only clearly 
shows that a determined and continuous effort has to be made. One-off
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investments such as the provision of an Industrial Area, or financial injections like 
the establishment incentives, are not adequate to sustain competitiveness. It would 
appear to be equally ineffective to try to adopt technology from one-off attracted 
multinational branches. In such cases, the possibility of local imitation is minimal to 
the extent that production machinery is integrated, all produced in core areas and 
usually far too complex for local imitation. A longer term technological policy is 
needed, based on a supporting institutional framework. As a conclusion, it can be 
argued that only continuous effort on innovation can bring incremental 
improvements to existing products. These, while minimising the demand lag, also 
broaden the present competitors' reaction lag, creating a larger total imitation lag. 
In addition, better quality and more competitive versions of products are produced. 
But where should an Industrial Area, or a development policy based on industry and 
innovation, be located?
In the debate about development and technology structures, the optimum 
location for increased productivity is left an open question. Moomaw and Williams 
(1991), in a case study test the effects of urban agglomeration on productivity. In 
a study of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for the United States they show that 
the correlation of TFP and leading agglomerations is positive, while for medium ones 
the relation is the converse. The cause of this observation may be the decline of 
medium industrial centres, towards either the metropolises, or small, new 
technology, agglomerations. It appears then that where new technology is 
abundant, that is in metropolises or small high technology centres, productivity is 
expected to be higher. A related analysis for the Industrial Areas of Greece is made 
in chapter four of this thesis.
As it appears, new technology may a the solution, but again the locational 
question must b& posed. A more detailed analysis on location and growth is given by 
the so-called Locational Factors approach. In a world dominated by the rather 
deterministic globalisation of production, as described previously, the Locational 
Factors approach tries to identify factors, besides technology inducement, that 
are likely to define the underlying attractiveness of particular regions for high 
technology. A wide variety of such factors is mentioned, among which are the 
presence of experienced entrepreneurs, skilled labourforce, accessibility of 
customers and new markets, favourable government policies, proximity to 
universities, availability of supporting services and attractive living conditions.
For example some activities need to establish in the largest agglomerations. 
Non-production activities such as non-routine administrative work (i.e. decision 
making), or research and development rely heavily on face to face contact and
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information. Such firms or branches undertaking such activities must be in a place 
which minimises the costs of contacts and acquisition of information. Establishment 
near the top of urban hierarchy is one option minimising the above mentioned costs. 
But establishment near agglomerations of other similar firms, which is exactly the 
objective of the Industrial Areas strategy, provides the opportunity to maximise the 
overall chances for acquiring information, rather than just minimising the costs of 
obtaining it (Oakey and Cooper 1989, Love 1988 ).
From an organisational point of view, there is a strong pull of research and 
development departments towards the firms' headquarters location. The latter 
tend to cluster especially in large urban regions. As regards staff employed in 
research and development, housing, school quality, recreation opportunities, jobs 
for spouse and cultural opportunities are important in their stated preferences 
(Ady 1986). Hall (1987) also stresses the importance of good climate and 
traditional or political factors.
Given the above implications for technology, some relevance can be found to 
the Industrial Areas of Greece and especially those in the periphery, in addition to 
the necessity for the use of new technology. There, even if the headquarters of 
firms could not be attracted, an effort to provide efficient industrial 
infrastructure, and urban infrastructure in the nearby agglomerations, given the 
good climate, can provide some attractive locational factors.
3 .2 .3  Information, a prerequisite for development through
technology
In the previous part the necessity of continuous effort for innovation was 
stressed, plus the locational prerequisites for an industrialising region to overcome 
any adverse technological gap. Next some theories stressing the importance of 
technology in the development process are presented.
The industrial revolution meant a large scale geographical concentration of 
economic and technological activities and people at places favourable to the 
production process. As a consequence, a necessity for large scale physical 
transport was generated and characterises the industrial society.This phenomenon 
has been called 'locomotion1.
Recently, information appears to have become the most valuable asset for a 
country or a region (UNESCO 1980). It is a principal factor in increasing 
productivity in industry, agriculture and services. Besides, informatics is a basic tool 
in planning, hypothesis testing and the simulation of programmes. Informatics has a 
leading role as an interface between the 'living system' (community) and its 'control
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system' (government) (Sharkas 1982). Nijkamp (1988) believes that the 'wealth of 
information' appears to be a substitute for Adam Smith's 'wealth of nations'. This 
trend is called 'infomotion'.
In the infomotive society, the emerging spatial pattern is that 
competitiveness of areas is determined by their accessibility to information and 
telecommunication systems (Giaoutzi 1985). Since data networks can function 
effectively without the participation of developing countries, the 'global village1 may 
not necessary include all countries. Riddle (1988) argues that the large quantities 
of information that countries, not currently competitive, miss, may make them fall 
behind at a geometric rate without swift and extensive remedial measures.
The information requirements of the various socio-economic activities will 
vary, according to space and specialisation. Both the public and private sectors are 
involved in the race for new technology and information.
To start with the public sector, research in Greece by Terrovitis (1988), 
puts forward two findings. First that information requirements of core regions are 
higher than those of peripheral regions. Quality of telecommunications is also better 
in core regions, while cost of provision is lower. Second, that the services sector is 
a heavier user of such infrastructure than the primary and secondary sectors. This 
sector is suggested to be no less critical for a developing society. Related research 
in India by Narasimhan (1982) showed that in order to develop consciousness of the 
occupational and development opportunities, the right services inputs have to be 
deployed, supported by information technology.
Interestingly, Terrovitis, (1988) showed that a slow pace of productivity 
and competitiveness is not due to lack of demand for telecommunications, but due 
to the inability of state monopoly supply to offer such services. As demonstrated in 
this research, failure to provide a high telecommunications standard may preclude 
development. Thus, it emerges that the need for better technology provision might 
also have to go through drastic organisational restructuring in such public sector 
agents. In any case, public sector technological improvements in a country put its 
existing production and services capacity in better competition terms.
Flexibility is not only needed in the public sector, the state or local 
government agencies, but also in the enterprises structure. A typology of the 
differences between the mass production mode and a new more efficient type of 
production has been made by Albrechts (1989) and Womack (1990). Thus, Fordism 
is the production philosophy that underlies standardised goods, processed in mass 
production. The integration of production plants is important, mainly in vertical, but 
also in horizontal large schemes. The locations themselves are normally resource
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driven rather than market oriented. The characteristics of labour in such 
production modes are those of increased productivity due to job specialisation, 
minimal learning experience through time, poor labour conditions and low wages. 
The fundamental point is the low production cost per unit and the external 
economies of scale. But the production procedure itself makes it difficult to initiate 
changes in the products' characteristics due to the labour’s difficulty in re­
specialisation, due to the specialised nature of the type of machinery used and due 
to the vertical production structure. This makes reaction to demand changes slow 
and above all, costly. Besides, imitation of technological standards by competitors is 
normally reasonably easy.
The new pattern of Flexibility in production, with the use of high technology 
is challenging Fordism. Changes to the production structure, with the use of 
computer aided design and computer controlled machines, make for easy custom- 
made production as well as volume production. Production becomes modular, 
changes in products' specifications are reasonably easily met, and greater variety 
of product types may be offered. Imitation is difficult due to the continuous nature 
of improvement and other changes that characterise such systems. Location of 
plants is demand driven and innovations influence the demand, rather than follow it. 
Integration is quasi-vertical via subcontracting to several smaller flexible 
components production firms. Labour characteristics involve multiplicity of tasks, co­
responsibility of the workers, on the job training, learning and skills development, 
high employment security and greater rewards.
Dicken (1992) makes the distinction between mass production and lean 
production. The latter has the flexibility characteristics and it is 'lean' compared to 
Fordist production because less manufacturing space, less engineering hours for 
new products development and far less on-site inventories are needed. The just-in- 
time supplies system, reduces the inventories of materials within firms. Production is 
based on collaborators and subcontractors rather than on simple suppliers who are 
distant, not only physically, but also organisationally (Sayer 1986, Dicken 1992).
The concept of Information Based Manufacturing is the application of 
information technology in order to integrate all economic, technological and 
organisational functions of production. Information technology offers flexibility in 
production and product mix, rapid response to market demand, greater control, 
accuracy and repeatability of processes, reduced waste, faster machines and 
distributed processing capability. The whole process can be enclosed in software. 
(Nijkamp 1988). Riddle (1988) gives the case of Benetton, having over two 
thousand retail outlets worldwide monitored daily. Trends and needs for new
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products can be met in one third of the time of a normal production procedure.
Flexibility in production, apart from its better growth perspectives, may also 
prove more robust in crisis conditions, due to the multiplicity of the collaborating 
firms that may channel their part of the production structure to complementary 
paths.
It would appear then that, infomotion as a principle and the required 
flexibility in public services and private production can be shown to be the main 
requirements for economic development.
How can information and technological restructuring interconnection lead 
to success or failure? Any dynamic economy will simultaneously experience a 
process of job losses compensated to a varying degree by growth of new 
employment. Freeman (1986) explains that periods of expansion occur when there 
is a good match between the new technological paradigm and the socio-institutional 
climate. Depressions are periods of relevant mismatch. As a consequence, if the 
productivity of nations or regions is to be improved, a better match between the 
new technologies and the institutional and social framework should be sought, to 
create favourable patterns for advance. This is much what seems to be needed also 
for the case of Greece.
3 .2 .4  New technology: transfer and match 
Deriving from the above discussion, if a region is to develop, it has to 
recognize the importance of the intangible investment in technical knowledge as 
equally important physical capital investment. This is a point that the Industrial 
Areas in Greece have not yet actively encapsulated in their regional development 
objectives. The method of attaining human embodied technology is learning. Thus, 
the region has to learn new technologies in order to be able to imitate and /  or 
reproduce them and eventually benefit from them.
Several ways of learning at regional level have been suggested. (Bell 1984, 
Fransman 1986). 'Learning by using' explains how productivity increases as a result 
of the production mode and it is relatively costless. The precondition is, though, the 
acquiring and diffusion of new technology among local firms. Another mode, that 
requires explicit effort and investment in imported new technological capacity, 
leads to 'learning by changing' i.e. opening the black box of technology and 
developing it. Research and development efforts and relevant feedback of the 
system’s performance at the local level are required. It offers the region 
understanding and confidence. Obviously this procedure is neither automatic nor 
costless. In 'learning through training', the latter has to go to the hows and the
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whys of technology in the productive process. In other words, a high level of 
technological training should be experienced before any significant improvements in 
technology and productivity are to be expected.
The pure research and development methods for technological 
developments are another procedure of learning. These processes of change 
require explicit allocation of non production resources by firms or regions. They 
also assume an already advanced technological background in local human and 
capital resources. But research and development encompasses all of the previous 
technology adaption methods
Of course in practice the diffusion of technology, as mentioned earlier, is not 
always easy. Even if there is some tendency to learn, as it might supposedly be the 
case with the Industrial Areas of Greece, various mechanisms besides patents, 
copyrights and trade secrets are commonly used means to keep technology away 
from competitive or potential competitive regions or firms. Still, though there are 
ways of overcoming some of these difficulties as shall be shown.
Since technology is rarely produced directly for sale, the issue of 
technology transfer (Ernst 1980, Molle 1990) to a country or a region is not a 
simple one. The main ways of transfer are either via technical documents, blueprints 
(disembodied transfer), demonstrations training and technical assistance (human 
embodied transfer) or by permission to use technology, under licence, franchise or 
lease, or by intra - multi site (or multi national) firm technology transfers.
The efforts of several international organisations for technology transfer 
among nations are also significant. The United Nations is running the U.N.D.P. 
(United Nations Development Programme ) that mainly supports the set up of 
national informatics centres, promoting education and research. The UNESCO 
(United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation) among others, 
supports postgraduate courses in computers and applications and runs the ICID 
(International Committee on Informatics for Development) and the IFID 
(International Federation for Information Processing). Additionally, the UNIDO 
(United Nations Industrial Development Organisation) provides the information 
required for selection and use of technologies. It runs the INTIB (Industrial and 
Technological Information Bank), aiming in generating and disseminating information 
on technologies. It also runs the TIES (Technological Information Exchange System) 
aiming in technology acquisition and upgrading of the participating countries. In the 
European context, the European Community runs SPRINT, a programme for 
innovation and technology transfer, and other foundations, such as the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Working Conditions, also focusing on matters of
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technology.
There can be little doubting that no small part of technology transfers are 
made in an informal way, (Simai 1990). The reason for this is that the formal 
research and development methods are comparatively more time consuming and 
costly. Such informal methods are professional visits of experts, engineers and 
scientists, utilisation of published technological data, books and patents, 
attendance of international seminars, exhibitions and conferences and 
technological-scientific intelligence work in commercial and military technologies.
The motivation for the technology recipients is twofold. To increase the 
value added or profitability of economic activities already established and to 
increase indigenous technological capability for new products design.
The procedure of new technology match and utilisation in an industrialising 
country may be divided in three general stages. (Kim 1980, Maissner 1988, 
Chattergi 1989). The initial stage may be called implementation of imported 
technology and relevant products are mainly aiming for the local markets. At a 
second stage, more or less the one being reached in Greece, the assimilation of 
technology takes place, and makes for product diversification using development 
engineering. The third stage is the improvement stage for enhancing 
competitiveness with use of local scientific personnel, research and development 
and mostly local components and parts, and aiming to produce for both home and 
international markets.
Finally, but no less important, the success of technology transfer depends 
on the ability and willingness of the importing society to accept and absorb the new 
technology, this being the most important and specific role the Industrial Areas in 
Greece have to play. The type and the technological level of the existing supporting 
industry of any region is critical. The risk of technology transfers without 
indigenous technological capability is common, especially in cases of countries 
attempting to increase their production output in minimal time. Adaption of 
imported technology, besides destroying traditional technologies and knowledge, 
may lead to economic dependency on spare parts and repairs larger than initially 
thought by the importing country. In addition, shortage of managerial capacity by 
the importing region may be critical. Managerial dependence may prevent 
entrepreneurship and diffusion of technology to the receiving area. Moomaw and 
Williams (1991) with US data show that the total factor productivity when 
correlated with technical change is negative, at least in the short run. This 
suggested to be due to the pace of change and general confusion until the relevant 
skills are developed by workers and managers.
8 6
As an alternative approach to technology, the Appropriate Technology
theories (Heierli 1986, Steward 1987) are a movement aiming somewhat further
than the well publicised soft energy application plans such as biogas, solar energy 
or windmill generators. It is a methodology to find appropriate technological 
solutions to given problems via the mobilisation of local creativity and use of local 
skills, while promoting the developing targets of the country. This does not mean 
that technology should not be new, or of a sophisticated nature, and in this way 
these ideas can be useful for the Industrial Areas Programme. The theory further 
criticises the inappropriate technology used in less developed countries by 
scientific, capital and political elites that is either unadaptable, due to lack of 
servicing networks and being beyond the local skills, and /  or out of reach of the 
indigenous population due to its cost. (James 1989).
In both underdeveloped countries and core areas the appropriate
technology methodology is often applied. For example, custom production of 
agricultural tools in underdeveloped countries, custom production of hi-fi 
components in the UK, watches in Switzerland, tailor made bicycles in Italy, or furs 
in northern Greece can be equally sophisticated, profitable and job creating. As 
regards information technology, it is essential for the development of more 
functional services, and the services sector has been seen to be a prerequisite for 
industrial and economic development. In this sense, information and high technology 
is perhaps an appropriate technology for development.
3.3  Policy questions arising from the conceptualisation
of regional development
3.3.1 Central development policies and the regional tools 
Historically, after what in fact amounted to the neo-feudalism of the 19th 
century, the state started its interventionary economic role. Regional policy 
emerged as part of state development policy, but it has also been suggested that in 
many cases a state paternalism replaced landlord paternalism in the 20th century. 
Regions and localities have too often mainly relied for their development on large 
scale enterprise and government policies. Regional unemployment and stagnation 
has been seen by many not as cyclical and temporary, but structural and 
persisting. On this context recently it has been more often suggested that central 
policies are able to redistribute economic activity only during growth dominated
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periods, (Stohr 1990a). They seem more or less unable to generate local innovative 
capacity during periods of restructuring needs. Greece, being not an exception, did 
experience such effects that are demonstrated in the chapters to follow.
As a development of the above, a major characteristic of the eighties has 
been the shrinkage of the public sector and the associated 'privatisation'. 
Privatisation in the eighties had questionable results, and as Novy (1990) explains 
there has been a growth of the 'informal economy' uncontrolled by the state, while 
the latter has sought to control inflation through fiscal austerity, monetary 
restriction and the rolling back of the welfare state. These are things about which 
Zolotas, (1981) had warned, and which became a common experience in Greece in 
the late eighties and early nineties. Salamon (1989) suggests that privatisation as a 
policy is focusing only on a narrow financial dimension of a government's possible 
actions, during periods of crisis. On the contrary, the use of the government's 
regional policy tools has multiple dimensions in helping both the firms and the local 
public sector to restructure and develop.
A mainstream theoretical thought regards the policy tools at the regional 
level as strategic variables for strengthening the local productive systems. These 
are the local development agencies, local /  regional new technology promotion 
centres, specialty technological agencies, business services centres and 
development of renewable energy sources. The case for these centres and 
agencies is that technical and organisational innovations increasingly take on the 
characteristics of a continuous process rather than of a few giant leaps, hence the 
necessity of social regulation and better institutional integration of the local 
system. Development of such a flexible complex of finance and technological 
assistance is much needed in Greece and much missed by the Industrial Areas 
Programme.
Local development agencies have a role of interfacing public and private 
actors and between demand and supply of business services, especially promoting 
information. Their main tasks are the promotion of a satisfactory industrial 
operating environment by means of developing various types of infrastructure, and 
the reinforcement of links among local firms. Other functions involve the creation or 
support of scientific and technological environments, vocational training and 
retraining, internal savings mobilisation towards local firms and investment 
information and finally, the establishment of links with the outside world (Garofoli 
1990).
Government aid should be channelled toward small new/high technology 
firms, providing venture capital for research, which will promote innovations and
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new products. Oakey (1986) suggests that, as a result of the short life cycles of 
high technology products the decisions on loans, etc. should be made fast, through 
decentralised agencies, in days rather than months. On this, Roobeck (1990) 
suggests that it is unlikely that a spatially uniform technology policy can be 
effective. Other writers have observed that, since each type of new technology, 
i.e. microelectronics, telecommunications, satellite, automation and the like, all have 
different seedbed conditions, development agencies may have a good case in 
regional context, but also in specialty context (Cappellin and Nijkamp 1990).
In the case of high technology, where technological advances are rapid, the 
finance required for research and development increases in magnitude as the firm 
grows. Oakey (1986) suggests that an agency providing capital for high technology 
small firms could take equity shares or an equity stake option in return. In this way 
fast finance is secured and commitment to the firm and long term support is 
enhanced.
Regarding the status of the development agencies, they can be of public 
status, through government (national or regional) designated boards, or of private 
status, with representatives of banks, trade unions, professional unions and/or 
from the public. Equally, their funds may stem from public bodies, or from banks, 
loan- issues, regional funds, etc. From experience in Europe (Robert 1985) agencies 
that mainly provide infrastructure mainly complement regional authorities and their 
component in regional growth is less evident than those providing specialised 
services (surveys, studies, finance, planning, technical advice), which often have 
striking results.
3.3.2 Policies for development through technology
Having the development channels settled, developed countries are mainly 
concerned in gaining access to and diffusion of leading edge technologies for 
restructuring and growth, and the promotion of international trade (Cooper 
1980). Developing countries, though, (Haq 1988) are burdened with social, political 
and often ethical questions as well as infrastructural, institutional and human 
resource development priorities. Greece being somewhere in the middle, most 
certainly has both types of problems.
First, to start with the socio-political problems, one policy debate is the 
restructuring versus job losses issue. Currently the productivity of firms is partly 
increased by reducing labour costs and the use of new technologies. But 
automation in primary, secondary and even the services sector, is expected to 
significantly reduce the quantity of labour required and this is posing serious social
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problems. A social parameter of the new technology adaptation is the reaction of 
the workers and the unions. Three case studies in England (Williams and Steward 
1985), showed that the application of new technology, despite the unfavourable 
industrial relations climate, eventually won the compliance and consent of the 
workforce, and there was little overt conflict. Unions were willing to accept job 
losses if in parallel with technological change. Intra-organisational disputes were of 
minor importance. Unfortunately, internal learning by the remaining staff and high 
technology specialisation within a firm could not guarantee regional spin offs in the 
form of additional employment and growth.
On the other hand, new technology and informatics-related industries both 
in manufacturing and services may generate new employment opportunities. 
Organisations, such as local government or national institutions, should furnish new 
technology clusters with an adequate policy and legislation framework providing 
information and skilled workers agglomerated in local markets, as well as 
encouraging entrepreneurship. This will facilitate the diffusion of firms' 
achievements to be spread in the regions by means of new, dynamic and flexible 
firms. From a long term perspective, the development and application of information 
technology may be the key to economic viability and competitiveness of developing 
countries. It is important to assess to what extent informatics revolution can give 
lagging regions the chance to increase productivity, create new wealth and 
eventually narrow the economic gap.
Second are the material infrastructure problems. Just as transportation is 
crucial for the distribution of raw materials and manufactured goods, adequate and 
reliable telecommunications and electric power are absolute prerequisites for new 
technology and informatics. The extent to which infrastructure for new/high 
technology can influence development policy and its crucial effectiveness has been 
demonstrated.
Third is the issue of finance and stimulation. A commonly used policy for 
sustaining or generating growth, in both developed and developing countries, is that 
of incentives. The incentives' objectives may vary, according to the state that uses 
them, according to its economic strength and to its perception of what is desirable 
for development. Common objectives of incentives are promotion of private 
investment, rise in exports, promotion of regional development, increased use of 
new technology, promulgation of research and development, protection of health 
and safety as well as employment creation amongst others. The broad categories 
of incentives are direct transfers, fiscal reliefs and facilities provision (Alexakis 
1990, Athanassopoulos 1990).
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Direct incentives transfer financial resources into the hands of the 
entrepreneurs. These, and especially those of the fiscal relief pattern, are used to 
a large extent as income revenues by the firms, and may well not be used in a way 
which helps the sector's long term self-sustained growth. There is the risk that 
large sums of direct incentives may create firms and activities in sectors and in 
areas where under different circumstances these would not have occurred and 
which lead later to problematic enterprises. Directed incentives can be justified 
only for a transitory period and in a certain sectoral context.
The facilities provision incentives involve the state undertaking activities to 
provide conditions that would encourage firms to engage in investment and other 
activities. They can be both of institutional and of material character. Examples are 
venture capital provision, finance leasing, factoring and forfeiting, capital markets, 
development agencies, information preparation and dissemination, products design, 
classification and standardisation, export trading companies, besides the obvious 
material infrastructure, such as industrial areas, buildings, locational plans.
In Greece, as was seen in the previous chapter, it is mostly the material 
incentives which are currently effective. But as research and development 
functions are extremely polarised worldwide, special stimulation of research and 
new technology activities is a critical strategy. Policies to improve the efficiency of 
production might include priority to innovation-oriented research. It might prove 
more fruitful if new ideas were given attention and procedures were established 
which actually lead to practical adoption of scientific achievements.
Fourth, incentives alone may prove not enough.The quality of the local public 
services provision is likely to be critical for the socio-institutional frame which 
becomes the base for development. The introduction of new technology in the 
public services can make the potency of them more effective and comprehensive. It 
is anticipated that fewer movements towards central branches or the capital would 
eventually be needed while, additionally, regional confidence would be supported.
Relevant research in Ireland, (Blennerhasset and Moran 1984), based on 
three public services provision departments, showed that computerisation of client 
services resulted in more convenient, more personalised services, with wider choice 
and better information for the customers. At the organisational level, the 
employees had greater variety of tasks, had less autonomy and their work was 
more tightly controlled, while in fact overtime work was eliminated.
Last, but equally crucial, is the development of the human infrastructure. 
This includes training of personnel within the regions to supply a variety of 
informatics services, and this could create new jobs. Data entry subcontracting by
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large firm, software development and customising and hardware assembly are 
labour intensive occupations that may provide jobs in peripheral regions. Of course 
upskilling does not necessarily mean labour upgrading (Noyelle 1987) since 
technology gives the opportunity for geographic segmentation of stages of the 
same industry. In other words the headquarters activities can remain in a 
metropolis and 'back office1 functions tend move to the periphery.
The above problems characterise, as described, the developing countries 
but also some of the more developed. In the latter cases, some more tools for 
enhanced development based on new technology and information could be 
employed. A modern approach that might be seen as supportive of centralisation is 
the Seedbed - Incubator Hypothesis. It is a theoretical approach for development 
through innovation that mainly occurs in the centres of large cities, considered also 
by Moomaw - Williams (1991). But Giaoutzi, (1990) suggests that other specific 
favourable parts of the spatial structure are capable of generating innovations, a 
description that should fit a well specified Industrial Area. She suggests that these 
'territorial innovation complexes' can be stimulated, financed or guided by 
development policy so as to create potential spin-offs for their region.
A further advance on the above development practice is the evolution of the 
Technological Parks concept. They are normally set up in urban areas with a 
developed industrial fabric, and with presence of techno-scientific infrastructure. 
They mainly aim to aid the promotion of diffusion of new technologies and 
information between local firms (Monck 1988, Stohr 1988). The interface and 
cooperation of the technological parks with world class universities, the leading 
local industries, and local government and other actors are thought to be critical 
to the regional effects of this strategy. In a more expanded form, technological 
parks take the form of Technopolises. Certain countries have set up nationwide 
technopolises plans, such as the Japanese plan, with 26 technopolises, and the 
French, with 37 planned and 12 in operation by 1989 (Malecki 1991). Such 
comprehensive policies have yet to prove their effects. Massey and Quintas (1992), 
stress the socially divisive and spatially polarising effects of such efforts. But even if 
technological /  science parks may fail to create world beating research, they might 
keep the regions aware of the latest technologies and therefore become innovation 
oriented.
Wider policy orientation to informatics also appears to be an attractive 
option. A case study for Ireland by Hanna (1982) shows how the informatics sector 
actually created development. Informatics industry was chosen due to its growth 
potential (25% annually at that time), the high value over volume ratio of its
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products and its profitability. The policy offered a well educated workforce, 
welcoming political structure, and cash, land, and buildings together with taxation 
incentives. The result was that ten of the world’s leading manufacturers were 
attracted, creating jobs and income. The potential for wider technological diffusion, 
to the extent that relevant knowledge is abundant, should not be overlooked.
The Business Services Centres concept is also meant to promote the 
formulation of new firms in less industrialised areas, and use information to match 
local supply to regional demand. Once established, the creation of joint services for 
small and medium sized firms, such as for exports and marketing, are possible. But 
even the more internal operations of the firm can be provided on behalf of small 
firms, such as legal advice, software customisation, market research and 
recruitment. It might prove in this way, that small firms concentrating on the 
clearly productive activities can improve their results. Other policies of potential 
may be those supporting electronic data interchange networks between firms, 
which have been shown to offer the potential of reducing local firms’ communication 
costs by 80-99% (Riddle 1988). For example, several car manufacturers in Europe 
created the ODETTE (Organisation for Data Exchange by Tele Transmission in 
Europe).
3.3.3 Alternative development patterns: endogenous development
Local cooperation is seen as one of the most appropriate institutional forms 
for local development and restructuring, as it was wisely set out by Stohr and 
Taylor (1981) before the crisis of the eighties emerged. Nevertheless, what in 
many cases might start as a 'local development programme', may often end up as 
being dominated and controlled by forces external to the region. Bryden and Scot, 
(1990) suggest that more importance has been placed by central governments on 
oiling the wheels of the market via loans and grants for the private sector, than 
supporting the locally based institutional structure, local morale and self 
confidence.
The phenomenon of the job generation gap is the result of the combined 
development of the culture of dependency and changing economic conditions 
(Steinle and Moya 1986). Lack of entrepreneurship in regions may well result from 
decades of normative acceptance of people working for a wage (Hudson 1983). 
Brugger (1986) suggests that central governments' regional policy during the last 
two decades realised a shift from the dictum of 'reduction of regional disparities' to 
the more convenient 'reduction of the undesirable regional disparities'. The latter 
can accommodate nationwide measures, maybe ineffective but of political benefit to
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the policy makers.
Given the above analysis, the theory of Endogenous Development is based 
on utilisation of the Endogenous Potential of an area. This is the amount of 
endogenous factors of production that can be operationalised in the interest of 
self- reliant regional development (Brugger 1986). In these cases decline tends to 
be outbalanced to a certain extent through local restructuring, use of high 
technology and innovation carried out by local entrepreneurs and cooperatives. 
The preconditions of improving the chances of such restructuring are the 
existence of a local crafts history or a technical culture, local entrepreneurial spirit 
and intensive intra regional linkages, physical proximity between local research, 
production and markets, local solidarity, and democratic decision making. (Stohr 
1990b)
First, from an economic point of view, in most cases the smaller the area the 
weaker the endogenous potential. Nevertheless, it is argued that advantageous use 
of the regions resources (by raising local value added) in production, maintenance 
and increase of local entrepreneurial competence and strengthening of intra 
regional linkages are the key issues. Small and medium enterprises may be increasing 
the flexibility of the regions' productive base and in some cases may be more 
receptive to knowledge transfers from universities or research institutes. From an 
environmental point of view, selective attraction of firms may be adopted and 
certainly some realistic economic concern should be given for environment.
Second, from a political point of view, it tends to be the case that when the 
subsidiary and solidarity principles are brought forward within the region, local 
confidence supports development. The theory suggests that it seems to be of 
great importance, that any measures taken by central governments should aim to 
further the potential local mobilisation rather, than being injections of finance and 
technology irrespective of the local factors. There are no few cases in Europe, 
where decline was caused by the crowding out effect of few large oligopolistic 
firms, often state-aided or controlled, later running into problems themselves. 
Equally, power of decision making, planning and implementing needs is proposed to 
be transferred down to the local level. Of course coordination usually remains at 
national level. But still, a continuous process of territorial monitoring and policy 
adjustment to the goals of endogenous development, may be very valuable, if 
formulated.
Third, on social and cultural grounds, endogenous development implies a 
collective process of goal setting, but at the same time the operation of individual 
decision making processes. It requires people to work towards collective goals,
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furthering development processes 'from below1, intensification of local 
communication networks and a strengthening of regional identity.
The above three-way development structure can be said to have been a 
theoretical underpinning of the recent reorientation of the Industrial Areas 
Programme in Greece, mentioned earlier. Internationally, in this direction, the I.L.E. 
(initiative locale de creation d1 emploi) are schemes promoted by OECD and EC and 
are presented as one remedy for unemployment starting from the grass roots. The 
I.L.Es may be community businesses, often emerging out of the 'alternative' 
movement, mobilising the grassroots and creating common awareness in the 
community. They have social, economic and sometimes environmental goals. Their 
greatest problem is undercapitalisation (European Commission 1988).
The critique to the concept of 'development from below', was initially based 
on three types of reasons. First, the economic argument is that local economies 
are too small and in command of too few resources. They would not be able to stop, 
it was argued, the deterministic changes of international division of labour. Second, 
a political reasoning focuses on grounds that the power vested at local or even 
regional level is too small to confront the dominance of large multinational 
enterprises. Third, is the general lack of information which provides the concept of 
good decision making, due to the reliance of local governments on central 
governments during the last decades (Schultze 1985, Gerdes 1985).
An alternative theory to the development from below ideas is the Self 
Reliance Movement. The theory assumes that endogenous development within the 
mainstream of economic policy is closed. The main argument is that endogenous 
development is a viable option only for the world city regions, which can use their 
countervailing power to negotiate with global capital and the state, for 
arrangements favourable to their economic and political elites. But this seems to be 
too far from what is meant as development from below. Friedman (1986a) 
describes the Self Reliance Movement as a social one, encompassing political action. 
It would expand beyond regional boundaries to achieve a loose and flexible posture 
amongst international capital and the states. The object of the movement, is 
suggested, is to change reality, not to administer it. The Self -Reliance movement is 
seeking effectiveness though decentralised forms of organisation and dispersed 
leadership responsibilities. It assumes ordinary people to involve as actors within the 
civil society and undertake related political engagement.
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3 .4  Conclusion
Political and economic power structures of today, assisted by the much 
improved transportation and information networks, have created a globalised 
economy. Countries and regions try and hope for an improved participation that 
can be thought of as the reflection of development.
In the world, or in one country, polarisation or centralisation of economic 
and political power is based on an unequal spread of information and technological 
advantage. Thus development of capacity, preferably with the use of indigenous 
capability, in the sectors of leading-edge technology and use of informatics gives 
countries, or regions, the possibility of better participation in the world economy 
and decreased dependency.
It is suggested that to attain the technological and information advantages, 
countries or regions have to overcome socio-political, infrastructural and human 
resources problems. Subsequently, a determined effort is necessary to promote 
and facilitate research advance. This process can be aided with the use of 
decentralised, fast and specific government tools and structures.
As pointed out earlier, postwar Greece has suffered from extreme 
centralisation of economic and industrial activities that continued while the national 
regional development policy was based on the two-sector neo-classical model. Given 
the inadequacy of the resultant regional development, the Industrial Areas 
Programme was conceived, and was based on the growth poles strategy. At a later 
stage, in 1988, the Programme was suggested to reorientate, to follow a 
generalised industrial space provision policy. The new plans are not yet 
implemented. The Industrial Areas Programme, designed in the sixties as national 
growth poles, and implemented in the seventies and eighties had varying results.
The Industrial Areas Programme in Greece could be one strategy that could 
accommodate the application of a flow of new technology and support peripheral 
infomotion, with the relevant soft and material infrastructure. In the light of the 
theories brought forward in this chapter, the restructuring of the existing 
Industrial Areas towards new /  high technology initiatives may well prove to be the 
main necessity, but not the only one. For improved effectiveness, as analysed here, 
much needs to be done in the area of decision making, decentralisation and efficient 
operation of existing and new government tools at local level. This is because 
technology and information do not flourish in 'castles in the desert1.
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Chapter 4 : Regional employment and productivity 
perform ance
4.1 In tro d u c tio n
Regional differences in employment and productivity change are important 
for two reasons. First, they reflect the outcome of different production processes 
in space, where available labour is combined with various sorts of capital using 
specific technologies. But also they reflect the regional comparative advantages 
and the consequent opportunities for efficient business operation in space and of 
course these can be affected by policy measures. The centralisation problem in 
Greece was outlined in an earlier chapter as were the development policies adopted 
and the appropriate theoretical framework. But since the main development policy 
evaluated here is the Industrial Areas Programme, it is useful to discuss the 
characteristics of the Industrial Areas and the recipient regions before tackling the 
quantitative analysis of regional performance.
The Industrial Areas were established in both peripheral industrial centres 
and remote or lagging regions to promote industrial development and consequently 
regional development. Table 4-1 illustrates the varying characteristics of the 
twenty regions with Industrial Areas. It can be seen that their population varies 
from almost a million to just over fifty thousand; many though are around the
150.000 level. Variations in levels of urbanisation are also large, ranging from some 
80% to less than 20%. In most cases though these regions have only one large 
urban centre around which most industrial activity is located.
Thus the regions are not at all similar in their population setting. This is also 
the case in respect to their manufacturing characteristics. Leaving aside 
Thessaloniki, which is by no means peripheral having a manufacturing sector over
100.000 strong, employment varies from over twenty thousand to under two 
thousand employees in the various regions. Table 4-1 also shows the ratio of 
employment in manufacturing over total population for each of the regions, termed 
the manufacturing index. It shows directly the importance of manufacturing for
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Table 4-1 : Basic employment magnitudes for all Industrial Brea Regions
VO
00
■"V"
Geographical 
Department *
Thessaloniki
Rchaia
Larissa
Magnissla
Pella
Kauala
Iraklio
Serres
Drama
Fthiotis
Hanthl
Messlnia
loannina
Euros
Kilkis
Dodecanissos
Rothopl
Rrcadia
Preueza
Fiorina
Capital
City
Thessaloniki 
Patra 
Larissa 
Volos 
Edessa 
Kavala 
Iraklio 
Serres 
Drama 
Lamia 
Xanthi 
Kalamata 
loannina 
Alexandrupolis 
Kilkis 
Rhodos 
Komotini 
T ripolis 
Preveza 
Fiorina
Total 
Population 
(a) 
871,580  
275,193  
254,295  
182,222  
132,386  
135,218  
243,622  
196,247  
94,772  
161,995  
88,777  
159,818  
147,304  
148,486  
81,562  
145,071 
107,957  
107,932  
55,915  
52,430
Urbanisation
Percentage
81.0%  
65.5%  
44.7%  
58.9%  
30.7%  
41.9%  
45.5%  
23.6%  
39.2%  
25.8%  
38.2%  
27.1%  
30.4%  
34.0%  
15.5%  
46.7%  
34.7%  
19.8%  
24.4%
24.0%
Regional 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
(b )  
106919  
21186  
17171 
14612 
11505  
11279  
10631 
10208  
8673 
8480  
6949  
6901 
6397  
6375  
6002  
4478  
4187  
2956  
2064  
1208
Manufacturing 
Index 
( b) /  (a) 
12.3% 
7.7% 
6.8% 
8.0% 
8.7% 
8.3% 
4.4% 
5.2% 
9.2%  
5.2% 
7.8%  
4.3%  
4.3%  
4.3%  
7.4% 
3.1% 
3.9% 
2.7% 
3.7%
2.3%
Jndustrial Areas v :
Employment
(c )
6030
1360
81
3900
234
209
1794
1004
1270
242
405
30
138.
0
1009 
0 
1200 
187 
730  
420
( c ) / ( b )
5.6% 
6.4%  
0.5%  
26.7%  
2.0% 
1.9%
16.9%  
9.8%  
14.6%  
2.9%  
5.8% 
0.4%  
2.2% 
0.0%
16.8% 
0.0% 
28.7%  
6.3%  
35.4%  
34.8%
 _ _ W
Establishments in Region 
Average
'V '
Number
18232  
3430  
3508  
2448  
1779 
1774  
3831 
2740  
1254 
1741 
853 
1993 
1990  
1748  
970 
1471 
984  
980  
600  
465
Size
(d)
5.9 
6.2
4.9 
6.0 
6.5
6.4 
2.8 
3.7
6.9
4.9 
8.1
3.5
3.2
3.6
6.2
3.0
4.3
3.0
3.4 
2-6
Establishments in Industrial Area 
Average 
Number Size 
(e)
54.8110
28
8
78
4 
14
100
18
39
9
5 
2
24
0
20
0
29
10
6 
7
48.6
10.1
50.0
58.5
14.9
17.9
55.8
32.6
26.9
81.0
15.0 
5.8 
0.0
50.5
0.0
41.4
18.7 
121.7
60.0
( e ) / ( d )  
935%  
786%  
207%  
838%  
905%  
235%  
646% 
1497%  
471%  
552% 
994%  
433%  
179% 
n/appl. 
815% 
n/appl. 
972% 
620%  
3537%  
2310%
Rll Industrial Areas 3,642,782 49% 268,181 7.4% 20,243 7.5% 52,791 5.1 511 39.6 780%
GREECE 9,800,000 58% 706,307 7.2% 20,243 2.9% 144,717 4.9 511 39.6 812%V_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
* Sorting Code: 'Total Manufacturing Employment"
Sources: Population:Population Census 1981; Industry: Industrial Census 1988
each region, undistorted by the varying economic activity rates, that are often 
unstable in peripheral regions due to partial employment in agriculture. The 
manufacturing index ranges from over 12% in Thessaloniki down to 2% in Fiorina. 
The median value of the index is 5.2% and the non weighed regional mean is 6%, 
while the index for all twenty regions - or regional weighed mean is 7.4%. The 
relations reveal higher values of the index in the larger regions.
The characteristics of the Industrial Area projects themselves, also vary. In 
Table 4-1 it can be seen that employment in Industrial Areas varies from over six 
thousand in Thessaloniki to some one hundred in other cases. One further ratio is 
extracted featuring the employment in the Industrial Areas over the total 
employment in manufacturing of each region. This shows the extent of importance 
of the Industrial Areas to the total regional manufacturing. There is considerable 
variation in the participation of the industrial Areas in local manufacturing and this 
variation is not analogous with the size of each Industrial Area, neither with the 
manufacturing index of each region.These comparisons can be seen in Figure 4-1.
It should be noted that the Industrial Areas are of decisive importance for 
the lagging regions with small manufacturing sectors, such as Fiorina, Preveza and 
Rothopi, where the Industrial Areas cover over 30% of all employment in 
manufacturing. For the more developed areas the most significantly participating 
Industrial Areas are in Magnisia (Volos) with some 27% of all manufacturing 
employment, and Iraklio at some 17%, while the large Industrial Areas of Thessaloniki 
and the one of Patra represent only around 6% of the respective manufacturing 
sectors. Finally, the Industrial Area - regions of Dodecanissos and Evros are 
mentioned as such since there were present Industrial Area sites in operational 
stage by 1988. But there was no virtually manufacturing employment in either site 
by 1988, only a small amount of construction and administrative employment. For 
these last cases, any regional productivity characteristics to be found in the 
following analysis are not directly attributable to the Industrial Areas.
Given the above employment magnitudes and the last reservation, one 
important issue arises regarding the importance of the Industrial Areas in the 
patterns of manufacturing in each region. The percentages may in cases seem low, 
but the type of the firms establishing in the Industrial Areas in all cases is rather 
distinctive. In Table 4-1 the average size of the establishments within the 
Industrial Areas is given, alongside the respective average regional size of all 
establishments. It can be seen that the size of the establishments in the Industrial 
Areas is much higher than the typical regional size. The ratio of the latter to the 
former describes the situation. The two values and the resultant ratio are graphed
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in Figure 4-2. In some cases the ratio is over 500% such as in Drama, Fthiotis, 
Messinia, while in Iraklio and Arcadia it is some 650%, in Achaia and Magnisia the 
ratio reaches about 800%, and in Thessaloniki and Kilkis some 900%. In some more 
remote northern regions though the ratio becomes even higher, reaching 1000% in 
Xanthi and Rothopi, 1500% in Serres, 2300% in Fiorina and 3500% in Preveza. The 
region with the lowest ratio is Larissa at 207%.
Thus it can be said with confidence that in general the Industrial Areas 
attract and concentrate the larger firms in the regions. Inevitably it also happens 
that the age of these production plants is less than the average regional. It can be 
now speculated that these firms are the very ones which have increased 
productivity and are more competitive at the national and even international level. 
It happens that the Industrial Areas are planned to and in cases do provide the 
operational infrastructure welcoming such firms and this is one of their strengths.
The analysis which follows attempts to investigate whether the Industrial 
Areas offer measurable external economies and technology transfer to the 
regions. The analysis provides a measure of the varying rates of employment 
change in the regions of Greece. Subsequently the productivity gains due to 
external economies and the utilisation of new technology over the sub-national 
territory are estimated. Such a framework can facilitate correlation between the 
regional economic performance and the regional development policy measures, with 
a specific focus on the Industrial Areas Programme. Finally, an estimation of the role 
of the structure of agglomerations in the country as regards technological 
efficiency is made.
4 .2  Analysing regional economic performance
In the first part of the analysis a description of recent regional employment 
change between 1978 and 1988 in the 51 regions of Greece ( illustrated earlier in 
Figure 2-4) will be undertaken. This will point up the basic regional development 
differences within the country and illustrate the significance of manufacturing 
activity in this respect. The method used is a standard shift share analysis. The 
analysis will identify the specifically ‘regional’ growth aspects of employment change 
after allowing for expected change due to industrial structure. A 
manufacturing-based regional performance index is then constructed in an attempt 
to judge the significance of this component in accounting for such ‘regional’
1 0 1
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employment change.
The second part of the analysis seeks to analyse the productivity patterns 
among the regions of Greece. Accounting for regional differences in productivity 
has become an important focus of research in the eighties (Moomaw 1981, 1983, 
1985). Progress has been made in advancing the level of understanding from the 
early attempts, which simply linked population-based measures of urbanisation and 
localisation economies, to more recent efforts which have tried to disentangle the 
effects of technological change from the broad influences of scale economies. 
Within what is now a substantial body of research on this topic the basic 
methodology is to derive explanations from the formulation of regional production 
functions. Some measure of output or value added is linked to a variety of factors 
of production in an attempt to judge the significance or otherwise of such capital 
and labour inputs. One such attempt, which is particularly interesting in that it 
explicitly isolates the role of technological change at the regional level, is by Beeson 
(1987) looking at productivity differences in the states of the US. She focused 
attention on the role of agglomeration economies as regards productivity growth. 
A variant of this approach has been developed here, and deployed in for the regions 
of Greece.
The objectives here are to utilise technology and variable returns to scale 
(based in part on agglomeration economies and levels of infrastructure provision) to 
develop the concept of what has been termed Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This 
may be usefully thought of as the difference between the growth rate of output 
and the weighted growth rate of constant returns to scale. In essence it is 
composed of the two components: variable, or non-constant returns to scale and 
technological change. The emphasis in this research is on the role of technological 
change in regional development and how such change might be influenced by 
regional policy, as with the Industrial Areas of Greece. The TFP model for Greece is 
calibrated on regional manufacturing value-added data for the years from 1980 to 
1988. The model, estimating differences in the value added in manufacturing given 
the employment and capital inputs, also produces a specifically ‘regional’ 
productivity growth component in value added terms. These empirical results are 
the prime ingredients of the second section.
In the third section, interesting conclusions may be drawn if the TFP model's 
findings, in value added terms, are compared with the regional growth components 
measured in employment terms. The characteristics of regions in relation to their 
results in both analyses may help to trace the extent to which various factors and 
policy itself work towards regional development.
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4.3 Regional employment change in Greece
4 .3 .1  Operationalising a shift share analysis
Employment statistics for some seven economic sectors have been used to 
analyze economic change in the regions of Greece between 1978 and 1988. The 
data derive from the 1978 and the as yet unpublished 1988 Censuses of Greek 
lndustry(National Statistical Service of Greece E2YE-3, 1978; EZYE-3, unpublished).
They refer to all 51 Geographical Departments in Greece and cover the following 
seven economic sectors: 1.Mining, 2.Manufacturing, 3.Electricity, Gas and Water, 
4.Trade and Tourism, 5.Transportation and Telecommunication, 6.Financial Services 
and 7.0ther Services. The sector of agriculture and stockfarming and the one of 
construction are not included in the analysis.
A standard shift share analysis has been used to describe the employment 
change of the 51 regions. Such analysis produces, besides a national growth 
component, also a structural effect and a residual effect. This latter is interpreted 
as the specific regional competitive change effect. This competitive effect is of 
course the result of the regional performance across all of the sectors used.
Existence of a positive competitive effect is of course the result of the 
regional performance across all of the sectors used and can only partly be 
attributed to manufacturing and relevant industrial policy. In order to better judge 
the manufacturing contribution, a manufacturing-specific regional performance 
index has been constructed (Rman). The index represents the ratio of the actual 
regional employment in manufacturing in 1988 over the expected employment in 
the region's manufacturing assuming national growth rates. One unit is subtracted 
from the formula so that positive values of the index indicate greater employment 
than expected, and vice versa.
Rman=[Regional Emant i /  (Regional Emanto *(National Emant i /  National Emanto))]-1 
where Eman = manufacturing employment.
The index is a measure of how much better or worse than the industry-specific 
national expectation manufacturing actually performed over time. Now this index is 
partially accounting for the regional residual component, and thus it can be 
measured against it. Where the two have the same sign the regional differential 
shift is enhanced by the specific regional performance in manufacturing, be it in a 
positive or negative way. In the case where the two have different signs the
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manufacturing sector’s specific performance counteracts the regional differential 
shift, again in a positive or negative manner.
Based on this analysis, a typology of four types of areas was produced, 
providing some potential for interpretation of the results in relation to the effects 
of the Industrial Area projects and the levels of regional technology.
4.3.2 The results of the shift share analysis
The national employment growth rate for the total of all seven sectors 
proved to be 12.9% for the decade 1978 to 1988. For the same period 
manufacturing grew nationally by 5.1%. The sector with the largest employment 
growth rate was financial services, with an increase of 45.7%. For relevant 
comparisons see Table 4-2. It should be thus noted that specialisation in 
manufacturing by a region can be considered unfavourable in this kind of analysis as 
it produces a negative structural component. The interesting question is to what 
extent can specific factors, such as for example the use of new technology, 
overcome this inherent structural disadvantage to produce a positive regional or 
competitive effect. The case is not theoretical because the manufacturing sector, 
even if only growing by 5.1% net, is still the second largest absolute contributor of 
new jobs, having provided some 16.1% of gross new jobs in the period. The first 
contributor, for Greece, is as expected the trade and tourism sector with 58.1% 
of gross new jobs.
In Greece, as it was described in Chapter 1, a strong centralisation of 
economic activity and economic development problems of different types continued 
during the sixties and seventies. By 1978, some 65% of the seven sector’s 
employment was concentrated in five regions, Attiki, Thessaloniki, Achaia, Iraklio and 
Magnisia, the figure rising to 68% when manufacturing alone is considered. One 
region, Attiki, in which the capital city Athens is located, accounted for 48% of the 
country's employment (except agriculture) and for 49% of manufacturing by 1978 
(Table 4-2). The participation of the above five regions fell to 61% in the seven 
sectors employment and to 64% for manufacturing in the decade. Participation of 
Attiki lessened to 43% in the seven sector’s employment by 1988, and to 42% for 
manufacturing. Regional policy can be partially accredited in that centralisation of 
economic activity can be seen to reduce over the period.
Attiki experienced declines in all activities except for financial services, 
other services, and the trade-tourism sectors. Table 4-3 shows that Attiki with 
its given industrial structure should have grown by 12.2%, very near to the 
national average. But Attiki had an employment growth rate of only 1.2%, only
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Table 4 -2 : Greece: changing employment, 1978 -  1988
7 Sectors % Change Net Nev» Sectors' % Sectors' %
in employment Jobs contributior contribution
in new jobs in lost jobs
Mining -3.9 -837 - 5.7
Manufacturing 5.1 33990 16.1 -
Electricity-Gas-Water 22.6 5899 2.8 -
Trade &Tourism 23.4 122430 58.1 -
Transportation &Telecommunication -9.1 -13906 - 94.3
Financial Services 45.7 32687 15.5 -
Other services 32.4 15887 7.5 -
ALL 7 SECTORS 12.9 196150 100.0 100.0
New jobs Lost jobs
V = 210893 = -14743 ,
f '  Employment in the Seven Sectors ^\
GREECE
1978
1516345
% 1988
1712495
%
Achaia 40278 3% 44426 3%
Attiki 728083 48% 736531 43%
Iraklio 29306 2% 39118 2%
Magnisia 27084 2% 30932 2%
Thessaloniki 153388 10% 201921 12%
FIVE REGIONS 978139 65% 1052928 61%
Employment in Manufacturing
1978 % 1988 %
GREECE 672317 706307
Achaia 21119 3% 21186 3%
Attiki 327729 49% 298277 42%
Iraklio 9124 1% 10631 2%
Magnisia 14788 2% 14612 2%
Thessaloniki 82886 12% 106919 15%
FIVE REGIONS 455 64 6 68% 451625 64%
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Table 4-3 Greece: Shlft-share analysis of employment In seuen sectors, 1978 -1988
^  SHIFT SHARE 
A N A L Y S I S  
VReglons
Regional Growth 
Rate (%)
( G .r)
National Growth 
Rate (96) 
(G .n )
Regional Growth (96) 
at National proportions 
( G .rn )
Structural 
Component (96) 
(G.m-G.n)
Competitive 
Effect (96) 
(G.r-G.m)
R.man.
R.man
R.man. correlation 
measure with 
Competitive Effect
Existence of 
Industrial Area
'Achaia ^ / 10.30 12.94 N(  12.55 -0.38 -2.26 N -0.045 0.102 i. n.
Arcadia 20.10 12.94 14.31 1.38 5.79 0.070 0.407 i. n.
Argolida 13.63 12.94 13.94 1.00 -0.31 -0.105 0.033
Arta 8.41 12.94 15.84 2.91 -7.43 -0.012 0.091
Attiki 1.16 12.94 12.22 -0.71 -11.06 -0.134 1.480
Chalkidiki 33.28 12.94 13.24 0.31 20.03 0.203 4.068
Chania 13.08 12.94 13.69 0.75 -0.61 -0.123 0.075
Chios 6.18 12.94 16.12 3.19 -9.94 0.034 -0.341
Dodecanissos 37.20 12.94 18.34 5.41 18.85 •0.062 -1.168 i. fl.
Drama 40.72 12.94 12.83 -0.11 27.89 0.490 13.658 i. n.
Etoloakarnania 10.77 12.94 16.53 3.60 -5.76 -0.088 0.506
Evia 4.SI 12.94 11.18 -1.76 -6.67 -0.034 0.230
Evritania 57.47 12.94 16.32 3.38 41.15 1.424 58.589
Evros 24.70 12.94 16.37 3.43 8.33 0.277 2.310 1. R.
Fiorina 33.85 12.94 15.86 2.92 18.00 -0.038 •0.680 i. n.
Fokida 8.33 12.94 12.25 -0.69 -3.91 0.350 -1.371
Fthiotis 8.31 12.94 13.49 0.55 -5.18 -0.054 0.277 1. R.
Grevena 13.94 12.94 14.53 1.60 -0.59 -0.065 0.039
Ilia 13.01 12.94 16.37 3.43 -3.36 0.010 •0.035
Imathia 21.17 12.94 11.39 -1.55 9.78 0.135 1.322
loannina 26.67 12.94 13.39 0.45 13.28 0.081 1.073 1. R.
Iraklio 33.48 12.94 16.56 3.62 16.92 0.109 1.846 i. n.
Karditsa 15.86 12.94 17.00 4.07 -1.14 0.149 -0.170
Kastoria 6.88 12.94 8.99 •3.94 -2.12 -0.064 0.136
Kavala 27.51 12.94 13.46 0.53 14.04 0.333 4.680 1. R.
Kephalonia 27.63 12.94 16.11 3.17 11.52 0.078 0.901
Kerkyra 8.12 12.94 18.01 5.08 -9.89 -0.156 1.547
Kilkis 45.57 12.94 13.50 0.56 32.07 0.535 17.170 1. R.
Korinthia 18.38 12.94 13.09 0.15 5.30 -0.008 -0.045
Kozani 52.90 12.94 11.18 -1.76 41.72 0.310 12.929
Kydades 54.94 12.94 14.34 1.41 40.59 0.388 15.750
Laconia 10.62 12.94 16.48 3.54 -5.85 -0.117 0.687
Larissa 23.44 12.94 12.74 -0.20 10.70 0.110 1.172 1. R.
Lasithi 34.64 12.94 17.87 4.94 16.77 0.029 0.482
Lefkada 21.68 12.94 16.75 3.82 4.93 0.034 0.169
Lesvos 2.07 12.94 15.40 2.47 -13.33 -0.112 1.500
Magnisia 14.21 12.94 12.43 -0.51 1.78 -0.059 ■0.106 1. R.
Messinia 9.21 12.94 14.85 1.91 -5.64 -0.093 0.523 1. R.
Pella 41.20 12.94 13.52 0.59 27.68 0.470 13.009 1. R.
Pieria 55.57 12.94 15.45 2.52 40.11 0.757 30.348
Preveza 21.98 12.94 15.16 2.22 6.83 0.079 0.539 i. n.
Rethimno 50.50 12.94 17.11 4.18 33.38 0.290 9.674
Rothopi 23.31 12.94 1S.11 2.18 8.19 0.404 3.309 1. R.
Samos 19.77 12.94 16.23 3.29 3.54 -0.052 -0.184
Serres 12.83 12.94 14.57 1.63 -1.74 0.175 -0.303 1. R.
Thesprotia 30.26 12.94 16.92 3.99 13.34 0.559 7.460
Thessaloniki 31.64 12.94 12.10 -0.83 19.54 0.228 4.452 1. R.
Trikala 23.73 12.94 14.53 1.60 9.20 0.099 0.913
Viotia 15.24 12.94 8.99 -3.94 6.24 0.092 0.576
Xanthi 51.80 12.94 12.96 0.02 38.85 0.550 21.358 1. R.
'Zakynthos y V 58.70 12.94 ^ V 16.52 3.58 42.19 J K 0.305 12.846
NOTE: The "Rman Correlation Measure with the Competitive Effect" is produced by multiplication of the values of the Competitive Effect and the Rman .
slightly accounted for by a negative structural component of -0.7%, and mainly due 
to a large negative competitive component of -11.1%. The causes may be lower 
productivity and diseconomies due to congestion, pollution, etc, besides an effective 
decentralisation policy due to regional development incentives and of course the 
Industrial Areas Programme. However, it is still a fact that Athens with 33% of the 
population of Greece still holds 43% of the jobs in the country.
Employment in Thessaloniki, given its structure and growth at the national 
rates, should have increased by 12.1%. Instead it grew by 31.6%, playing the role 
of Athens in the northern part of the country. Although its structural component 
is negative, -0.8%, its residgal -competitive- component is substantially positive at 
19.5%. It is not without importance that the Rman of this region was 0.23 showing 
that manufacturing grew 23% faster than the sectoral expectation. Recent 
centralisation in Thessaloniki is becoming more marked since here 8% of the 
country's population holds 12% of the employment by 1988 in the seven sectors 
considered. But it interesting to see -later- the way in which productivity is 
affected by this centralisation. In the region there is a large and thriving Industrial 
Area.
Besides these two large city regions in Greece, several other departments 
with conurbations over 50,000 people have been active in attempting to promote 
economic activity. Patra, for example, is a city of just over 150,000 and has a 
considerable industrial tradition. Employment here grew by 10.3%, and this is 
slower than the national growth rate. The mix effect is slightly negative and both 
the regional competitive factor and the Rman index are negative. In Patra the 
Industrial Area project was not able to counteract the regional trends; ageing 
infrastructure and old technology are not untypical of the region. Iraklio is the 
largest city on Crete with 110,000 population. Here employment grew by 33.5% , 
much higher than the expected given its structure. Iraklio has a large positive 
competitive effect that is not all due to tourism; the Rman is positive and the local 
Industrial Area is successful. New technology in new flexible firms may well be the 
prime reason? Volos is another industrial city with 100,000 population and a large 
Industrial Area. Employment increased here by 14.2% which is higher than its 
structural expectation. The competitive effect is positive while the Rman is 
marginally negative. This may well be a case where industrial restructuring is having 
important effects.
It is possible to construct a typology of employment performance in all 
regions (Table 4-4). In thirteen of the twenty departments possessing an 
Industrial Area, a positive value for Rman is associated with a positive competitive
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Table 4-4 : R typology regarding contribution o f manufacturing employment to regional competitiueness
V J
(  AREA R.man. Competitive Correlation A
TYPE Effect of Rman with Number of Regions
V
Competitive Effect J
+ + + fl.Thessalonikl 1 \
+ + + B. Iraklio
+ + + B. Larissa
+ + + B. Viotia 3
+ + + C. Arcadia
+ + + C. Chalkidiki
+ + + C. Drama
+ + + C. Evritania
+ + + C. Imathia
+ + + C. loannina
+ + + C. Kauala
+ + + C. Kephalonia
+ + + C. Kilkis
T Y P E + + + C. Kozani
+ + + C. Kyclades
+ + + C. Lasithi
I + + + C. Lefkada
+ + + C. Pella
+ + + C. Pieria
+ + + C. Preueza
+ + + C. Rethimno
+ + + C. Thesprotia
+ + + C. Trikala
+ + + C. Zakynthos 20
+ + + D. Euros
+ + + D. Rothopl
+ + + D. Hanthi 3
l>Jumber o f Regions consisting Type 1 27 J
X
+ - - C. Fokida
T Y P E + - - C. Ilia
II + - - C. Karditsa
+ - - C. Serres 4
+ - - D. Chios 1
^Number of Regions consisting Type II J
- + - B. Korinthia
T Y P E - + - B. Magnisia 2In -  - - + - C. Fiorina 1
- + - D. Dodecanissos
- + - D. Samos 2
.Number o f Regions consisting Type 111 J
- - + A. Attiki >
- - + B. Achaia 1
- - + C. Argolida
- - + C. Arta
T Y P E - - + C. Chania
- - + C. Etoloakarnania
- - + C. Evia
- - + C. Fthlotis
IV - - + C. Grevena
- - + C. Kastoria
- - + C. Kerkyra
- - + C. Laconia
- - + C. Messinia *(1) 11
- - + D. Lesvos 1
^Number of Regions consisting Type III J
NOTES:
Regions in Bold possess Industrial Areas ( I.A.)
The letters pre-fixed to the regions' names show the national incentives classification of the regions, Law 1262 /82
(A) Central Regions, no investments financial incentives, except for special high technology projects.
(B) Developed Regions, low financial incentives.
(C) Less developed Regions, stronger incentives.
(D) Lagging and Remote or Strategical Regions, powerful incentives.
* (1 ) Messinia joined the (D) assisted areas in 1987, with the Law 168 2 /8 7  after being hit by earthquaqes.
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effect. In other words a better than average performance in manufacturing gives 
these regions a positive all sectors regional growth effect (type I). In one further 
case (type II) a faster than average increase in employment in manufacturing was 
not able to offset a below average all-sectors performance. In three more cases a 
negative Rman is associated with a negative shift-share residual, again showing the 
critical role of manufacturing in the performance of a region, (type IV). In only 
three cases of the twenty (type III) is found that above average performance is 
associated with manufacturing increase rates below the national average.
There are specific mitigating circumstances in all three deviating areas. 
Dodecanissos is an island complex successfully devoted to trade and tourism 
resulting in a positive structural component, in fact amongst the highest in Greece. 
It is, however, not a prime manufacturing area. The Industrial Area was not in 
operation until very late in the examined period (as explained) and its future role 
can be thought of as a receiver for industry rather than stimulating agent. Fiorina 
is located in one of the most distant and mountainous areas on the northern 
boarder of Greece. The location of the Industrial Area has a strategic as well as an 
economic role. The case of Magnesia is different - a large old industrial region with a 
port and two significant Industrial Area sites. Employment in manufacturing, the 
most important sector by far, fell by 1 %. This area has a manufacturing base much 
suited to modernisation and restructuring. Although the region does have a positive 
competitive effect in the shift share analysis this is much dependent on service 
sector performance. Larissa, however, the neighbouring department with a similar 
sized manufacturing sector and also with an Industrial Area, shows a much better 
and above average performance in manufacturing.
Among the regions that contain an Industrial Areas, some 70% , those 
shown in Figure 4-3, benefitted from more than proportionate growth in 
manufacturing for whatever the reasons (types I and II). The relation can be 
regarded as compatible with the hypothesis that the Industrial Areas strategy 
helps the recipient regions to maintain and expand their manufacturing capacity 
above national levels. This is not to say, however, that important manufacturing 
gains have not been achieved in regions without Industrial Areas. Several of the non 
Industrial Area regions achieve type I and II classification (positive Rman), but the 
relevant percentage is 58% compared to the 70% of all the Industrial Area regions. 
Besides, in 80% of the cases growth in manufacturing (Rman) is co-directional with 
the all-round competitive effect (types I and IV).
Overall, some 27 of the total 51 regions (53%) experienced accelerated 
manufacturing gains together with all-round positive competitive effects (type I).
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Figure 4-3: Higher than expected performance in 
manufacturing employment grouith of the regions 
of Greece hauing an Industrial Rrea, 1981 -1988
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Some 32 regions (63%) experienced faster employment growth in manufacturing 
than the expected (positive Rman, types I and II). Finally, a co-directional relation 
between Rman and the competitive effect, (types I and IV) is found in 41 of the 51 
regions, 80% overall. The previously observed strong relationship between the 
fortunes of manufacturing and all-round performance is clear.
One further aspect of the typology needs to be explained. Each region 
carries with it a particular code letter (A-D) which is its assistance class, reflecting 
the strength of the assisted status accorded to the region under the national 
legislation for development (Law 1262/1982). It can be seen that there is 
considerable relationship between the strength of manufacturing performance in a 
region and the level at which financial incentives are available to assist industry. 
Peripheral areas with strong incentives seem to be better represented in the list of 
high performing (in employment terms) (type I) areas. It would appear that financial 
incentives of the nationwide assistance scheme plus the existence of the Industrial 
Areas Programme seem to overcome locational disadvantage in remote areas 
providing acceptable operating environments for new and re-located firms. Firms 
located in such areas, being either recently established or enlarged, tend to have 
more up-to-date equipment using newer technologies. In older industrialised areas 
the results are less clear cut. Financial incentives are weaker, of course, and local 
industry is in some cases ageing and in need of restructuring.
There is obvious scope for policy to efficiently pursue technological advance. 
While employment increase is one aim, productivity and the related competitiveness 
is another. The last mentioned proved in the theoretical part of this thesis as a main 
prerequisite for sustaining existing employment and creating new growth. How, 
when and where do these features match? These are questions that can be 
approached in the following total factor productivity analysis.
4 .4  Regional productivity change in Greece
4.4.1 Measurement of productivity growth and the total factor
productivity models
It would be instructive to begin with a definition of productivity growth. In 
the productive process it can be said that, if the output growth rate is greater 
than input growth rate from a first period to a second period, then there has been 
productivity improvement. The length of the time interval over which the
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measurement is undertaken is of no determining importance - it may be years or 
quarters.
Other definitions which derive from the above are provided by Diewert 
(1992). When output per unit of input is greater in one period than in a previous 
one increased productivity occurs, and this is termed a ‘technical coefficients’ 
definition. The ‘deflated costs and revenues’ definition claims increased productivity 
when the final over initial period revenue ( output) ratio is larger than the relevant 
costs ratio. Finally, the ‘Jorgenson and Griliches' price index’ method defines 
productivity as a ratio; it is the rate of growth in input prices from the one period 
to another, divided by the rate of the relevant growth in output prices.
The above methods and definitions are more suitable if one input is measured 
against one output, or alternatively, the summed costs of several inputs measured 
against summed revenues from of one or more outputs. The use of production 
functions for the measurement of productivity allows the use of more extensive and 
distinctive sets of inputs and/or outputs.
Output (Q) can be described for each period as a function of inputs. For two 
inputs xl and x2 it has the form:
Qt = f(x1 ,x2)
As this is the case for each period, the right hand part of the equation can be 
transformed into a temporary component (at) and an atemporal part:
Qt = at f(x1 ,x2)
Then the measure of productivity (P) is P = at=l /  at=0
The equation can be redefined in various operational forms such as a linear 
production function, or Cobb-Douglas type production function. The latter is one 
that implies that inputs (capital and labour) and outputs, if several, are perfect 
substitutes and the elasticities of output in respect to inputs sum to one, if scale 
economies are not assumed. A quadratic form, or a translog production function, 
introduced by Christensen et. al. (1971) does not restrict substitution possibilities.
Total factor productivity (TFP) attempts to measure the effects on output 
of all factors of production, as opposed to only labour productivity and/or only 
capital productivity, etc. The TFP methodology was introduced by Kendrick (1973). 
He used the real gross product as the output measure and was interested in the 
TFP of various sectors of the US economy. In a later work (1980) he emphasised 
the trends and cycles of the TFP over time, using data for the US between 1948 
and 1976.
Jorgenson et.al. (1987) also made analyses of the economic growth of the 
US for 1948-1979. They too measured gross output of the economy and produced
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a production function for each economic sector. The innovative part of their 
method was that they used a labour input factor which was enhanced by a complex 
factor of labour quality. They also incorporated a quality dimension to their capital 
input factor. In addition to their capital and labour inputs they used the interesting 
notion of an intermediate input and this was empirically calibrated using 
input-output tables. Results showed that the driving forces in the 3.4% annual 
average expansion of the US economy over this period were mainly due to capital 
and labour increases, contributing an average of 2.6% annually, while in contrast 
productivity growth only accounted for 0.8%.
For international comparisons the work of Kurosawa (1984) should be 
mentioned. In a measurement of the productivity of Japan for the period 
1970-1980 he finds an annual increase in national (all sector) productivity of 4.0%. 
The manufacturing sector's annual productivity growth for Japan was 9.3%, while 
that of Singapore was, he suggests, only around 4%.
One advantage of a value added as opposed to a gross output based TFP 
production function is that capital and labour inputs alone adequately account also 
for the 'intermediate* input. In addition, the use of value added information 
embodies important socio-economic aspects of the economy that the gross output 
does not (Kurosawa 1984). A further advantage of the TFP methodology is that it 
does not have to account for the (social) opportunity cost of investment since it 
uses capital stock instead of total investment. On the other hand the method is 
also, almost by definition, sensitive. If, in a progressive economy, the ratio of capital 
stock over total investment rises constantly, or, in other words, if net investment is 
ever increasing, the method would tend to underestimate value added productivity.
Using a value added TFP model, Beeson (1987) advances previous work in 
that she extends analysis of productivity in the regional context. Specifically she 
evaluates the role of agglomeration economies in the regional productivity growth 
of the manufacturing sector. Data for the 48 contiguous states of the US for 
1959-1973 on value added and the labour input were obtained from government 
manufacturing surveys. The more elusive capital stock data relies heavily on 
previous research by other authors. The research deploys two analytical stages. 
First, using time series data, TFP is estimated together with its constituent 
components, scale economies and technological change. Second, the TFP findings 
are related, using cross-sectional data, to a series of location specific explanatory 
variables, selected to represent agglomeration effects of various sorts as well as 
the spatial arrangement of cities.
In the field of measurement of productivity, there have been further
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attempts to consider ideas such as the efficiency of use of capital and labour inputs 
in the manufacturing sector. Beeson and Husted (1989) use the TFP methodology 
through a stochastic frontier production function model which estimates the 
properties of the best practiced technology among the regions of the US. 
Inefficiency of a state's manufacturing is measured as deviation from the best 
technology practice frontier.
4 .4 .2 Operationalising the total factor productivity analysis for
Greece
This research utilises the TFP methodology. Regional translog production 
functions accounting for value added in manufacturing comprise the model to be 
used here. Beeson (1987) was mainly concerned to account for the spatial 
differences in the productivity change components by agglomeration economies. 
But the productivity components and their distribution over space seem just as, if 
not more, interesting themselves. These are the focus of this paper.
Employment and value-added data are derived from the Annual Industrial 
Surveys of Greece (E2YE-4, various; E2YE-4, unpublished) for the years 1980 to
1988. For reasons of confidentiality and resultant necessary aggregation 
statistics are provided only for 42 regions instead of the full 51 departments.
In the main equation of the model the difference in output is a function of 
the elasticity-weighted capital stock of a region, the elasticity weighted labour 
inputs for the period and the rate of technical change. Growth in value added is 
decomposed into a constant returns to scale (CRS) portion, a scale economies 
(VRS) portion, and a portion attributed to technical change (TEC). The TFP is the 
growth attributable to all factors, apart from the CRS component. In other words 
TFP is the output growth due to VRS and TEC. In accounting for changes in 
manufacturing output, VRS need not be restrictively attributed to agglomeration 
economies. This component may well incorporate the results of an interventionary 
policy by government as well as the regional entrepreneurial and innovative 
potential. Similarly for technological change.
Subsequently, a technological stochastic frontier arrangement is deployed 
for the decomposition of the part of value added growth attributed to technology. 
Here again CRS and VRS are used, but allowance is made for distorting factors in 
the previously estimated TEC. The regions are then distinguished and ranked 
according to their deviation from where best technology practice occurs.
In order to utilize these types of TFP growth models and to be able to
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estimate the technological evolution, a critical input of the regional capital stock 
was needed. For the case of Greece, an estimation of the capital stock for industry 
and in a regionally disaggregated manner was unavailable to the present authors, if 
available at all.
Creating a method that would provide an estimate of the capital stock used 
by industry in the regions of Greece was a challenge, as well as a necessity, in this 
stage of the research. The following procedure was followed using the investments 
in 42 regions for fourteen years (1974 to 1987). Regionally disaggregated data 
for investments in industry are not available for the years before 1974. The annual 
current prices of the above mentioned investments were then deflated to constant 
1974 prices. Given the lack of nationwide land value indices for the years 
mentioned, the investments were deflated by a rated scale based on the capital 
goods and building materials deflators provided by the official source E£YE.
Based on these constant price measures, an average annual investment 
indicator was produced (Al). The estimation of the capital stock was based on the 
fact that investment in industry is divided in three categories, investment in land, in 
buildings and in machinery. The relevant average percentages of these categories 
were extracted and named PL, PB and PM respectively. It is set that PL+PB+PM=1. 
Subsequently, the estimation was based on an assumed full depreciation period for 
each category of investments. This was named TL, TB and TM respectively. Given 
these, the estimated capital stock, (KE) can be computed by the formula:
KEt=0 = AI ( PL TL + PB TB + PM TM )
where the (PL TL + PB TB + PM TM ) may be called weighted full depreciation period.
For the case of Greece, Al was computed from the years 1974-1979, the 
year t=0 was 1980, and the settings were PL= 0.0477, TL- 62.5 years, PB = 
0.7143, TB = 25 years, and PM = 0.2380, TM = 10 years. These gave a weighted 
full depreciation period of about 16 years.
Subsequently, the model can provide estimations for the next years' capital
stock, based on the subtraction of the annual weighted depreciation and the
addition of the relevant new investment ( I ). Thus,
KEt=1 = KEt=0 [1 - 1 /  ( PL TL + PB TB + PM TM )] + lt=0
The annual weighted depreciation rate [1 /  ( PL TL + PB TB + PM TM )] for
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the settings used for Greece was about 0.062 or 6.2%.
The capital estimation method which has been created is likely not to be 
wholly accurate but gives theoretically meaningful estimations and fully utilises the 
limited existing data. Besides it is possibly the first such attempt for the regions of 
Greece.
After the capital stock estimation was completed the value added in 
manufacturing for each of the 42 regions was deflated to 1974 constant prices, 
for the years 1980 to 1988. As an estimation of the work hours variable, which 
was required by the model, a 1974 constant price variable of the total salaries paid 
to workers was used for the same 42 regions for the same years. They derive from 
the same dataset as the value added.
Having all the disaggregated variables for the years 1980 to 1988 the 
model was thus fully operationalised. The first equation of the model takes the form 
of a translog production function attempting to account for levels of value added 
for each region. It is regressed separately for each of the 42 regions for the years 
1980 to 1988.
Ln VAjt = boi +bfj lnT + by InLjt + bKj InKjt + bLKi InLftlnKjt + Uj
where T=1...9, a dummy variable for the years 1980 to 1988, L=labour input and 
K=capital stock; i = 1 ...42 and t  = 1 ...9.
The above produces 42 sets of ( bQ , br , bt_, b x , bi_K ), one set for each
region. The goodness of fit and the values of the above coefficients can be seen in 
Table 4-5. It should be noted that the i (42) sets of b x , b|_, bye are timeless, that
is they are used time-fixed for the multiplication with the t  (9 )  time-different Kj and
Lj datasets to produce the eKit and the eyt elasticity matrices.
The elasticities eK* and eLjt of capital and labour are then constructed as
follows:
exit = bxi + bLKi InLjt and eLjt = by + bya InKjt
The scale economies factor is then the sum of the capital and labour 
elasticities.
vit =  ©Kit +  ey t
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Table 4 -5 : Regression coefficients o f the value added production function j
Regions R. sq BO Bt Bl Bk Blk "N
Achaia 0.66 -569.4 -0.180 74.38 (*) 60.70 (*) -7.82 (*)
Arc.& Laconia 0.39 -867.8 0.208 190.47 (*) 123.26 (*) -26.90 (*) |
Argolida 0.83 -702.6 0.019 135.63 (*) 88.96 (*) -17.02 (*)
Attiki 0.83 448.7 -0.091 -42.63 (**) -37.32 (**) 3.63 (**)
Chalkidiki 0.99 234.0 -0.148 -49.94 (*) -36.58 (*) 8.02 (*)
Chania 0.44 441.8 0.040 -100.47 (*) -74.37 (*) 17.11 (*)
Chios 0.93 -98.3 0.043 30.81 (*) 17.40 (*) -5.25 (*)
Dodecanissos 0.47 -235.0 -0.054 51.91 (**) 34.99 (**) -7.55 (**)
Drama 0.92 966.2 -0.002 -154.91 (*) -126.50 (*) 20.42 0
Etoloakamania 0.47 -240.9 -0.040 47.45 (**) 29.97 (**) -5 .7 6 (0
Evia 0.95 324.7 -0.094 -42.73 (**) -32.45 (**) 4.38 (O
Evrit.& Fokida 0.41 101.6 -0.751 -14.72 (**) -13.05 (**) 2.03 (O
Evros 0.80 -70.1 0.041 1 5.44 (**) 10.71 (**) -2 .1 8 (0
Florin.& Grevena 0.65 87.4 -0.216 -30.30 (**) -15.23 (**) 5.54 (O
Fthiotis 0.71 -95.2 -0.219 20.84 (**) 10.35 (**) -2 .1 2 (0
Ilia 0.76 683.6 -0.241 -135.83 0 -85.31 (*) 17.11 (*)
Imathia 0.80 1260.7 0.190 -184.89 (*) -147.64 (*) 21.78 (*)
loannina 0.66 73.2 -0.018 -11.43 (*) -8.49 (*) 1.44 (*)
Ionian Isles 0.56 -32.6 -0.094 7.47 (**) 6.93 (**) -1.37 (O
Iraklio 0.55 2223.4 0.224 -406.68 (*) -285.63 (*) 52.39 0
Karditsa 0.76 -17.7 -0.084 7.73 (**) 3.27 (**) -1 .1 3 (0
Kastoria 0.90 13.6 0.015 -1.27 (**) -3.11 (O 0.56 (O
Kavala 0.95 -20.0 0.117 3.62 (**) 2.65 (**) -0.34 (O
Kilkis 0.90 -84.5 0.099 16.73 (**) 11.05 (**) -2.03 (O
Korinthia 0.83 -166.6 -0.365 21.12 (O 18.53 (O -2.23 (O
Kozani 0.83 551.0 -0.116 -89.41 (*) -61.79 (*) 10.15 0
Kyclades 0.92 -65.2 -0.587 15.40 (**) 8.74 (**) -1.93 (O
Larissa 0.86 3628.8 0.243 -535.96 (*) -404.69 (*) 59.89 (*)
Lesvos 0.93 -147.2 -0.215 37.23 (*) 23.87 (*) -5.83 (*)
Magnisia 0.43 -463.9 -0.051 65.11 (**) 47.48 (**) -6.55 (O
Messinia 0.84 -54.1 -0.384 1 4 .1 0 (0 7.36 (O -1 .7 0 (0 .
Pella 0.89 -23.5 -0.125 5.91 (**) 2 .7 6 (0 . -0.55 (O
Pieria 0.88 -141.5 -0.063 29.74 (*) 18.69 (*) -3.77 0
Pre.The. Arta 0.30 -87.2 -0.079 17.26 (**) 12.99 (**) -2.39 (O
Reth.& Lasithi 0.42 35.3 -0.314 -13.31 (**) -7.57 (**) 3.26 (O
Rothopi 0.98 38.6 -0.259 -10.88 (*) -5.79 (*) 1.81 O
Samos 0.78 30.3 1.000 -8.80 (**) -2.72 (**) 0.96 (O
Serres 0.49 1429.7 -0.130 -261.03 (**) -192.40 (**) 35.29 (O
Thessaloniki 0.41 2934.2 -0.01 -337.43 (*) -274.68 (*) 31.69 O
Trikala 0.89 -710.4 0.139 142.22 (*) 105.29 (*) -20.91 O
Viotia 0.44 1648.0 0.019 -206.31 (*) -152.51 (*) 19.20 0
Xanthi 0.85 -375.5 -0.014 65.36 (*) 44.83 (*) -7.66 O
GREECE 0.75 380.9 0.008 -3 4 .16  (**) -32 .20  (**) 2.99 (O
V _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ._________________ /
Key to significance of estimated coefficients:
(*) shows cases with significant t-statistic above the 0.10 level (20 cases) 
(O  shows cases with significant t-statistic from 0.10 to 0.25 level (22 cases)
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The final equation that measures output growth between consecutive time 
periods requires the differential elasticities E|<jt and Eyt, the differential scale
economies factor Vjt, and finally the weighted output value X .^ These are derived as
follows:
EKit = 0.5 [ eKi(t) + eK,(t-1) ] and ELlt = 0.5 [ eu(t) + eu(t-1) ]
Vit = 0.5 [vj(t) + Vj(t-1) J
Xit = E|(jt [InKj(t) - lnKj(t-1)] + Eut [InLj(t) - InLj(t-l)]
The final output growth measuring equation of the model is the following: 
lnVAi(t)-lnVAi(t-1)=Vit-lXit + ( l - V ^ )  X* +TEQ
The left hand part of the equation is the growth in output (VA) between any 
two years. On the right hand side the Vjt-1 X& component is the breakdown of the
weighted output due to constant returns to scale CRS, and the (1-Vjt- i )  Xjt
component is the output assigned to variable returns to scale VRS. The value TEC,- is
a normal subtraction residual between the growth in VA and the weighted growth 
due to constant and variable returns to scale. This is the part of output growth 
credited to technological change. All these components are either known or 
estimated by regression and subsequently derived.
The TFP for each region is defined as the addition of the VRS and the TEC 
components. The growth in value added is provided by the model in the form : 
ln(b) - ln(a) *  CRS + VRS + TEC
this is an approximation of the actual growth percentages which are (b-a) /  a.
The calculation of the actual percentage is as follows:
P = kCRS +kVRS +kTEC 
where ln(b) - ln(a) is ln(b/a)-A and P= eA -1 and k = P /  A.
This transformation is undertaken for precision reasons only, since the differences 
of the percentages are small and the positive or negative sign is always the same.
The equation is operationalised eight times, starting with growth from 1980 
to 1981, finishing with growth from 1987 to 1988, thus giving for each region 
eight different decompositions of VA growth. An average of the components from 
the eight equations is made to produce the actual growth percentages. Thus
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average VA growth for each region is decomposed to its average CRS, VRS and TEC 
components for valid comparisons over the regions. Time trends could be 
constructed for individual regions, for any or all components.
4 .4 .3  Some technical issues on measuring and modelling the
total factor productivity
Official statistics in Greece do, as elsewhere, underestimate the value of 
output produced as well as the numbers in the employed workforce, possibly at 
different levels for each. It should be emphasised here that manufacturing is the 
sector least susceptible to ‘informal economy’ practices in comparison with 
activities in agriculture and trade and services. However one of the advantages of 
the methods used in this research is that they are mainly dependent on year to 
year variations in the changes of the input factors of production and the resultant 
outputs. The research is thus not biased by absolute magnitudes and possible 
relevant inconsistencies in the way data are collected.
On a technical point, mention should be made here of the technical 
difficulties encountered in research of this nature which uses regional time series 
data having few observations. Similar problems are to be seen in the work of 
Kurosawa (1984) and Beeson (1987) already referred to. The basic difficulty with 
the present study is that with only nine yearly observations (for a considerable 
number of regions) the levels of statistical significance associated with the 
resultant regression coefficients are likely not to be high. In many regional cases in 
this study this is true, although in all cases t-statistics would be significant at the 
0.25 level. Several alternative methods were devised to query the reliability of the 
magnitude and direction of the parameters given above and the subsequent results. 
The results given in the tables that follow refer to the original data set.
Interpolation
The nine years’ observations for each region were enhanced to produce some 17 
observations by deriving mid-year estimates based upon inter-year averages. The 
whole analysis was replicated using these enhanced data. The result, as might be 
expected, was that the variance explanation was substantially improved and the 
t-statistics for the key parameters are almost all significant at the 0.10 level, with 
many significant at the 0.05 and some at the 0.01 levels. But more important than 
the level of significance is the fact that the model run on 17 observations gave 
similar results to those for the original data set. The regions all remained in the 
same classes of performance - this typology being the object of the exercise.
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Pooling
A different method to overcome statistical difficulties is the pooling of all the data, 
which was also operationalised. This increases the number of observations to 378 
and produces one single set of parameters representing the relationships involved 
between value added and labour and capital for the whole of the country for the 
whole of the time period. The results from such an exercise are statistically robust, 
both in terms of the variance explained and the levels of significance achieved. For 
Greece as a whole the results, although not identical, are not particularly different 
when compared with the main method used in the analysis. In fact the value for TFP 
is the same (-0.04%) in both cases. However the pooled estimators are for Greece 
as a whole and are not regionally specific. To apply these national parameters to 
each of the different regions in Greece to produce the composition of output would 
be misleading.
Cross-sectional regression
Both approaches above consider labour and capital relationship fixed for the whole 
period. Pooling of data also looses the regional dimension for increased significance. 
A cross-sectional regression method delivers equally high explanatory value and 
significance as the pooling one, still missing the regional dimension, but accounting 
for changing labour and capital relations over time. Accordingly, the value added 
regression equation was run nine times, once for each of the years 1980 to 1988, 
over the 42 regions (R2 ~ 0.96 to 0.98). This produces nine sets of ( b|<, b|_, b tx ) 
to produce nine sets of annual nationwide elasticities, e«t and e[_t- From then on, 
the described methodology is followed for the decomposition of annual growth of 
value added to CRS and TFP. The latter are consequently averaged to produce a 
comparative basis, as above. This significantly different method, that is time 
sensitive, results in decomposition of the national average annual decline of value 
added of -0.47% to -0.26% CRS and -0.21% TFP. The method stresses further the 
inefficiencies of production, that in some years were large, and pulls the average 
estimations of the TFP - annually discretely constructed-, somewhat lower. Again, 
here, the method's national parameters should not be applied to each of the 
different regions in Greece.
The technological efficiency frontier model
An innovative idea on measurement of productivity in the manufacturing sector of
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the regions has been the use of a stochastic frontier production function model. To 
utilise the idea, the following procedure was adopted, based on the TFP model that 
was used above. In the model, the growth rate of value added (DVA) for each 
succession of years (t) was finally transformed through each regional (i) estimated 
production function as:
DVAjt = CRSjt +  VRSjt + TEC*
The CRSjt and VRSjt were constructed, while the TEC value was derived as the one 
that would satisfy the equation.
Following the frontier model's assumptions, the TECjt contain external distortion, in 
addition to any technological efficiency indications. If the equation
DVAjt = CRSjt +  VRSjt + Ujt
is regressed in the form
DVAjt = b0j + b-] CRSjt b2VRSjt i^t
for each region, (i times), over t years, the Ujt are decomposed in bj intercepts that 
are regionally distinct allowing for the noise residual Ujt.
These intercepts account for the technological efficiency of each region. The 
frontier arrangement is based on these intercepts. Inefficiency of a region's 
manufacturing is measured by its deviation from this best technology practice 
frontier - the largest intercept. The measure of deviation from the technological 
frontier, for each region, is given by an always negative value Vj as follows:
D-VAjt = ( bomax + Vi) +  biCRSjt + b2VRSjt + urt 
or,
D-VAjt = bmax + bj CRSjt b2VRSjt Vj + Ujt
The model also allows for ranking of regions, according to their deviations 
(Vj) from the region with the optimal technological efficiency.
The model was constructed and run for Greece and the results are 
presented subsequently, after the ones of the original method, and in relation to 
them.
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Finally, before examining some of the results, it must be recognised that 
these are only models for concepts that are really complicated processes. The 
models deal with straightforward input values of the basic factors of production, 
measuring the efficiency with which they are combined, which is affected by several 
other factors in times and places.
4 .4 .4  Total factor productivity results
Following the originally described method, the growth rates are decomposed 
into constant returns to scale (CRS), variable returns to scale (VRS), the 
technology factor (TEC). The total factor productivity (TFP) estimates were 
produced for the manufacturing sector of Greece, covering some 42 regions of 
Greece, based on some aggregations of all 51 departments, for the eight years, 
1981 to 1988.
What can meaningfully be compared are only the average TEC and VRS 
values as well as TFP for each department over the whole period. This is because 
analysis of the year to year and region to region values of the TFP, TEC and VRS 
estimates developed as above proves to be extremely problematical since the values 
move in a cyclical way. Manufacturing value added from year to year varies, 
amongst other reasons, due to market conditions, which in turn are based on the 
performance of other sectors, international demand, local wages policy, political 
coincidences and the like. All these factors explain why neither technological 
advances nor infrastructural efficiency gains can be evaluated on a year to year 
basis for individual regions. Thus, the results given in Table 4-6 comprise the 
average annual percentages of growth in regional value added. Indication of the 
regions that have an Industrial Area is also made.
For the whole of Greece, a simple average of growth and its components for 
all the regions would be deceptive due to varying regional importance in 
contributions to national output. To overcome this and to create a measure of 
national value added growth and its decomposition into CRS, VRS, and TEC, the 
model was run in full but for the whole of Greece over the same years. The rate of 
output in manufacturing, in value added terms, for Greece shows an average annual 
decrease of 0.47%. But as was shown earlier the increase of employment in 
manufacturing for the ten years 1978-1988 was 5.1%; an average annual 
increase of 0.5%. Thus the average annual change in value added (-0.47%) is 
negative and as large as the relevant employment growth rate (+0.5%). Nationwide 
then, productivity in manufacturing, as traditionally conceived, was considerably 
reduced over this period.
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Table 4 -6 : Greece: Total Factor Productiuity fo r 1981-1988
r ^Average ^ ^  Average Average Average ^ ' Average y
Regions DUR CRS URS TEC (URS+TEC)=TFP
Achaia I.A. 0.72% 6.09% -0.21% -5.16% -5.37%
Arc.& Laconia I.A. -5.01% 5.20% -14.18% 3.96% -10.22%
Argolida -1.09% -0.74% -0.52% 0.18% -0.35%
Attiki -1.45% -0.51% 1.00% -1.94% -0.94%
Chalkidiki 4.27% -2.43% 11.22% -4.52% 6.70%
Chania 1.41% 0.32% -0.21% 1.30% 1.09%
Chios -7.37% 0.71% -9.88% 1.79% -8.08%
Dodecanissos I.A. 0.53% 0.29% 1.19% -0.95% 0.24%
Drama I.A. 4.06% -9.59% 13.51% 0.14% 13.65%
Etoloakamania 0.07% -2.20% 1.46% 0.81% 2.27%
Evia -3.17% 0.77% -1.52% -2.42% -3.94%
Evrit.& Fokida -0.96% -5.34% 26.39% -22.01% 4.38%
Evros I.A. 6.22% -9.03% 12.81% 2.44% 15.25%
Florin.&Grevena I.A. -7.16% 1.39% -1.66% -6.89% -8.55%
Fthiotis I.A. 3.32% -3.25% 10.41% -3.85% 6.57%
Ilia -0.38% 0.81% 3.54% -4.73% -1.19%
Imathia 2.05% 0.49% -2.89% 4.45% 1.56%
loannina I.A. 3.26% -2.15% 4.21% 1.21% 5.42%
Ionian Isles 0.99% 7.41% -0.50% -5.92% -6.42%
Iraklio I.A. 0.97% 0.80% -6.75% 6.92% 0.17%
Karditsa 6.53% -6.94% 14.48% -1.02% 13.47%
Kastoria -0.05% 6.66% -6.28% -0.44% -6.71%
Kavala I.A. 9.28% 4.46% 1.23% 3.60% 4.83%
Kilkis I.A. 5.64% 2.33% 1.65% 1.66% 3.31%
Korinthia -2.31% 1.90% 5.95% -10.15% -4.21%
Kozani -2.60% 1.09% -0.51% -3.19% -3.69%
Kyclades -6.38% 3.79% 4.94% -15.11% -10.17%
Larissa I.A. 1.38% -0.85% -4.56% 6.79% 2.23%
Lesvos -9.85% -7.48% 3.55% -5.91% -2.36%
Magnisia I.A. -1.12% -1.22% 0.43% -0.33% 0.10%
Messinia I.A. -4.34% -3.07% 9.09% -10.36% -1.27%
Pella I.A. 2.05% 13.38% -6.01% -5.32% -11.33%
Pieria 4.43% -1.43% 8.48% -2.62% 5.86%
Pre.The.Arta I.A. -1.50% 3.00% 1.19% -5.69% -4.50%
Reth.& Lasithi 2.58% 5.31% 7.77% -10.49% -2.72%
Rothopi I.A. 13.93% 5.65% 14.67% -6.39% 8.28%
Samos 15.21% 7.31% -19.71% 27.61% 7.90%
Serres I.A. -2.32% 0.98% -0.82% -2.48% -3.30%
Thessaloniki I.A. -0.36% 4.84% -4.65% -0.54% -5.20%
Trikala 4.77% 0.74% 0.34% 3.69% 4.03%
Viotia 0.26% 3.06% -4.41% 1.61% -2.80%
Xanthi I.A. 7.37% 3.64% 4.53% -0.80% 3.73%
y y  y v y y J
GREECE Ruer. DUR Ruer. CRS Ruer. URS Ruer. TEC Ruer. T.F.P.
_^_____  -0.47%  -0.43%  -1 .26%  1.22% -0.04%  .
I.A. = Industrial Area
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Given such productivity declines what about TFP? For Greece, CRS is 
negative at -0.43% and as such roughly corresponds with the output performance. 
But the VRS are strongly negative at -1.27% implying that agglomeration and 
infrastructural diseconomies may well be in place. The TEC effect, however, appears 
strong and positive (1.22%) indicating that there has been some new technology 
utilisation over the period. This factor counteracts for the most part the negative 
VRS. As a result, the TFP is marginally negative at -0.04%. Such analysis suggests 
that, for the given structures and elasticities calibrations, even at constant 
returns to scale manufacturing output would decrease by a rate which is 
practically the same as the total output decline. The negative VRS would then 
further decrease the output rate if it were not for the positive technological 
factor.
For the regions of Greece TFP varies widely from -11.33% to some +15%. 
The unweighted mean TFP among the regions is +0.18%, and median value is 0%. 
The TEC percentages again vary widely from -22.0% to +27.6%; the unweighted 
mean is -1.69% and the median value is -2.45%. The results show that more regions 
experience negative TEC and the fewer have stronger positive values. The VRS 
values cover the range from -19.7% to +26.4% annual average growth, the 
unweighted mean being +1.88% and the median some +1.1%. Thus, positive VRS 
regions are more frequently occurring and experience stronger effects. No 
conclusions for Greece as a whole can be drawn from these averages, as explained 
above, since they are unweighted. At the regional scale now, both extremes in VRS 
and TEC belong to the two same regions. Such dramatic results can occur in small 
regions with small manufacturing sectors. One or two large expanding or closing 
plants over the whole period can make large differences. The cases of Samos and 
Kyclades are not untypical in this respect.
It should also be noted that when comparing employment change and 
productivity, inverse rates of change in manufacturing employment and value added 
are experienced for a number of areas, much in line with the given declines in 
national productivity. It could simply mean that in the regions where this occurs 
production has shifted to lower value added activities, perhaps from production to 
assembly, in some manufacturing sectors, yet taken on workers to provide this 
capacity. It may well reflect a slowness to adopt new technology or new working 
practices. Such a feature is especially typical of Thessaloniki as shall be discussed 
subsequently. Finally, the time periods for the TFP and the previous employment 
analyses are not exactly the same as stated. The employment change data derived 
from periodic industrial censuses (1978 and 1988) while the TFP model ones come
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from annual industrial surveys from 1980 onwards. Much employment growth has in 
fact occurred, in certain cases, in the period 1978 to 1980 - a period not covered 
by the TFP model's data. Standing this reservation, next follow some comments on 
interpreting the position in some of the more important regions.
The Attiki region produces a negative Rman of some 13% (Table 4-3). This 
means that the employment performance of manufacturing here is lower than 
expected given national rates, for 1978-88. In output terms Attiki has an average 
value added change rate that is negative at -1.45%. The CRS factor is also negative 
at -0.51% and in line with the decrease in employment. The VRS, however, are 
larger and positive (1.00%) showing that as regards manufacturing Attiki still offers 
external economies, which is as anticipated. Such returns partially justify the 
Kaldorian theory of the economies of large urban centres. But the TEC factor is 
strong and negative at -1.94% and this produces a negative TFP rate of -0.94%. 
Why should the TEC be negative in Attiki? One reason that can be advanced 
concerns policy. Firms in Attiki receive minimal expansion incentives and also some 
restrictions for new industry location. On the contrary, firms are assisted if they 
move out to other areas. As a result it might be expected, especially as regards 
manufacturing, that the younger firms and the new branches of the older 
established firms - those possibly deploying more modern technology - are locating 
out of Athens. Thus employment, output and utilisation of modern technology in 
manufacturing all seem to be declining in the capital city.
In Thessaloniki, as has been shown, the Rman is large and positive (23%), 
implying that the region is increasing employment in manufacturing considerably 
faster than its structural expectation. The average value added growth though is 
negative at 0.36%. What could be the cause of this advancing low productivity? The 
CRS are large and positive at 4.84% annually, again coincident with the large gains 
in manufacturing jobs. The TEC factor is negative but small (-0.54%). Nevertheless 
Thessaloniki has a large Industrial Area project and this may well be a reason why its 
TEC, even though negative, is four times smaller than that of Athens. According to 
the analysis it is the large negative VRS of -4.65%, which accounts for the decline 
as regards value added. What appears to be the case is that the real congestion 
diseconomies are occurring in the second city rather than in the capital even 
though Thessaloniki is more than three times smaller an agglomeration. To repeat, 
although only housing 8% of the national population, Thessaloniki holds 12% of the 
total national employment. The area seems to be a centre of labour intensive, 
rather low productivity production. The important employment gains in Thessaloniki 
are due wholly to the competitive effect in shift share terms. It would seem that
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the comparative advantage of economic activity in this region does not stem from 
better productivity. The success of the Industrial Area may well be evidence of the 
substantial infrastructural and agglomeration diseconomies of the rest of the 
region.
Volos (Magnisia) is an established industrial region located midway between 
Athens and Thessaloniki along the main north-south national motorway. It has a 
negative Rman of -5.9%, much less than the structural expectations of the region. 
The annual change in value added is negative at -1.12%. Here, as in both previous 
cases, the CRS is co-directional with the Rman; in this case it is negative (-1.22%). 
Being an older industrial region Volos expectedly has a positive VRS (0.43%). The 
region has two large Industrial Area sites that, given the region’s small size 
compared to the two previous areas, can provide the foundation for such 
advantageous external economies. Here the TEC is negative, perhaps related to its 
modest assisted area status, but it is small enough for the region to have positive 
TFP (+0.10%).
Patra (Achaia) has been the largest peripheral industrial centre (excluding 
Thessaloniki). The area is known to be de-industrialising in the eighties and it only 
manages a negative Rman of -4.5%. Even given this, the established manufacturing 
industries here have succeeded in producing a positive average annual growth 
(0.7%) in value added for the period, in contrast with all previous regions 
mentioned. These two statistics alone show an increase in the productivity of 
labour. Consequently, and since the CRS is large and positive (6.07%), it has to be 
the case that a considerable substitution of labour by capital has occurred. The 
VRS of the area are negative but small (-0.2%). Patra has an Industrial Area but it 
seems that the location there is unattractive for new firms and that the older firms 
survive by automating production. The TFP value is large and negative (-5.3%), due 
mainly to a large and negative TEC component (-5.1%). How can this be accounted 
for? It may sign that the outcome of a positive increase in value added is caused by 
significant increase in CRS, but in a strange and seemingly non-economical way. A 
plausible explanation could be that, given the closures of industrial units and the 
employment decrease, the capital already injected, does not create the value 
necessary for the extra technological economies. Or, put another way, that there 
is idling capital, that confuses the model that regards it as old technology. Patra is 
effectively preserving its profitability and productivity at the expense of 
employment.
Where in Greece, then, are then the positive TEC values that are strong 
enough to give the whole country a positive TEC character? And where are the VRS
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positive if not mainly in the large urban centres? For the following departments it 
can be seen that specifically regional characteristics and perhaps interventionary 
policy seem to be at least as important as agglomeration effects.
Larissa and Fthiotis, both near the middle of the Athens-Thessaloniki axis 
and neighbouring to Magnisia, show positive TFP. In the case of Fthiotis it is large 
(6.5% annually). Kavala (4.6%), Kilkis (3.3%) and Drama (13%) in northern Greece 
all have positive TFP due to both positive VRS and TEC. All these mentioned regions 
have Industrial Area projects. Xanthi, Rothopi (7.7%) and Evros(14%), that is all 
regions of Thraki in the northeast of Greece, have all strong positive TFP and again 
are also Industrial Area regions. Thraki is strongly assisted by grants and incentives 
of the national assistance policy containing several class D areas. Also, Iraklio and 
loannina , both capitals of the larger geographical departments of Kriti and Ipiros, 
have positive TFP. They both have Industrial Areas and little competition from 
neighbouring regions due to physical geographical characteristics. Lastly the island 
complex of Dodecanissos has a positive TFP although, like Patra, it has a negative 
Rman of (-6%) but is increasing its value added.
In summary, for the whole country, the technology factor has a positive 
effect in output growth of value added for fewer departments than the VRS 
factor. The TEC value is positive in 38% or 16 of the 42 regions, as illustrated in 
Figure 4-4. Positive VRS (beneficial economies of scale) are experienced in 24 of 
the 42 regions (57%). The TFP for the period is positive for 21 regions, shown in 
Figure 4-5, which comprise half of the regions examined.
Six types of regions are defined and are analysed in detail in Table 4-7 on 
the basis of the sign of their VRS and TEC values, and their overall TFP sign. The 
positive TFP areas are grouped into three types and so also are the those areas 
with negative TFP performance.
Type I areas are those with both agglomeration economies and economies 
due to technological change. The constituents of the group show that all seven are 
medium sized cities (of around 50 to 60 thousand population) and all are newly 
industrialising (none is an old industrial region, or a central area). Apart from Evros, 
all belong to the medium, non remote class C division of assisted status. They have 
experienced rapid economic growth and five out of seven have an Industrial Area. 
Six out of seven are in northern Greece (north of Volos - Larissa)
Type II areas are those with positive TEC and negative VRS. These appear to 
be remote areas or areas without large urban centres, which seem to have 
benefitted from modern technology utilisation. This is certainly the case in three 
out of five of the constituents. The fourth, Iraklio, is a large urban centre, probably
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Table 4 -7 : Greece: Total factor productivity typology (1981-1988 )
P o s i t i v e  T . F . P .
Type I Type II  Type I I I
+ Tec, + Urs + Tec, -  Urs -T e c ,  + Urs
C. Drama
C. Etoloakarnania 
C. loannlna
C. Kauala
C. Kilkis
C. Trikala
D. Euros
B. Iraklio
B. Larissa
C. Chania
C. Imathia
D. Samos
B. Magnisia
C. Chalkidiki
C. Evrit.&Fokida 
C. Fthiotis
C. Karditsa
C. Pieria
D. Dodecanissos
D. Rothopi
D. Hanthi
- A .
N
Type ID 
-  Tec , -  Urs
e g a t I u e 
Type u 
+ Tec . -  Urs
T.  F.  P
R. Thessaloniki
B. Rchala
C. Evia
C. Florin.&Greuena
C. Ionian Isles 
C. Kastoria 
C. Kozani 
C. Pella
C. Serres
B. Viotia
C. flrc.fr Laconia
C. Argolida
D. Chios
Type Ul 
-  Tec . + Urs
A. Attiki
B. Korinthia
C. Ilia
C. Kyclades 
C. Messinia *(1)
C. Pre.Thes.Arta
C. Reth.&Lasithi
D. Lesvos
NOTES:
Regions in bold possess Industrial Areas
The letters pre-fixed to the regions' names show the national incentives classification of the regions, Law 1262/82
(A) Central Regions, no investments financial incentives, except for special high technology projects.
(B) Developed Regions, low financial incentives.
(C) Less developed Regions, stronger incentives.
(D) Lagging and Remote or Strategical Regions, powerful incentives.
*(1) Messinia joined the (D) assisted areas in 1987, with the Law 1682/87 after being hit by earthquaqes.
utilising modern technology, but suffers from problems of congestion which seem to 
affect its VRS. Larissa is larger, but seems not yet to have developed the required 
industrial infrastructure to an adequate degree.
Type III areas have a negative TEC with a positive VRS. Theoretically these 
ought to be long established, central, Industrial Areas certainly possessing 
agglomeration economies, but deprived of the recent benefits of modern technical 
change. This is likely to be the case for Magnisia and Fthiotis. But interestingly, the 
group is also joined by three class D assisted areas. These are certainly not central 
or developed. Policy may well be significant here and be related to the presence of 
Industrial Area projects.
Type IV are areas with negative TEC and negative VRS. This group contains, 
as expected, some areas that are remote and undeveloped, without any significant 
urban centre. But the main constituents, six in all and including Thessaloniki and 
Patra, are those that did not manage to increase productivity. This was associated 
either with manufacturing employment declines (Patra and Evia), or substantial 
growth (Thessaloniki, Pella, Kozani and Serres).
Type V are supposed to be areas with some positive technology utilisation, 
not enough though to give them a positive TFP, due to their negative regional 
characteristics. This group is most consistent, as none of the regions has a city 
greater than 30,000. The fact that Viotia belongs to assistance group B is only 
because it is on the northern borders of the Attiki region and if it were C, little 
industry would be tempted to move further afield.
Finally, Type VI are areas with some positive agglomeration economies, but 
with a TEC component negative enough to drag them down into the negative TFP 
group. There are two sub-groups here again. One is Attiki and its westward 
neighbour Korinthia, both with well developed infrastructure that still provides them 
with economies of scale and agglomeration. However they both lack the structure 
of industrial incentives to maintain and attract new and modern industries. The 
other group is comprised of six areas which are technologically lagging peripheral 
regions that have managed to secure some scale economies. Two of them have an 
Industrial Area and Lesvos is a strongly assisted area.
The regional constituents of these TFP types can also be considered in 
terms of assisted area class (Table 4-8) under the nationwide assistance policy. 
For areas of least assistance -class A (Attiki and Thessaloniki), TFP is negative. For 
areas of the most modest assistance -class B, half the regions have positive TFP and 
these are medium to large conurbations (Iraklio, Magnisia and Larissa). The other 
half have negative TFP and these include Viotia and Korinthia which are neighbours
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( Table 4 -8 : Greece: Total factor productlulty and types o f assisted area status— . „ >
In c e n tiu e s  Areas
V.  . . . . . . . . . .  y
/*"" ................ . .................
Positiue T.F.P. % N e g a tiu e  T.F.P. %
r  > 
A
V
. . .  . . . .
0%V  . ................
'Attiki (VI) ^  
Thessaloniki (IU) 100%
r >
B
J
C  Iraklio ( I I )  ^  
Larissa ( I I )
^Magnisia ( I I I )  50%  ,
'flchala (ID)
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^Viotia (V) 50%  y
f  >
C
V  J
/^halkidiki (III)
Chania (II)
Drama (1)
Etoloakarnania (1)
Evrit.&Fokida (III)
Fthiotis ( I I I )
Imathia (II)
loannlna (1) 48%
Karditsa (III)
Kauala (1)
Kilkis (1)
Pieria (III)
Trikala (1)
V  J
/Rrc.& Laconia (II) "’x\
Argolida (V)
Evia (IV)
Florln.&Greuena (III)
Ilia (VI)
Ionian Isles (IV)
Kastoria (IV)
Kozani (IV) 52% 
Kyclades (VI)
Messinia (Ul) *(1)
Pella (IU)
Pre.Thes.Rrta (Ul)
Reth.&Lasithi (VI)
\Serres (IU) J
■ )
Dodecanlssos ( I I I )
Euros (1)
Rothopi ( I I I )  71%
Samos (II)
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'/Chios (V) ^  
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29%
v  J
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Parentheses show Types of Positive or Negative TFP as defined in Table 4-7 Regions in bold have Industrial Areas
*(1 ) Messinia was a (C) region until 1987. It became (D) with Law 1682/87
of Attiki and which have unfavourable incentives for what they offer. Class C areas, 
having the second to top tier of industrial incentives, comprise the largest group 
(27) and these tend to be medium sized cities, usually peripheral but not lagging. 
Although five out of the six Type I (+VRS, +TEC) regions are in this group, overall 
only 48% are TFP positive. Lastly, class D areas, where maximum incentives are 
available, are in remote locations. These areas have performed well both in terms of 
TFP as well as in job generation and some 71% of the group have positive TFP. 
These percentages can be usefully compared to the national percentage of 50% 
positive TFP and 50% negative.
In terms of TEC components (Table 4 -9 ) the percentages of both positive 
and negative values in the two least assisted classes of regions, A and B, are much 
the same as for TFP. However the lists for the two classes of highest assisted 
status are dominated by negative values. Technology , then, needs some form of 
agglomeration to establish itself. Only policy-induced VRS can be observed in remote 
regions as the much higher relevant percentages of positive TFP in classes C and D 
show. Overall only some 38% of areas managed to produce positive TEC values.
From the twenty departments with an Industrial Area, 12 or 60% had a 
positive average TFP; these are illustrated in Figure 4-6. However in the two 
assisted classes B and D the TFP is positive in 75% and 100% of the cases 
respectively. It is no accident that while the class B areas have a considerable 
agglomeration near the Industrial Area and class D areas are those with strong 
assistance, in class C areas, where none of these conditions occur, the positive 
percentage is much lower. Considerably lower scores are achieved on positive TEC 
values by regions with Industrial Areas. Eight of the twenty such regions have 
positive TEC as can be seen in Figure 4-7. For these regions the positive TEC 
percentages fall with increasing assisted status; for B areas it is 50%, for C is 45% 
and for D only 25%. The requirement of the presence of an agglomeration seems to 
be more important for a positive TEC for the Industrial Area regions. The necessity 
for an agglomeration will again be tested -and verified- later in this chapter. It 
becomes clear that the high positive TFP percentages in the Industrial Area regions 
are due to mainly to VRS economies and these are what the Industrial Areas rather 
successfully offer to the peripheral regions.
To summarise the findings of the TFP model, 57% of all regions experience 
positive VRS and 60% of the Industrial Area regions, and 38% of all regions have 
positive TEC rising to 40% of those with Industrial Areas. Half of all the regions have 
positive TFP, but this feature amounts to 60% of the Industrial Area regions. As 
shown in Table 4-10, areas with an Industrial Area have observable positive
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Figure 4-6: Total factor productiuity in the regions
of Greece hauing an Industrial Rrea, 1981-1988
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Figure 4-7: The role of technological effects 
in the productiuity of the regions of Greece 
hauing an Industrial Rrea, 1981-1988
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Table 4 -1B: Greece: A summary of the combined results
of employment and productiuity analysis
Results in Respect to the Industrial Areas
Positive Rman Positive TFP Positive TEC
^ In d u s tr ia l Rrea Regions 70% 60% 40%
Non Industrial Rrea Reyions 58% 41% 36%
Rll Reyions 64% 50% 38%
Results in respect to the National Assistance Divisions
V
Positive Rman Positive TFP Positive TEC J
r R 50% 0% 0% ^
B 50% 50% 50%
C 67% 48% 37%
D 57% 71% 43%
Rll Reyions 64% 50% 38%
National Assistance Divisions:
(A) Central Regions, no financial incentives, except for special high technology projects.
(B) Developed Regions, low financial incentives.
(C) Less developed Regions, stronger incentives.
(D) Lagging and Remote or Strategical Regions, powerful incentives.
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advantages as regards accelerated employment growth and productivity. Rman is 
positive in 70% of these areas; it is positive in only 58% of the non-industrial Area 
regions and in 63% overall. Also positive TFP is considerably higher in Industrial Area 
than non-industrial Area regions. The Industrial Area regions boast positive TFP by 
60% while non-industrial Areas regions only by 41 %. As regards positive TEC, only 
40% of Industrial Areas may be so classified, compared to 36% for non-industrial 
Areas and 38 % overall. Thus the Industrial Areas appears to provide successfully 
employment opportunities and infrastructure-induced agglomeration external 
economies, while the technological advantage is less apparent.
Areas with assisted status seem to gain some mild positive advantage as 
regards participation in accelerated employment growth especially where the most 
favourable grants are available (Table 4-10). As regards positive TFP, important 
progress is to be found in remote regions where considerable assistance is available. 
When it comes to technology it would seem that regions housing medium to large 
agglomerations, but having at least some grants and incentives available to draw 
upon, are more advantaged. In summary both aspects of regional policy intervention 
seem effectively to promote regional development by decentralisation of 
employment and productivity.
4.4.5 The technological frontier model results
With the technological frontier arrangement, a different procedure for the 
decomposition of the part of value added growth ascribed to technology (TEC) is 
deployed, as described. The consistency of the frontier technology model to the 
original TFP model is high. The two sets of technological indices for the regions have 
a correlation of 0.85. The regions classified as above the national level in 
technology by the TFP model are by 83% the same to those so classified by the 
frontier model (1 0  out of 12). Those below national levels are the same to the tune 
of 90% (27 out of 30). Table 4-11 shows the two technological indices of the 
regions, in comparison. These are the intercept of the frontier model (F-TEC), and 
the TEC of the original one.
Consequently, following the frontier model the regions are distinctively 
ranked according to their deviation from where best technology practice occurs. 
The results of this type of analysis and a ranking thereupon can be seen in Table 4- 
12. It can be seen that the best technological utilisation occurs in the small region 
of Samos where there exists a 20.17% annual increase in value added due to 
technological effects, or 20.67% above the relevant figure of Greece as a whole.
The relative magnitudes in this respect of this region explain the reservation
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Table 4 -11 : The technological indices fo r the regions :
the TFP model's TEC, and the fro n tier model's F-TECV________________   J
TFP model Regions
TEC Intercepts
(F-TEC)
27.61% Samos 20.17%
6.92% Iraklio I.R. 5.64%
6.79% Larissa I.R. 3.04%
4.45% Imathia 3.77%
3.96% Arc.& Lakon. I.R. -3.54%
3.69% Trikala 0.68%
3.60% Kavala I.R. 2.13%
2.44% Evros I.R. 2.30%
1.79% Chios 4.45%
1.66% Kilkis I.R. -0.84%
1.61% Viotia 1.65%
1.30% Chania 1.18%
1.22% GREECE -0.50%
1.21% loannina I.R. 4.99%
0.81% Etoloakamania 0.83%
0.18% Argolis -1.17%
0.14% Drama I.R. -0.85%
-0.33% Magnisia I.R. 0.69%
-0.44% Kastoria -0.43%
-0.54% Thessaloniki I.R. -0.55%
-0.80% Xanthi I.R. -2.89%
-0.95% Dodekanissos I.R. -0.96%
-1.02% Karditsa -2.91%
-1.94% Attiki -2.40%
-2.42% Evia -1.99%
-2.48% Serres I.R. -3.76%
-2.62% Pieria -7.24%
-3.19% Kozani -3.60%
-3.85% Fthiotis I.R. -4.18%
-4.52% Chalkidiki -6.10%
-4.73% Ilia -4.95%
-5.16% Achaia I.R. -3.37%
-5.32% Pella I.R. -0.40%
-5.69% Pre.The.Arta I.R. -5.05%
-5.91% Lesvos -11.80%
-5.92% Ionian Isles -0.49%
-6.39% Rothopi I.R. -2.76%
-6.89% Florin.&Grev. I.R. -7.78%
-10.15% Korinthia -9.61%
-10.36% Messinia I.R. -10.14%
-10.49% Reth.& Lasith. -18.72%
-15.11% Kyklades -13.25%
-22.01% Evrit.& Fokis -10.09%
Frontier m o d e l^
I.A. = presence of Industrial Area
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Table 4-12: The results of the technological frontier model, 1981-1988
D e u i a t i o n s  f r o m
/Regions technological Technological National ^ /Rank
Intercepts Frontier Frontier Technological
(F-TEC) o f Samos of Iraklio Leuel
Samos 20.17% 0.00% 14.53% 20.67% 1
Iraklio 5.64% -14.53% 0.00% 6.14% 2 I.R.
loannina 4.99% -15.18% -0.65% 5.49% 3 I.R.
Chios 4.45% -15.72% -1.19% 4.95% 4
Imathia 3.77% -16.40% -1.87% 4.27% 5
Larissa 3.04% -17.13% -2.60% 3.54% 6 I.R.
Evros 2.30% -17.87% -3.34% 2.80% 7 I.R.
Kavala 2.13% -18.04% -3.51% 2.63% 8 I.R.
Viotia 1.65% -18.52% -3.99% 2.15% 9
Chania 1.18% -18.99% -4.46% 1.68% 10
Etoloakamania 0.83% -19.34% -4.81% 1.33% 11
Magnisia 0.69% -19.48% -4.95% 1.19% 12 I.R.
Trikala 0.68% -19.49% -4.96% 1.18% 13
Pella -0.40% -20.57% -6.04% 0.10% 14 I.R.
Kastoria -0.43% -20.60% -6.07% 0.07% 15
Ionian Isles -0.49% -20.66% -6.13% 0.01% 16
GREECE -0.50% -20.67% -6.14% 0.00% *
Thessaloniki -0.55% -20.72% -6.19% -0.05% 17 I.R.
Kilkis -0.84% -21.01% -6.48% -0.34% 18 I.R.
Drama -0.85% -21.02% -6.49% -0.35% 19 I.R.
Dodekanissos -0.96% -21.13% -6.60% -0.46% 20 I.R.
Argolis -1.17% -21.34% -6.81% -0.67% 21
Evia -1.99% -22.16% -7.63% -1.49% 22
Attiki -2.40% -22.57% -8.04% -1.90% 23
Rothopi -2.76% -22.93% -8.40% -2.26% 24 I.R.
Xanthi -2.89% -23.06% -8.53% -2.39% 25 I.R.
Karditsa -2.91% -23.08% -8.55% -2.41% 26
Achaia -3.37% -23.54% -9.01% -2.87% 27 I.R.
Arc.& Lakon. -3.54% -23.71% -9.18% -3.04% 28 I.R.
Kozani -3.60% -23.77% -9.24% -3.10% 29
Serres -3.76% -23.93% -9.40% -3.26% 30 I.R.
Fthiotis -4.18% -24.35% -9.82% -3.68% 31 I.R.
Ilia -4.95% -25.12% -10.59% -4.45% 32
Pre.The.Arta -5.05% -25.22% -10.69% -4.55% 33 I.R.
Chalkidiki -6.10% -26.27% -11.74% -5.60% 34
Pieria -7.24% -27.41% -12.88% -6.74% 35
Florin.&Grev. -7.78% -27.95% -13.42% -7.28% 36 I.R.
Korinthia -9.61% -29.78% -15.25% -9.11% 37
Evrit.& Fokis -10.09% -30.26% -15.73% -9.59% 38
Messinia -10.14% -30.31% -15.78% -9.64% 39 I.R.
Lesvos -11.80% -31.97% -17.44% -11.30% 40
Kyklades -13.25% -33.42% -18.89% -12.75% 41
Reth.& Lasith. -18.72% -38.89% -24.36% -18.22% 42
I.A. = presence of Industrial Area
141
made earlier in the chapter about small regions and extreme results. The value 
added in manufacturing for the island of Samos was in constant 1974 prices some 
32 million drachmas in 1980, to rise to 99 million drachmas by 1988 or to some 
310% of the base. Meanwhile employment was less than doubled over the period. 
The bulk of the investment was made in the first two years of the period and from 
then on the capital stock remained constant, that is investment only covered 
depreciation. All of this may be due to only one large plant and the result is that the 
region becomes one of the most noted for utilising technology to increase 
productivity. The opposite happened in the Kyklades islands. Here a large state 
shipyard kept on its employees although gradually reducing its business, until it shut 
down in 1989. With all this idle capital and labour, productivity was pulled down to 
amongst the worst in the country, although some other small industries might have 
done well in productivity terms.
Among all regions in Greece there is a wide range of divergence in growth 
due to technology. This extends to some 39% annually below the frontier of Samos, 
as seen in Table 4-12. If the extreme case of Samos is excluded, as it probably 
should be, then Iraklio, in Kriti becomes the technological frontier region in Greece. 
This is empirically quite acceptable, since Iraklio is the major agglomeration in the 
large island of Kriti, offering a comprehensive range of services, a university, and of 
course a dynamic Industrial Area with young innovative firms, as shall be shown from 
the field study results. From the technological frontier of Iraklio, regions lie in a 
range of some 24% of deviation in annual growth due to technology.
To facilitate comparison a measure of the deviations from the national level 
is also shown in Table 4-12. Greece as a whole stands at some 6.1% below Iraklio. 
From the frontier region of Iraklio (within the deviation of +6.1% annually) there are 
fifteen other regions, those having a technology component above the national 
levels. Below, there are some twenty six regions that extend over a range reaching 
18.2% of annual deviation from national level. Figure 4-8 illustrates the regions 
according to their level of efficiency in technology practice.
As regards the Industrial Areas factor, in the first eight technologically 
leading regions five house an Industrial Area. If the case of Samos and the similarly 
small island region of Chios are excluded this becomes five out of six. While an 
Industrial Area may not be the absolute prerequisite for technological competence 
in a peripheral region the above feature looks to be more than just a coincidence.
Finally, and as also found in the original TFP model, the type of regions that 
seem to practice technology efficiently and above the national levels may be 
peripheral regions but housing substantial medium sized agglomerations (Figure 4-
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Figure 4-8: The frontier model of technological
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8) and not the older established industrial centres.
Overall, the variants of the value added TFP model portrayed the recent 
regional patterns of manufacturing growth in Greece quite realistically. Reality 
indicates that as regards export and non-locally oriented manufacturing industry 
there is absolutely no reason to establish in the south near the capital. There is a 
preference for the well assisted areas elsewhere, for example in regions bordering 
Thessaloniki. Activities oriented to central Greece are attracted to Magnisia, 
Larissa or Fthiotis. Kriti is served by Iraklio and the northeast of the country by 
Kavala, or for the most pioneering all of Thraki offers considerable financial 
assistance opportunities. To all of the above regions the model has assigned positive 
TFP, meaning above expected (CRS) average output growth for the eighties.
4 .5  Technological efficiency and agglomeration
4 .5 .1  Urbanisation as a factor for technological efficiency
It has become apparent that the regional policy of Industrial Areas has had 
some positive effects on the recipient regions’ TFP. Significant effects of the policy 
on the technological aspects of on productivity (TEC) have not been so well 
established. One reason may be that the Industrial Areas Programme and the more 
wide national economic assistance for development, are not specifically designed to 
promote the technological development of the recipient regions. The previous 
analysis gave an indication, and it was thought useful, using the originally described 
dataset to examine here whether technological efficiency advantage is significantly 
inherent in the TFP of regions with considerable urbanisation levels and urban 
agglomerations in Greece. In addition, to measure the impact of the general 
assistance policy against the urbanisation effect on technological efficiency.
Based on Pred (1966) and Kaldor (1970) it might be expected that larger 
agglomerations provide the facilities for scale economies and economies due to 
human specialisation, and also at the same time increase the rates of technical 
change. Under the more recent 'seedbed - incubator' hypothesis is suggested that 
centres of large cities, or other specifically favourable parts of the urban system 
function as territorial innovation complexes. These through their technological 
advances, have the potential to create development spin-offs. Giaoutzi (1990) 
suggests, under a neo-Fordist approach, that the new industrial cluster based on 
high technology industry has introduced a 'new regime of accumulation'. The
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corresponding mode of social regulation is suggested to be determined by the 
technical core, its surrounding managerial subsystem and the inclusive institutional 
system.
In an empirical evaluation of the technological effects of agglomeration, 
Beeson (1987), found that an agglomeration gravity index for the US relates 
positively with technical change induced productivity. In a later work though, 
(Beeson and Husted 1989) a significant negative relation of technological efficiency 
and size of metropolitan population was found. On the other hand, states with high 
diversity of employment seemed to be technologically efficient, high levels of 
unionisation and education are positively related to efficiency and finally, the four 
most capital intensive states have negative relation to efficiency. From these two 
papers it can be seen that while the actual size of agglomeration is not inducing 
technological supremacy, certain arrangements of urban centres in regions do 
seem to relate to such an advantage.
Thus, technological change and spatial transformation are increasingly 
regarded as parallel phenomena with closely intertwined relationships. Nijkamp 
(1990) focuses in his research on the questions of technological take-off 
(technogenesis) and spatial technological impact (pervasiveness of new 
technologies). He suggests that traditional theoretical contributions emphasise in 
the role of spatial mobility of production factors such as labour and capital, 
assuming technology as given and uniform. But economic development is also 
affected by the regional receptivity towards technological change. Regional or 
spatial factors may facilitate or hinder the generation and diffusion of new 
technologies. Different regions have different levels of development of important 
enabling factors such as social entrepreneurity, economic robustness, institutional 
and organisational structures and availability of information. Entangling with policy 
issues, Nijkamp suggests that the urban orientation of modern technologies 
supports the need for a better integration of the urban dimension within regional 
policies.
It is thus evident, at least in theory, that the urban sector of regions plays a 
significant role in their technological competence and development.
4 .5 .2  Technological efficiency, urbanisation and regional
development policy in Greece
To empirically test some of the above assumptions, agglomeration measures 
and assistance indices are next entered into linear regression models to 
understand their significance in explaining the variance of the TEC amongst the
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different regions.
The agglomeration index Ui is the percentage of population in any one
region that live in urban agglomerations over 10,000 people. The agglomeration 
index U2 is constructed to show the percentage of the population of the single
largest urban centre of each region. The assistance indices are first, A i, for the 
total state support in manufacturing in the form of grants (of Law 1262/1982) 
that were destined to the region from the initiation of the Law in 1982 to 1993. 
Second, A2, for the ratio of the above support over total investment carried out in
the region. Data for this are obtained by the Ministry of National Economy of 
Greece, (MNE, unpublished). The spatial dimension of the above indices is illustrated 
in Figure 4-9 for the urbanisation levels and in Figure 4-10 for the distribution 
of support in absolute terms. There is an indication, that is going to be tested next, 
that although the structure of assistance over the national territory, (Law 
1262/1982), shown in Figure 4-10, features increased intensity of assistance 
for the peripheral regions, assistance in absolute terms remains quite centralised. In 
fact the region having received the highest support is Thessaloniki and its small 
neighbouring, highly assisted Department of Kilkis. Equally the large industrial 
activity of the capital Athens is assisted to 'decentralise' few miles along the 
motorway to the north in the neighbouring Departments of Viotia and Fthiotis. All 
the islands and most part of the southern and central/western peripheries have 
received small amounts of support. The Industrial Areas Programme has the 
advantage that it specifically prescribes the targets for development than rather 
'blanket' covering the national territory; but the focus in this section -only- is on 
agglomeration and the national assistance scheme. Some of the above indications 
are going to be tested empirically next.
It was not expected that agglomeration or assistance indices, either singly 
or in combination would explain fully the spatial variance of the technologically 
induced productivity, that is TEC. What was hoped for was to first, test the 
existence and significance of such relations and second, to compare the strength 
of the assistance policy impact in this context with the assumed 'natural' affiliation 
of urban agglomeration and technological advance.
Correlation of the two urbanisation indices, Ui and U2 is high, 0.92, showing 
that most regions are uni-polar. Correlation between the two assistance indices Ai 
and A2 is low, 0.29, showing that intensity of assistance is much less related to the 
absolute amounts of assistance. Correlation between the urbanisation index Ui and
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assistance index Ai is a medium 0.45, showing that developed regions still get much 
of the assistance.
After the above rough indications, the first set linear regressions were run 
for the Ui index. A logarithmic transformation of the indices was used as a second
option to normalise them since the TEC are percentages with a mean near zero 
while the values of the indices are all positive. The equations were in the following 
forms:
TECi = b0 + b1Uli
that resulted to the equation: TEQ= -0.73 + 1.52 Un R2= 0.39
t=5.54, p=0.0001
and
TEQ = bo + bi InUn 
that resulted to: TEQ= 0.35 + 0.42 Inllij R2=0.55
t=7.66, p<0.0001
where TEC is the technological component of the TFP and Ui is the first
urbanisation index, as defined above and i are the 42 regions.
The set of equations provides a surprisingly high R2 at 0.39 which with the 
logarithmic transformation increases to R2=0.55. The negative intercept of the 
original equation shows that with zero urbanisation level the technologically induced 
productivity would be negative. Results reveal a considerably high relationship 
between the size of urban agglomeration and the productivity growth due to 
technological advantage. The finding is very much in line with the theoretical 
assumptions in this context.
Second, the same TEC were regressed with the second urbanisation index 
U2 . This index can more specifically measure the effects of polarisation or
centralisation in a single centre of a region. Thus, in the light of the previous 
general urbanisation index results as regards technological efficiency, the effect of 
polarisation was isolated by calibrating the equations:
TEQ = bo + biU2i
that resulted to the equation: TEQ= -0.59 + 1.25 U2j R2= 0.23
t=3.82, p=0.0004
and the second form was
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TEQ = bo + bi lnU2j 
that resulted to: TEQ= 0.17 + 0.33 lnU2l R2=0.10 
t=2.34, p=0.02
where U2 is the second urbanisation index, as defined above.
In this set of equations the R2 is 0.23 and significance is strong, but if the 
index is transformed to logarithms explanation and significance reduce. Clearly, 
using the urbanisation index U2 as an explanation of the variance of the TEC,
explanatory power is reduced in comparison to the previous index (U i) however
significance remains quite strong. In result it can be said that the centralisation 
around one single urban agglomeration within the regions is a not as strong a 
prerequisite than general urbanisation levels themselves. If the largest city only is 
measured much urban potential in several dual pole regions is not thus accounted 
for. This accounts for the lower explanatory and significance levels of this second 
index.
It is justified then to conclude that the spatial variance of the technological 
efficiency leading to increased productivity is to a considerable extent explained by 
the intensity of urban agglomeration in the various regions. All such potential is 
important and not only that centralised around the dominant city of each region.
Next, in a similar mode of testing, the connection of the actual monetary 
flow of national assistance in manufacturing with the regional TEC indices is 
explored in the following regression models:
TEQ = bo + b]Aij
that results to the equation: TEQ= -0.43 + 0.001 An R2= 0.10
t=2.25, p=0.03
and
TEQ = bo + bi InAi j 
that results to: TEQ= -1.63 + 0.19 InAn R2=0.21
t=3.59, p=0.001
where Ai is the absolute national assistance index.
In this set of equations the R2 is 0.10 and if the index is transformed to 
logarithms explanation and significance are increased (R2 becomes 0.21). Thus, 
some significance can be found in the levels of assistance to manufacturing
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investment in the forms of one-off grants explaining the technological competence 
of the region. Also, the negative intercept shows that with zero assistance the 
technological induced productivity would be negative. But explanation of the 
variance in these models is not as high as in those examining agglomeration 
relationships.
Finally it was tested whether the intensity of assistance ( index A2) is any 
more related to the technological efficiency. The following equations were 
estimated:
TEQ = bo + biA2i
that results to the equation: TEQ= -0.81 + 1.49 A2j R2= 0.03
t=1.19, p=0.23
and
TEQ = bo + bi lnA2i 
that results to: TEQ= 0.35 + 0.60 lnA2j R2=0.04
t=1.31, p=0.19
where A2 is the assistance intensity index, as defined above.
In this set of equations the explanation offered by this index is negligible, R2 
being at 0.03 and also significance is quite low. With transformation into logarithms 
no significant improvement was recorded. Intensity of assistance does not seem to 
relate with technological competence.
Overall, the results of the above tests of urbanisation and national 
assistance in manufacturing as regards their relation to technological efficiency 
give a quite clear picture. There is considerable relation of the absolute money flow 
of assistance with technology. But the intensity of assistance is disappointingly, but 
not unexpectedly (Figure 4-10), much less significant. The second point can be 
understood considering the design of the assistance structure. Of course, the 
remote and lagging regions are those that achieve higher assistance percentages. 
In these regions, although assistance is higher as a percentage of the absolute 
investment, it is more than likely to be smaller in absolute terms than in more 
developed regions. In addition these areas are also likely to have lower urbanisation
percentages. The latter proved to be an important factor that can be suggested
as a prerequisite for the promotion of technological competence. More specifically 
the existence of urban agglomerations appears to be important, rather than a 
necessity for population to be centralised in one pole within the region.
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To make a comparison from an empirical point of view it was interesting to 
test the significance of the 'natural1 urbanisation structures against that of the 
'induced' assistance of manufacturing as regards their relevance to technological 
levels. Testing of the following model makes the necessary comparison:
TEQ = bo + bilnllii + bzlnAij
resulting to: TEQ = 0.52 +0.44 InUn -0 .02  InAn R2=0.55
t=5.97 t=0.41
p^O.OOOl p=0.71
where Ui is the total urban agglomeration index and Ai is the total assistance 
index.
This final test shows that compared to the significance of the structure of 
the urban agglomerations in the regions of Greece (U i), the assistance in 
investment in manufacturing (A i) has little effect as regards technological
efficiency. This is not to suggest that assistance alone has had little or no impact, 
because it was found it does have, but that the 'natural' array of agglomerations 
remains the main determining factor as regards the levels of technological 
advancement.
In commenting on the general effectiveness of the assistance policy as 
regards technological efficiency several wider issues need to be brought forward. 
From one point of view, it is not given that the policy designers indeed aim to divert 
the structure of technologically supreme regions to a different one. After all, the 
development legislation itself (Law 1262/1982 and 1892/1990) makes practically 
no distinction among regions as regards projects that can be characterised as 'of 
high technology' and assists such efforts even in the capital, Athens. On the other 
hand though, it may be that the scope of such policy may be more concerned with 
new employment creation or sustenance of existing jobs. Two implications are 
important in this respect. First, technological advance may not go hand in hand with 
job generation goals, at least in the short term. And second who is to say that the 
more intensively recipient regions could have been even worse off had the policy 
been not undertaken. Finally, it should be stressed that if the regions that more 
intensively receive assistance are still technologically lagging, then it can be argued 
that these are precisely those that should continue to be assisted. The question is 
if these regions indeed and effectively receive a 'critical mass' of such assistance 
through the general assistance policy or should perhaps the more specific-targeted
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type of Industrial Areas intervention be allocated more funds from the development 
budget.
4 .6  Conclusions
In this chapter an analysis of the regional performance as regards 
employment and productivity was carried out. The methodology used was mainly 
based on the shift-share analysis and on variants of the total factor productivity 
analytical structure. The comparison of employment and value added change over 
time for regional manufacturing in Greece points to some interesting conclusions.
The shift share analysis first shows that the manufacturing sector is still an 
important contributor to new employment. Growth in this sector is strongly 
correlated with the overall regional competitive effect. Second, the Industrial Area 
projects, and to a lesser extent the general levels of economic assistance, can be 
shown to be closely related to the regionally specific conditions that prove 
favourable for new employment creation.
In terms of regional productivity it can be demonstrated that strong 
correlations exist between an Industrial Area location and increased TFP, mainly 
due to agglomeration and scale economies. However the Industrial Area causality 
relationships are favourable but not as strong when it comes to growth in 
productivity due to technological change. Some substantial agglomeration seems to 
be also needed. The nationwide assistance policy indicates that, by and large, they 
help peripheral regions create employment and, to a certain extent, semi-central 
regions to restructure or gain technological advances.
The results of the two main analyses, the employment-based shift share and 
the value added-based TFP, are not conflicting. They lead to the conclusion that 
restructuring is taking place in old established industrial regions, often using less 
labour with higher technology, but also taking advantage of the existing 
infrastructure. Elsewhere in strongly assisted peripheral regions agglomeration 
economies can be replicated or simulated by the policy effects. For the locations 
where technological advance can be seen, medium sized peripheral cities are the 
norm. This is also proved to be the case with the technological frontier methodology 
showing high consistency with the results of the TFP model. Large gains in 
employment are rarely related to the occurrence of substantial gains in the 
technological component. There is a strong indication that productivity has been
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improved and some new technology utilised outside the central areas of the 
country and as a result regional competitiveness can be said to have improved at 
least for manufacturing through these processes.
In the final section of this chapter it was found evident in theory, that the 
urban sector of regions plays a significant role in their technological competence 
and development. In Greece also, the spatial arrangement of technological 
supremacy is related to the intensity of urbanisation levels among the regions of 
the country. It is less important if, within those regions, the urban agglomeration 
structure is centralised or multi-polar.
The assistance in manufacturing under the nationwide regional development 
assistance policy has milder effects in providing better technology utilisation to the 
recipient regions. It has done little to divert the existing structure of 
technologically supreme regions in the country. A technology policy needs focused 
orientation towards regional and sectoral specific circumstances to induce 
technological advances. Variety and flexibility of policy may seem to be more 
important in this context than comprehensiveness.
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Chapter 5: The selection and characteristics of the
sample of Industrial Areas and the structure of the 
survey
5.1 The context and purpose of the survey
The purposes of a form of regional policy like that of the Industrial Areas 
Programme are tied to the theoretical underpinning of the potential agglomeration 
and localisation economies, mentioned in the theoretical context of the policy. But 
development theories further stress, as was seen, the necessity of new technology 
utilisation, the effective interaction between enterprises and the local socio­
economic interaction. Following these issues, an evaluation of the Industrial Areas is 
needed as to the extent to which they managed to attract to the distant regions, 
technologically advanced competitive firms, to provide technological support for the 
local industry to upgrade, mobilise and stimulate the local potential and 
entrepreneurial spirit. In some cases this might mean the creation of productive 
industrial nuclei and in others, the restructuring of older and less productive 
regional manufacturing character. Understanding the empirical reality of such 
complex questions explains the indices of secondary data analyses. These remarks 
illustrate the necessity of undertaking the survey.
The statistical analysis in chapter four of this study followed two separate 
and parallel procedures. With the shift share analysis various characteristics were 
assigned to the regions according to their all-round economic performance and 
their specific performance as regards employment growth in manufacturing. The 
second procedure, a measurement of productivity growth, provided a view of the 
efficiency of regional manufacturing. Having a combined assessment of employment 
and productivity results, a more precise typology of the type of growth each area 
experienced was formulated. Thus, estimations for each type of assisted area 
regarding productivity beyond constant returns to scale, perhaps due to local 
technological levels and regional specific economies, were regionally quantified. 
These showed in various ways some connection of the Industrial Areas Programme 
with positive regional economic performance.
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The aim of the survey is first, to help to explain and specify the indications of 
the statistical analysis. Evidence about the state of manufacturing in the selected 
Industrial Areas will be valuable in providing a perspective on the real dimensions to 
the regional development characteristics. In other words this will reveal the extent, 
and more important, the ways in which the existence of an Industrial Area supports 
the quantified regional characteristics. A secondary aim is to capture the 
restructuring processes in specific types of the industrial regions and to view the 
role of industrial pole formation in the evolution in the lagging regions. More 
specifically the survey aims to draw evidence of the extent to which firms do 
actually transfer productivity and employment to a region having been attracted 
from more central locations. The survey will measure how many new local firms were 
born in the Industrial Areas and how many local firms relocated to the projects in 
an attempt to rise their productivity recognising any advantages experienced 
there. The survey was designed to discover evidence of the state of technology 
used, any specific technological support received, or any channels of technology 
diffusion among firms.
Second, questions were posed in tending to evaluate and provide 
measurements of qualitative regional characteristics, the measurement of which 
officially is not even attempted, such as the levels of industrial conscience, local 
cooperation and morale. Finally the survey explores the evidence of any 
inadequacies in the Industrial Areas that could be improved.
5 .2  The selection of the Industrial Areas to be surveyed
The areas where the field study was carried out were selected on the basis 
of the results of the foregoing statistical analysis. As analysed, regions were put 
into categories according to their performance in the shift-share-employment 
analysis and the TFP output productivity analysis. Representative regions of various 
types were then selected for the case studies.
For the necessities of the field study design, regions with a placement in the 
positive cluster in both types of analysis are termed group one. They are the faster 
growing regions in both productivity and employment in manufacturing. The 
important characteristic of the cluster is that all regions are peripheral, newly 
industrialising, with medium sized agglomerations. The four large cities of Athens, 
Thessaloniki, Patra and Volos are not represented. The group includes none of the A
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class assisted regions, Larissa and Iraklio of class B, loannina, Kilkis, Drama and 
Kavala of C, and Rodopi, Xanthi, Evros, of D. Recall that increasing economic 
assistance applies from A through D. Three representative regions are to be 
selected from this important group, that includes nine of the twenty Industrial Area 
regions. As it can be seen in (Figure 5-1), a common attribute is that all regions 
(with the exception of Iraklio) are located in northern Greece. From the regions of 
this group, Iraklio on the island of Crete was selected due to its distinct location 
amidst the other regions of the group. From the less developed regions of the 
group, Xanthi and Rothopi, were selected, to represent the group's peripheral 
character.
The second group consists of the regions that have positive TFP in the 
relevant model, but belong to the slower than national average increase group as 
regards employment growth in manufacturing. These regions can be characterised 
as undergoing restructuring. They are, Magnisia of the B assistance class, Fthiotis 
of C and Dodecanissos of D. The second group, (Figure 5 -2 ), are rather more 
developed regions that restructure their methods of production to a more 
productive and less labour intensive character. The representative area selected 
here is Magnisia, an old established, industrially developed area. It was selected to 
represent a core type aspect and to provide for comparative purposes of the 
development characteristics of larger peripheral centres. Dodecanissos could not 
have been a representative region, since it is predominantly devoted in tourism. 
Here the industrial Area intervention is small and too young, as discussed earlier, 
and is based on the larger and most developed of the twelve islands comprising the 
region, Rhodes. At the moment it can be regarded more as a local industry 
accommodating land-use policy and further problems of the non-contiguity of the 
region would make an analysis problematic.
The third group consists of regions that managed to increase employment 
without any productivity increases. One of these is the Thessaloniki region of A 
assistance class. This is the second largest conurbation in Greece, which is by no 
means peripheral, while experiencing very fast growth in the eighties. For this 
region, the scope of regional development policy as such, is vague. The Industrial 
Area here is more of a national, if not international, importance. The other regions 
in this group are the peripheral regions of Arcadia, Pella, Preveza and Serres 
(Figure 5-3). These regions house small and mostly incomplete Industrial Areas 
without local administration. As it will be explained in the findings of the field study, 
that follow, such cases are not yet integrated in the local economic networks and 
local growth is often diverted in other more favourable locations in the region.
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Information for the Industrial Area of Arcadia was obtained by the local 
administration of Patra.
The fourth and final group consists of those regions that scored negatively 
to both employment and productivity measurements. From this group the region of 
Achaia housing the important city of Patra was selected. Patra, an old established 
peripheral industrial centre has been subject to rapid restructuring of economic 
activity. The other declining regions of the group are Fiorina and Messinia (Figure 
5-4 ).
The geographical locations of all the selected Industrial Areas for the field 
study are shown in Figure 5-5.
5.3  The characteristics and industrial specialisations  
of the selected regions
The above mentioned five Industrial Area regions that shall be the main 
objects of the field survey cover a range of population from about 90,000 in Xanthi 
to 275,000 in Achaia. They cover the range of typical non-central Greek regions. 
The capitals of these regions are urban centres again representative of typical 
provincial towns with agglomerated populations ranging from 31,500 in Xanthi, to 
some 155,000 inhabitants in Patra. The average urbanisation percentage of the 
sample regions is 52%. The sample is representative of urbanisation percentage for 
the whole country, that is some 58%, if some allowance for the existence of the 
large urban concentration in Athens is made. As regards the industrial assistance 
status of the regions, three of them belong to the 'B'-class less assisted developed 
regions, and two of them in the remote or lagging highest assistance ’D' regions.
The profiles of the selected areas follow, as regards their population, their 
employment in manufacturing, both in the region as a whole and in the Industrial 
Area, their assistance group and their productivity and employment growth results 
based on previous analysis. These are summarised in Table 5-1.
Xanthi : This is^Vather small region on the northern border of Greece with 
population of 88,777 and the smaller capital city of the sample, Xanthi, of 31,541 
inhabitants. The urbanisation percentage in the region is low, at 38%. The region 
belongs to the higher 'D' assistance class. The region has a total employment in 
manufacturing (1988) of 6,949 producing an average manufacturing establishment 
size of 8.1 which is the highest of the sample. Employment in large manufacturing
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Table 5-1 : Comparatiue attributes of the geographical departments of the fiue sample Industrial Rreas
Geographical Department Kanthi Rothopi Magnisia Achaia Iraklio Sum o f 5 All Industrial GREECE " \
Rrea-regions
Total Population 88,777 107,957 182,222 275,193 243,622 897,771 3,642,782 9,800,000
Capital City Xanthi Komotini Volos Patra Iraklio - - -
Capital City Population 31,541 37,461 107,407 154,596 110,848 - - -
Urbanisation % 38% 35% 59% 66% 46% 52% 49% 58%
v Area's Assistance Class
V
D D B B B J
' Total Employment Manufacturing 6949 4187 14612 21186 10631 57565 268181 706307 ^
Average establishment size 8.1 4.3 6.0 6.2 2.8 5.0 5.3 4.9
Employment in 'Large'
Manufacturing (over20 employees) 4208 1223 8191 11520 1842 26984 109067 294989
Average 'Large' establishment size 114 58 122 113 37 97 81 83 j
^  " .......- ■ ■ -...........- ■
Industrial Area \
Operation Date 1981 1978 1969 1979 1971 - -
Area (sq.km) 2.00 4.33 4.44 4.05 1.47 16.29 48.75
Number of Operating Firms 5 29 78 28 100 240 627
Employment 405 1200 3900 1360 1794 8659 20700
v Average establishment size 81 41 50 49 18 36 33 _ J
Output T.F.P. Analysis A
TEC (%) • o 00 -6.4 -0.3 -5.2 6.9
VRS (%) 4.5 14.7 0.4 -0.2 -6.8
'TFP (%) 3.7 8.3 0.1 -5.4 0.2 ... . . J
T  ■" ............... "■
[ Employment Analysis
Shift - Share
Relative Competitive Effect 38.9 8.2 1.8 -2.3 16.9
^R.man. index 0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 . J
Selection Group 1 1 2 4 1
N
J
firms (over 20 employees) is considerable, at 4,208, in 37 plants, giving a typical 
large plant of 114 employees that is again comparatively high. The Industrial Area 
there has only five firms operating but accounts for a total employment of 405 and 
an average size of 81, again the highest of all other Industrial Areas of the sample. 
With this profile, Xanthi produced a large positive TFP value, of 3.7% annually, mainly 
due to economies of scale, (positive VRS) as expected given the above structure, 
and not due to modern technology (small negative TEC). As for levels of 
employment, the region had fast employment growth in manufacturing ( Rman = 
0.6) and the all-round shift-share competitive effect of the region is the highest of 
the sample. In summary, Xanthi is an agricultural region, housing few large plants, 
mainly in the food, tobacco and leather processing industry, that increase 
employment and productivity.
Rothopi: This is a region with 107,957 inhabitants, mainly dispersed over its 
territory, since the administrative and only city, Komotini, has 37,461 inhabitants. 
The urbanisation percentage is the lowest of the sample at 35%. Rothopi belongs to 
well supported 'D' class of assistance. The manufacturing sector is also the smallest 
of the sample at 4,187 employees giving an average establishment size of 4.3 Large 
industry in this region has only 1,223 employees in some 21 plants, giving a typical 
regional large plant size of 58 employees. The Industrial Area is important and 
houses 29 firms and 1,200 employees. Employment in manufacturing is also here 
growing faster than the national (Rman 0.4) This setting seems optimal for scale 
economies to exist in the region since they produce the highest VRS of the sample, 
leading to the highest TFP. The technological indicator is though negative. The 
region has a wider range of manufacturing activities in smaller plant sizes and an 
important Industrial Area, with increased productivity and employment growth.
Magnisia : This is a manufacturing region with 182,222 inhabitants being 
quite concentrated around its capital, Volos, that has 107,407 inhabitants. The 
urbanisation percentage is high at some 59%. The manufacturing sector is the 
second larger of the sample at 14,612 employees giving an average establishment 
size of 6.0. Employment in large industry amounts to more than half, at 8,191 
employees in 67 plants, producing a typical large plant size of 122 employees, the 
largest of the sample. The Industrial Area here is important and houses 78 firms and 
3,900 employees at an average plant size of 50 employees. Employment in 
manufacturing is growing here just slower than the national (Rman -0.1). The region 
has a positive TFP, mainly due to scale economies for the region (positive VRS). The 
technological indicator is though negative. The region has a tradition in metallurgy, 
metal products and machinery. To sum up, the region has a considerable
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manufacturing base and an important Industrial Area; productivity is increased but 
without associated employment growth.
Achaia : This is the largest region in the sample with population of 275,193 
and the largest principal city, Patra, with 154,596 inhabitants. The urbanisation 
percentage in the region is the highest of all in the sample, at 66%. The region also 
has the highest total employment in manufacturing (1988) of 21,186, that gives an 
average manufacturing establishment size of 6.2. Manufacturing employment in 
large firms (over 20 employees) is again the highest in the sample, at 11,520, in 
102 larger plants, giving an typical large plant size of 113 employees which is 
comparatively high. The Industrial Area here has twenty eight firms in operation, 
giving a total employment of 1,360 at an average size of 49. Achaia produced a 
large negative TFP, -5.4% annually, mainly due to inadequate new technology 
utilisation. On employment levels, the region had employment growth in 
manufacturing slower than the national( Rman = -0.1) and the all-sectors shift- 
share competitive effect of the region is the only negative (-2.3%) in the sample. 
Achaia is an older industrial region housing many large plants, mainly in the textile, 
chemical and metal products sectors. Closures of plants with some rationalisation 
have maintained profitability of firms but reduced employment and productivity.
Iraklio : This is an important region of 243,622 inhabitants, quite dispersed in 
its territory. The main city Iraklio has some 110,848 inhabitants. The urbanisation 
percentage is low, at 46%. The manufacturing sector consists of some 10,631 
employees producing the smallest average establishment size of 2.8 in the sample. 
Large industry has only 1,842 employees in 50 plants, which produces an average 
large plant of 58 employees. The Industrial Area is important to the region and 
houses 100 firms and 1,794 employees. The average establishment size here is the 
lowest of all Industrial Areas in the sample at 18 employees. Employment in 
manufacturing in this region is growing faster than national (Rman 0.1) and the all­
sectors regional competitive effect is large and positive. This setting proves optimal 
for economies due to new technology (the highest in the sample) but the small sizes 
of establishments tend to give rise to scale diseconomies. The TFP is positive. This 
region has a wide range of manufacturing activities in small plants especially in food 
processing, plastic and machinery activities. Significantly it also has a densely 
populated Industrial Area. Such features have generated increased productivity 
due to technology advance as well as employment growth.
Overall in the five sample regions the average establishment size is 5.0 
employees, slightly above that of all Greece is 4.9, while in the twenty Industrial 
Area regions as a group the relevant size is 5.3. The five sample Industrial Areas
1 6 6
though have an average establishment size of 36 employees which for the twenty 
Industrial Areas as a group becomes 33. These are sizes much higher than the 
respective regional or national average sizes. But when the 'large' ( over twenty) 
industry sizes are compared to the Industrial Areas establishment sizes, it can be 
seen that the latter are considerably smaller, amounting to about half. This shows 
that the Industrial Areas are not solely designed for large manufacturing, neither 
are they, somehow, inaccessible to small firms of say ten employees.
The industrial specialisations that establish in the Industrial Areas is an 
important characteristic as regards their flexibility in accommodating a variety of 
industry and their specific attractiveness to various sectors. A sub-sectoral 
analysis of the firms established in the sample five Industrial Areas can show the 
manufacturing sub-sectors for which the Industrial Areas have proved most 
attractive. A complete analysis and evaluation of this kind is made in chapter seven. 
Here two aspects can be given on this context.
First, the number of establishments, by sector, in the sample five Industrial 
Areas as one group is shown as a percentage of all relevant establishments in the 
whole country. Second, the employment per sector established in the sample 
Industrial Areas is compared to that of the whole country. Figure 5-6 shows the 
number of the established firms and their employment in the sample of the five 
Industrial Areas, both as a fraction of the total -respective- figures for the whole 
country.
The percentages as regards the number of units are expectedly low, but 
the employment they account for is much higher. The main plant specialisations 
tend to be in the basic metal industries, oil and coal refining, tobacco industry and 
paper manufacturing sectors. Additionally, beverages, chemicals, rubber and other 
metal-related sub-sectors also show some preference to locate in the Industrial 
Areas of the sample. Textiles, footwear, wood, furniture, leather and printing units 
are much less attracted to the Industrial Areas. A somewhat different view is given 
as regards the employment percentages that the above established units 
generate. The five Industrial Areas of the sample show particular employment 
concentration in sectors such as Beverages, Tobacco, Paper, Rubber, Metal 
products, Machinery and Electrical Appliances, as can be clearly seen in Figure 5- 
6. A combined analysis can show that the beverages units in the Industrial Areas 
are exceptionally large as are the establishments in the paper manufacturing, the 
rubber and plastic, the metal products and the electrical appliances sectors. On 
the other hand, the more important plants in petrol refining and basic metal 
industries tend to locate out of the Industrial Areas.
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A more detailed presentation of the sectoral specialisations, in absolute 
terms, of establishments within the five surveyed Industrial Areas is given in Table 
5 -2  and illustrated in Figure 5-7. There it can be seen that the main 
concentrations of establishments are in rank order in metal products, food 
preparation, machinery, rubber and plastic, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and 
beverages. Food did not come high as a specialisation in the previous relative-to- 
national presentation due to the large number of establishments in the whole 
country. But this sector seems to be actively and strongly participating in the 
Industrial Areas Programme, though it does not have a special preference, as a 
sector, to establish there.
Details of the coverage by the survey regarding number of establishments, 
employment and participation of the various sectors is also shown in Table 5-2 
and illustrated in Figure 5-7. It can be seen how the survey tried to follow a 
representation the sample’s specialisations. The percentage of the established 
firms surveyed in each Industrial Area varies from 18% to 60%, with a general 
coverage of 23% of all firms. The coverage of the survey as regards employment 
ranged in the selected Industrial Areas from 93% to 42%, with a general coverage 
of some 59% of all employment.
5 .4  The field study procedure
The main frame of the field study was designed to be based on structured 
questionnaires. Three kinds of questionnaires were deployed for the survey 
purposes each one addressed to specific actors. The first was addressed to the 
central administration of the Industrial Areas Programme in Athens. This is the 
division of Regional Development and Industrial Infrastructure ( ITABY-ETBA ) of 
ETBA bank. The second was addressed to the local, on-site Industrial Areas 
administration, in the cases where there was one, or the relevant responsible ETBA 
branch in the area. The third and last questionnaire was addressed to the above 
mentioned sample of established firms in the Industrial Areas of the survey. Finally, 
for the selected case-study areas, any locally available data source, or actors' 
opinions and perceptions were utilised by the author to better formulate a 
perception of the situation.
The central administration ( ITABY-ETBA) questionnaire obtained aggregate 
data for the establishment and operation of the Industrial Areas Programme. It also
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Table 5-2 : Sectoral allocation of establishments in the sample Industrial Areas and the suruey coverage
Industrial Areas: 'N' f  Kanthi ^ ^  Rothopi ^ ^  Magnisia N^  Achaia ^ ^  Iraklio ^ ^Sam ple o f all Fiue
Established firms(1992) /  Surveyed Establ. Surveyed Establ. Surveyed Establ. Surveyed Establ. Surveyed Establ. Surveyed Established Surveyed
Manufacturing Sub-sectors
20: Food Preparation 2 1 4 3 10 1 3 1 20 5 39 11
21: Beverages 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 10 4
22: Tobacco Manufacturing 1 1 2 3 1
23: Textile 2 1 3 3 1 8 2
24: Sewing and Footwear 1 3 4 0
25: Wood and Cork 4 2 1 4 10 1
26: Furniture and Fixtures 2 4 6 0
27: Paper Manufacturing 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 8 4
28: Printing, Publishing 1 1 3 2 5 2
29: Leather and Fur 2 1 3 0
30: Rubber and Plastic 2 1 4 1 1 10 1 17 3
31: Chemicals 2 4 1 2 4 2 12 3
32: Petrol.& Coal refining 1 1 1 2 1
33: Non-metallic Minerals 4 1 2 1 5 3 11 5
34: Basic Metal Industries 4 1 5 0
35: Metal Products 5 3 21 4 8 3 11 1 45 11
36: Machinery,(non-electric) 2 5 1 2 16 2 25 3
37: Electr.machines & Appliances 1 1 5 1 2 9 1
38: Transport Equipment 4 3 4 8 3
3^9: Miscellaneous Manufacturing J V 1 y v 2 ) V  2 yv yv.5_ yv 10 0 .
/ i ’otal number o f Firms A ^  5 3 > f  29 10 \ ^  78 14 y^  28 10 y^ 1 0 0 is yr 240 55 y
% of firms covered by survey 60% 34% 18% 36% 18% 23%
Total Employment 405 375 1200 880 3900 1853 1360 1244 1794 752 8659 5104
% of employment covered by survey 93% 73% 48% 91% 42% 59%
J /V yv / V ........._yv . J \ . J
'N u m b e r  o f  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
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asked about the criteria for the selection of the firms applying and any auditing or 
guidance procedures in use. It was also designed to gather estimations of the local 
response to the Industrial Areas Programme, cooperation with local government, 
scientific/academic institutions and training or re-specialisation projects and a 
general political comment about the whole Programme's needs.
The local Industrial Areas administration questionnaire collected information 
for the specific projects procedures for land and infrastructure provision, the 
facilities, their maintenance and the services provided now on-site, and the costs 
and financial sources for these operations. A distinct part of the questionnaire 
asked for a full list of established firms, their manufacturing branches and their 
employment. Annual data about the Industrial Area employment and industrial space 
delivered to firms were not available. The local administration questionnaire also 
tried to evaluate the subtle local conditions, interactions and implementation 
differences that possibly create differentiation among the various sites' quality and 
performance.
The construction of the firms’ questionnaire was made in an articulated 
matter. The main questions of the survey derived from the theoretical and 
quantitative analysis presented earlier in this research. First, the sector, size and 
growth of the established firms were collected, and their estimations on the 
efficiency of infrastructure, facilities and services provided. These show the extent 
to which the Industrial Areas are acknowledged to lead to localisation and scale 
economies. Second, the technological levels and attitude towards new technology 
of the firms was surveyed. These measure the success of the Industrial Areas in 
concentrating, promoting and diffusing advanced technologies in the policy regions. 
Third the local interaction of the firms and their perception for the development 
prospects of the region were assessed. These measure the degree of pervasiveness 
of the Industrial Areas to the local economies.
The above questions are grouped into relevant parts in the questionnaire. 
The parts of the questionnaires are: a.'Firm's Identity’, providing ownership, 
employment size and sector of the firm; b. 'Infrastructure Efficiency' providing 
data, estimations and suggestions on the efficiency of all kinds of infrastructure by 
the firms; c. 'Technology Issues', where a measurement of the state of the 
technology in practice is made and the technological orientation of the firms and 
their technological needs are exposed; d. 'Local Characteristics' where regional 
government cooperation and existence of skills are evaluated; and e. 'Evaluation of 
the Industrial Area' where the firms' perceptions on the evaluation of their 
Industrial Area project and policy in general, on regional development issues, are
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collected. Finally, one supportive part of free format collected any suggestions for 
the better operation and efficiency of the Industrial Areas.
The established firms' questionnaire was constructed in a way that would 
give a large amount of detail, under two constraints. The first is the actual length 
of the questionnaire, that should be reasonably easily filled in about thirty 
uninterrupted minutes. It should not exceed a limit of forty questions, or so. The 
second constraint was that the questions should be of a kind that would obtain 
comparable answers among the various firms and among the five case-study areas.
The questions of all questionnaires were derived from a larger set of 
relevant questions, after the pilot testing of potential answers. The questionnaires 
in some cases handled qualitative issues, which for analytical purposes had to be 
quantified. Various techniques were used to derive quantified measurement of 
these issues. An outline of the questions in each questionnaire can be seen in Table 
5-3. The questionnaires can be seen in Appendix One.
5.5 The field study as carried out
The field study and survey was carried out in the summer of 1992. Contact 
was made with the helpful assistant director of the i ia b y - e t b a  Mrs. Pagoulaki, for 
the central administration issues for the Industrial Areas. Besides, basic data were 
obtained for all twenty Industrial Areas in operation.
Visits to the five sample Industrial Areas took place, (Xanthi, Komotini, Volos, 
Patra, Iraklio), as planned in the survey design. There, the local administration 
provided information and data which were collected, not only for the sample five 
Industrial Areas, but also for others that were under the administrative authority 
of the interviewed local administrations. Thus in fact, local administration 
questionnaires for a total of nine Industrial Areas were collected. In the case of 
Volos a Scientific Research Centre and a Workforce Specialisation Centre were 
established within the Industrial Area. These were also visited and relevant 
documentation was acquired. Following the relevant questionnaires, other issues 
came to the surface, of which notes were taken. All interviews were carried out, by 
the author of this study, in person. In general, appointments keeping and willingness 
to cooperate was good.
In addition to the Industrial Area administration interviews, selected firms 
were interviewed in each Industrial Area, using the prepared questionnaires. A total
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Table 5-3: Outline o f the field study questionnaires
V--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /
Central Administration 
of Industrial Areas (ETBA) 
Questionnaire:
( 13 questions)
 ^Local Administration 
of Industrial Areas 
Questionnaire:
(29 questions)
Established Firms' Questionnaire: 
(41 questions)
a. Employment
b. Land
c. Financing
d. Responsibility/Accountability
e. Selection/Technology
f. Local interaction
g. Central policy
h. Evaluation
a. Infrastructure, Employment:
b. Selection criteria, Technology
c. Local interaction
d. Estimations
a. Firm's identity
b. Infrastructure efficiency
c. Technology lisues
d.Local characteristics
e. Evaluation of Industrial Area
2 questions
1 question
2 questions
2 questions
3 questions 
1 question
1 question 
1 question
9 questions 
8 questions 
7 questions 
5 questions
18 questions 
13 questions 
3 questions 
7 questions
Suggestions
of fifty five firms were interviewed, with employment in them varying from ten to 
five hundred. The total number of employees of these firms exceeds five thousand. 
The questionnaires were completed in cooperation and in presence of the author 
and, where needed, comments besides the answers were written down. The 
attitude towards the survey varied among both places and firms, from simple 
answers to the questions, to guided tours around the establishment.
The firms are, in general, established in spacious pieces of land. The physical 
characteristics of the establishment vary considerably, not only due to the site of 
each Industrial Area, but also due to the industrial sector of the firms and the 
personal and qualitative character of each. In all surveyed Industrial Areas a trip 
around the site was made for personal evaluation of the conditions of the existing 
infrastructure and landscape, and photographic records were made to illustrate 
the situation. A presentation and an analysis of the results of the field study is 
made in the following chapter. The semi-processed results of the firms' 
questionnaire are shown in Appendix Two.
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Chapter 6: A survey of the provisions and operation of 
the Industrial Areas Programme
6.1 Administration and range of the Industrial Areas 
Programme, the firms' partic ipation  and the  
employment effect
6.1.1 The administrative setup for the Industrial Areas 
Programme, strengths and weaknesses
As it was seen in earlier chapters, the state has since 1965 assigned the 
Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA) the role of achieving the target of 
economic development, as regards the manufacturing sector. The bank has 
designed the Industrial Areas as a network of centres for industrial development, 
near some of the substantial urban centres of the country. The Industrial Areas 
Programme is meant to serve "directly, economically and comprehensively" the 
operation of modern manufacturing units, as the central administrator of the 
Programme has pointed out in interview. "Directly", since ETBA is the only operator 
of the Programme, and is responsible for the speedy process of the establishment 
formalities. "Economically", since the Programme enjoys a preferential position in 
the national development legislation. "Comprehensively", since the Industrial Areas 
are meant to provide all necessary infrastructure utilities. In addition, the Industrial 
Areas are planned to serve the rural areas physical planning efforts, and also to 
facilitate environmental protection, as claimed by central administration. They are 
also expected to have a decentralised administrative authority.
The principal responsibilities of the Programme are held by the head of the 
department of "Regional Development and Industrial Infrastructure" (I1ABY), of the 
ETBA bank which is based in Athens. The department produces and suggests to 
ETBA the annual and long term Industrial Areas development Programme. 
Responsibilities include programming, guidance and auditing of all activities that 
relate to the Industrial Areas. More specifically, responsibility is taken for the land 
selection and acquisition, the administration, the accountancy and the technical 
support of the Programme. The Central administration intervenes in any cases in 
which the local projects' administration may have problems. The head of it a b y  
reports to the board of ETBA and subsequently to the government through the
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Ministries of Industry Research and Technology (YBET), National Economy (YnEGO), 
and Environment, Planning and Public Works (YriEXQAE), on various issues related to 
development permissions and project funding.
The Programme's administration is decentralised to better serve the needs 
of the Industrial Areas. Administration can serve at the local level many of the 
Industrial Areas needs, including the procedures for the selling of industrial land and 
fixing contracts regarding the construction of infrastructure. A major task of the 
local administration is to audit the compliance of the established firms to the 
Industrial Area regulations. For example, all firms that buy land have to start 
construction work within six months of land purchase and have to start operating 
within two years. During the operational period, firms should not practice retailing 
nor have as their main activity simply the storage of goods.
As regards environmental regulations, local administration is assigned with 
the duties of the relevant audit, where there is such a procedure in operation. 
Local administration also has to ensure that the firms pay their share of running 
costs. As regards infrastructure, the local administration's task is to inspect the 
new provision and check the maintenance of the existing facilities. A technical 
department is usually responsible for this. The main procedures are programming, 
organising and auditing of the completion of the contract terms by the 
infrastructure contractors.
Finally, the local Industrial Areas administration forwards information to the 
central administration in Athens about firms' compliance with the regulations. It is 
the central office in Athens that decides on deviations from regulations, on 
Industrial Areas infrastructure, as the Athens office allocates funds for 
infrastructure extensions and approves new land sales.
The decentralised administration scheme seems important for the potential 
clients of the Industrial Areas. The firms can have the ETBA administration near 
them, and ETBA can be nearer to the firms and the projects themselves. The 
contact with the local actors can be much better if there are representatives of 
ETBA on the site. Still though, only eight of the twenty Industrial Areas have a local 
administration branch up to now. The projects that do not have a local 
administration on site, have obvious difficulties both in provider-client 
communication and in local cooperation and interaction. Such features are mostly 
the case with the small, peripheral and young Industrial Areas. But this defect is 
important, since these are the projects that need to establish their local appeal. In 
addition, peripheral and young projects, even when established are still building or
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completing their infrastructure and thus are in need of more care and attention 
from an administrative point of view.
The flexibility and efforts of ETBA are constrained, it was claimed in 
interview, by the slower moving national administration (the various Ministries), the 
policies of the Bank of Greece and of course by the general national macro- 
economic circumstances. As regards the concern about the natural environment, 
the local administrations in practice do not control industrial emissions and solid 
waste. The reasons for this are rather complex, in part being lack of suitable 
equipment especially as regards the emissions, but also the lack of suitable 
infrastructure as regards the solid waste. However, it may additionally be lack of 
suitable will by both tiers of administration, as will be discussed later.
Finally, from the field study it became apparent that the relations between 
the local administration and the established firms can be substantially improved. 
Firms in general are of varying opinions on the efficiency of the financial spend, as 
regards the running costs of the Industrial Areas. The physical condition of each 
area to a large extent determines the running costs expense. It is obvious that on 
the most populated sites, the cost per firm or per employee decreases. Thus in the 
smaller Industrial Areas often firms complain about the running cost expenses they 
have to pay. This means they have more reasons to be reluctant when asked if 
more facilities should be added in the projects, when the expenses or maintenance 
costs are included in the running costs. Conditions improve when Industrial Areas 
become more populated. Other areas of firms’ antagonism towards the 
administration include the rare Industrial Area contact with firms on issues other 
than those relating directly to the running cost bill, little individual understanding 
for each firm's needs, and the limited information about the administration's future 
plans for the Industrial Area. The administration would like to make firms to feel and 
behave more responsibly towards the whole Programme but it seems from the 
survey that further efforts are needed to make this a reality.
6 .1 .2  The range and provisions of the Industrial Areas
Programme
The Programme of the Industrial Areas consists of twenty sites in operation, 
in various locations in Greece as was shown earlier. They are situated in areas 
strategically selected for the regional development of Greece. The age of the 
various sites varies from 1969 to very recent. There are plans for more projects to 
establish. The Industrial Areas are in fact defined land spaces, for industrial use with 
infrastructure provision, owned by the ETBA bank and sold to selected firms at
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advantageous prices to attract them to remote or strategic areas and to 
concentrate them spatially in industrial clusters. The existing infrastructure varies 
among the different sites and its quantity is relevant to the age of the site and to 
the number of the established and incoming firms. According to ETBA, during the 
planning and the construction of the Industrial Areas considerable care is taken to 
promote the least possible degradation of the natural environment.
The total area of the Industrial Areas Programme was 47.3 sq.km in 1992, 
spread over 20 sites. The clear and usable industrial space is 33.3 sq.km. The rest is 
taken up by roads, free space and other infrastructure. The specific area of each 
site varies, but the average area of each is some 2.4 sq. km. The average usable 
industrial space in each is 1.7 sq.km, that is about 70%. This means that 
infrastructure and open spaces amount to about 30%, demonstrating that the 
Industrial Areas are of relatively low density and provide ample breathing space for 
the established firms. The infrastructure generally includes paved streets, area 
lighting, electricity and telecommunications provision, in most cases water and 
sewage provision, while in some cases a sewage treatment station is in operation. All 
the mentioned infrastructure is programmed for all of the sites.
From the clear industrial space of 33.3 sq.km, some 11.9 sq.km was 
occupied by established firms in 1992. Thus, general average space occupancy 
rate is some 35.9%. The occupancy, though, varies a great deal among the 
different sites due largely to the age of the site, its location and the level of 
infrastructure provided. While the Programme has been constantly expanding and 
enlarging its total space, this average percentage is in general, not particularly low. 
Of course there are regional differentiations both in the provision of infrastructure 
and in land sales.
To provide a general view of the basic features of the Industrial Areas, the 
operation date, the size and the detailed nature of the infrastructure provision for 
a selection of nine sites, are given in Table 6-1. These nine sites are under the 
authority of the local administration of the five Industrial Areas which comprise the 
survey's sample. This selection of sites has areas varying from 1 sq.km. to over 4 
sq.km. All Industrial Areas have medium voltage electricity (220/380 V), telephone 
lines, paved internal roads and sewage. All have water supply except Iraklio on the 
island of Kriti. Street lighting is available in five out of the nine Industrial Areas and 
high voltage electricity in four. Iraklio, Patra and Komotini have a sewage treatment 
unit. Motorway connection is generally poor with the exception of Komotini, Xanthi 
and Volos. Finally, only Volos has railway connection. Bus connection and passenger 
train connection is generally not available to the Industrial Areas or markedly
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f industrial Rrea
Table 6 - 1 :  Some features of the provision leuels In a selection of Industrial Rreas
Iraklio
1971
1.47
4.0
Patra Uolos Hanthi j Komotini Tripolis I Larissa Kalamata RleKandrupolls\
Date of Operation 
Total Area (sq.km) 
Land Price ( million drs/1000m£)fv  
In frastructure
1979
4'05
2.5
1969
4.44
2.5
1981
2.00
1.5
1978
4.33
1.0
1981
1.62
1.3
1981
2.50
2.0
1986 
1.09 
1.5
1983
2.10
1.0
Internal Road Network ir * ■dr k ★ it * * *
Water Provision •k ★ * ★ it * k ★
Sewage ★ * ★ * ★ ★ * U.C. ★
Sewage Treatment *k * ★
Refuse Collection k ★
Atmos. Pollut. Control
Illumination ★ * * * U.C.
Std. Voltage Electricity + * it * ★ * k ★ ★
High Voltage Electricity ★ k it *
Telephone Lines Availability ★ * it * ★ ★ * * ★
Sports Facilities
Motorway Connection * * *
Railway Connection 23 km it 7 km 13 km 3 km 12 km 15 km
Bus Connection ★ it * *
Adjacence to Port 5 km 23 km 5 km 30 km 36 km 15 km
V  Adjacence to AirpopcV 2 km /  23 km /  10 km /85  km /8 0  km 10 km 15 km J
Administration -  Services r
Administration on site * * * it
Bank Services 6 km 23 km + 6 km 13 km 3 km 3 km 7 km 15 km
Post Services 6 km k * 6 km 13 km 3 km 3 km 7 km 15 km
Health Services * 23 km * 6 km 13 km 3 km 3 km 30 km 15 km
Exhibition Hall ★ *
Restaurant/Cafeteria ★ ★ it
Workforce Specialisation Centre ★
Technological Research Centre ★
V  Applicants Consultation staffV , 1 1 J
'u.c.' stands fo r: 'under construction'
inadequate.
Amongst ail twenty Industrial Areas, only two (Thessaloniki and Volos), have 
a research institute and a technological training and specialisation centre. These 
are not run by ETBA, but by private entities, with some help from the Greek 
Industrialists Club (2EB) and the state. Seven of the twenty Industrial Areas have an 
on-site administration building. Where such a building is available the staffing varies 
from two to about ten. Support for the on-site administration is provided by the 
nearest branches of the ETBA bank. There are still a few sites where any kind of 
administration is over one hundred kms away. In the large majority of Industrial 
Areas, services such as a bank, post office, health centre, exhibition hall or 
restaurant are not available. A first aid centre is missing or is inadequate in almost 
all cases.
In none of the Industrial Areas is there a regular monitoring procedure of 
the levels of atmospheric pollution. Sewage monitoring is in operation in the sites 
having a sewage treatment units. A small 'green belt' of a few tens of metres is 
planned in some cases to surround the site and some care of the green features of 
the site is taken, mostly in the older established areas.
The industrial land prices in the Industrial Areas at present are around two 
million drachmas (i.e. £ 6000) per 1000 sq.m.; prices though do vary among sites. 
For example, land prices range from 4 millions in Iraklio, to 2.5 millions in Patra and 
Volos and down to one million drachmas per 1000 sq.m in Komotini. The main factors 
that affect the prices of land are the original land values that ETBA paid to buy the 
land, the amount of infrastructure subsequently provided and the attractiveness of 
the area and the surrounding land values trends. It should be understood that in 
cases of rapid increase of external land prices, as in Iraklio, ETBA would tend not to 
match these increases. Equally, when local land prices are falling, ETBA has to be 
competitive and follow the local patterns, as perhaps is the case in Komotini. In both 
cases this is quite costly to the bank. Even so the Industrial Area space in Iraklio is 
four times more expensive than that of Komotini. But surrounding land market 
values in the two regions may vary by ten times or more.
The land sales of the above selection of nine Industrial Areas are next 
presented in Table 6-2. There data show the industrial space available in each site 
and place the space sold to firms in comparison with the age of each site. Industrial 
Areas' performance can be measured from three aspects (Figure 6-1). The first 
measures the total industrial space sold to firms. This shows the importance of 
Volos, and then of Patra and Iraklio respectively. The second measures the space
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Table 6 -2 :  Rrea,  industr ial  space and land sales in a se le c t ion o f  In d u s t r i a l Areas
Industrial Area Iraklio Patra Uolos Xanthi Komotini Tripolis Larissa Kalamata Rlexandrupolis
Total Area (in thousand m2) 1472 4050 4440 2000 4330 1620 2500 1090 2100
Total Industrial Space 1100 2804 3000 1200 2840 1060 1780 800 1460
Sold Industrial Space 890 1070 2070 180 520 220 90 20 0
% Industrial Space /  Total Area 75% 69% 68% 60% 66% 65% 71% 73% 70%
% Sold Space /  Industrial Space 81% 38% 69% 15% 18% 21% 5% 3% 0%
% of Sold Space, in Operation 85% 79% 93% 94% 85% 100% 59% 100% -
Years of Operation ( incl. 1991) 20 12 22 10 13 10 10 4 8
I Average Space Sold Annually 44 89 94 18 40 22 9 5 0
f  Figure 6-1 : Sales of industrial space in a selection of Industrial Areas
a. Sold Industrial Space b. Sold Space as % of Industrial Space c. Average Space Sold Annually
in thousand m2 in thousand m2
2500 -x ;
2000 4 r+ J
1500 | — j -  
1000 I ' .:  ;
100% t 100
 I J.60%
40% ~r 40
.I______20%500 T
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XO)
sold as a percentage of each site's capacity. Here Iraklio proves the most advanced 
with 81% developed, followed by Volos at 69% and then Patra with 38%. The other 
sites of the selection are all below 20% of developed capacity. The third measures 
the average industrial space that was sold to the businesses on an annual base for 
each site. Here Patra is shown to match Volos, and Komotini to match Iraklio in the 
speed of space utilisation. This might imply that the high percentages of land sold in 
Iraklio and Volos are much a function of their considerably older age. In general, 
Volos effectively proves to be the most attractive Industrial Area of the selection, 
followed by Iraklio, Patra, Komotini, and then the rest. Alexandroupolis on the other 
hand proves to be a total failure. The reasons for this are not necessarily only 
geographical (it is in fact the sole prefecture with a land-border with Turkey) but 
also have to be organisational, since there is some growing industry in the 
geographical department of Evros, but this is outside of the Industrial Area.
As has been shown, the Industrial Areas are an ambitious Programme which 
has tried to provide affordable and operational industrial space in the Greek 
regions. The experience of the Programme shows that time is needed and that 
success does not come overnight. The conditions, though, in each site that are 
measured next in this survey may throw some light in the hows and the whys of the 
successes and the failures.
6.1.3 The Industrial Areas Programme's finances
The total cost of the Industrial Areas Programme from its start in 1968 to 
1991 has been, at constant 1982 prices, over 40 billion drachmas, ( or about 
£300 million, at the 1982 exchange rate). The sources of the finances were made 
up of some 71% (28.4 billion drachmas) from the ETBA bank, some 21.2% (8.5 
billion drachmas) the Greek State, through the "National Investments Programme" 
(nAE), and some 7.8% (3.1 billion drachmas) from the European Community (now 
European Union) through various funds and programmes, mainly after 1981 when 
Greece joined the EC. Details on the Programme's cash flows through time are 
analysed in depth in the following monetary evaluation chapter.
The annual running cost of the full Industrial Areas Programme was in 1991 
around 500 million drachmas (£1.5 million). The local administration of each project 
bears the running expenses of the provided infrastructure and services and then 
allocates costs to ETBA and the firms. The running cost is calculated by each 
administration and statements are produced on a six-monthly basis. The costs are 
allocated to firms according to the space they occupy, to the size of their
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employment and to the type and volume of their sewage. The running cost, in 
general, consists of the following four parts: a. Administration expenses, 
maintenance of infrastructure, landscape care and street lighting; b. Water 
provision expenses; c. Operational expenses of sewage treatment station, and d. 
Workshops expenses, where applicable (Table 6-3). In general the firms cover the 
sewage treatment and the water provision expenses, while the ETBA covers the 
salaries of the administration staff. The infrastructure maintenance is divided 
between established firms and the ETBA.
In Industrial Areas that are densely populated by firms, the ETBA proportion 
of costs is lower and this can be seen in Table 6-3. In Volos ETBA covers 8% of 
overall running costs, in Iraklio some 9% and in the case of Komotini 12%. For the 
specific administration and maintenance expenses, the contribution of ETBA 
becomes smaller in Industrial Areas that are densely populated by firms. Thus, the 
ETBA covers 8% of these costs in Volos, rising to 18% in Iraklio and reaching a high 
69% in Komotini. It can be also seen how the price of water influences running 
costs, where drilling and pumping is involved, as in Komotini. In this case water 
expenses alone are almost as high as all of the running costs in Volos. In Iraklio there 
is no water provision for industrial use.
Administration has to play an important role as regards the interface 
between the attraction of capital and its allocation in Industrial Areas, especially at 
local level.
The selection criteria regarding applicant firms are as follows. Initially the 
fulfillment of the full legal requirements for eligibility according to the Industrial 
Areas regulation is checked. Subsequently, the economic solidity, credibility and 
estimated viability of the firm are evaluated. The employment creation potential of 
the applicant firm plays considerable role in the acceptance of a firm. Firms that 
already operate elsewhere wishing to relocate in the Industrial Areas also receive 
positive consideration. In general, applicant firms introduced to national incentives 
schemes receive positive consideration. In these cases the selection procedure is 
actually carried out by central or regional government departments. The local 
Industrial Areas administration generally accepts such firms, to the extent that the 
firm’s needs in limited resources (i.e. water and space) can be covered.
A measure of the selection priorities as given by the local administrations at 
interview is shown in Table 6-4. What it seems to be the most important is the 
employment to be created. Almost equally as important, but a second priority of 
selection, is the profitability of the firm also expressed as expected economic 
viability. Less important comes the technological status of the firms. Export
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Table 6 -3 : Structure o f the running enpenses (1991) o f three selected  
Industrial Areas and the ir sources o f finance
Running Expenses Total ETBA Firms
Administration & Maintenance 19448 18% 82%
Workshops' expenses 1045 52% 48%
;Sewage Treatment 22560 0% 100%
Water 209 0% 100%
Total )143262 9% 91%!
r KOMOTINI ^ S'f U0L0S
Total ETBA Firms Total ETBA
9821 69% 31% 30917 8%
19255 0% 100% 0
26132 0% 100% 0
155208 12% 88%J[30917 8%
Firms
Values are in thousand Drachmas
Table 6 -4 : Priorities in the selection o f firms fo r the sample Industrial Areas
Measure of importance of each priority 
j Employment creation 18
| Viability/Profitability 16
I Technological status 11
I
| Export potential 9
: Production ties to existing firms 6
\ ___________________________________________________________________________
Measure is assessed from the relevant responds of the local administrators
Table 6 -5 : Aejections o f applicant firms by reason, 
fo r the sample Industrial Areas, 1990 -  1992
Rejections by reason All 5 sites Iraklio Patra Uolos Kanthi Komotini
Non-Viable 2 1 - - - 1
Incompatible to regulations 2 1 - 1 - -
! Lack of suitable space 1 1 - - - -
Excessively polluting 3 - - 1 1 1
! Total number of rejections: 8 3 0 2 1 2 J
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potential also gets few marks in the scale of priorities. As regards the production 
ties with any other established firms, administration of Volos indicated that it was 
the firms’ own decision, not their’s and this was the general view. As can be seen 
from the firms' selection priorities of the administration a rather low profile 
intervention stance and a somewhat tolerant selection process of firms is followed 
by the administrators.
The reasons for applicant firms' rejections given by the local Industrial Areas 
administration are grouped into some four main categories. A first rejection 
category is the 'non-viable' group of firms. Mainly, this has to do with firms not 
being adequately financed, but also some concern is given to unrealistic marketing 
and production costs. A second group of rejected firms is the one which requests 
space that the relevant Industrial Area cannot offer. This may involve large firms 
that physically would not fit, or others, where the suggested employment or 
development per area ratio seems to the local administration to be unfavourable. 
Next in the rejection list comes the polluting firms group. Such firms are usually not 
admitted to Industrial Areas, except if a special place for them exists. The last 
group of rejected firms is the one deemed to be incompatible with the Industrial 
Area regulations. This is a general group, in which belong firms that in regard some 
of their attributes, either in the nature of the production sector or in the mode of 
manufacturing, are incompatible with the regulations. (Table 6-5)
An analysis of the firms’ rejections can possibly reveal some characteristics 
of the concerns of the various local administrations. Letting alone the 
incompatibility to regulations and the non-viability reasons, some indications can be 
understood from the lack of space and the pollution type of rejections. It can be 
seen that in Patra there have been no rejection cases lately. Patra is in need of 
firms. In Iraklio there have been rejections due to lack of space. The Industrial Area 
there is almost full, and expansion is possibly a too expensive option, due to the 
proximity to Iraklio itself which is only four kilometres away. In Volos, Xanthi and 
Komotini, there have been rejections on pollution grounds. The two latter areas 
seem particularly to be developing concern for their natural environment, during 
their transition from an agricultural to an industrial way of life.
Finally, an effort is made by administrations at the local level to match firms' 
specific characteristics and sector of industry spatially within the Industrial Areas 
space itself where possible. The creation of sectoral clusters is deemed desirable by 
the administration. The perception of the administrator of the Industrial Area of 
Volos, indicated through interview, is that 'neighbouring' may either give firms the 
opportunity to merge in the future thus creating larger and stronger ones, or just
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maintains competition and encourages improvements. The Industrial Areas 
administration is also concerned over environmental pollution. In some cases it 
consults with and often receives pressures from local environmental activists as 
regards environmental impact. In other cases there are complaints from certain 
located firms (often food processing) on unwelcome environmental interactions by 
other (polluting) industrial establishments.
6.1.4 Employment and participation of firms in the Programme
The total number of persons employed in all the established firms in the 
Industrial Areas Programme in 1992 was around 20,700. In 1988 it was 19,000 
and in 1982 it was 12,600. There were 627 established and operating firms in the 
Industrial Areas Programme in 1992; in 1988 the number was 477 and in 1982 it 
was 310. It can be seen that the Programme in general is increasing its size as 
regards employment. From 1982 to 1992, the total employment increased by 
8100 jobs in ten years, or an average increase of 810 jobs per year. (Table 6-6, 
Figure 6-2 a)
For the period 1982 to 1988 the average new jobs per year, though, was 
1067, while for the period 1988 to 1992 the average annual increase was only 
425. This seems to be a result of the general recession taking place in the period 
rather, as shall be shown, than a reduction of the attractiveness, or the efficiency 
of the Industrial Areas Programme. Put in percentages, an average annual increase 
of 6.75% was maintained for the six consecutive years of the period 1982 to 
1988. This is by far higher than the national rates of increase in manufacturing for 
the period. As regards the period 1988 to 1992, an annual average increase of 
2.14% in the employment of the Programme was experienced at a time of recession 
with practically no increase in employment in manufacturing at the national level. 
Thus, as a first evaluation indication it can be said that the Industrial Areas 
Programme on the whole has been successfully attracting employment to selected 
developing areas. Much more thorough evaluative procedures are reserved for the 
next chapter.
As regards the firms that participate in the Programme, there was an 
increase of 317 in their number, in the period 1982 to 1992, or that some 32 new 
firms were attracted on average every year. The rate was 28 new firms annually 
for 1982 -1988, but 37 for the period 1988 to 1992. The average size of the 
participant firms in 1982 was 41 employees, in 1988 it was 40, while in 1992 it 
became 33. (Table 6-6 , Figure 6-2 b and c)
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Table 6-6: Total employment and firms participation in the full Industrial Rreas Programme, 1982-1992
Years
1982
1988
1992
Employment Number of Firms 
12600 310
19000 477
20700 627
Average size of Firms 
40.6 
39.8 
33.0
V
Figure 6-2: Employment, number and size of firms in the full Industrial Rreas Programme, 1982-1992
oo
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These facts give a hint of how the Programme has dealt the recession of the 
latter period. New smaller firms kept opening, at higher rates, while the large ones, 
had to reduce their payroll staff. The net employment result was positive, and a 
basis of more firms is created. This larger base is more modern and supposedly more 
flexible and given the opportunity, has the potential to expand its employment to 
much higher numbers.
6.2 Perceptions of infrastructure provision and views 
on satisfactory operating environments
6.2.1 Perceptions for the land values and transportation  
in fras tru c tu re
In the field survey questionnaire, firms were asked to assess the price of the 
land they bought in the Industrial Areas, given the infrastructure offered, and in 
comparison to other sites within the geographical department. The possible 
answers were: 'cheap', or 'advantageous', or 'competitive', or 'expensive'. An 
average of some 60% among the 55 firms that were asked characterised the price 
of the land as 'advantageous'. About 30% of the firms regarded the prices as 
competitive to other locations. Few firms, some 4 and 5% of all, regarded prices as 
cheap or expensive respectively. (Figure 6-3). Although most firms found the 
pricing of the industrial land offered to them by ETBA to be advantageous, many 
firms commented that at the time they bought the land, price was not cheaper 
than in other places and also, that they had to wait for considerable period until 
the infrastructure provision was completed. There are still cases where the planned 
infrastructure is not yet ready. But in general firms in Industrial Areas were 
pleased with the pricing aspects of their land purchases.
Various comments were made by firms as to the attributes of the location 
of the Industrial Area. Perceptions varied among different sites, as they were often 
considered to be too 'far' or too 'near' the city, or 'up' in the mountains. The fact 
is that in all three cases of Patra, Volos and Iraklio where a nearby port is available, 
the Industrial Areas are located several miles distant from the coast, and at a 
considerable altitude of between 300 to 900 feet above the sea level. Thus it is 
obvious that the potential advantage of an adjacent port is lost. As regards 
environment, in some cases the monitoring of the firms' sewage has caused
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Figure 6-3: Land prices in the industrial Rreas as perceiued* 
by firms established in the sample Industrial Rreas
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80%
60%
40% —
20%
Cheap Advantageous 1 Competitive Expensive
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Patra
H  Uolos
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HI Komotini
Figure 6-4: Eualuation* of the public transportation seruing the Industrial Rreas 
by firms established in the sample Industrial Rreas
11 Iraklio100%
80%
Patra
S3 Uolos
40% —
Kanthi20%  —
0%
m  KomotiniNot available Poor Medium Good Excellent
* Percentages show the proportion of Firms in each site that selected each 'attribute'
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problems among firms and between firms and administration. In general, air pollution 
levels are perceived to be kept at low levels, though in most cases they are not 
monitored.
The large majority of the surveyed firms' executives evaluate the public 
transportation that connects the Industrial Area with the residential areas as poor 
and few as non-existent (Figure 6 -4 ). The inadequate public transportation can 
be explained by the fact that the early established firms had to provide company 
transportation for their workers. The new firms that came had few alternatives but 
to follow the practice of the older ones. In most cases it has proved to be difficult 
for the public transport operators to follow the shifts timetables of the firms, or to 
provide an adequate continuous service to the Industrial Area. The present 
situation is that one bus may make one or two journeys in the morning and one or 
two in the afternoon. But in all cases the bus cannot cover extended areas and 
maybe different localities to collect the workers. Thus the private car becomes a 
strong option for work journey. Still, though, no congestion or parking problems 
have yet developed in the sites of the case study. Problems that are caused by this 
lack of public transportation, according to the firms’ views are that the Industrial 
Areas remain unconnected to the nearby localities' life, in addition of course to the 
externality of higher transportation cost.
As regards personnel transportation, it appears that the large majority, 
about 95%, of the employees do not use the public transportation to go to work. 
(Figure 6-5). Instead, about 45% use the company buses and another 50% use 
private cars. It was observed that almost all firms with more than 50 employees 
provide company buses for staff transportation. Some smaller firms remarked that 
they give petrol allowances to their employees for their travel to work. It can be 
observed that in Iraklio, with smaller sizes of firms, the private car is the norm. In 
Patra, the private car is outweighed by buses that the larger firms provide.
As far as transportation of raw materials and finished products is 
concerned, the situation is quite clear. The large majority of the products, that is 
on average 80%, are transported by road. The sea transportation is the second 
option and this varies from 10 to 35% according to the location of the Industrial 
Area. The largest percentage expectedly of necessity belongs to the island-based 
Iraklio. The railway is not at all favoured, and only in Komotini did it reach a two 
percent preference. Air transport is not used for goods in any case (Figure 6-6). 
Goods transportation modes are in all Areas road oriented, in part because the only 
Industrial Area with proper railway connection is Volos. But even there, the one 
main reason for not using the train that came up from the survey is the totally
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Figure 6-5: Modes* of employees transportation to the sample Industrial Rreas
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* Percentages show average use of each mode, based on number of employees in each area
'Figure 6-6: Modes of products transportation* from the sample Industrial Rreas
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* Percentages are computed as average (on Firms basis) use of each mode in each site
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inadequate handling speed. In Volos, firms were asked to evaluate first the proximity 
to the firm's site to rail facilities, and second the speed and safety of products' 
handling by rail. Answers regarding railway proximity varied a lot from firm to firm. 
Numerical values were attributed to qualitative characteristics in order to be able 
to derive average opinions, in the following way. Zero score relates to inexistent 
facility, one to very poor, two means of low use or quality, three corresponds to 
moderate, four to good and five to excellent quality of the facility. This way an 
average score of 2.21 was produced, five being the best. Answers as regards 
quality of handling proved lower and more concentrated around the average score 
of 1.64 again out of five. In the other Industrial Areas, without railway connection, 
reloading to the train at the nearest railway station was almost never considered, 
given the inadequate local stations' facilities, on top of the above reservations. It 
also transpired from the survey, that railways have too limited a network for many 
firms' distribution necessities. Sea transportation practically is used only in cases 
where there is no other possible option.
The evaluation of roads infrastructure was made in three stages. First, the 
firms had to assess the roads quality within the Industrial Area, second, the 
existence of the roads connecting the Area with strategic points, and last the 
speed of the connecting roads. The five-sites’ average of the internal roads 
evaluation is 4.04 points out of five, or quite 'good'. Figure 6-7 shows the detailed 
regional scores with their relation to the qualitative attributes. Scores of inside 
roads vary from 3.67 points in Xanthi to near 'excellent' 4.36 in Volos. As regards 
the Industrial Areas connecting roads, the five-sites average mark is 2.53, or 
'moderate', with considerable variation from 1.33 points in Iraklio to 4.07 in Volos. 
The speed of the connecting roads is also generally evaluated at 2.66 points, or 
'moderate', but widely varying from 1.44 points in Iraklio to 4.21 in Volos. The 
roads' evaluation question shows some real problems for the Industrial Areas. While 
the roads on-site are good, the connecting roads are often old, narrow, or going 
through residential areas and are thus congested. The result is that journeys are 
slow and travel times unreliable. This causes real problems in Patra and Iraklio. In 
contrast, Volos’ connecting roads are very good.
Consequently, a hypothetical railway versus motorway comparison was set 
in the four mainland Industrial Areas that could have train connection. Iraklio is 
excluded since it is on the island of Kriti where there is no railway. Firms are offered 
five financial tokens to spend for improvements on the roads or the railway. In the 
four-area context, an average of 4.26 tokens went for the roads and 0.74 to the 
railways. Patra gave only 0.4 tokens out of the five for train improvements, Volos
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Figure 6-7: Eualuation of roads by firms established
in the sample Industrial Areas
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Figure 6-8: Hypothetical future spending on road and rail 
by firms established in four of the sample Industrial Areas
Spending on Roads Spending on Railway
Patra
Uolos
H  Hanthi
S3 Komotini
* Each Industrial Area's average spending of the five financial tokens available by each firm.
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1.14, Komotini 1.40, and Xanthi zero (Figure 6 -8 ). The roads versus rail 
improvements question reveals some of the firms’ needs in different Industrial 
Areas. In Patra for example, where the site's road connection has proved to be 
inadequate, firms strongly demand improvements in roads. Relevant to this is that 
the railway gauge (width) in Patra, and the whole Peloponnissos, is narrower than 
the rest of Greece and Europe and further expenditure on this infrastructure is 
perceived of limited potential. Besides, Patra is rather southerly located and also 
has a port. In the case of the distant Komotini, with average road conditions, the 
need for better railways is relatively more strongly put. Firms using their own 
trucks perceive their transportation cost as being rather high. But in Xanthi, with 
slightly better roads and a hundred kilometres nearer to Thessaloniki, no money at 
all is allocated to the railway in the hypothetical analysis. Interesting enough is that 
in Volos, where road conditions are the best, firms start to consider railways 
improvements for cost reduction. The larger firms put this forward, as regards raw 
materials and especially exports and imports from Europe, (the situation in former 
Yugoslavia was not as serious at the time of the survey).
As a conclusion, in all cases roads have the main priority but the arguments 
about the railway are interesting and point to some potential contribution. 
Comments made in the survey suggest a better organisation of the railways as a 
prerequisite, but several firms are pessimistic as regards the chances of creating a 
reliable and cost-effective railway service.
6.2.2 Telecommunications and power infrastructure
Firms were asked in the questionnaire how many telephone lines they have 
and how they are spread among telephone, fax, telex and datalines. From this, an 
index of the 'number of telephones per firm' shows the firms' orientation to the 
telephone, but without considering the employment size of the firm. To achieve this, 
an index of 'employees per telephone line’ was computed. It shows the intensity of 
the use of telephone in each Industrial Area, without being affected by the size of 
the established firms. It also gives an indication of the type of industries that are 
established in each area, and their telephone orientation.
It appears from the survey that the average 'number of telephones per 
firm1 index was about seven lines per firm and did not vary much among the 
Industrial Areas that were surveyed (from 5.2 in Komotini to 8.6 in Xanthi). The 
'employees per telephone line' index though, varied considerably, from 5.4 in Iraklio, 
to 19.1 in Volos (Figure 6-9). This shows that the larger firms as regards 
employment make more 'economic' use of the telephone. For example, the average
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firm size in Iraklio is much smaller than in Volos, or Patra. Iraklio needs 3.5 times the 
lines Volos uses, or three times those of Patra, for a given amount of employment, 
thus loading analogically the local networks.
After these quantitative questions, an evaluation of the quality of the 
telephone connections provided was attempted. Firms were asked to give an 
average number of failing attempts for one long distance call. From this, a 'long 
distance call success' percentage was extracted. It proves that the best quality of 
telephones is in Patra, with 63% success rate, Volos follows with 58%, Iraklio 37%, 
Xanthi 31% and Komotini with only 22% of success. The indication of 'economical' 
use above, is currently justified. In Volos and Patra the efficacy of the telephone 
connections is higher than the equally developed but overloaded Iraklio. Of course 
economic use of the telephone by the industry could never countervail the low 
quality of the lines in some areas including the distant regions of Xanthi and 
Komotini. The average success rate among the surveyed Industrial Areas is only 
42%. On the same issue, perceptions of overall quality were collected, with results 
relevant to the above. In Patra 40% of the firms regard telephone lines as 'good', 
for Volos the percentage is only 30% and in Iraklio even lower at 12%. Lastly it is an 
important finding that no firms perceived telecommunications as 'good' in Xanthi, or 
Komotini. Figure 6-9 provides the perceptions in detail.
Firms were also asked if they suffered operational and entrepreneurial 
problems due to the general inadequacy of the telecommunications provision. In 
general, 30% answered 'no', 26% declared 'small' problems, 41% 'considerable' and 
3 percent 'serious' problems. Considerable problems were declared by 80 % of the 
firms in Komotini, 33 % of the firms in Iraklio and Xanthi, 30% of the firms in Patra 
and 21 % of the firms in Volos. In the case of Komotini, one firm owner commented 
that if they need about four attempts to make a long distance call and they need 
to make fifty a day, they need all the staff of their offices to do nothing but deal 
with the phones and the fax all day. But even in the other areas, such difficulties 
are a considerable unnecessary handicap to the efficient operation of business.
In terms of power infrastructure, the firms were asked about their monthly 
electrical consumption. This magnitude of use, of course, varied a lot from firm to 
firm. Figures reveal consumptions from 1.5 to 1740 MWH per firm, per month, and 
the general average of the sample is 232 MWH. It was found out that the average 
firm in Iraklio consumes some 60 MWH monthly, whereas in Xanthi the figure is 93, in 
Volos 393 and in Patra 456. Subsequently, in order to produce a less company-size 
biased measurement of electricity consumption, each firm's employment was used 
and an index of electricity consumption per employee was produced. The
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Figure 6-9  : Use and quality of telephones, as perceived by
firms established in the sample Industrial Rreas
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Figure 6 -1 B: Electricity consumption and reliability o f provision 
as perceived by Arms established in the sample Industrial Rreas
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measurement unit is made to show MWH per employee, annually. Thus, it turns out 
that in Xanthi 9 MWH per employee are consumed on average, in Iraklio the figure is 
17.2, in Komotini 18.6 , in Volos 35.6 and in Patra 43.9 (Figure 6-10).
From the electricity consumption questions it can be seen that there is a 
considerable difference in the types of firms and their activities, amongst the 
different Industrial Areas. The typology shows that the Area in of Iraklio, occupied 
predominantly by small firms, gives the smallest average energy consumption per 
firm. But the energy per employee is not the lowest, actually it is double than the 
lowest scoring Xanthi. This gives a hint that small firms can also have capital 
intensive production methods, in some cases to a much higher extent than in larger 
firms. The power consumption data also characterise the Industrial Areas according 
to their modes of industrial production as can be clearly seen in the cases of Volos 
and Patra. In these areas large capital intensive industries have been established, 
and the power consumption is several times higher than in the light industry of 
Iraklio, Xanthi and Komotini, either measured on a firm or on an employment basis.
The reliability of the electricity supply was also assessed. Firms were asked 
how many times per year they have electricity cuts and how many hours these last. 
It turns out from survey that in general, there are 8 power cuts per year and 
these amount to about sixteen hours, in total. But results vary among the different 
Industrial Areas (Figure 6-10). Thus, in Volos there are three cuts per year 
summing up to less than eight hours; in Xanthi and Iraklio six power cuts, lasting in 
total for six and sixteen hours respectively; in Patra seven, lasting less than eight 
hours; but in Komotini though, these are eleven, lasting forty two hours in total. 
Firms have installed electricity generators for emergency use, ranging from 11 to 
60%, among areas and at an average of 40% for all five areas. From the data it 
proves that in the distant area of Komotini and to some extent the islandic Iraklio, 
this part of the infrastructure base is causing some problems. As a matter of fact, 
it also demonstrates that where the largest electricity customers are established, 
there the electricity supply proves to be more reliable. An interaction of supply and 
demand can be clearly seen. The large heavy industries using a large amount of 
power tend to establish in areas with proven efficacy of such provision and this in 
turn means that the National Electricity Enterprise invests more and better 
maintains the lines feeding these substantial demand clusters.
6 .2 .3  Site safety and security, work safety, landscape and
environment
Firms were asked to evaluate the safety of their respective Industrial Areas
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as regards fire safety, night security, organisation of safety drills and seminars. In 
Xanthi all kinds of such infrastructure are not in operation. In the one to five scale 
described above, the situation in Iraklio is rather similar, with fire at 1.11( no 
water), night at 1.33, and drills and seminars at 1.0 (only planned). In Komotini 
there proves to be adequate fire infrastructure, getting a mark of 4.0. In Patra 
there is some fire infrastructure producing 1.4 marks out of five. In Volos, there 
are some safety seminars indicated by a mark of 2.71 but drills get 1.14 out of five. 
Fire infrastructure is indicated by 2.57 marks and night security by 1.29, all out of 
five. (Figure 6 -11). Existence and quality of such infrastructure is in general 
limited. As regards Iraklio, for example, there is no fire piping or plugs for the simple 
reason that there is no water available in the Industrial Area. But also there are no 
fire brigade or fire engines available on site. In all Areas there is no night security; 
the only relevant infrastructure provided is the night illumination of the estate. The 
common situation of either non-existent or low capacity or quality security and 
safety infrastructure causes several problems to the established firms. They all 
have to undertake the security and safety measures for themselves, and 
presumably at substantial cost. This is regarded by many firms to be a considerable 
disadvantage of location in the Industrial Areas, compared to firms located in the 
urban agglomeration, which influences their operating cost equation.
Subsequently, firms were asked to evaluate the efficiency of the on site first 
aid /  health facilities. In Xanthi and Komotini there is no such facility at all. Overall, 
care of the employees health proves in general inadequate. It can be seen that the 
best perception of such provision is in Iraklio, and to a lesser extent in Volos. But in 
both places such facilities are mainly characterised as inefficient (Figure 6-12). 
At best, there is a small surgery with a nurse and a visiting doctor for four hours in 
the morning (Volos, Iraklio). In other cases there is just an ambulance on site 
(Patra). There are also cases, like at Xanthi and Komotini, without even an 
ambulance on site. Large firms there, undertake the cost of a surgery and a full 
time doctor on their premises. But small firms can not undertake these provisions. 
Firms in all cases claim that a health station, operating for twenty four hours, 
providing health counselling besides the first aid in case of an accident, would 
improve considerably the quality of the operating environment.
Landscape care and recreation facilities, as is demonstrated from the firms' 
answers are either not existent or firms do not recognise them, since in general 
firms declare by 93% that there is no such provision in their respective Industrial 
Areas. In Iraklio, Patra, Xanthi and Komotini, firms are by 100% convinced of the 
absence of such provision. In Volos the same index is 71%. Firms tend to be positive
199
Figure 6-11: Site safety and security perceiued by firms in the sample Industrial Hreas|
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for landscape care and recreation facilities provision in the Industrial Area. In total, 
some 68% of the firms declare a willingness to pay a share for such provision; 
percentages though vary, from 100% in Xanthi, to 79% in Volos, 64% in Iraklio, 
60% in Komotini and only 40% in Patra. Regarding to the issue of landscape care 
and sports facilities, some firms are very keen for such provision. One firm in Iraklio 
indicated that it would construct some common-use recreational provision itself, if 
required, implying fears that the administration would charge higher rates for this. 
Larger firms sometimes provide such facilities in their own grounds and would not 
want to contribute for such infrastructure for common use, partly due to their 
larger percentages of the Industrial Area running costs.
Lastly on this theme, firms were asked if seminars on safety of work are 
organised in their Industrial Area. Answers were negative, by one hundred percent 
in all cases with the exception of Volos. There 21% of the firms participated in some 
way on such seminars. The follow up question of whether firms would share the cost 
of such seminars had a positive answer by 65% overall. In Xanthi 100 % of the firms 
would be willing to share the costs, in Komotini 80%, in Patra 60%, in Iraklio 50% 
and in Volos only 36% where there already was some provision (Figure 6-13). In 
some cases, large firms especially, (Patra, Volos) organise their own safety of work 
seminars. This is one reason for a few of them not being willing to contribute for 
such seminars. Other reasons given from smaller firms (Iraklio) are that their 
production is too specific for general seminars and that they are afraid that such 
seminars might prove a failure. But still, some of the large firms, and some of those 
established in Volos, where some seminars took place in the past, are willing to 
contribute.
The levels of atmospheric pollution are not officially measured in any of the 
Industrial Areas. This is also what all firms declared in all cases. To the follow up 
question about whether it should be measured, firms generally gave a positive 
answer in 65% of the cases. In Patra, all of the firms agreed that measurements of 
atmospheric pollution should be made. Firms in Volos agreed by 93 %, in Iraklio the 
figure was 61 %, in Komotini 60 %, but in Xanthi it is interesting that no firm 
considered it necessary. It is interesting that the more environmentally concerned 
firms prove to be the larger ones and the ones near the larger urban centres 
(Patra and Volos). Firms in distant areas or in regions with little industry, do not see 
the need. In the latter areas firms gave the reason that industry at the moment is 
not enough to cause damage. But also it can be assumed that not enough pressure 
exists from the neighbouring urban centres on this issue and that the distant areas 
may be more dependent on the little industry they have (Xanthi, Komotini). The
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small, individualistic type of industry (Iraklio) is less keen on being controlled.
6 .3  Encouraging technological change and deployment of 
new technology by the participating firms
6.3.1 The efforts  and lim itations of administration in 
promotion of new technology
As described earlier, the Industrial Areas provide developed space for 
industrial use on the outskirts of regional agglomerations. The market for such 
space is by no means a one-sellers market, since peripheral regions do not have 
serious space limitations, and because the establishment of industry anywhere in 
their territory is also supported. In such a situation a firm's preference for 
establishment in the Industrial Areas is often based on two reasons. First, on the 
proportion of incentives for establishment in the Industrial Areas that exceeds the 
regional amounts, and second on any operational advantages that the Industrial 
Areas offer. In the cases where the above are not considered important, demand is 
bound to be moderate and the Industrial Area's administration has lifci/e power to 
enforce controls and of course to impose technological level requirements.
The firms' selection procedure made by ETBA does not include specified 
technological standards as a condition for admission to the Industrial Areas and 
relevant evaluation is not made. The current set-up of the Industrial Areas 
Programme does not centrally incorporate any technological department and there 
is no centrally organised technological guidance or help scheme. Such efforts are 
left to other central public entities, to the local actors' and firms’ initiatives, and to 
the local Industrial Areas' administration. As regards the latter, field research 
showed no staff or resources for this purpose. According to the answers of the 
Industrial Areas' administrators the selection procedure for new establishments 
does not seem to give high priority as regards the state of technology to be used. 
What it seems more important is that employment be created. This seems to be 
their principal policy criterion, but up to an extent it can be seen that a more strict 
policy might prove costly. A possibility of empty Industrial Areas could well harm the 
bank's actual cash flows. As it was shown earlier, in Patra there have been no 
rejections of firms at all; in Xanthi only one. These projects are not full by far, as 
was shown previously.
Administration at the local level was asked of any specific efforts they make
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in an attempt to improve the technological status of the established firms. None of 
the local administrations can provide technological consultation to firms. In Patra 
there is an agreement between the Industrial Area and the local University for 
cooperation on technology matters. The progress is slow, if any, as no results were 
mentioned by the administration. In Iraklio there is a late effort to promote 
contacts of the Industrial Area with a private technological institute, and the local 
University. The scheme is recent and does not have a clear setup and organisation. 
Here, the Industrial Area administration possibly lacks the organisational capacity 
for a well structured cooperation of this kind. In Volos a technological institute 
specialising in metallurgy and related fields is successfully operating. In most other 
Industrial Areas, excluding Thessaloniki, cooperation with technological institutions 
is non-existent.
Local administrations are keen on educational visits to the site. These are 
organised from time to time in cooperation with local schools and universities. 
(Table 6-7). The aim of the organised educational visits is familiarisation of 
students with industry and possibly fruitful interactions between firms' engineers 
and students of relevant research interests. Again, here arrangements are made 
on occasional rather than on a regular structured basis.
However the local administration does regard the technology used in the 
Industrial Areas as equal or superior to the rest of their respective regions. In 
Iraklio, Patra and Komotini, the interview answers suggested 'superior' and in Volos 
and Xanthi, 'equal' levels to the surrounding region in this respect. Consequently 
administrations estimate that in all cases, except that of Xanthi, that the Industrial 
Areas by far attract the technologically developed firms. (Table 6-7). From these 
estimations the following can be marked. In the recently industrially declining region 
of Achaia, the firms in the Industrial Area of Patra are regarded to be 
technologically ahead. In the case of Iraklio the perception shows that even in 
rapidly growing areas, still the Industrial Area manages to be technologically ahead 
of surrounding counterpart activities. The same happens in the distant and less 
developed Komotini, where any new or relocating firms would establish in the 
Industrial Area. By contrast, in Volos, equal levels mean that several technologically 
advanced firms are also out of the Industrial Area. The region has an old established 
extensive industrial base which is currently making restructuring efforts. In Xanthi, 
the Industrial Area is at an early development stage, perhaps too young to gain 
technological leadership from older established firms. In no case though, the 
Industrial Areas are concentrating technologically lagging firms.
It seems as if it is too difficult a task for the Hellenic Industrial Development
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Bank (ETBA) to offer the privilege of location in the Industrial Areas mainly to 
technologically advanced firms. If it were able to operationalise this, it could prove 
an incentive for innovation for all firms. The reasons of this lack of influence can be 
due to financial and other constraints as explained. It must be concluded that there 
is a marked inadequacy in provision of technological assistance for the part of the 
Greek manufacturing industry ETBA accommodates in the various Industrial Areas. 
There is a questionmark on whether the potential effects of such a policy 
realisation are not yet estimated, or not appreciated as a determining priority by 
the central decision making bodies.
6.3.2 Technological levels and innovation in practice
While the Industrial Areas offer limited technological assistance, an average 
of 81 % of all the firms do receive external, private technological consultation. In 
the case of Volos there is a technological consultation and research institute 
specialising in metallurgical issues actually located in the Industrial Area. In Volos 
metal and related industries are the dominant sectors. Some 36 % of the firms have 
received technological help from the institute, while 29% of the firms had longer 
term cooperation, that is hiring the institute for specific research on their behalf. 
Given the institute's specialisation constraint, the percentage of firms taking 
advantage is significant. The firms in Volos found it useful to have this technological 
research institute available on site. But as regards the total sample surveyed (fifty 
five firms in five sites) a mere 7% were receiving technological assistance within 
their Industrial Area, and all of these were in Volos.
The technological consultation costs vary, of course, according to the firms' 
sizes, sectors and orientations, but the general average costs per firm, amongst 
the firms that gave data for this cost, was 3.9 million drachmas, (or £ 12,000) 
annually. It transpired from the interview answers that the firms receiving 
technological consultation generally belong to one of two categories. First are 
those that buy such services independently. Second are others that cooperate 
with larger firms, often abroad, or are subsidiaries of such firms, both receiving 
technology as packages from their supervising firm. Other, mainly smaller firms, do 
not receive technological consultation by specialising experts, but by their 
machinery dealers or suppliers. This is a common situation in the cases of minor 
changes of their machinery. The new technology installed should be compatible with 
the older and usually is of the same brand, or simply installation and compatibility is 
guaranteed by the same dealer.
Firms in general, attend on average between one and two conferences or
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exhibitions on technological issues annually. But this does not apply to all, since 21 
out of the 55 firms normally do not attend such meetings. In the question how 
important would it be for the firms if the Industrial Areas organised sectoral 
conferences, 52% of all firms answered 'very important1. This was 80% at the 
distant Komotini, 67% at the nearer Xanthi, 50% in Kriti, 40 % in Patra and 21% in 
Volos (Figure 6-14). Some 30% of the firms in Patra surprisingly declared 'not 
interested'.
It becomes clear that the smaller firms want conferences more than central 
and large firms do. In peripheral areas, firms unquestionably would like to see 
conferences in their own region. The reasons are that smaller firms want to 
externalise the information costs as much as possible. These costs are for small 
firms comparatively higher, especially if they are independent and do not have a 
technology flow from master firms abroad. This is even more evident in firms trying 
to export their products. Larger firms, in Volos and Patra would be less interested, 
since they often have an oligopolistic situation in the Greek market and usually use 
unrivalled technology within the Greek boundaries. They usually cooperate with 
specialists abroad and many of them are not export oriented.
The most important prerequisites for the latest technology adaptation and 
use were then traced. Firms were asked to indicate the necessities if they were to 
install or utilise leading edge technologies. The question proposed five structured 
answers and one open, while the firms had two votes. From the answers of all fifty 
five firms 'capital' is regarded as the most important prerequisite and collects some 
31 votes. The second most important factor, with 25 votes, proves to be the 
existence of 'markets', for the products to be produced. Lack of 'specialists' for 
the latest technology adaptation, including lack of skilled labour for its handling is 
also put forward, with 20 votes. Lack of information on technology issues gets 19 
votes and the issue of job cuts as a necessity is only proposed by one firm. Other 
suggestions were made in six more cases; an interesting one is international 
cooperation in technology matters and the other can be related to the information 
or capital (such as state support) broad categories (Figure 6-15).
The above preferences show interesting variations among the different 
Industrial Areas as shown in detail in Figure 6-16. For example, in Xanthi capital is 
suggested by 100 % of the firms. Iraklio also needs capital, recognised by 53% of 
establishments. In Volos the prime necessity is markets for the products, by 64% of 
respondents. In Komotini the issues of 'information' and 'specialists' abundance both 
get 50%. Patra needs 'markets' and 'specialists' both mentioned by 50% of the 
firms, but little 'information' (only 10%). The question reveals the firms' concerns in
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the different areas. Firms in industrially developed areas (such as Volos or Patra) 
claim to be using quite modern technology. In Volos, from the interview discussion it 
came out that a costly marginal change towards the edge technologies, would 
lower the production cost only a little and would only be justified if large contracts 
were undertaken. Thus the operators here mainly seek markets for their products. 
In Patra, industries feel they are also in need of markets, but also of specialists, 
that are not available to the extent that the industrialists would like. Patra 
compared to Volos has no technological research institute on site. The local 
University, while rather oriented towards technology, has not proved to be 
adequately linked with the industry of the region. In Iraklio there is predominance of 
small industry. A strong indication formed here is that smaller firms often can not 
find the capital needed for operationalising the latest technology. In distant, less 
developed areas, such as Komotini, besides the lack of capital, information proves 
slow to penetrate, and specialists reluctant to establish themselves in such 
locations.
An assessment of the state of technology that the firms currently use was 
attempted. Initially firms were asked about their technological status in comparison 
to their competitors. Those admitting that any of their competitors use later 
production technologies were asked to give two reasons. Overall forty firms of the 
fifty five, (or 73%) declared that no competitors in Greece use more advanced 
technologies. The spatial distribution of firms claiming use of latest technology is in 
Iraklio 94 %, in Komotini 70%, in Xanthi 67%, in Volos 64% and in Patra 50% of the 
firms. It can be seen that firms established in distant regions tend to give higher 
rates. This could be to a certain extent an overestimation of their attainments, due 
to these firms supremacy over their neighbouring competitors, and the long 
distance from the centrally located competitors. It happens that the 'better than 
competitors' percentages are analog to their distance from Athens. It may be that 
distance from the centre still gives some monopoly confidence and power to a 
regionally dominant firm. Interestingly though, the above perceptions are quite in 
line with the technological efficiency estimations made earlier (chapter four) where 
Iraklio is found to be the technological frontier region of the country.
The average figure of 73% mentioned above, may not provide full evidence 
but it is a strong indication that the Industrial Areas concentrate firms that use 
comparatively advanced technology, at least within the Greek industrial 
manufacturing environment. The reasons for this may be that most of the firms are 
comparatively young, with an average age of less than ten years and also tend to 
operate comparatively new machinery. Also, as seen, the size of the established
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firms is in all cases much higher than the respective average regional size. 
Furthermore, to the extent that new firms continue to establish there, technology 
used will tend to be continuously updated. An important question is though if, and 
how well, the conditions and procedures for a continuous flow of innovation are 
structured in the Industrial Areas.
Of interest are the views of the remaining 27% of the sample, (or 15 firms), 
that claimed that other firms, in Greece, use better technology. Each gave two 
reasons. These 30 responses have been turned into percentages and are shown in 
Figure 6-17. Some 33% claim that other firms have a generally larger scale of 
production and 23% suggest that other firms have more capital. Thus those 
industrialists' main perception is that mass production seems to allow for the use of 
highest technology. Alternatively only intense capital investment in an industry 
would allow for latest technology use. The third reason, with 20% of the votes, is 
the claim that other firms are branches of multinationals; the latter obviously 
provide the former with modern production technology. Only 13% believe that 
other firms use better technologies because they are nearer to the centre. Thus, 
there is evidence that scale, capital intensity and international links are critical for 
the use of latest technology use.
To obtain information on one aspect of technological status interpreted as a 
flow of innovation, the firms were asked about the frequency of their innovation as 
regards various operational processes. On average over all Industrial Areas, firms 
had their last innovation in production method 4.0 years ago; their data processing 
major upgrade was on average 4.1 years ago; their telecommunications expansion 
was 4.3 years ago; their office equipment renewal was 4.6 years ago and their 
internal communications, where existed, were renewed 5.0 years ago (Table 6- 
8 ). The overall average on technology facets and Industrial Areas gives a 
technological age of 4.4 years. This is not a poor result in relation to the national 
levels although there is no proper and detailed comparison available.
The spatial variation of the innovation rates is considerable and can lead to 
some indications on the national competitiveness of the Industrial Areas. The 
average age of the all-facet technology used varies from 3.5 years for Volos, to 
5.4 years for Komotini. As regards the production method, it can be noted, that in 
Iraklio it is 2.6 years old; in Volos the figure was 2.7; in Patra 3.3; in Xanthi 5.3; and 
in Komotini 6.1 years. (Table 6-8). It can be seen that in Iraklio the small firms 
certainly proved to be the most innovative, and quite consistently had earlier 
claimed, by 94%, a lack of more advanced competitors. Earlier, the distant Komotini 
and Xanthi, provided perceptions of lack of more advanced competition immediately
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Figure 6-17: Reasons for use of more advanced technology by competitors 
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below those of Iraklio. But it appears from this further enquiry that they have the 
lowest innovation rates. In proves that in these cases the distance, as evidence was 
also found before, is protecting these firms from competition. But also, the lack of 
information flow to these areas that was earlier proposed, now appears to be the 
case. Volos at 2.7 years and Patra at 3.3 years of production technology age are 
well aware of their competitors. The newest data processing age is found in Volos 
with average of 2,9 years of age, the newest telecommunications in Xanthi, at 3.3 
years and the newest office equipment also in Volos, at 3.8 years.
Stemming from the theoretical analysis, the levels of facilitation of domestic 
technology and the ability to adapt or customise new technology were considered 
to be of interest. To this end, an index of the use of domestically produced 
machinery was created and firms were asked if changes were carried out in order 
for technology to better fit their production needs. Consequently firms were asked 
about any research and development they carry out on the technology or 
production methods they use.
In general, the 77% of the machinery used in all industries is imported, while 
the rest 23% is domestic technology. Firms in Iraklio have on average 36 % of 
domestic machinery, in Patra 27%, in Volos 20%, in Xanthi 17% and in Komotini 
16% of the machinery is domestic. Regarding the 'change to fit' procedures, in 
general 68% of the firms have carried out such engineering work. In Iraklio it was 
83%, in Patra 80 %, in Volos 71%, in Xanthi 67% and in Komotini 40%. In general 
some 50% of the firms do not work on research and development. A further 13% 
declared they do some research and development work, being part of the job of the 
firm's engineers. Finally, some 37% of the establishments have a small department, 
in most cases one or two specialists, concerned with technological issues. Only one 
firm has a larger-staffed (ten persons) research and development department. In 
Iraklio, firms declaring research and development activities of any type are 61%, in 
Patra the figure was 60%, in Volos 57%, in Xanthi 33% and Komotini 40%. The 
figure of 50% of all firms undertaking some research and development activities 
might seem rather high, but up to an extent can be justified by the overall 68% of 
'change to fit' work. The answers of the firms on the issue of research and 
development seem related to the changes in technology rates. Efficiency of 
research, though , is rather controversial to evaluate. Details are given in Figure 
6-18.
From the set of the above measurements it appears that the use of 
domestic technology is closely related to research and development. This tend to 
lead to customising technology to the needs of firms, to high innovation rates and
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to the achievement of an advanced position against competition. For example, the 
Industrial Area of Iraklio, giving the fastest innovation rate, also uses the highest 
rate of domestic machinery, at 36%. The same area also gives the highest rate, by 
83%, of local 'opening of the technology box' and adjusting it to the specific needs 
of their own industry. The area gives an example of high innovation rates, 
comparatively high locally produced technology and high tailoring of technology to 
specific needs. All this implies quite good interaction between local industries, higher 
internal multipliers and of course better competitiveness. It is based on a smaller 
average size of innovative flexible firms. It now becomes more clear why Iraklio 
achieved a high positive total factor productivity and also a faster employment 
growth, in the measurements given earlier in this research, in addition to its 
technological efficiency.
Higher research and development activities and higher percentages of 
domestic technology seem to interact the following way. Concentrations of 
development specialists in firms maintain ties with their colleagues of domestic 
technology-creating firms, and possibly prefer these domestic products. They also 
have the potential of influencing, cooperating, or even hiring the domestic 
technology-producing firms maintaining a feedback of their specific needs. On the 
other hand, areas with the highest percentage of imported technology happen to 
have lower rates of research. In the case Komotini, 84% of the machinery is 
imported and only 40% of the firms have made changes to their machinery. There, 
it seems as if the 'box of technology’ is still 'black' and firms' operational advantages 
are mainly based on incentives. In Volos and Patra, firms also seem rather actively 
changing technology to fit their needs.
To identify the main prerequisites for creating and sustaining a research 
and development department a structured but open-end question was deployed. 
Firms were allowed to make one or more suggestions, and resultant views were 
spread. Some 35% voted for financial support by the state, which can be available 
for such activities. The issue of information availability produces a 32% vote. The 
need for specialists in the region achieves a 24% response. A variety of 'other' 
necessities gets 23%. Suggestions vary among the different sites, the most striking 
being a 67% of 'state financial support' in Xanthi, a 60% for 'information' in Patra 
and a 40% for 'specialists' in Komotini. The claim for more financial support is 
obviously an easy way, though not at all without importance, to show research 
difficulties. But Iraklio having declared the highest research percentage is, as is 
often the case, the one that puts first the need for more money. It seems that 
money is needed not only to set up but also to maintain any research advantage.
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From another point of view, Volos, with possibly the largest population of research 
staff, suggests mainly better flows of information. Similarly, Patra, the only city 
among the five boasting a technical university, also gives the highest percentage to 
information requirements. The highest percentages on the issue of 'specialists' 
availability is not unexpectedly given by Xanthi and Komotini, the distant regions. 
Other issues that were brought forward on this debate are the size of the firm and 
to a substantial degree the ties with multinational firms. Several firms declared that 
they do not have an adequate size to carry out any research, others mentioned 
that they seek external specialists' advice when needed, and some declared that 
research is done on the premises of their counterparts abroad that in cases are 
their master companies.
Finally, firms were asked if they feel that innovations spread in the Industrial 
Areas faster than in the non-organised space, this being one of the main 
suppositions of the purpose of the Industrial Areas. The answers were negative by a 
firm 86%. Firms said that they cannot see organised channels for technological 
diffusion in the Industrial Areas. They stressed that this may happen on a random 
basis. But still the perception of the firms is possibly ignoring or underestimating 
that not only the effects of cooperation but also those of competition between 
firms in the Industrial Areas are probably boosting technology diffusion and 
innovation.
To specifically test this last idea, and the assumption of external economies 
of industrial agglomeration, firms were asked if they cooperate with other firms in 
the Industrial Areas and in what modes. Interestingly some 35 of the 55 firms of the 
sample, or 64% of them, declared some form of cooperation with others in the 
Industrial Area. In Volos and Komotini this figure was 70% of the firms; in Iraklio and 
Patra 60% claimed cooperation and Xanthi the figure was 33%. The most 
significant mode of cooperation is in production, followed by marketing as it turned 
out from the survey. Other modes of cooperation are in the ordering of raw 
materials, or on site security.
From the comments that firms made, especially in smaller industrial 
concerns, it seems that there is competition along with cooperation amongst the 
firms in the Industrial Areas. Physical proximity within the Industrial Areas plays its 
proper role as it seems. Interestingly there is a considerable divergence between 
perceptions of faster technology diffusion in the Industrial Areas and the rates of 
cooperation between firms. Figures 6-19 and 6-20 show this 'mis-perception', 
with special focus on Iraklio where though, the greatest innovation rates were 
found. Large firms, though, were more positive when there were cooperation
214
Figure 6 -1 9 :  Proport ion  o f  estab lished  f i rm s  th a t  p e rc e iv e  fa s t e r
spread o f  innouations w i th in  the  sam ple  In d u s tr ia l  Rreas
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Iraklio Patra Uolos Kanthi Komotini
Figure 6-28: Proportion of established firms declaring cooperation with  
other established firms in the sample Industrial Rreas
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Iraklio Patra Uolos Kanthi Komotini
215
possibilities, while some of them were established in the Industrial Area, as they 
declared, solely on that purpose. In the latter cases the external economies are 
evident. In smaller firms, as it proved, competition along with cooperation rises 
overall competitiveness of the businesses located there.
6 .4  The markets of the Industrial Area businesses and
their needs for assistance
6.4.1 The range of target markets in the surveyed Industrial
Areas
Among the firms that are established in the Industrial Areas Programme 
there are some that solely serve their own geographical department, but there are 
also others that have a strong international export orientation. The representative 
marketing destinations for each surveyed Industrial Area are illustrated in Figure 
6-21. They are calculated on value of sold goods as were obtained from the 
survey, and vary as follows. Komotini exports to destinations abroad some 32% of 
its production; for Patra the export figure is 18%, in Iraklio it is 16%, in Volos some 
15% and in Xanthi it is 12%. The Industrial Area best connected with the market of 
Athens is Xanthi, with 39% of its production sent there. Almost equally strong in 
this respect are Patra and Volos, with 31% of each one's products serving 
Athenian markets. On the other hand Iraklio sells only 9% to Athens, having some 
53% of the value of its products being marketed within its own geographical 
department. Magnisia absorbs 13% of the Volos Industrial Area products and 
Achaia only consumes 8% of its local Industrial Area (Patra) products.
Iraklio is the Industrial Area with the strongest local market orientation. It is
in distant location, as is Komotini, but being on an island proves to be a hinderance 
to high volume of exports. Local firms, and several local branches of larger multi-site 
firms, have been mainly created to serve the local markets. Only a few companies, 
mainly in the speciality foods business could possibly penetrate into the main 
European markets. Here, there is a large urban centre and a considerable 
surrounding population, of considerable economic strength, to sustain a demand for 
a wide range of industrial products. Many of these products can be produced 
locally and thus the locality has seen the emergence of the Industrial Area. 
Considerable local interaction and multiplier effects also occur here, as 
demonstrated by this research.
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Figure 6-22: Assistance preferences of firms established in the sample Industrial Rreas
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A second type of Industrial Area, typified by Komotini and Xanthi, has 
populations dispersed and largely agricultural. Possibly, they are least likely to 
sustain local demand for an Industrial Area. Accordingly, Komotini is the most 
export oriented of all. It exports internationally more products than those sent to 
Athens, or than those marketed within its own geographical department of Rothopi. 
Firms deciding to locate in a distant area of this type do not aim to target the 
central inland markets, especially Athens, since competition from other more 
centrally located industries would be too intense. Many firms deciding to establish 
there are either export oriented or are franchising foreign firms' products aiming 
again at markets other than the local. Often firms are simply acquiring the 
advantage of the locational incentives and infrastructure of the Industrial Area 
rather than intertwining with the local industrial base. This type of development 
may not be as socially beneficial as that of Iraklio, but nevertheless it still transfers 
some resources to remote regions.
6.4.2 Assistance provided for marketing
In general the administration of the Industrial Areas provides only limited 
help, if any, as regards the marketing of the firms located there. Administration at 
a local level usually does not have the staff and/or the capacity to offer such help 
to the firms. Active advertisement of the products produced in the Industrial Areas, 
and consultation services on marketing issues though are not offered even at the 
central level, either. The firms themselves recognise this inadequacy, although with 
some degree of understanding. One provision of the Programme on this matter 
existing in some Industrial Areas is an on-site conference /  exhibition centre for the 
firms to promote their marketing needs. In the sites of Iraklio and Komotini, a 
conference /  exhibition hall is provided. The local administration in Komotini believes 
that the exhibition /  conference hall can play an active role not only in helping the 
established firms to promote their products, but also in accommodating several 
other business needs or festivities in the region. They believe that this centre soon 
shall be able not only to finance itself but also be profitable as well. On the contrary 
in Iraklio no beneficial use is credited to the centre. But in both cases the numbers 
of days of operation of these centres are limited, as suggested by the firms, being 
only about three days per year in Iraklio and not more than five days in Komotini. In 
Iraklio the perception is that they do not have any economies realised in their 
marketing or public relations expenses; only 17% of the firms declared that they 
achieved some savings due to this centre. In Komotini though the picture is 
different, where some 80% of the firms declare some cost economies due to the
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existence of the centre. In Volos, Xanthi and Patra, there is no such centre in 
operation, and firms do not have the opportunity of such cost savings.
Firms in general accept that the Conference /  Exhibition centre is a positive 
idea, but feel their result cost savings would be rather limited anyway. One 
argument for this proved to be the distance of the Industrial Areas from the city, 
amounting to about 23 km in the case of Patra. Another argument, especially of 
the larger firms, is that the industries are not retailing oriented and their 
customers are far distant. Thus they would rather take part in exhibitions held in 
large national or international exhibition halls, and organise conferences in centrally 
located hotels. The case of the distant Komotini though, shows that in remote 
regions having only a small urban centre, the conference hall of the Industria Area 
may prove useful to the firms.
6.4.3 The firms' preferences for assistance
To obtain information about the firms' preferences for financial assistance, 
as distinct from the infrastructure provision, they were asked about their needs in 
terms of financing and about ways in which the administration of the Industrial 
Areas or the state could help. Three questions were deployed which all had a 
technology component in them, the aim being to measure the firms' orientation 
towards technological upgrading. The relevant financial needs of the firms were 
revealed.
At first, firms were asked to choose one, amongst three policies that the 
Industrial Areas Programme could potentially put into action, a. assistance in 
marketing operations; b. training of the workforce in relevant skills; c.technological 
consultation. From all answers to this question, the technological consultation was 
only favoured by 12 of the 55 firms (22% of all), the help in marketing by 17 firms 
(31%), and interestingly the employment training by 26 firms (47%). Details for the 
preferences among the regions are shown in Figure 6-22. Iraklio and Patra mainly 
voted for the workforce training, while Volos and Komotini for the marketing 
assistance. Several firms made the comment that the Industrial Area could not 
possibly offer them effective technological consultation. They either had their own 
technical information, or had international connections, or in cases felt that they 
were too big, or too specialised to be assisted. But experience has shown that the 
Industrial Area can successfully house sectoral technological centres, as is the case 
of Volos. There were also firms that indicated that the Industrial Areas can not 
provide business services such as marketing; at the best it can only perhaps train 
some workforce in relevant skills in cooperation with other existing institutions.
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These perceptions may in part be correct, but the potential in these respects 
perhaps should not be underestimated.
Firms were then asked to put in order of preference the following three 
potential (in theory) financing policies of the state, a. employment subsidies; b. 
exports subsidies; c. new technology subsidies. In general, the 'new technology 
subsidies' are in the first place of the preferences of 29 firms, (or 53% of all). The 
rival policy of 'export subsidy' is the first choice for 15 firms (27%) and 
'employment subsidy' for only 11 firms (20%). At a regional level, the new 
technology subsidies get more votes in all Industrial Areas except Komotini; there, 
export subsidy gets most preferences. Details are given in Figure 6-23. It seems 
then that state subsidisation for new technology purchases by the firms, obtains 
by far the highest preference rate, compared to possible subsidisation of labour 
costs or export prices. Thus, it seems that, in contrast to the first question, firms 
are oriented towards the implementation of technological innovation. Firms this way 
provide a hint, based on their experience, that both markets are conquered and 
costs are compressed with the use of the latest technology. The case of Komotini is 
the sole exception, where the firms would be keener for export subsidising, which 
anyway is not a current practice. This is an interesting finding that relates to the 
product and profit cycle theories reviewed earlier. Komotini having already a 
particularly high rate of exports would prefer to realise profits than to innovate its 
utilised technology.
Given the principal result of the last question, it was investigated if firms 
wanted 'money for technology' or just money. The third question enquired about 
the firms' favourite delivery system of state financial support. They had to choose 
among a. subsidies for new technology; b. state capital for company shares; c. soft 
loans. On average, some 47% of the firms preferred soft loans, 35% subsidies for 
new technology and 18% were willing to give shares for state capital. At the 
regional level, Volos and Xanthi prefer strongly the option of technology subsidies, 
Patra Iraklio and Komotini would rather choose the soft loans (Figure 6-24). Only 
a small proportion of the firms declared they would like a state partnership and 
subsequent control, fearing perhaps that this might lead to lack of flexibility. The 
results overall proved that more firms would prefer the flexibility of soft loans, 
rather than receiving subsidy for installation of new technology. This gives a hint of 
the necessity for operational capital by many firms, in some cases also concealing 
more serious liquidity problems.
There were several firms that quite frankly proposed that the central 
incentives system should be reoriented. Rather than supporting new firms, the
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Figure 6-23: Preferences on potential state subsidies
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state should try, it was argued, to maintain and strengthen the existing firms to 
survive the crisis This could be done by financing shift to new technology, or by 
offering to viable firms more and affordable capital.
It turns out that in Greece a substantial number of firms are aware about 
the need of new technology, and do some research, but in many cases they lack 
the resources to install it. The majority of firms are somewhat afraid of state 
intervention and less often ask for such activity. Technology financing proves 
important but not first priority for the surveyed firms. There are not a few cases 
where the struggle for survival has held back those firms' technological upgrading.
6 .5  Local economic linkages and effects
6.5.1 Perception and support to the Industrial Areas by the
local actors
A basic aim of the Industrial Areas Programme is to help and promote local 
economic development. The emergence of an Industrial Area in a region generates 
employment and activates economic life, but it also brings in more competitors to 
the older established business interests. In most recipient regions local actors were 
of varying opinions of how the Industrial Areas would affect their region, especially 
in the early stages. Cases were identified in the field research where conflicts with 
certain local vested interests had emerged. Local interaction varied considerably 
between different sites in different times and on different issues.
Local reaction to the Programme initiative has varied from wholehearted 
cooperation to dynamic opposition. In some cases a sort of 'moral' support was 
provided by the locality involving mainly good relations, school visits or occasional 
sports events (Iraklio, Komotini). As regards tangible support from local communities 
to the Industrial Area, in none of the cases was this financial. Most often it involved 
sharing of infrastructure, as in the case of connecting roads. In some cases the 
shared use by the Industrial Area of resources perceived as belonging to the 
community was conceded, such as underground water stock, not without some 
dispute though.
However infrastructure was never built by local governments to serve the 
Industrial Areas specifically. The limited local government finances tend to be mainly 
spent on inner city development and redevelopment. On the other hand, local 
government do attempt to capitalise on the fact that ETBA eventually will provide
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all necessary infrastructure for the Industrial Areas. In other cases the use of the 
Industrial Area's infrastructure, such as the sewage treatment units of few sites, 
was offered to the local communities. In cases of opposition to the programme the 
main causes involved environmental issues and planning issues.(Patra, Xanthi). Time 
does however seem to bring reconciliation, but there are odd exceptions involving 
cancellation (Egion), or total failure, ( Alexandroupolis).
Firms on the surveyed sites were asked to what extent they felt that the 
local government had supported the Industrial Area. The question includes both 
particular actions of the local government in support of, or against the project, or 
just the morale towards the Industrial Area. Firms answered in a semantic 
differential mode, which was then converted to a 'percentage' to produce the 
regional average and allow for interregional comparison. The results are illustrated 
in Figure 6-25. Thus, on average, the firms in the five Industrial Areas feel that 
the local government support is at the 'low' end of the scale. Estimations of support 
varied among areas. For Iraklio and Komotini practically no support is perceived, in 
Patra and Xanthi the rating of support was only low and in Volos support was 
perceived as comparatively higher. In general firms expected more from their 
respective local governments. Comments the firms made regarding the local 
government, included cases of allegations of inefficient handling of funds, lack of 
organisation and professionalism, and lack of interest for the region's industrial 
development. In Volos, the oldest established Industrial Area of the sample and the 
larger one, firms felt that a comparatively better cooperation with the local 
government exists. It seems as time and effort is needed to engender such a level of 
cooperation.
6 .5 .2  Perceptions of local labour productiv ity  and
attrac tiveness
In general, the local administrations estimate that the Industrial Areas have 
brought rather important expansion of the industrial base and its diversification as 
well as employment specialisation to regions. The strength of such effects are 
estimated to be high in Iraklio, Volos and Komotini, the regions where the projects 
are rather successful. Less strong is the effect in this respect in the new project 
of Xanthi. Patra already had an industrial base but the Industrial Area, though well 
equipped, has not yet managed to play the leading role that it was designed for, for 
various reasons. But as regards provision of specialised training, it is only in the 
project at Volos where there is a training centre for the local workforce. Here 
they offer specialised skills training tailored to the local industry needs. This centre
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Figure 6-26: Aduanced labour productivity in the region as perceiued 
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is run in cooperation with the Industrial Area and is established in the administration 
building.
On the above issue, firms were asked to evaluate the extent to which their 
respective geographical departments have developed the advanced industrial skills 
and practices, thought of as prerequisites (together with infrastructure) for a high 
productivity of industrial investments. Answers here were also converted into 
percentages to show the average intensity of the perceived situation at each site 
(Figure 6-26). The average level for all Industrial Areas is 31% of 'best' or 'low'. 
Variation across sites is considerable, and in Volos firms regard that the labour in 
the region has achieved a 'considerable' (64% of 'best') level of advanced industrial 
productivity. In Iraklio the same figure is 38%, in Xanthi it reduces to 24% and in 
Patra and Komotini 19%. From these perceptions of regional labour efficiency it 
can be seen that firms in general, except in Volos, are not satisfied with the 
available industrial skills and practices in their regions. This argument is consistent 
with the preference mentioned by most firms earlier, for the need of training of 
labour undertaken in or via the Industrial Areas Programme. It also shows that firms 
are oriented to the use of modern technology which requires higher labour 
specialisation. Volos is a marked exception to the above perception. Here firms 
comment that the industrial tradition of the region offers, besides physical 
infrastructure, skills and industrial application in abundance and this is also related 
to the local labour-training centre there. This is not the case with Patra though, 
where, although tradition exists, at the present firms do complain about the 
general attitude of the local labourforce. It seems as during the recent de­
industrialisation crisis, skilled labour has tended to out migrate, while at the same 
time the local unions have tightened their stance. In Iraklio the situation seems 
slightly better. But there, firms indicate that the local manufacturing workforce 
has strong employment alternatives, mainly in the tourism industry, but also in part 
time agricultural activity. This makes the labour costs and the number of days 
absent days rate higher than other places in Greece.
The attractiveness of the Industrial Areas to the local investors as distinct 
to external capital was evaluated next. Measurement was based on estimations of 
the investment 'attractiveness' of each project, obtained by the established firms. 
Answers were again given in a semantically differential mode and subsequently 
converted numerically to show the average for each region, as percentage of the 
'best' possible attractiveness. Figure 6-27 shows the scores of the various 
projects and relates them to their qualitative characteristics.
In general, the Industrial Areas are estimated to be attractive at the rate of
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some 38% of the maximum to the local capital and 32% for the external capital, or 
'low'. On average, the firms' perception of attractiveness of all Industrial Areas to 
all types of capital is estimated to the 34% of the maximum, but perceptions vary 
among sites. The more attractive Industrial Areas to the local capital prove to be 
Volos with score of 62%, followed by Iraklio with 59%, both 'considerably' 
attractive. Volos is also the most attractive project to the external capital, with 
score 55%, but in this case it is followed by Komotini with 37%. Most attractive to 
any type of capital proves to be Volos, scoring 58%. The least 'capital-attractive' 
projects are perceived to be Xanthi at 11% or 'not' attractive, immediately 
followed by Patra, that offers 25% of the maximum, or only 'low' attractiveness, as 
was indicated by the firms.
From the presentation of the Industrial Areas' attractiveness for capital 
estimations, it can be seen that the appeal to investors varies amongst the 
different sites. Apart from the locational incentives, the actual location, the 
infrastructure and the labourforce available in the region are issues that firms 
consider. Iraklio seems only to be locally appealing, due to the higher transportation 
cost (shipment), and higher labour cost. Volos has wider national appeal due to the 
good infrastructure and strategic location in the country's map. Xanthi has the 
lowest appeal, being a younger project with minimal and incomplete infrastructure 
and has competition from the nearby more developed Industrial Area of Komotini.
The appeal of the project in Patra proves to be low in the sample. The first 
reason is clearly locational. The city is not on the Athens - Thessaloniki motorway 
and developing corridor. The Industrial Area is located 23 kilometres west of Patra 
which is too far from the city. The actual location of the Industrial Area is shown in 
Figure 6-28. In addition, the project is in the opposite direction of the motorway 
axis that connects Patra to Athens. It is not convenient (some 30 kilometers away) 
to the ferry-junction to central Greece, at Rio, which is adjacent to the eastern 
fringe of Patra, as shown. A second, related reason is poor connections. The 
Industrial Area has a congested road connection to the city of Patra. Traffic has to 
pass through the city of Patra, as there is no direct road connection to Rio and to 
the Patra to Athens motorway. There is also no railway connection of the project. 
A third reason is that Patra also has comparatively high labour costs as has been 
seen.
6 .5 .3  Perceptions of economic and social effects of the
Industrial Areas at the local level
According to the aims of the Industrial Areas some substantial positive
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Figure 6-28 : The Location of the Industrial Area of Patra and the road connections to Athens and rest of Greece
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effects for the local economies and societies should emerge. Thus, estimations of 
any positive effects to the local communities due to the emergence of the Industrial 
Areas were collected. The perceptions of social effects were generally on the mild 
side (Table 6-9). In summary there were no marked effects on the improvement 
of the social life of the localities, with the exception of Komotini. In this location it 
was argued that industrial tradition was being developed in the area, largely 
through the effects of the Programme. No betterment was perceived in the local 
educational levels in any of the areas due to the Industrial Areas. As regards 
increase in female employment, effects and implications are perceived to be rather 
strong, with Komotini most influenced and this is not irrelevant to the social life 
improvements issue. There were also some more widespread perceptions of the 
projects bringing wealth into the regions and of stabilising of the previously 
diminishing population. In Komotini and Patra the Industrial Areas were credited with 
positive demographic effects, that is keeping population from migrating to 
Thessaloniki and Athens respectively, and also with bringing wealth into the local 
communities. Similar was the case in Volos, only to a lesser extent. In Iraklio, 
manufacturing is thought to have had only small effects since perception of wealth 
is connected mainly with the tourism industry.
Enquiring on the issue of the community businesses and the attraction of 
them to the Industrial Areas, it was found that it is non-existent. In none of the 
regions having community businesses, ( Iraklio, Volos and Komotini), are any of them 
are established in the Industrial Areas. The reasons for this are probably the 
extremely localised nature of community businesses. As regards their industrial 
sectors, they mainly are in the wood and textile manufacturing. It seems as if such 
industry is more suitably located in the urban environment and sees no benefits of 
relocating to the Industrial Areas.
The next area of enquiry involved the question of whether or not the 
Industrial Areas can satisfy their employment requirements locally. A measurement 
of the percentage of the employed in the Industrial Areas was attempted, 
according to whether they were living in the same geographical department (within 
a radius of 40 km on average) before their employment in the respective firms, or 
they were attracted to the department due to their employment. Attraction can 
be used to show to what extent industrial Areas have utilised all locally available 
skilled labour. On average, 78% of the employees are local. The local workforce 
defined in this way in Iraklio and Volos amount to 84%; in Komotini the figure is 82%, 
in Xanthi 77% and in Patra 65% (Figure 6-29). Consequently an average of 22% 
of the employed have been attracted from other regions to the Industrial Areas
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Figure 6-29: Percentage of local-origin employees in the Industrial Rreas
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surveyed . A markedly higher 'labour-attraction' percentage can be seen to occur 
in Patra. Up to an extent it is due to the presence of larger firms that carry out 
recruitment procedures over wider areas. It is no coincidence that the firms there, 
have declared the greatest shortages of local skilled employees. The ties of the 
Industrial Area with the city of Patra seem not to be the close. Overall in summary it 
appears that interregional migration due to jobs seems not to be high. On the other 
hand the significant figure of 22% of this type attracted labour shows that to a 
considerable extent all suitable local labour has been offered an opportunity.
A measurement of the extent of differentiation of the regional production 
bases with the emergence of the Industrial Areas Programme was next attempted. 
Differentiation involves two basic issues. First, it involves the attraction of new 
industrial activities to the region and second the restructuring of the existing 
economic activity. This is undertaken in an attempt to estimate subsequent 
economic benefits to the region. Percentages are calculated to show the intensity 
of the perceived effects and these are given in Figure 6-29. The general overall 
outcome is 'considerable' ( or 55%). This is much the case for Komotini which 
achieved 67% on the scale, for Volos at 62% and for Iraklio at 59%. The effect is 
lower in Xanthi 44% and in Patra at 43%. Differentiation of the regional production 
basis, due to the presence of the Industrial Area project, gives some hints about 
the past and the present of the recipient regions. For example, in the cases of 
Komotini and Iraklio, the Industrial Areas have created two brand new industrialising 
areas. Volos has become a rather rapidly restructuring industrial area. In Patra on 
the other hand the Industrial Area is still rather static. It has had only modest 
results in attracting new industry, and much less than expected effects on 'saving' 
the existing largely declining industrial basis of the region. Still though, the 
restructuring which has taken place has created some benefits to the region.
Consequently, respondent firms estimated the regional benefit due to the 
existence of the Industrial Areas. Distinctly, the benefit for the poorest, rural or 
deprived parts of the region was estimated. Perceptions are illustrated in Figure 6- 
30. On average, regions seem to have had benefits reaching the 44% level, or 
rather moderate. Overall the poorest parts in the sample regions are thought to 
have benefited somewhat less, by some 37% of the maximum, in other words 'little'. 
At regional level, in Komotini the region seems to benefit 'considerably' by 60%, and 
43% for the poorest parts as does Volos by 52% and 48% for the poorest. Patra 
benefits less, at 43% and 40% respectively and Iraklio at 43% and 33% . In Xanthi 
the figure is 22%, or too low for both the whole region and the poorest or deprived 
parts.
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All regions are perceived to have had some considerable benefits as the 
estimations show. The poorest parts of the regions in general, have benefited less 
than the whole region but this could difficult be else. The poorest, rural or deprived 
parts of the regions would probably be less appealing for jobs or investments 
spinning off by the Industrial Areas than each region's capital city. Such parts, 
would only be better of, if care was taken that a favourable sectoral distribution of 
the Industrial Areas activities would create economic links with them. In the case of 
Komotini it seems that what the Industrial Area has offered is so important to the 
region because the likelihood is that otherwise there would very little, if
any industry there. The low benefits for Xanthi are due to the limited participation, 
partly due to the more recent start of the project. The region with the highest 
positive effects on the poorest parts due to an Industrial Area, is Volos. Here, 
although the specialisation of the project is anything but for food or crops 
processing, the high appeal of the Industrial Area for capital has offered the 
poorest regions ample employment possibilities.
The availability of the infrastructure provided by the Industrial Areas for use 
by local communities was also checked out. This shows the extent to which 
communities receive such an indirect benefit, irrespective of employment 
generation or other main aims of the projects. As regards such use, it turned out 
that the road network of the Industrial Areas are used by the local communities, 
where this is helpful. (Iraklio, Patra and Volos). The local dynamics are such, that 
although Industrial Areas carry all provision and maintenance, they would not 
prohibit public use. Additionally, the sewage treatment when provided by the 
Industrial Areas, is used by the local communities at a nominal or zero charge. 
(Patra, Komotini). However, as described, use of water by industry, (paper, 
textiles) causes need of new costly deeper drilling for water, that cause dispute 
with local communities. (Patra, Komotini, Iraklio). Again the local dynamics are such 
that the Industrial Areas usually give-in to the local demands.
In all cases the Industrial Areas are perceived to moderately help the local 
self-reliance in terms of economic and social development. The Industrial Areas 
Programme itself has been shown to be important as regards the process of 
regional industrialisation. The Industrial Areas appeal to investors is not low, and 
more important still, is the potential to encourage better penetration to the local 
economic networks and more beneficial local interaction. As a conclusion, it seems 
that with time the regions gain and the local populations tend to realise the 
benefits from the Industrial Areas. Industrialisation of rural areas causes some 
environment disturbance and sometimes leads to dispute over resources.
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6 .6  Perceptions of success or failure, operational and 
effic iency issues
As regards the perceptions of the administration on the issue of levels of 
success of the Programme, the head of the Regional Development and Industrial 
Infrastructure division (IIABY) of the ETBA bank is of the opinion that three sectors 
need more effort and development. These are, in order of importance, the policy 
for improvement of the expertise of administration executives and officers, the 
regional planning and land use policy, and the policy for the adoption new 
technology. The answer to the question as to whether the Industrial Areas actually 
attract technologically developed and competitive firms was that the authorities 
did not know. The fact that there has not been any research in this field and there 
are no data available was emphasised but the authority was keen on having relevant 
evidence. The central Industrial Areas administration though, as expected, believes 
that whatever has been achieved is done with much effort and is the best that the 
conditions allow.
Any critical evaluation of the Industrial Areas Programme should consider 
this sort of statement of limitations by administration. The situation shows that 
although some attractive results have been attained in some cases, several further 
steps have to be made for the Programme of the Industrial Areas to be more 
efficacious. Greater efforts in improving the functional efficiency of administration 
and planning for better provision of the infrastructure are of course both 
necessary and desirable. However it seems clear that distinct policy oriented 
towards technological improvement would be one that would maintain and enhance 
the competitiveness of industry. Competitiveness is the key ; : to providing
market share. For many respondents in the survey the latter was assessed to be 
the most vital factor for their businesses development.
To estimate the local disadvantages in the Industrial Areas, a question was 
posed to the local administration regarding the reasons of firm closures. The first 
reason put forward was the bad administration of the firms themselves. This is 
clearly a problem, especially with small and family companies. The second reason 
advanced is the relatively high re/location cost and the consequent lack of 
operational capital by the firms. Related to this is the comment concerning the lack 
of financial sources or venture capital and the high cost of money. However these 
last mentioned reasons may, in some cases, simply hide some propensity for
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speculation. The national industrial incentives system supports the establishment or 
relocation of new or existing firms to assisted areas and especially in the Industrial 
Areas. Thus there can be interest by relocating firms to make larger expenses on 
this field than those rationally needed, since they bring in large amounts of cash 
from the state. These can reach 20 -50% of the new investment. Building a new 
factory at half the cost is always interesting, even if later in cases it proves it can 
not profitably operate. A third main reason arises from the relatively high 
transportation costs and lack of specialised workforce in distant regions. Peripheral 
areas seem to suffer unavoidably higher transportation costs and also have access 
to a less specialised workforce as well as rather limited local demand. But they also 
often suffer infrastructural disadvantages and somewhat less information that the 
Industrial Areas should reasonably provide.
With regard to the above reasons given by the administration for firm 
closures, it is interesting to see that none speaks about lack of competitiveness or 
technological status. It may be that administration has not perceived the need for 
competitiveness and the technological status needed for this. But it also may be, as 
was indicated earlier, that such levels are usually above average in the Industrial 
Areas anyway, certainly compared to the surrounding region. In any case the rate 
of closure in the Industrial Areas is perceived to be considerably lower than that of 
firms nationally.
No overt cases of pure property speculation were given by administration, 
possibly because firms cannot sell their land and premises at the first instance, if 
they shut down. But eventually they can, if they are free of any other financial 
obligations and if the buyer is acceptable to the Industrial Area. This might be a field 
that needs more attention since there can be some scope for private speculation, 
within such an expensive social project as that of the Industrial Areas. Even simple 
occupation of valuable but idling industrial land in the Industrial Areas is considerably 
reducing the efficiency of the Industrial Areas as they were planned.
As regards the firms' perceptions, a measurement was attempted on how 
important was the existence of the Industrial Areas in their decision to locate in 
that specific region. Firms in Volos gave the highest importance to the existence of 
the Industrial Area ( 69%), understandably due to the good infrastructure and the 
large firms that seem to use it more than the smaller ones. Volos is closely followed 
by Patra,(67%) also due to the predominance of large firms. In distant Komotini 
importance was somewhat lower (53%) being spread amongst the smaller firms 
that would be in the region anyway, and the larger ones mostly attracted due to 
the higher incentives. But in Iraklio and Xanthi the importance of the Industrial Area
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in location in the region was low. Thus to better measure the above indication, the 
established firms were asked if they would be in the region, irrespective of the 
existence of the Industrial Areas. In general it turned out that 31 out of the 55 
surveyed firms (or 56%), established in the Industrial Areas would be in the same 
region anyway. Thus, something less than half (44%) of the established firms were 
attracted to the region due to the Industrial Areas themselves. Regional 
percentages of course do vary in this respect. In Volos some 71% of the firms can 
be said to have been attracted to the region by the project. In Patra the figure is 
70% and in Komotini 60% of the firms have been similarly attracted. But in Iraklio 
only 6% and in Xanthi none of the firms would have established in a different region 
had the local Industrial Areas not existed. (Figure 6-31).
The function of the various Industrial Areas seems different. It seems that 
firms in general took quite seriously into consideration the Industrial Areas 
Programme as regards their location decisions in Volos, Patra and Komotini, where 
firms are mainly not local. In these cases firms are usually attracted due to the 
infrastructure offered by the Industrial Areas and the locational financial 
incentives, and they give rather minor importance to the local demand for their 
products. On the contrary, the Iraklio and Xanthi Industrial Areas mainly serve local 
industry, although each for different reasons. In Xanthi the infrastructure offered 
up till now is not adequate and the financial incentives are the same in its 
neighbouring Komotini where firms are offered better industrial environment and 
cooperation potential. Thus, firms relocating from the centre to this part of the 
country would normally opt for Komotini. In Iraklio, the fact that the Industrial Area 
is on an island, twelve sea-journey hours away from the capital, has adverse effects 
on its wider location appeal at national level. In comparison, Patra is only 2.5 hours 
away from Athens, and Volos only four hours from Athens and three hours from 
Thessaloniki. On the other hand, Iraklio and Kriti in general can dispose sufficient 
demand for few branches of larger firms to operate there and serve specifically the 
island. The attraction, though, of the Industrial Area of Iraklio is not minor, since it 
has attracted so many local firms and has the highest occupancy rate of all areas 
surveyed.
Finally, firms were asked if, after their establishment in the Industrial Areas, 
they enjoy locational and operational advantages or disadvantages. The question 
was considered by the firms as a most important one. Here, although possible 
answers were structured, firms tended to give longer comments or discourses as 
answers. Still, though, the structured answers show that in general, the five 
surveyed Industrial Areas offer to their firms some 38% of the maximum possible
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expected advantages. Volos is shown to offer 'considerable' advantages, or 64% of 
the best expectations of the established firms. Such perception elsewhere is 
weaker, in Iraklio being 41%, in Komotini at 33%, in Patra at 30% and finally in 
Xanthi at 22% which is quite low meaning no advantage, to the moment at least. 
(Figure 6-32).
The above scores actually show the firms' own evaluation of their own 
location decision, and reveal what their benefits from the Industrial Areas are. 
Additionally it is a general evaluation of their local Industrial Area project. Industrial 
Areas that accommodate firms experiencing operational advantages are bound to 
attract and concentrate more firms, and create even more employment and local 
income. The answers also include the feelings of the firms for the local factor, as 
was made clear with comments on this subject. The Patra versus Volos distinction is 
important. Although both areas have almost equal proportion of 'attracted' firms, 
firms after ten years of establishment feel that in Patra they have half the benefits 
compared to those in Volos. Patra's project is not well connected and it also seems 
the area has an industrial relations problem. Komotini scores rather well for its 
distant location, being slightly above Patra. Firms in the Industrial Area of Iraklio in 
reality ought to declare higher advantages. There a majority of local firms, without 
moving from their region, receive incentives to be in the Industrial Area. The project 
there is regarded as a success. But some inefficiencies in infrastructure that 
persist even now that the project is full, is the cause of some regret by the firms. 
There may well be a case for some more money to be put into this project to 
increase its efficiency, before a soon-to-be-needed second Industrial Area is 
planned on the Island.
6 .7  Conclusion
The Industrial Areas Programme, financed mainly by the state with some 
support by the European Union, is growing steadily, both in number of participant 
firms and in total employment, on various sites amongst the peripheral regions of 
Greece.
The firms established in the surveyed Industrial Areas seem to enjoy 
advantages of an adequate and affordable operational space, good on-site roads, 
mostly good power supply, vehicle parking, sewage treatment and, to some extent, 
cooperation with other firms established there. On the other hand, established
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firms believe, in cases, they still have some operational disadvantages compared to 
their more centrally located competitors. These are due to some persisting 
problems with the infrastructure provided, such as inadequate connecting roads, 
water provision and in cases poor telecommunications. Also, lack of on-site services, 
such as post, bank, school, nursery education, railway station and other 
transportation facilities, proves to be affecting quite seriously the established 
firms, as is the lack of on-site administration for some projects.
The local effects of the Programme are mainly related to some moderate 
net employment creation and increase in local income and some land use benefits. It 
is understood that services provision within the Industrial Areas and workforce 
training schemes would also improve the local quality of life. It can be said that sites 
attract their targeted attention of industry slowly, in ten or even more years of 
operation. This slowness of integration of the projects in the regional economic life 
is also due to the lack or ineffectiveness of administration at the local level. Reason, 
though, is not incompetence, since efforts are evident, but rather a lack of 
participation of the local factor in the planning and development of these projects.
Last, but not least, technological levels of firms in the Industrial Areas seem 
to be higher, and the closure rates lower than average. In the surveyed Industrial 
Areas a substantial number of firms are aware about the need of new technology, 
and do some research. Financing technology is important but not first priority for 
most firms. There is a marked need for administration to start actively promoting 
orientation to technology and innovation in the Industrial Areas. This will help to 
maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the firms in the surveyed and the 
other Industrial Areas.
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Chapter 7 : Evaluation of the effectiveness and the costs 
of the Industrial Areas Programme
7.1 Outline of policy evaluation procedures
A number of methods have been used in the field of the evaluation of 
assisted-area policy effects. The methods can be broadly grouped into three broad 
classes.
The first is the time series evaluation group, using differential trends as 
regards the effects of the policy. The methods are based on distinguishing 
differential growth rates during selected policy 'on* and policy 'off' periods. The 
concepts of the factual results and the counterfactual condition are employed. The 
factual refers to the observed results given the policy, while the counterfactual is 
the potential results had the policy been not in existence mainly described through 
effects net of those nationally expected. A fundamental problem emerging from the 
division of results on the basis of policy ’on’ and policy 'off' periods is that internal 
regional conditions for each period and regional /  national performance trends 
external to the model are difficult to account for. This is due to the timing 
orientation of the methods.
Alternatively, cross sectional methods try to distinguish differential 
performance related to areas targeted and not targeted by the policy. These may 
be thought 'on' and 'off' regions or intra-regional clusters. One advantage of the 
cross-sectional method is that it seeks the counterfactual conditions in 
simultaneous timing with the factual, thus it is not affected by national or market 
trends, and migration trends external to the model. Difficulties may arise in such 
models in the counterfactual condition estimation due to linkages of policy 'on' and 
'off' regions or clusters, as well as trying to control for the different conditions 
existing in different regions. To these methods also belong the various analyses of 
industrial specialisations.
The third group of analyses involves those couched in cost benefit 
structures. Here, the costs of a project or policy and benefits stemming from it are
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compared through various schemes. The measurement of intangible costs and 
benefits and perceptions of time spans and time preference are known difficulties 
of these methods.
In this stage of the present study, analyses representative of each of the 
above classes are to be attempted. The time series process attempt to distinguish 
between employment growth trends in specific regions before the Industrial Areas 
policy , comparing them with trends after the policy is considered 'on'. The cross 
sectional evaluation has the potential to make a further comparison, within policy 
recipient departments, using defined policy 'on' and 'off' clusters. It evaluates the 
differential performance of these clusters, eventually attempting to relate the 
policy to the achieved regional performance. The specialisations analysis evaluates 
the comparative growth rates of manufacturing sub-sectors attracted in the 
projects in relation to the national and other rates. The final part of the evaluation 
shall be the application of a cost-benefit analysis. The cost benefit analysis will 
explore different types of costs and benefits, monetary and intangible (social), in 
the form of two methods. The first one is of the pay-back type and the second 
constitutes a full-life evaluation. Both produce results on the efficiency of the 
Industrial Areas Programme and can provide a sensitivity analysis assuming different 
economic conditions.
7 .2  Evaluation using tim e-series models
7 .2 .1  The main approaches of the time-series evaluation
A significant amount of research is available on evaluation of effectiveness of 
regional policy. A short review emphasising the main methodologies of evaluation 
using time-series based methods is provided next.
MacKay (1972) makes an analysis of industrial performance in development 
areas in the UK during the sixties. The comparison is based on projects' approvals 
(footage and expected employment) and is made using annual percentages and 
annual growth rates amongst types of development areas and between 
development areas and national figures. These annual rates are more meaningfully 
juxtaposed to their contemporary regional policy measures than projects' 
completions and reflect the impact and the response to the various policy measures 
in the correct timing. A conclusion of this work had been that assistance in the 
form of grants had been more effective than the more modest and widespread
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subsidies.
In a later piece of work on the same context, MacKay (1975) admits two 
limitations of the 'approvals' dataset in that they overestimate expected 
employment and miss out some small projects. Thus the movement of firms statistics 
are suggested as an alternative while also recognising the shortcomings. Finally 
review is made of the classic shift-share-based actual minus expected employment 
comparison. The assumption made in theory is that a regional deviation from the 
national growth trends is either a result of the inherited structure of industry, the 
regional industrial mix, or the result of regional policy. He suggests that the 
method, although more precise than the others reviewed, has complex and variable 
time-lags between implementation of the policy and its effects on employment. This 
is understandable because of the different life-cycles of the production methods 
and plants that have been suggested later. MacKay also suggests that the impact 
of the macroeconomic situation of the country is also reflected in the impact of the 
regional policy, and this is not accounted for by the method. Results of this paper 
again conclude to that 'blanket' subsidies do not bring expansion.
Moore and Rhodes (1976) also analyse the effectiveness of regional policy in 
the UK. Their approach has been to relate the number of industrial moves to the 
changing strength of the regional policy. They initially measured the new factory 
openings. Then, using as a guide the number of moves to development areas at a 
period when regional policy was in abeyance, they predicted moves into the same 
areas during active policy periods and made comparisons. To do this they fitted 
regression equations, where the moves to the development areas were regressed 
against the intensity of various policy instruments. The derived estimated moves 
were compared with the actual, for different periods and regions. Subsequently, 
using average jobs per move indices they come to encouraging conclusions 
suggesting that the regional policy package has generated substantial number of 
manufacturing jobs.
Ten years later, Moore, Rhodes and Tyler (1986) on the same context of 
policy evaluation use again the classic (shift-share-based) methodology. The 
evaluation is based on comparing the regional industrial mix alternative or 
'expected' position to the actual. Consistently, the expected regional position was 
constructed as if each industrial sub-sector had grown at the same rate it grew 
nationally. By subtracting the expected from the actual the resultant shift is 
regarded to be due to policy. With this methodological framework they proceed to 
divide firms to indigenous and immigrant and subsequently disentangle the effects of 
individual instruments of policy as in their previous work. Two main findings to be
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mentioned here are that, first, about one third of sub-sectors responded to policy 
in a way that jobs were destroyed. Second, that three quarters of the policy 
assistance was channelled to one quarter of the sub-sectors, among the latter 
being some of the least job-creating.
7 .2 .2  Basic assumptions for the time-series procedure
The analytical procedure here is a chronological trend estimation of growth 
trends belonging to national and sub-national spatial divisions, before and after 
certain time points, all to be specified in relation to the Industrial Areas policy. The 
growth rates and trends of the later periods are to be analysed in the light of, and 
in comparison to the trends in the former periods.
First, the relevant periods are defined. The critical time point is the year 
1978 which is used to divide active and inactive policy periods. This date is 
convenient due to the availability of the National Industrial Census of the same year. 
The 'off' policy period is taken to be from 1978 back to 1969, for which date 
detailed data are also available from the Industrial Census of that latter year 
(sources: E2YE-3, various). By 1978 the Industrial Areas Programme was at a very 
early stage of operation. There were five Industrial Areas in operation, but only two 
of them were of a substantial size. The regional development legislation was first 
introduced in 1978 and became comprehensive only in 1981/1982. Thus, from 
1969 up to 1978, the growth patterns and characteristics will be regarded as 
belonging to a 'passive' policy period.
From 1978 onwards, a larger batch of Industrial Areas gradually started 
operations, and began to produce some effects in the recipient regions. The period 
from 1978 to 1984 can be regarded as a transitional period, or as a 'partially on' 
period. By 1984 there were sixteen Industrial Areas in operation and the financial 
and other incentives of regional policy were in full deployment. Thus, from 1984 
until 1988, a benchmark due to the latest National Industrial Census of 1988 (E2YE-
3, unpublished), produces a period which can be regarded as 'fully active' in policy 
terms, or the policy 'on' period.
Second, the terrain of the policy has to be defined. All regions of Greece are 
first regarded as one large region, to form the national policy terrain, on which the 
effects of policy 'off' and 'on' periods are to be demonstrated. Subsequently, a 
sixteen-region cluster is to be examined, to be called 'Sixteen', that constitutes the 
regions that had an Industrial Area in full operation after 1984. This sixteen-region 
cluster can be further divided to two others. The first is a five-region cluster, the 
'Five', where the Industrial Areas were operating between 1978 and 1984, for
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which cluster the transition period (1978-1984) can be regarded as policy 'on'. 
The second is an eleven-region cluster, the 'Eleven', where the Industrial Areas 
were active only after 1984. A final cluster can be distinguished, as the national 
'terrain' minus the sixteen-region Industrial Areas-cluster, named 'Greece - 
Sixteen', to show the fortunes of the regions not affected by the Industrial Areas 
policy.
7 .2 .3  Evaluation using two classic time-series arrangements
Initially the actual change of manufacturing employment is traced among 
regional groups and periods. Manufacturing employment figures for the defined 
regional groups, showing also their construction, and for all periods are given in 
detail in Table 7-1. The actual effects of the policy are demonstrated in Figure 7- 
1, where the growth path of a typical sample of 100 employees in 1978, in each of 
the above distinguished clusters, is traced through the policy 'off* and 'on' periods. 
The actual average annual growth rates for each period and cluster are also given 
in the first part of Table 7-2.
From this analysis it appears that for Greece, the national average annual 
growth rate for manufacturing during the policy 'off' period of 1969-1978 was 
3.3%, while for the transitional period (1978-1984) it became 0.3% and in the 
policy 'on' period (1984-1988) it became 0.8%. This assigns few credits of positive 
effects to the policy on national level. However an analysis of the details of this shift 
needs to be made. For example what happened in the 'Sixteen' group -the Industrial 
Areas cluster? There it can be seen that for the policy 'off' period of 1969-1978, 
the annual growth rate was 3.9% annually, that became 2.3% during the 
transitional period and further fell to 1.6% in the policy 'on' period. The analysis 
suggests a continuous worsening of the growth rates of the specific policy- 
recipient regions.
If the sixteen-region cluster is decomposed to the five older Industrial Area 
regions cluster, and the eleven new Industrial Areas cluster, the following arise. The 
'Five' grew at 3.7% annually for the policy 'off' period, which became 2.3% during 
transition period (policy-'on' for this cluster) and 2.2% for the last period (1984- 
1988). It seems then that the ’Five' were somewhat worse-off with the policy. But 
also, the 'Eleven', the regions that mainly received the policy after 1984, continued 
decreasing their annual growth rate from 4.2% at policy 'off' to 2.3% at transition 
and 0.9% at policy 'on'. This means, following the logic of this analysis, that the 
regions which specifically received the policy aid experienced the gravest decline at 
policy 'on' period. Interestingly, the 'Greece - Sixteen' region, the non-recipient
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Table 7-1: Regional employment in manufacturing of selected regions
of Greece, 1969 -  1988
Regions 1969 1978 1984 1988
1. Thessaloniki 59282 82886 96726 106919
2. Magnisia 10170 14788 15507 14612
3. Iraklio 8988 9124 9783 10631
4. Preveza 1252 1821 2216 2064
5. Drama 2854 5542 6987 8673
Sum FIVE 82546 114161 131219 142899
1. loannina 3897 5634 6605 6397
2. Rothopi 2463 2839 3893 4187
3. Kavala 6947 8053 9730 11279
4. Achaia 16425 21119 22507 21186
5. Fthiotis 4639 8529 8672 8480
6. Xanthi 2009 4268 6338 6949
7. Serres 5873 8273 9077 10208
8. Larissa 8626 14731 16503 17171
9. Arcadia 2460 2629 2709 2956
10.FIorina 1106 1195 1402 1208
II.Kilkis 1525 3721 5164 6002
Sum ELEVEN 55970 80991 92600 96023
Sum SIXTEEN 138516 195152 223819 238922
GREECE 501522 671496 684147 706306
Greece-Sixteen 363006 476344 460328 467384
Table 7 -2  : Ruerage annual grouith rates in m anufacturing o f selected
regions o f Greece, 1969 -  1988
Actual employment Actual -  expected Actual -  expected
Groups of grouith rates (expected: unweighted (expected: weighted by
Regions (average annual) national manufacturing rate) subsectoral national rates)
*69-'78 ,7 8 - ,84 ,8 4 - ,88 6 9 -7 8 7 8 -8 4 8 4 -8 8 6 9 -7 8  7 8 -8 4  8 4 -8 8
Fiue 3.7% 2.3% 2.2% 0.4% 2.0% 1.4% 0.7% 1.9% 1.7%
Eleuen 4.2% 2.3% 0.9% 0.9% 1.9% 0.1% 1.3% 2.0% 0.0%
Sixteen 3.9% 2.3% 1.6% 0.6% 2.0% 0.8% 0.9% 2.0% 0.6%
Greece 3.3% 0.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Greece-Sixteen 3.1% -0.6% 0.4% -0.2% -0.9% -0.4% -0.4% -0.9% -0.3%
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Figure 7-1: Regional manufacturing employment; annual growth rates in different periods
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regions, shifted from 3.1% annual growth at policy 'off' to -0.6% during the 
transition but up to 0.4% at policy 'on'. The result then would appear to show that 
the policy much worsens the growth of the recipient regions, while the non­
recipient manage to slightly improve their position.
As a first counterfactual arrangement, the annual growth rates of the 
various clusters are presented net of the national manufacturing growth rate, 
without accounting for regional sub-sectoral mix. These figures are the actual 
minus expected employment change paths of the regions, where the expected 
regional overall manufacturing growth rates are assumed to be the same to the 
overall national manufacturing growth, for each period. These are shown in the 
second part of Table 7-2. An illustration of this kind of counterfactual assessment 
of the policy effects on all manufacturing employment for each group of regions is 
made in Figure 7-2.
Thus at policy 'on1, the 'Five' (old Industrial Area regions) grew annually at 
1.4% ahead of the nation and the 'Eleven' (new Industrial Area regions) at 0.1% 
ahead. This makes the 'Sixteen' to grow at 0.8% ahead of the national rate at the 
policy 'on' period, while the non-industrial Areas regions grew at 0.4% below the 
national average. From this point of view the employment growth of the Industrial 
Areas regions is seen to be better than the national average and beyond 
comparison to the non-industrial Area regions that fall short of the national 
average.
These quite encouraging results as regards the policy, if seen through the 
time-trends analysis, lead to somewhat different conclusions. The 'Five' grew at 
policy 'on' at a rate of 1.4% above the national and 2.0% during the transition ('on1 
for the 'Five'), while they had only achieved 0.4% above national at the policy 'off' 
stage. But the time profile is not as good for the 'Eleven'; the 0.1% above the 
national rates at policy 'on', was 1.9% during the transition (practically 'off' for 
this cluster) ^nd had been 0.9% before. This is not an encouraging result. For all 
’Sixteen', the 0.8% above national rates at policy 'on', was 2.0% during the 
transition but it had been 0.6% at policy 'off', a mild but positive an effect if the 
first and the final periods are compared.
The method's counterfactual is not as strong as it might be, it could be 
argued, since the specific sub-sectoral mix of each region ( and clusters) is not 
assumed. It does have analytical value though, since the actual employment 
differentials are the ones that the regions realise. In this method the expected 
employment is not constrained by the national growth rates of 'given' mix, and the 
latter can be allowed to change individually within a region through time.
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Figure 7-2: Regional manufacturing ; growth rates in different periods, net of unweighted expected growth
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The second counterfactual arrangement is more widely used. It is argued, 
not without reservations (MacKay 1975), that the sub-sectoral mix of each 
region's manufacturing determines the expected growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector of the region. Here the expected regional figures for each time are based 
on the product of the regional sub-sectoral mix and the national growth rate for 
each sub-sector of manufacturing, for each period. The growth figures for the 
earlier defined regions following this method are given in the third part of Table 7- 
2. The illustration of the typical sample's growth in this type of counterfactual 
assessment is given in Figure 7-3.
From these results it can be seen that while the figures are somewhat 
different, the main conclusions are verified and remain. The 'Five' are clearly better- 
off during the policy 'on' period albeit with a diminishing momentum. Their weighted 
net annual growth rates had been 0.7% at policy 'off' and became 1.9% and later 
1.7% during policy 'on'. These figures for the 'Eleven' are 1.3% at policy 'off', that 
became 2.0% during the transition but reduced to 0.0% at policy 'on', showing 
that the effect remains as found earlier. Overall for the 'Sixteen', the net growth 
at policy 'off' had been 0.9% annually, that became 2.0% for the transition to 
reduce to 0.6% at policy 'on'. The method shows a slight comparative decline if the 
first and final periods are compared, instead of the slight positive effect of the 
previous arrangement. The non-recipient group of regions is found to start at - 
0.4% at policy 'off', further decline during the middle period at -0.9% and slightly 
improve, still having a net decline though, at -0.3%.
The above types of analyses suggest, in short, that there has been some 
increase in growth for the older policy recipient regions but no such success for 
the more recent ones, and the overall effect is rather neutral. It could perhaps be 
said that the early projects absorbed much of the potential of the economy and 
less was left for the later ones.
7 .2 .4  A specially weighed time - series method
The Industrial Areas-policy is affecting the different sub-sectors in 
manufacturing at different intensities, that is some sub-sectors are more sensitive 
to the policy and some less. To take into account the effect of the above, a more 
appropriate application of the sub-sectorally weighted methodology would be to 
use a weighing reflecting those sub-sectors of manufacturing that are more 
responsive to the specific Industrial Areas policy. A custom made sectorally 
representative sample deriving for each region was considered. The following 
arrangement was deployed.
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Figure 7-3: Regional manufacturing ; groiuth rates in different periods, net of subsectorally weighted expected growth
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From the survey that was carried out in five Industrial Areas, the exact 
employment of each participant firm and the firms' sub-sectoral classification were 
available for 1988. But a set of sub-sectoral growth rates for the above defined 
periods was unavailable, especially for the initial periods. Even for the final policy 'on' 
period, small or zero employment figures for some of the twenty sub-sectors of 
manufacturing for the base period would cause relevant computational problems. 
Thus the Industrial Areas-specific sub-sectoral growth rates could not be produced 
and utilised as in the previous method.
Instead, the available dataset for 1988, was used to produce a 
representative typical Industrial Areas-specific sub-sectoral participation set, to be 
called the 'Industrial Areas-mix'. This, which has to be supposed as fixed for the 
whole evaluation period, shows the intensity in which the various sub-sectors are 
attracted to the Industrial Areas and subsequently 'affected' by the policy.
Thus the 'Industrial Areas mix' provides the weights vector. This can be 
understood as 'applicability-of-policy' for the non Industrial Area regions, and 
speculatively as 'responsiveness-to-policy' for the Industrial Area regions. The 
weights set is applied to the actual mix of all regions whether possessing an 
Industrial Area or not. The suggested arrangement produces policy responsiveness 
weighted employment samples for all regions and exahnined periods. The employment 
samples are obtained as follows:
( rj1» rj2> — iji)t * (W1, W2, ...Wj) = (S ji, sj2, ...Sji)t 
Where (rjj)t is the regional employment for each of the j = 51 regions and the i=20 
manufacturing sub-sectors, for the t=4 reference years, (1969, 1978, 1984 and 
1988); the Wj are the 'Industrial Areas mix' weights for the i sub-sectors; the( Sjj)t 
are the derived weighted employment samples.
Subsequently, the average annual growth rates are extracted and these 
are comparable among regions, groups of regions and time periods.
It is understood that within the resultant employment samples, the sub­
sectors are not represented by percentages equal to the original regional mix. With 
the suggested method though, the original regional mixes are biased equally for all 
regions and time periods to reflect the responsiveness to policy through the 
'Industrial Areas mix' weights. The logic of the argument is that the more similar the 
mix to the Industrial Areas-mix a region develops over the years, the larger the 
product weighted employment sample becomes, which subsequently transformed to 
relevant growth rates reflects larger regional gains from the policy. What is 
captured is how the Industrial Area regions have responded to the policy over time,
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in comparison to themselves and to the similarly 'filtered' non-recipient regions.
The results are shown in Table 7-3. The national annual growth rate for 
the policy 'off' (1969-1978) is 3.2%, it falls to 0.1% during the transition period 
and rises again to 0.6% at policy 'on1. (The relevant figures of the original dataset 
had been 3.3%, 0.3% and 0.8%). It appears that this method of measurement is 
quite consistent to the original.
On the other hand it can be seen that the derived sample's growth rates 
are somewhat lower than the ones of the original national manufacturing. This 
means that the sectors affected by the policy, or in other words the ones that the 
Industrial Areas more intensively accommodate are not the fastest growing ones. 
But if the change from 'transition' to policy 'on' is observed it seems that the 
acceleration given by the policy to the national weighted sample is considerably 
stronger in relation to that for the original unbiased all-round manufacturing set. 
This means that the supported sub-sectors may not have been the fastest growing 
ones nationally, but the policy (on) manages to increase their growth rate, at a 
faster pace than the general manufacturing.
Beyond the national figures, the arrangement can give indications for the 
effects of the policy over time, for groups of regions. Thus, the 'Five' (old Industrial 
Areas) show somewhat increased annual growth rates, from 3.3% at policy 'off' to 
1.8% at transition ( 'on' for the Five) and further to 1.9% for 1984-1988. With 
the original data the trend was diminishing as shown (from 3.7% to 2.3% and 2.2% 
respectively). The difference although subtle, shows first that the 'Five' 
considerably concentrate the Industrial Areas favoured sub-sectors, quite 
expectedly since the Industrial Areas there are older established. This is explained 
by the derived growth rates that are lower, given that these sectors are slower 
growing. Second, it shows that these sub-sectors are actively accelerated by the 
policy (at policy 'on'), enough to manage to change the diminishing original regional 
trend into an increasing one in the weighted arrangement. Consistently, if the 
growth rates of the 'Five' are assumed net of the weighted-national, the weighted 
method suggests that the policy 'on' period brought a relative increase to the 
regions from 0.1% ('off'), to 1.7% and 1.3% ('on') above national rates. This 
suggests a faster acceleration and a softer decline than those of the original data 
set (from 0.4% to 2.0% and to 1.4% respectively).
The weighted method also gives results in the same direction as the original 
methods for the remaining groups of regions. In fact it intensifies the more subtle 
policy effects found originally. For example, for the 'Eleven' an 'ineffectiveness' 
conclusion was traced with the original methods. The net of national growth rates
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Table 7 -3 : Ruerage annual growth rates in m anufacturing o f regional 
samples weighted fo r Industrial Areas' specialisations
r  ^ Actual growth rates Rctual -  expected grow th rates '
Regions o f weighted samples (expected: at rate of national sample)
69-78 78 -84 84-88 69-78 7 8 -84 84-88
1. Thessaloniki 3.4% 2.3% 2.5% 0.2% 2.1% 1.9%
2. Magnisia 4.5% -0.8% -1.8% 1.3% -0.9% -2.4%
3. Iraklio -0.6% 1.3% 1.7% -3.7% 1.2% 1.2%
4. Preveza 4.5% 3.0% -0.9% 1.3% 2.8% -1.5%
5. Drama 7.4% 3.4% 3.8% 4.1% 3.2% 3.2%
S u m  F I V E 3 . 3 % 1 . 8 % 1 . 9 % 0 . 1 % 1 . 7 % 1 . 3 %
1. loannina 4.0% 3.8% -1.0% 0.8% 3.7% -1.6%
2. Rorhopi 1.8% 3.8% 3.0% -1.3% 3.7% 2.4%
3. Kavala 1.0% 3.7% 2.7% -2.1% 3.6% 2.1%
4. Achaia 2.2% 1.8% -1.4% -0.9% 1.6% -2.0%
5. Fthiotis 5.6% -0.4% -0.6% 2.4% -0.5% -1.1%
6. Xanthi 10.0% 6.6% 2.0% 6.6% 6.5% 1.4%
7. Serres 4.5% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 0.6%
8. Larissa 5.8% 1.3% 0.5% 2.6% 1.2% -0.1%
9. Arcadia 0.7% 0.5% 1.3% -2.4% 0.4% 0.7%
10.FIorina 1.7% -0.8% -1.6% -1.5% -0.9% -2.1%
11 .Kilkis 8.2% 5.0% 2.3% 4.9% 4.8% 1.7%
S u m  E L E V E N 3 . 8 % 2 . 2 % 0 . 4 % 0 . 7 % 2 . 1 % - 0 . 2 %
S u m  S IX T E E N 3 . 5 % 2 . 0 % 1 . 2 % 0 . 3 % 1 . 8 % 0 . 7 %
G R E E C E 3 . 2 % 0 . 1 % 0 . 6 % 0 . 0 % 0 . 0 % 0 . 0 %
G r e e c e - S i x t e e n 3 . 0 % - 0 . 7 % 0 . 2 % - 0 . 1 % - 0 . 8 % - 0 . 3 %
JV J
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for the three defined periods are now 0.7%, 2.1% and -0.2%. The effects are in 
the same direction and more bold than those suggested originally ( 0.9%, 1.9%, 
0.1%). The method more precisely focuses, through the weighing, on the specific 
policy effects. Overall then for the 'Sixteen' a less ambiguous, but still not strongly 
positive, indication of a net of national growth of 0.3%, 1.8% and 0.7%, for the 
respective periods is produced, compared to the 0.6%, 2.0%, 0.8% and the 0.9%, 
2.0%, 0.6% respective results found with the previous methods.
Still, the fact is that even the specifically-weighted method has the main 
characteristic the original methods have. Time series methods measure growth 
against each cluster's past performance. Thus they can indicate that a certain 
policy is causing decline to recipient regions that still grow faster than nationally. 
But persistent higher growth rates in the policy regions eventually increase net 
employment differentials from non-recipient ones, and these are not accounted for 
as will be shown next.
However, the design of the policy might be considered a success in that it 
specifically helped at the correct time certain regions that were suffering or about 
to suffer a decline, helping to maintain a considerable annual growth rate, faster 
than the one of the whole country and much faster than the non-recipient regions.
7 .2 .5  Conclusions from the time-series procedures
The whole structure of the analysis undertaken through the time-series 
methodology testing the policy 'off' and 'on' effects shows the following seemingly 
paradox situation. First, the national figures show increase in manufacturing during 
policy 'off', a decline in the transitional period and a subtle increase in policy 'on'. 
Based on this it could be said that the policy 'averted' a further or greater decline 
and reformed it to mild growth. Second, further analysis shows that recipient 
regions, while always retaining faster growth rates than the national, by and large 
reduced their speed of growth from transition to policy 'on'. While, paradoxically, 
the non-recipient regions mildly increased their rates of growth. Obviously, the 
policy is designed to attract industry rather than avert it from the policy recipient 
regions. Through these dynamics it can be seen again that a time-based method 
offers only little help to the analysis of the situation. The particularly helpful aspect 
of retaining of a faster growth than the national, even with smaller acceleration, by 
recipient regions is less focused upon by the method.
It should be added though that one critical factor affecting the results of 
the time-series methods as used here, is their foundation on growth rates in 
employment. It is understood that if another arrangement is made in measuring
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absolute employment, results could be different. For example, the sample of 100 
employees at the end of the policy ’off' period (1978) can be examined for each of 
the groups of regions, as in Figure 7-1. Measuring the absolute numbers of 
employees, or the absolute increase in employment, and using the original (actual 
employment) dataset, the following can be reported. The sixteen policy recipient 
regions at the end of the policy 'on' period will have larger surplus of employment 
compared to the non recipient ones (123 to 98, surplus of 25), than that they had 
at the beginning of the policy 'on' period (115 to 97, a surplus of 18).
With this arrangement the ’Five’ prove to be favoured by the policy, the 
'Eleven' less but still favoured, and all 'Sixteen' quite favoured as shown above. The 
conclusion is that the policy is actually effective as regards employment growth. It 
also shows that the policy proves even more effective when recipient regions have 
more mature Industrial Areas (Five). Another way of putting this is that the 
comparative advantages of the policy increase with time. This way the time series 
method pays attention to the fact that the differentials in volume of employment 
increase during the course of the policy 'on' period. But it does ignore of course 
the declining growth rates seen in the Industrial Area regions, and allocates 
perhaps more than justified credits to the policy.
Given the various shortcomings in establishing stable results with the time- 
series class of methods as has been demonstrated, it will be shown that a cross- 
sectional method can more precisely judge the effects of the policy putting more 
attention on the regional aspects. The time-series methods in general lack a 
counterfactual that would take into consideration the specific situation in each 
region, they often suffer from complex time lags between implementation and 
effects and also are affected by distorting parallel economic and social trends that 
are external to the model. The cross-sectional method distinguishes the 
performance of the policy 'on' and 'off' clusters within regions, rather than 'on' and 
'off' periods, and demonstrates whether their influence was beneficial to the 
recipient regions or not. A timing dimension is not incompatible with the cross- 
sectional method, as it shall be demonstrated.
7.3  A cross-sectional evaluation procedure
7.3.1 Description of the method
The second procedure focuses on a 'policy on' evaluation of the Industrial 
Areas Programme effectiveness. The principle of the procedure is one of measuring
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the differential characteristics, as regards employment growth, of the Industrial 
Areas themselves against their respective regions, in various ways.
With this method useful results for the effectiveness of the Industrial Areas 
Programme and the relevant infrastructure provision in creating regional growth 
can be assessed. Additionally, the evaluation can help derive conclusions about the 
participant firms' performance. This analysis is intertwined with, and can be 
measured against the firms' selection procedure and the promotion and use of new 
and high technology. The method is operationalised twice, for the full policy 'on' 
period 1978 - 1988 for five regions, and for the period 1984 - 1988 for sixteen 
regions. Each period involves the maximum number of regions having substantial 
policy characteristics, in other words an actively operating Industrial Area.
In a first arrangement of the method the participation of the Industrial 
Areas in the respective regional employment is measured through time. This is 
equivalent to comparing the employment increase rates in the Industrial Areas to 
the respective regional growth. Conclusions can be drawn about the potential of 
the Industrial Area clusters and their respective regions. Comparisons can also be 
made for the two consecutive time periods.
Participation gives a measure of the attractiveness (local and national) of 
the incentives offered and infrastructure package available in the Industrial Areas 
Programme. The growth rates show the dynamics of the Industrial Areas 
Programme in each region. They not only show the attractiveness of the Industrial 
Areas to firms, as distinguished from the rest of the region, but also the increase in 
already established firms' employment.
In a second arrangement, derivative growth rates can be used, if the 
Industrial Areas employment is separated or 'clustered' from the respective 
regional employment. Here two different growth rates are compared, the policy 
'on' whole region growth, inclusive of the Industrial Areas effect, and the 'policy off 
cluster' (whole region minus Industrial Areas cluster) growth. This arrangement 
describes the counterfactual, that is how the region would perform, had the 
Industrial Area been not existent. The meaning of the test is to check if the region 
had no intervention, would it grow slower or not.
There is one bias which could be attributed to the above test. From the set 
of excluded firms of a regions' Industrial Area at the final period, some clearly would 
have established in the region during the course of the period even if the Industrial 
Area was not there. These are not accounted for, thus the relevant growth rate in 
this respect appears smaller. Thus, part of the growth of the Industrial Areas 
cluster should be 'returned' to the 'surrounding' region's performance. On the
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other hand, had the Industrial Area not been in the region, some of the therein 
established firms at the initial period would also be in the region anyway. These also 
are subtracted from the region, thus providing a smaller initial period denominator 
that tends to increase the 'surrounding' region's growth rate. If these two 
opposite effects are considered counterbalanced, then the arrangement is 
unbiased and usefully describes the 'counterfactual'.
To deal with the possible disturbance of small initial employment figures in 
certain Industrial Areas, generating large growth rates which would be difficult for 
the region to follow, compared regions are finally summed, forming thus 'larger' 
regions. This is done first for a group of five regions and then for sixteen regions. 
These 'larger' regions can be thought as the whole 'terrain of policy'. Thus in the 
first arrangement the grouped 'Industrial Areas cluster' is compared with the 
respective whole 'terrain of policy'. In the second (counterfactual) arrangement 
the policy 'on' cluster is the whole 'terrain of policy', while the policy 'off' cluster is 
the 'terrain of policy' stripped from the 'Industrial Areas cluster'.
7.3.2 Application of the cross-sectional (clustering) procedure
for five regions
The first measurement, in an attempt to utilise the longest period for which 
policy 'on' and 'off' clusters can be distinguished, had to compromise on the number 
of the regions. Those with an active Industrial Area by 1978 are five; Thessaloniki, 
Volos, Iraklio, Preveza and Drama. These regions were tested through the methods 
described above. Results for the participation, the growth rates and the 
counterfactual arrangement are shown in detail in Table 7-4. The figures are 
given distinctively for the period 1978-84 and for 1984-88 and also for the full 
period 1978-88. The growth of the Industrial Areas in the five regions, and their 
effects on regional growth are illustrated in Figure 7-4, for the decade 1978- 
1988.
The results show that the effects of the Industrial Areas cluster in the total 
regional employment is case-sensitive. For the period 1978-1988, in three of the 
five cases there are clear positive effects on the regions due to the Industrial 
Areas, that is in Volos, Iraklio and Preveza. For these it can be said that they 
effectively provided benefits to their respective regions. In the remaining two 
regions any positive effects of the Industrial Areas are less obvious. There, only 
some subtle effects can be found for Thessaloniki, and it has to be said some 
ineffectiveness for Drama.
The Industrial Area of Volos started at 16.9% of the regional employment in
256
Table 7-4: Participation of Industrial Areas In regional employment and their effect on regional growth rates
Flue regions E m p l o y m e n t  (manufacturing) Participation of Annual Average Employment Growth Rates REGIONS
INDUSTRIAL AREAS R E G 1 0 N S Industrial Areas INDUSTRIAL AREAS R E G I O N S without Industrial Areas
1978 1984 1988 1978 1984 1988 1978 1984 1988 78-84 84-88 78-88 78-84 84-88 78-88 78-84 84-88 78-88
Thessaloniki 4773 5331 5903 82886 96726 106919 5.8% 5.5% 5.5% 1.9% 2.6% 2.1% 2.6% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.5% 2.6%
Volos 2501 3688 4207 14788 15507 14612 16.9% 23.8% 28.8% 6.7% 3.3% 5.3% 0.8% -1.5% -0.1% -0.6% -3.1% -1.6%
Iraklio 264 1001 1295 9124 9783 10631 2.9% 10.2% 12.2% 24.9% 6.6% 17.2% 1.2% 2.1% 1.5% -0.1% 1.5% 0.5%
Preveza 350 350 468 1821 2216 2064 19.2% 15.8% 22.7% 0.0% 7.5% 2.9% 3.3% -1.8% 1.3% 4.0% -3.8% 0.8%
Drama 805 952 1053 5542 6987 8673 14.5% 13.6% 12.1% 2.8% 2.6% 2.7% 3.9% 5.6% 4.6% 4.1% 6.0% 4.9%
All Flue 8693 11322 12926 114161 131219 142899 7.6% 8.6% 9.8% 4.5% 3.4% 4.8% 2.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.2% 2.8% 2.1%
Sixteen regions E m p l o y m e n t  (manufacturing) Participation of Annual Average Employment Growth Rates REGIONS
INDUSTRIAL AREAS R E G 1 O N S Industrial Areas INDUSTRIAL AREAS R E G I O N S without Industrial Areas
1984 1988 1984 1988 1984 1988 84-88 84-88 84-88
Thessaloniki 5331 5903 96726 106919 5.51% 5.52% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5%
Volos 3688 4207 15507 14612 23.8% 28.8% 3.3% -1.5% -3.1%
Iraklio 1001 1295 9783 10631 10.2% 12.2% 6.6% 2.1% 1.5%
loannina 32 89 6605 6397 0.5% 1.4% 29.1% -0.8% -1.0%
Rothopi 630 1232 3893 4187 16.2% 29.4% 18.3% 1.8% -2.4%
Preveza 350 468 2216 2064 15.8% 22.7% 7.5% -1.8% -3.8%
Drama 952 1053 6987 8673 13.6% 12.1% 2.6% 5.6% 6.0%
Kavala 74 174 9730 11279 0.8% 1.5% 23.8% 3.8% 3.6%
Achaia 736 1132 22507 21186 3.3% 5.3% 11.4% -1.5% -2.0%
Fthiotis 57 276 8672 8480 0.7% 3.3% 48.3% -0.6% -1.2%
Xanthi 349 359 6338 6949 5.5% 5.2% 0.7% 2.3% 2.4%
Serres 276 725 9077 10208 3.0% 7.1% 27.3% 3.0% 1.9%
Larissa 26 62 16503 17171 0.2% 0.4% 24.3% 1.0% 0.9%
Arcadia 97 127 2709 2956 3.6% 4.3% 7.0% 2.2% 2.0%
Fiorina 46 66 1402 1208 3.3% 5.5% 9.4% -3.7% -4.2%
Kilkis 250 630 5164 6002 4.8% 10.5% 26.0% 3.8% 2.3%
All Sixteen 13895 17798 223819 238922 6.2% 7.4% 6.4% 1.6% 1.3%
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Figure 7-4 : Ruerage annual grouuth rates for fiue Industrial Area- regions, 1978 - 1988
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1978, and grew to 23.8% by 1984 and to 28.8% by 1988. The growth rates 
analysis shows that the Industrial Area of Volos for the period 1978-84 grew by an 
average annual rate of 6.7%.; at the same time the region grew at only 0.8%. For 
the period 1984-1988 the Industrial Area grew annually by 3.3%, while the region 
experienced a decrease of minus 1.5% per annum. Overall (1978-88), as shown in 
Figure 7-4 the Industrial Area of Volos managed an average annual growth of 
5.3%, the annual growth rate of the region would have been a -1.6% had the 
Industrial Area not been there, instead of the actual -0.1% per annum. Significant, 
if not decisive, is the role the Industrial Areas played in averting a serious decline in 
the region. It can be said that the Industrial Area effectively provided an 
advantageous location for incoming firms (especially in the first period). It can also 
be said that the selected firms participating in the Industrial Area form a recession- 
proof core that clearly and actively helps the region (second period).
Similarly beneficial proves the Industrial Area for the region of Iraklio. In 
1978 the Industrial Area accounted for the 2.9% of the regional employment, 
which became 10.2% by 1984, and reached 12.2% in 1988. The growth rates' 
analysis show that for the period 1978-84 the Industrial Area was growing at an 
annual 24.9%, while the region grew at only 1.2%. Subsequently, for 1984-88 the 
Industrial Area grew at 6.6% while the region at 2.1% per annum. Overall, for 1978- 
88 the Industrial Area had been growing at an average annual rate of 17.2%, that 
made the region grow at 1.5% annually instead of 0.5% had the Industrial Area 
been not there (Figure 7-4). Even if allowance of any amount of internal 
relocation is made, still the Industrial Area is shown to be important to the region. 
Intra regional relocation is beneficial to the region's planning. But more important is 
the jobs augmentation that has occurred within the Industrial Area, along with 
attracted investments. What also counts, besides employment, is the advancement 
in productivity and competitiveness due to the use of new technology and 
infrastructure, as shown in all previous analyses.
The last region having a clearly positive Industrial Area effect is Preveza. 
There the Industrial Area started at 19.2% of the regional employment in 1978, 
and fell to 15.8% by 1984, to grow again to 22.7% by 1988. The growth rates' 
analysis shows that the Industrial Area of Preveza for the period 1978-84 did not 
grow (average annual rate of 0%); at the same time the region grew at 3.3% per 
annum. For the period 1984-88 though, the Industrial Area grew annually at 7.5%, 
while the region experienced a decrease of -1.8% per annum. Overall (1978-88), 
the Industrial Area of Preveza managed an average annual growth of 2.9%. The 
region would have grown at 0.8% without the Industrial Area, but it actually grew
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at a 1.3% annually. Here the case shows that when recession hit the region and 
total employment declined at the second period, the Industrial Area managed a 
rapid growth. Availability of skilled employment plus the attractiveness of the 
Industrial Area possibly initiated a relocation stream to the region and specifically 
into the Industrial Area. The region clearly benefited from the project.
In Thessaloniki in 1978 the Industrial Area accounted for the 5.8% of the 
regional employment, which became 5.5% by 1984, and remained at this figure until 
1988. The growth rates analysis show that for the period 1978-84 the Industrial 
Area was growing at an annual 1.9%, while the region grew at 2.6%. But for 1984- 
88 the Industrial Area grew at 2.6% while the region at 2.5% per annum. Overall, 
for 1978-88 the Industrial Area of Thessaloniki has been growing at an average 
annual 2.1% with the region growing at 2.6% per annum. For the case of 
Thessaloniki the counterfactual effects are subtle but rather in favour of the 
Industrial Area. The regional growth rates are equal at 2.6% with or without the 
Industrial Area for the decade. But the second period, as subtle the effect as it 
may be, gives a hint of slightly better durability of the Industrial Area's advantages. 
The Industrial Area managed to increase its employment in the less favourable 
economic climate in the region that lowered the overall growth rate. Thessaloniki is 
offering obvious operational advantages for locating firms, whether in the Industrial 
Area or not. But the Industrial Area here again proves recession-proof and hints at 
a rather efficient combination of technology use and infrastructure provision.
The last of the five regions is Drama. There the Industrial Area started at 
14.5% of the regional employment at 1978, and fell to 13.6% by 1984, to fall 
again to 12.1% by 1988. The growth rates' analysis shows that the Industrial Area 
of Drama for the period 1978-84 grew at an average annual rate of 2.8% but at 
the same time the region grew at 3.9% per annum. Again, for the period 1984-88, 
the Industrial Area grew annually at a rate of 2.6%, while the region experienced 
an increase of 5.6% per annum. Overall (1978-88), the Industrial Area of Drama 
managed an average annual growth of 2.7%, the region actually grew at 4.6% 
annually, while without the Industrial Areas employment growth would have been 
4.9%. In this case the dynamism of the region as a whole outpaces the Industrial 
Area's performance. Still the Industrial Area's growth of 2.7% annually for a 
decade is substantial and perhaps the Industrial Area can be considered as the 
core of the region's industrial security against any possible future regional 
slowdown.
To have a representative result for the five regions, as regards the 
participation test, a new 'all five' region was constructed. Results for this 'region'
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show the total effect considering the strength and magnitude of the positive or 
negative results of each specific regional test above. Thus, it can be seen that the 
Industrial Areas cluster accounted for 7.6% of the 'all five' region's employment in 
1978, that became 8.6% in 1984 and reached 9% by 1988. A clear index of 
increasing participation of the overall Industrial Areas structure emerges, given the 
multiple constraints faced by firms considering relocation. As regards growth rates, 
the all-five Industrial Areas' cluster shows 4.5% annual increase for 1978-84, as 
opposed to 2.3% for the 'region'. This credits the Industrial Areas cluster with 
almost double the regional growth speed. For the period 1984-88, the five 
Industrial Areas' cluster grew at 3.4% annually, as against only 2.2 % for the 
'region'. Overall, for the decade 1978-1988 the Industrial Areas grew at 4.0% 
annually and the regions at 2.3%, quite higher than the estimated 2.1% had the 
policy been not present. This 0.2% of an annual difference amounts to some 4500 
new jobs in the five regions over the decade. These rates come from a mixture of 
regions of different geographic locations and economic specialisations and levels of 
development, thus they have a considerable analytical weight.
7.3.3 Application of the cross-sectional (clustering) procedure
for sixteen regions
Instead of applying the tests for the maximum period possible, here they are 
deployed for the maximum number of regions given the data available. That is, the 
regions that had some substantial Industrial Areas employment by year 1984, until 
the latest period with available data, 1988. These regions amounted to sixteen. 
(The full twenty regions that operated by 1987 could not be evaluated since there 
are no regional data available after 1988 and the test period would have to diminish 
to one year, besides computational biases in percentages due to small bases). Thus, 
the method was operationalised as above, again shown in detail in Table 7-4 and 
illustrated in Figure 7-5.
Starting from the 'all sixteen' region set, that is the whole span of the 
Industrial Areas Programme for the period, it can be seen that participation of the 
Industrial Areas increased from 6.2% to 7.4% from 1984 to 1988. The employment 
increase rates in the Industrial Areas are largely higher than the respective 
regional, since the 16-Industrial Areas cluster has an average annual growth of 
6.4% for the period 1984-88, while the respective sixteen regions (the 'policy 
terrain') grew at only 1.6% annually at the same period. The counterfactual 
regional annual growth rate would only have been 1.3%, had the Industrial Areas 
policy been not injected, that is lower than the actual 1.6%. The difference of
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Figure 7-5 : Huerage annual growth rates for sixteen Industrial Brea- regions, 1984 -  1988
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0.3% amounts to some 4000 new jobs in sixteen regions from 1984 to 1988.
As regards the regional specific results, it can be seen that the Industrial 
Areas in the large majority of the regions have increased their participation to 
percentages that vary from under 3% to some 30%. In some thirteen regions of 
the sixteen were realised clear positive effects of the Industrial Areas policy. In 
these cases the policy 'on' actual growth rate was larger than the estimated policy 
’off' one, had the Industrial Area been not present. Among this group were Volos, 
Iraklio, Patra, Kavala, Kilkis, Fiorina and Komotini. Thessaloniki proved to be only 
marginal in this respect. Thus for a total of fourteen out of the sixteen regions of 
the whole Industrial Areas Programme, the effects seem to have been beneficial for 
employment growth, besides any other positive regional aspects. The Industrial 
Areas are in most cases acting as growth stimuli or decline shields. The two regions 
with a negative Industrial Area performance are Drama ( for reasons given above) 
and Xanthi where the Industrial Area is not successful (also confirmed by field 
survey). In Xanthi the lack of on-site administration and delays in infrastructure 
provision as late as 1992 unfortunately blunt any policy inspirations. Figure 7-5 
gives an illustration of these overall effects, for each and all sixteen regions.
7.3 .4  Conclusions from the cross-sectional analysis
As a first conclusion, it appears that the Industrial Areas Programme largely 
helped the recipient regions' employment growth. Had it not been there some 90 % 
of these regions would have been worse off, and some of them with large 
employment losses.
Second, from the five regions longer term test it turns out that if, due to 
some exceptional positive circumstances, high regional growth rates emerge, 
(Drama, at 4.6% annually for the decade, or Thessaloniki for 1978-1984), then the 
Industrial Areas can prove slow or inflexible enough to follow; but not always, as 
Iraklio showed. On the other hand, in cases of decline or slowdown, the Industrial 
Areas manage to keep pushing strongly in favour of the region (Volos, Preveza 
1984-1988). It should be said that the selection procedure and monitoring by the 
Industrial Areas administration is connected to this result. It can be assumed that 
the above causes some delay and also scares 'opportunist' firms in booming times/ 
regions. Still the Industrial Areas clusters do prove decline-proof in other times 
perhaps for some of the same reasons. There is a plausible hint for better 
technology utilisation in this effect, in addition to the formation of attractive 
'oases' for external capital as regards infrastructure provision and financial 
incentives for location.
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The third and more interesting conclusion is that the effectiveness of the 
Programme improved during the latter period. The effects became much larger in 
range but no less intense. Not only the shift of Thessaloniki shows this. In 1984- 
1988 the policy produced a 0.3% higher actual annual growth rate than the policy 
’off' option for some sixteen regions, as compared to only 0.1% of a shift above the 
policy 'off' option for only five regions from 1978 to 1984. This shows an increasing 
effectiveness of the Industrial Areas Programme in the second period 1984-1988.
The reasons for the above can be maturity of the Programme in the form of 
better administration and wider penetration to regional economic networks. But 
interestingly, the last period under analysis was one of national slowdown. The 
finding that the Industrial Areas in general prove better in performance than their 
regional average, and support growth in their own regions in periods of decline is 
indicative of an advanced competitive position. This is must only be due to better 
technology utilisation and better available infrastructure.
When looked at within this methodological framework, the Industrial Areas 
prove as providing significantly accelerated growth and durability to the recipient 
regions' employment. In other words the Industrial Areas tend to enhance and 
secure regional development.
7.4  An evaluation based on industrial specialisations
An interesting piece of analysis regarding the specialisations of the firms 
that are attracted to the Industrial Areas can be made through the use of a 
relevant methodology. Having results on the identity of the firms attracted to the 
Industrial Areas it can be assumed that these represent manufacturing sub-sectors 
that find advantages from the current structure of the Industrial Areas. To the 
extent that these firms happen to belong to the faster growing sub-sectors of 
manufacturing, or in other words the sectors that enjoy comparative advantages 
in the international competitive economy, the Industrial Areas attain their targets 
better. To the extent that the above target is missed, suggestions for 
reorientation of the Industrial Areas' structure and appeal may emerge so that the 
Industrial Areas may possibly become better at accommodating also some faster 
growing manufacturing sub-sectors. In this way the Industrial Areas not only will 
even more help these sectors in their competitiveness, but also by attracting them 
to the peripheral regions regional development should be enhanced.
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A method utilising measurements of specialisation amongst the various 
industrial sectors related to economic performance is followed here. In other 
words, what the method describes is an equivalent of the 'industry mix' (or 
structural) effect of a standard shift share method. As mentioned above such a 
shift-share cannot be applied over the Industrial Areas, due to computational 
problems of infinite increases.
Having the employment figures dissagregated to manufacturing sub-sectors 
for each of the five Industrial Areas of the field survey and those of the respective 
regions for year 1988, (Table 7-5), the following specialisation index (SI) is 
computed:
Slic =  (Eic / E c) / ( E ir / E r)
Where EjC is the employment of each i sector in each c cluster, Ec is the total 
employment of each c cluster, Ejr is the employment of each i sector in each r 
region, and Er is the total employment in each r region.
For the current analysis the c clusters are each of the five Industrial Areas 
of the sample, and a sixth, that is the sum of the five Industrial Areas, as a larger 
Industrial Area set. The r regions are the relevant five regions plus the sixth derived 
region from all five.
The values that this index can take are zero, or any positive value. Practice 
shows that value of one means that the cluster has equivalent 'specialisation' or 
preference for the sector in question as its surrounding region. Values below one 
show adverse or negative preference shown by the cluster to the sector, while the 
threshold of two is generally agreed for a sector to be regarded as a 'strong and 
valid' specialisation that can be credited to the cluster. The index is immune to the 
size of the cluster in relation to the size of the region, that is the participation 
intensity, while exclusivity of participation of a sub-sector in the cluster is the fact 
that raises the value of the index.
Industrial Areas are compared to their respective regional rather than any 
national figures, to keep the Industrial Area - specific effect distinct from any 
'regional' attractiveness or specialisation
As can be seen in Table 7-5, the Industrial Area of Xanthi has specialisation 
in the Tobacco and the Miscellaneous manufacturing sub-sectors. The Industrial 
Area of Komotini concentrates on the sectors of Beverages , Tobacco, Textiles, 
Paper, Printing, Leather and Chemicals. The Industrial Area of Volos specialises in 
Paper manufacturing, Rubber and Plastic, Chemicals, Metal Products and Electrical 
Appliances. Patra focuses on the sectors of Wood and Cork, Paper, Petrol and Coal
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Table 7 - 5: Specialisation of Industrial Areas among manufacturing sectors, 1988
Employment of 1988
" V "
K A N T H  I
■V"
M OT I
^ Region I.A. S.l. y Region I.A.
K 0 N I
~V'~
S.l.
V
Region
0 L 0 S
I.A.
I.A. = Industrial Area
S.l. = Specialisation Index (as defined in text)
S.l. Region
Manufacturing Sectors
20: Food Preparation 1841 11 0.1 697 134 0.7 2105 381 0.6
21: Beverages 63 0 0.0 67 42 2.1 320 175 1.9
22: Tobacco Manufacturing 813 330 7.9 8 8 3.4 171 0 0.0
23: Textile 468 0 0.0 199 199 3.4 1513 235 0.5
24: Sewing and Footwear 1512 0 0.0 1251 313 0.8 1220 49 0.1
25: Wood and Cork 235 0 0.0 232 15 0.2 606 36 0.2
26: Furniture and Fixtures 178 0 0.0 155 0 0.0 392 0 0.0
27: Paper Manufacturing 330 0 0.0 236 224 3.2 266 212 2.8
28: Printing, Publishing 43 0 0.0 42 38 3.1 221 0 0.0
29: Leather and Fur 2 0 0.0 3 3 3.4 13 0 0.0
30: Rubber and Plastic 299 0 0.0 166 71 1.5 358 331 3.2
31: Chemicals 12 0 0.0 16 15 3.2 190 225 4.1
32: Petrol.& Coal refining 6 0 0.0 0 0 - 12 0 0.0
33: Non-metallic Minerals 218 0 0.0 135 0 0.0 1565 355 0.8
34: Basic Metal Industries 98 0 0.0 9 0 0.0 1413 203 0.5
35: Metal Products 299 0 0.0 362 85 0.8 790 780 3.4
36: Machinery,(non-electr) 83 0 0.0 110 15 0.5 1123 222 0.7
37: Electr.machin&Appliances 183 5 0.5 99 45 1.5 544 438 2.8
38: Transport Equipment 248 0 0.0 341 25 0.2 1682 546 1.1
39: Miscell. Manufacturing 18 10 10.8 57 0 0.0 107 19 0.6
Total 1988 ,6 9 4 9 356 ) , 4185 1232 J 14611 4287 /
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0.9
7.2
0.0
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2694 263 0.8 10216 935 0.6
774 177 1.9 2418 853 2.5
0 0 - 992 338 2.4
386 74 1.6 6619 508 0.5
688 3 0.0 8264 365 0.3
632 11 0.1 2456 196 0.6
528 27 0.4 1683 27 0.1
16 16 8.2 1400 563 2.8
245 53 1.8 872 91 0.7
27 0 0.0 281 3 0.1
335 49 1.2 1938 485 1.8
79 24 2.5 516 273 3.7
71 12 1.4 162 25 1.1
931 189 1.7 4141 558 0.9
0 0 - 1563 203 0.9
638 130 1.7 3958 1191 2.1
626 77 1.0 2569 326 0.9
380 40 0.9 1893 532 2.0
1470 52 0.3 5147 623 0.8
108 98 7.4 470 127 1.9
^10628 1295 y V 57558 8222 J
refining and Metal Products. Iraklio seems attractive in Paper, Chemicals and 
Miscellaneous manufacturing. If the five Industrial Areas are considered as one 
cluster, representing the total Industrial Areas Programme in Greece, then it comes 
that the Industrial Areas specialise in the following sectors, by order of strength: 
Chemicals (SI =3.7), Paper(2.8), Beverages (2.5), Tobacco (2.4), Metal products 
(2.1) and Electrical Appliances (2.0). Next come the sectors of Miscellaneous 
manufacturing (1.9) and Rubber and Plastic (1.8). The SI of all other sectors are at 
or below the unity, showing adverse specialisation of the Programme to them.
From the sub-sectorally dissaggregated employment data of the decade 
1978 - 1988, the national average annual growth rate is extracted for each of 
the twenty sub-sectors of manufacturing. By order of magnitude these rates are 
shown in Figure 7-6. They can be broadly divided in three groups. The first 
consists of the sub-sectors growing at over 2% annually for the decade; these are 
Petrol and Coal refining, Sewing and Footwear, Tobacco, Printing and Miscellaneous 
manufacturing. The second group comprises sub-sectors with positive growth below 
2%. These sectors are Food, Transport equipment, Paper, Chemicals, Beverages 
and Basic Metal industry.The third group clusters the declining (as regards 
employment) sub-sectors.
From the six main specialisations (SI over 2) in the Industrial Areas, as 
extracted above, one belongs to the fast growing group, (Tobacco), three to the 
slow growing group (Chemicals, Paper, Beverages) and two to the declining group 
(Metal Products, Electrical Appliances).
What can be seen from the above analysis is that the Industrial Areas for 
the above period managed to provide industrial space to water consuming 
industries (Paper and Beverages), accommodate polluting industry such as 
chemicals, and also house employment-reducing sectors such as metal products and 
electrical appliances. The fast growing sectors in Greece, and also the most labour 
intensive, are the 'soft' industrial sectors, such as Sewing and Footwear, Printing 
and Tobacco. These prove to be only marginally attracted (and assisted) by the 
Industrial Areas. Also the specific, and absolute fastest growing sector of fuel 
refining is less attracted. One reason, of course, may be the 'general use1 type of 
Industrial Areas that were built up till now (not suitable for refineries, etc.). A 
second and most important reason is due to the, mostly, limited services provision 
and communication with the neighbouring urban structures, not suitable for labour 
oriented and specialised labour intensive manufacturing that seem to be the fastest 
growing nationally.
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7 .5  A benefit-cost appraisal of the Industrial Areas 
Program m e
7.5.1 The objectives and the context of cost-benefit analysis
The objectives of this part of research are to discover just how beneficial 
(or otherwise) has been the actual spending on the Industrial Areas Programme in 
Greece. As was seen earlier, the Industrial Areas Programme, much like those in 
other countries, has attempted to encourage economic development through the 
deployment of a range of practical economic policies. These have involved provision 
of basic infrastructure and industrial land as well as direct grants in aid to industry. 
Results of this type of policy used will be discussed subsequently mainly in the light 
of their costs of provision in the form of a cost-benefit analysis.
The principle of cost-benefit analysis is to compare benefits that stem from 
a project to those parties that they may accrue with the costs of undertaking the 
project itself. The procedure was initially formulated in the United States in the 
early fifties by public works authorities. In the subsequent years regard was paid to 
different sets of value judgements, leading to different approaches each serving 
different purposes, one perhaps as valid as another.
If cost-benefit analysis is to be used as a tool for social decision making the 
often used welfare economics criterion of Pareto optimality may on many occasions 
not be fulfilled. The criterion seeks solutions where some parties improve their 
welfare without others falling to lower welfare levels. A cornerstone of cost-benefit 
analysis is the Kaldor-Hicks view of welfare economics (Kaldor 1939, Hicks 1939) 
one based on the compensation principle. This proposes that a social policy is 
beneficial if it’s benefits are more than enough to compensate any losers. 
Compensation of course was thought of only in theoretical terms, since if it was to 
take place in reality a series of inevitable disturbances in the model would occur. 
(Scitovsky 1941).
Lack of markets and pricing mechanisms for many social benefits such as the 
limitation of environmental pollution or the reduction in general levels of noise, or 
costs such as aesthetic damage or increased pollution, challenge cost-benefit 
analysis for suitable financial appraisal. Values assigned to issues like these along 
with material costs and benefits are often a product of political circumstances or 
pressures. Various methods are proposed for ‘monetisation’ of intangibles perhaps 
using arbitrary, but specified, weights on measurable magnitudes, or eliciting 
judgements through surveys using questionnaires or bidding techniques. Weighing of
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streams of benefits was introduced by Bergson (1938). The issue of whether 
individual preferences should count using such gauging techniques, or alternatively 
whether only those of the policy making body (consensus bearing) should be 
considered has caused much theoretical debate bringing up the issue of coercion. 
Little (1957) simply suggests that a beneficial social project is the one that fulfills 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, does not contain the Scitovsky compensation paradox 
and provides a ‘good redistribution of wealth’.
The early seventies saw an attack on this methodology from political science 
(Self 1972) and was based on the proposition that cost-benefit analysis should not 
replace political decision making by a ‘mechanistic calculus’. More radical critiques 
(Hunt 1968, Schwartz 1972) focused on the notion that cost-benefit analysis 
unthoughtfully accepts the prevailing income distribution as optimal. Furthermore 
they pointed out that the prevailing income distribution resulting from a project 
usually had a longer lifetime than the relevant decision-making bodies or the elected 
governments. Pearce and Nash (1981) compromise by concluding that the main use 
for cost-benefit analysis should be to describe simply the intensity or sensitivity of 
effects.
In technical terms the appraisal part of cost-benefit analysis has employed 
a variety of approaches (Diamond and Spencel 984, Schofield 1987) ranging from 
the widely used investment criteria of the net present value, to the internal rate of 
return and benefits over costs ratio along with the older but more criticised 
payback methods. All of these analytical approaches will be utilised in this research. 
Further concerns in the methodology relate to the choice of an appropriate social 
discount rate, the social opportunity cost rate and the lower social time 
preference rate having been developed.
7 .5 .2  Data sources and basic assumptions underlying the
methodology
The policy to be evaluated is the Greek Industrial Areas Programme which is 
mainly based on infrastructure provision but also includes some state locational 
incentives for industry. The overall aim of course is regional economic and social 
development. To facilitate the cost-benefit analysis of the Programme annual cash 
flows from its commencement in 1968 up to 1991 were collected from ETBA. Cash 
flows for some six Industrial Areas were available, being the maximum that ETBA 
would disclose for this study. These comprise the five locations of Volos (in the 
region of Magnisia), Patra (in Achaia), Komotini (in Rothopi), in Iraklio, in Xanthi plus 
the flagship project of Thessaloniki (Figure 7-7). Prices were standardised for
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inflation at the 1988 level, using the annual rates of discount for capital 
investments that ETBA uses for its own studies. The year 1988 was chosen for the 
prices standardisation since it is the latest year for which measurements on 
manufacturing salaries exist for national and regional levels (Annual Industrial 
Survey, 1988). Employment data were available for the Industrial Areas from 1978 
to 1992 (ETBA, unpublished) and at national and regional levels from 1978 to 
1988, (National Industrial Censuses 1978, 1984, 1988). Additional information was 
drawn from the field research.
For the purposes of this analysis, common acceptance of the prevailing 
income distribution in Greece arising from policy is assumed, and this is based on the 
understanding that decision making is democratically founded. It is further assumed 
that it is commonly accepted that over-concentration of manufacturing in the 
region of Athens is not ‘beneficial’ since it can degrade the living standards of its 
inhabitants and also can limit the development possibilities of the enterprises 
themselves. It is taken as given that in order for industries to establish in peripheral 
regions, locational incentives are needed along with the existence of some local 
demand, an operating labour market, some complementary firms and, of course, the 
necessary infrastructure. Finally, it is also taken as given that recipient regions do 
not have any objections to receiving investments that are likely to promulgate 
induced demand for employment.
Costs and benefits are grouped in ‘central’ and ‘regional /  social’, the 
distinction being made according to whether they relate to the policy recipient 
region (regional) or to the general public (social), or to the central provision agency 
(ETBA). The costs and benefits are divided into those which are direct or indirect, 
according to whether they are directly measurable or can only be estimated. An 
outline of the costs and benefits and a the diagram of the path to be followed in 
their assessment is shown in Figure 7-8. There it is shown that prior to the final 
assessment of the Programme two sub-balances are formulated. The central 
balance leads to the net central cost, and the regional /  social balance produces 
the net regional /  social cost or benefit.
7 .5 .3  Definitions of the central and the social/regional costs 
and benefits
a. Central balance.
The central costs can be thought of as the Industrial Areas provision costs. 
These consist of the costs of land purchase (CC1), the consequent infrastructure 
construction cost or land development cost (CC2) and the costs of the various
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Figure 7-8: Diagrammatic indication of the components of the cost benefit analysis
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development studies regarding all aspects of the Industrial Areas (CC3). The sum of 
the three can be thought as the total development cost. The revenues in the 
central balance of costs come solely from the land sales (BC1). The land sold is clear 
industrial space being understandably of less usable surface area than that bought, 
allowance for infrastructure and open space being made.
These costs are mainly borne by the Programme agency, ETBA, with small 
support from the Greek State and the European Community. An outline of the costs 
structure of the Programme up to 1991 is given in Figure 7-9. Here the cost of 
land is assumed to be the net cost, that is land sales are subtracted from land 
purchases. The different stages of operational state of each Industrial Area can be 
discerned. Areas with small or zero net land cost are more mature; ones with 
higher proportions of costs for land, administration and studies are in the initial 
stages of operation.
Figures 7-10 and 7-11 illustrate the actual timing of the component 
costs as they occur in Thessaloniki and Volos for example. Throughout, the main 
costs are due to land and infrastructure with the costs incurred on studies and 
administration being considerably smaller. In the earlier period of evolution the costs 
incurred tend to be higher than in the later phases. The graphs illustrate the 
potential for variation between projects in the purchases and sales of land and in 
the timing of large capital expenditures on infrastructure. Figure 7-12 shows a 
comparison of the total costs incurred as they occurred in the six projects by the 
end Of 1991. In Thessaloniki it can be seen that the total costs peaked around 
1984-85 and then subsequently constantly but modestly declined to the present. 
In essence this is due to the fact that the provision of infrastructure was then 
complete and that land sales have been a feature of recent times. In contrast the 
graph for Patra shows a continuing upward trend in the project costs.
There could be perhaps a case for adding an additional social cost to some 
of the sources of the above finances. But the main financial sources of ETBA, 
besides its other activities as a bank, arise through internal loans via ETBA bonds. 
These are offered on free market basis and at competitive interest rates, thus 
they should not really be thought of causing an additional social burden. Additionally 
the Greek State gives some support to the development cost through the National 
Investments Programme financed from general taxation. Some support comes from 
European Community aid through the European Regional Development Fund and the 
Coordinated Programmes for Development. The amounts involved are small in 
relative terms because much of the Industrial Area development programme was 
started long before Greece’s entry into the Community. For these sorts of funding
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Figure 7-9: The structure of costs jn thejndustrial Areas from start to 1991
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Figure 7-11: R costs profile ouer time of the Industrial Area of Uolos
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it would be difficult to ascribe social costs. The component costs of each of the six 
Industrial Areas under consideration are shown in Figure 7-13, both in terms of 
absolute amounts given in million drachmas and the percentage of contribution of 
each source to the total for these six projects as a whole.
Overall then the efforts to promote regional development from central funds 
are perceived to be a national priority based on a subsidiary principle and also on 
national security grounds. They seemingly enjoy a nationwide consensus.
b. Social and regional balance.
Starting with the tangible costs, first are the Industrial Area’s running costs 
which mainly comprise costs of administration and infrastructure maintenance 
(CR1). A second group of costs arises from the locational incentives. The finances 
of this cost derive from state taxes and therefore should be added to the social 
costs incurred as they are not returned to the society in a wider sense but to 
certain private interests in the form of selected firms. Regional development 
incentives currently comprise of one-off grants, accelerated depreciation schemes, 
tax allowances and subsidies on loan interest rates for new or relocating firms. The 
Industrial Areas Programme is integrated into the national financial incentives 
scheme for investments in industry. Laws provide enhanced incentives for location 
within the Industrial Area compared to the respective surrounding region since 
1978 with Law 849/1978 and consequently through Law 1262/1982 and its 
successor 1892/1990. Thus, from 1978 onwards the portion of ‘enhancement’ 
should be attributed as a social cost to the project (CR2). Finally, there may be 
some regional environmental costs that occur in the recipient regions. These 
include some damage to natural landscapes and some environmental pollution that 
can be associated with the new economic activity (CR3).
The basic benefits to be found within the recipient regions or the society in 
general can be summarised as follows. They range from those that involve tangible 
income flows to those which are much more difficult to quantify. The main 
component of the former is new employment creation and its multiplier effects 
which can be estimated through the applicable regional salaries (BR1). There is also 
a welfare component transferred to the region through the salaries paid for the 
construction of the project's infrastructure (BR2). Furthermore there are some 
social benefits deriving from the income created from the salaries involved in the 
production of the studies for the Industrial Areas (BR3). Finally there are salaries 
that are paid within the region as part of the scheme’s running costs which include 
maintenance and administration tasks (BR4).
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Figure 7-13: The sources of funding of the Industrial Areas from start to 1991
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The Industrial Areas, besides having regional development aims, also serve as 
a decongesting factor for the large metropolis of Greece - Athens - and to a much 
lesser extent for Thessaloniki. The region of Athens (Attiki) accounted for some half 
the national industrial activity by the late seventies. This caused substantial 
infrastructure and environmental problems and subsequent costs. Any 
deconcentration due to the Industrial Areas Programme provides benefits to such 
regions. Social benefits experienced in congested regions arise from enhanced land 
use potential and de-congestion created due to the export of industry to the 
periphery (BR5), and a distinct benefit by way of environmental relief, especially as 
regards pollution, on central regions (BR6).
Additionally there are regional benefits which result from potential or actual 
land use improvements within the recipient regions (BR7). These arise from 
evacuation of industrial spaces that were previously occupied by industry in the 
region which is now relocating to the project. Furthermore properties (commercial 
and residential) in the region theoretically are supposed to increase their value as 
they become better serviced and as a result of increased demand promulgated 
through multipliers (BR8). Finally, there are other social benefits (BR9) deriving 
from sustenance of existing employment. Salaries are assumed to sustain local 
demand for goods and services, provide central and local income and produce 
consumption taxes. These enable the financing of other ‘commonly acceptable’ 
social projects, provide for savings or potential investments and sustain education 
levels. Parallel arguments can be developed which conclude that crime, poverty and 
degradation should also be reduced.
7.5.4 The settings for the costs and benefits calibrations
Given this specification of the costs and benefits of the Programme the next 
issue involves the assumptions of how the account can be calibrated. Table 7-6 
gives a summary of the settings to be used in this analysis.
To start with the benefits, four types of job generation can be distinguished 
within a project facilitating some induced employment demand. The first type is the 
straight forward creation of work places that did not exist before. Let the 
percentage of these of the total of new jobs be L I . These jobs sensibly should be 
accounted to the benefits of a project fully, that is by a weight factor w1=1. 
Second, there are jobs that are transferred to the project through the relocation 
of previously centrally located (non-assisted) firms (L2). These jobs are again 
sensibly accredited to the project, but still pose some small cost to the ‘central’ 
areas. This cost could be considered as amounting to some one fifth of a lost job,
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Table 7 -6  : The settings and assumptions for the cost -  benefit analysis o f the Industrial Rreas
V________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ /
Costs Settings
CC1 (land purchases)
CC2 (Infrastructure provision cost)
CC3 (studies cost)
CR1 (running cost)
CR2 (K) (regional investment/job) (all new jobs) K = Excessive aid (than regional) on investment in the Industrial Areas (after 1978) Value *  5%
CR3 (M) (net new jobs) (regional salary) (SC) M = Factor on regional salaries regarding cost due to environment degradation Value = 2%
SC = Social Coefficient ( on salaries ) Value *  40%
Benefits
BC1 (land sales)
BR1 (net new jobs) (multiplier) (regional salary) (SC) Multiplier (on employment) Value = 1.25
BR2 (V2) (infrastructure cost) (SC) V2= Percentage of salaries paid locally, on infrastructure cost Value *  40%
BR3 (V1) (studies costs) (SC) V1= Percentage of salaries paid, on studies cost Value = 75%
BR4 (V3) (running cost) (SC) V3= Percentage of salaries paid locally on running cost Value = 35%
BR5 (12) (all new jobs) (N) (regional salary) (SC) N= Factor on regional salaries regarding central benefit due to land use potential Value = 6%
BR6 (12) (all new jobs) (P) (regional salary) (SC) P=Factor on regional salaries regarding central benefit due to environment relief Value = 3%
BR7 (13) (all new jobs) (N) (regional salary) (SC) N = Factor on regional salaries, regarding benefit of land use potential Value = 5%
BR8 (R) (land sold) R= Factor on Industrial Areas land sales,rising aggregate regional properties value Value -  25%
BR9 (S) (net new jobs) (multiplier) (regional salary) S=» Factor on regional salaries for employment related benefits Value -  10%
Net new jobs = (all new jobs) (11 w1 +I2w2+I3w3)
11 = percentage of new created jobs w1 *  weight of an "11" job Value = 100%
12= percentage of relocating employment from central regions w2=» weight of an "12" job Value = 80%
13= percentage of internal relocating employment w3= weight of an "13" job Value = 25%
Social Discount Rate (annual) Value = 2%
and consequently these jobs are to be weighted by w2=0.8. Third, there are jobs 
attracted to the project from other assisted areas. These transfers are to be 
considered here as ‘random’, that is without rational explanation, since they could 
have been encapsulated in their original region's respective project, and 
bi-directional, thus creating net result of zero. (If there were clear indications for 
the existence some significant inter-regional trends of this kind these jobs should be 
accounted for, perhaps bearing some half the benefit of a new job.) Last, there are 
the jobs that already exist in the region which are simply transferred from out of 
the project into it (L3). These jobs should be accounted for positively since even 
this transfer can be considered desirable as land use aims may be achieved and 
better productivity result from a location within the industrial agglomeration. These 
jobs are here only weighted by w3 at one quarter of a new job. For the needs of 
the present cost-benefit analysis the distinction of the percentages L I, L2, L3 for 
the types of job generation in each of the six sites can only be based on research 
undertaken through questionnaires and vary among sites.
Firms that relocate to Industrial Areas in ‘remote’ regions sometimes find it 
more difficult to cooperate with the existing, older, supposedly complementary 
firms but of course some do. It can be assumed, consequently, that either other 
new firms are going to establish in the region to serve these new needs, or existing 
complementary firms grow. To the extent that these firms are not in the project 
area, and thus their growth not accounted for, it is reasonable to deploy an 
employment multiplier. This multiplier is to be applied to the net new employment, 
since the Intra-regional relocation of firms probably does not create additional 
effects. A more than usually modest plus 25 percent multiplier (1.25) is used here. 
This is low enough to account for any of the process being diverted out of the 
region, or for the servicing of firms from within the project and thus being directly 
accounted for.
Given the above methodology for estimating the employment generation, the 
salaries paid are the economic expression of the above effect and mainly comprise 
the regional benefit. Salaries can be accounted in full as regional benefits from one 
point of view. But also of course, salaries are the payment for work done by 
employees. This begs the question as to what extent is a salary a social benefit in 
addition to a compensation for the output or the task done? Employees producing 
nothing will soon find that they are receiving only unemployment benefit. To deduce 
the social benefit extent of salaries it can be assumed reasonably that 
compensation for the task done should be that part of the salary that exceeds the 
applicable unemployment benefit. Employees finding the compensation part of
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salaries too small for the job done would opt for unemployment benefit (given no 
alternative job). On this basis the social benefit part of a salary is the level of 
unemployment benefit applicable.
Based on the above rationale, and given that the employment benefit in 
Greece is some 40% of the ‘basic’ salary, the social benefit part of the salaries paid 
is to be measured at 40% of the ‘actual’ salaries paid in generated jobs. The 
‘actual’ salaries were chosen since it is anticipated that employees would have to 
feel rather seriously under-compensated for their performance to opt for 40% of 
the ‘basic’ salary as unemployment benefit. Thus, the social coefficient (benefit 
part) of the salaries is 40% for the analysis. In all cases the average regional salary 
in manufacturing is used.
Thus, benefits due to new jobs (BR1) are calculated as the net multiplied 
salaries in an Industrial Areas project, weighted by the social coefficient on salaries. 
Benefits due to salaries paid in the construction of infrastructure (BR2) are 
calculated assuming V2=40% (fraction of salaries in total infrastructure costs). 
The social coefficient on salaries is also applicable here. The social direct benefit due 
to the salaries involved in research and preparatory studies (BR3) uses VI =75% as 
the salaries fraction of the costs of studies together with the social coefficient on 
salaries. The benefits due to salaries paid as part of the running cost (BR4) assume 
V3=35% in a similar manner.
The indirect social benefit of land use potential (BR5) occurring in central, 
congested regions is measured using the L2 percentage of jobs relocated from 
central regions and an N=6% factor on salaries (using social coefficient) regarding 
the land use potential and decongestion. The calibration of the benefit of 
environmental relief of central areas (BR6) again uses the L2 percentage of jobs, 
social salaries and also the factor P=3% on social salaries regarding environmental 
relief. The land use social benefit occurring in regional areas (BR7) is calibrated at 
N=5% on regional social salaries. No multiplier is used since only employment actually 
transferred into an Industrial Area generates land use potential. Only the L3 
percentage of new jobs is accounted for here, that is the jobs relocated from 
within the same region. The benefits regarding increased property values (BR8) 
are, however calibrated with a multiplier effect. For each piece of land sold in the 
Industrial Area, it is argued, there is a demand for some additional industrial land 
(and housing) that is reflected in higher property values. The increase in prices of 
all other properties together is assumed to be R=25% of the price of land sold in 
Industrial Areas. Finally, the other social benefits related to employment (comprising 
BR9) provide an extra social welfare in the recipient regions estimated at S=10 %
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of net multiplied salaries.
The central costs CC1 to CC3 and the running cost of Industrial Areas 
(CR1) are used as they occur on an annual basis. They are standardised for 
inflation at constant 1988 prices as are all other prices used in the analysis. The 
state aid cost (CR2) is calibrated using a factor of aid additional to the standard 
amounts applicable to the region. This is K-5% on amount of investment in the 
Industrial Area multiplied by the regional investment per job ratio and by the 
number of the new jobs generated by the project. The cost of regional 
environmental degradation (CR3) is calibrated at M=2% of the net new salaries to 
the project adjusted by the social coefficient.
7.5.5 The balance procedures
The Industrial Areas Programme is a public policy for regional development. 
As it involves a transfer of resources from central locations (in Greece and the EC) 
to lagging regions the benefits and the costs should be compared at both national 
and regional levels using at equal weights and without distinction. No expectation of 
full returns at the national scale is realistic but net central costs can be compared 
with the results they bring forward. Net benefits thus are assumed to arise 
through various outcomes involving increased salaries and improved social welfare 
that occurs in a region as a result of the project which are over and above the 
overall costs of the provision and operation of the scheme. The aim of the analysis is 
to judge how efficiently the project funds were spent or, in other words, how 
cost-effective are the Industrial Areas in reaching their objective of regional 
development. The evaluation procedure is based on two different methods.
The first utilises one of the pay-back-type methods. These are useful in that 
they minimise the uncertainty that is associated with lengthy projections and 
difficulties related to the variable timing of projects. The method takes the total 
costs of the initial ‘x’ years of a project and calculates, given the estimated 
benefits stream, the number of years required from the date of initial operation to 
cover these costs. The pay-back period can be shown to be sensitive to varying 
discount rates.
The second is a full-life cost-benefit evaluation. This analyses how the 
benefits brought forward from each project compare with the costs of the project 
and is based on an assumed life cycle of each scheme. Such evaluation adds an 
extra dimension to the comparative performance estimations of the similar ages 
comparisons involved in the pay-back method above. The full impact can be seen 
through a critical view of what the position would be, in terms of net present value
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(NPV), at the end of the assumed full life cycle of each project. Additionally the 
internal rate of return (IRR) is produced for each project which provides an 
indication of the marginal efficiency of its capital. The life cycle evaluation attempts 
to simulate, logically, characteristics of the mature operation of the project after 
the completion of the basic investments and other initial costs. The model is based 
on the logical flow and timing of the various costs, including any social costs, and 
the various benefits that result. This method also permits the testing of the 
sensitivity of both the NPV and the IRR to the use of social or full salaries in the 
calculations. Additionally it also illustrates the sensitivity of the NPV to the 
variations in the social discount rate.
This way the foundations of a general benefit-cost analysis model have been 
set out. The model is suitable for evaluating industry-based assisted-area 
programmes which are typical of sub-national planning in many countries. The 
assumptions and operational definitions have been detailed as well as the data 
sources to be used in the analysis. The model is calibrated on a sample of projects 
formulated under the Industrial Areas Programme in Greece. The results are of 
course dependent on the way the evaluation model is calibrated and must be read 
in close conjunction with the general principles presented.
7.5.6 Evaluation of Industrial Areas using the pay-back of the
first V  operational years
a. Calibration of the method
This method is valuable because the six Industrial Areas examined are of 
different ages and consequently at different stages of maturity. By the end of 
1991 ages varied from 22 years (Thessaloniki and Volos), through 20 years for 
Iraklio, 13 years for Komotini, 12 years for Patra, to 10 years for Xanthi. This 
creates a problem of direct comparison amongst the six areas taking into account 
their full lives to the present. The problem stems basically from the timing of the 
expenditures on the various types of investments. Heavy financial deficits exist for 
the initial years due to unsold land. These are accompanied by substantial 
expenditures incurred by large construction works and studies’ costs. On reaching 
the years of mature operation, the land deficits tend to be recovered (Thessaloniki) 
or even income flows from land sales may occur (Volos). Such income from land can 
be set against the costs of the studies and the provision of infrastructure. As 
projects mature the latter tend to be covered by the former.
Given that the data used for costs are standardised for prices no inflation is
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involved. Initially the social discount rate is set to zero to show the pure monetary 
flows as they occur. The choice of the appropriate social discount rate (SDR) is 
problematic. The SDR of a project is usually set between the social time preference 
rate and the social opportunity cost. The social time preference rate is a discount 
rate which reflects the preferences of a society to consume now or later. Higher 
values reflect economic short-sightedness in demanding consumption now rather 
than later. Lower, sometimes zero, values are used for state investment projects. 
Social opportunity cost is a discount rate which reflects the real cost of a social 
investment and is related to the real returns that capital can command in the 
economy. In this case since the prices are standardised for inflation and the 
projects are in the public domain, no economic ‘myopia’ should be assumed; the 
social time preference rate is taken to be zero. Altruistically, and based on political 
sensitivities, this could even be thought of as negative. The social opportunity cost 
rate may be set at the leading, widely available, real interest rate for investments 
(nominal - inflation). This for Greece is rarely above 3 to 4%. Thus for the present 
analysis a 2% SDR is assumed.
Utilising the pay-back method for the first eight years, the structure of 
costs given in Table 7-7 was calculated. (It was assumed that the first substantive 
part of the life cycle of a project is complete in eight years. Additionally, the 
relative newness of three of the six projects (10-12 years) made the selection of a 
considerably longer costs-period problematic if projections were not to be used.)
A few years after their formation the different Industrial Areas start 
creating employment and related benefits while over the same period often 
considerable costs have mounted up. If the first ‘x’ accounting years were taken to 
be from the start date considerable differences would exist between the sites jn 
the accounted for operational years. Instead the pre-operation costs have been 
aggregated to be placed alongside those of the eight properly operational years. In 
this way the periods of comparison between the sites, although unequal in reality, 
were equal in terms of the ‘logical’ stages of project maturity and relevant costs.
b. The resulting costs and benefits over the first eight operational years
As outlined in Table 7-7 this methodology produces nine years of costs 
occurrence for Thessaloniki, Volos and Komotini, ten for Xanthi and Iraklio and 
eighteen for Patra. In Patra there was a considerable and costly delay in 
preparation and operationalisation which should be accounted for if the efficiency 
of the project is to be measured. Ten years of preparation costs with only minimal 
benefits surely pose social costs besides logistical ones. Besides, the aim of this
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Table 7-7: Pay-back of costs from start to 8th year of operation of each Industrial Rrea
Regions : Thessaloniki Volos Patra Iraklio Komotini Xanthi
Time Span of Costs : 9 years 9 years 18 years 10 years 9 years 10 years
Full salaries
Costs to 8th year of Operation -4803 -1423 -6169 -1730 -4172 -574
SDR OFF Operational Year to Recover Cost: 6 2 2 4 1 1 2 7 1 5
Balance1992 : 7207 5908 -1942 3125 -1301 -52
Costs to 8th year of Operation -7381 -2203 -7989 -2475 -5157 -671
SDR ON Operational Year to Recover Cost: 6 2 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 5
( *  2%  ) Balance! 992 : 8962 7875 -2932 3321 -1716 -63
Social salaries
Costs to 8th year of Operation -476! -1397 -6156 -1727 -4165 -572
SDR OFF Operational Year to Recover Cost: 1 6 6 6 1 1 8 7 1 4 7
Balance1992 : 1069 2156 -4196 623 -2889 -342
Costs to 8th year of Operation -7319 -2165 -7974 -2470 -5148 -668
SDR ON Operational Year to Recover Cost: 2 0 6 8 9 2 0 1 1 2 6 7
( = 2 % )  Balance! 9 9 2 : 532 2705 -5629 326 -3618 -400
Social discount rate for pav-back of initial 8-vear cost on vear 16
Full salaries SDR 2 3 . 6 % 5 8 . 2 % - 6 . 0 % 1 0 . 8 % - 1 4 . 0 % 2 . 5 %
rank: 2 1 5 3 6 4
Social salaries SDR 0 . 0 % 2 0 . 6 % - 1 6 . 0 % - 3 . 0 % - 2 5 . 0 % - 1 9 . 0 %
rank: 2 1 4 3 6 5
SDR = Social Discount Rate
particular test is to measure the initial ‘acceleration’ of the projects and not the 
full life cycle impact. Apart from this, a distinction was also made between the SDR 
turned ‘off’ at zero and ‘on’ at 2%. Lastly, since all prices are standardised to the 
1988 levels there is no difference between the timing of the value of the costs and 
benefits.
For the first part of the analysis the full salaries are used and the sensitivity 
which results from the SDR ‘on’ or ‘off’ is explored. The second part consequently 
assesses the pay-back periods if social salaries are assumed, again the SDR is either 
‘on’ or ‘off’. The third part seeks to assess the varying discount rates which are 
necessary for each Industrial Area to pay-back in a sixteen year period.
If full salaries are assumed and SDR is ‘off’, the project cost of Thessaloniki 
to the eighth operational year is 4803 million drachmas. Figures for the other 
projects are Volos 1423, Patra 6169, Iraklio 1730, Komotini 4172 and Xanthi 574. 
Projects then clearly have different costs and these are not only due to their 
different sizes. The cost of the Thessaloniki project is more than three times that 
of Volos, both sets of expenses having occurred at the same years, and the former 
is by no means three times as large. The difference is largely due to varying land 
prices. Of course differences in location influence the site's attractiveness and 
hence cost. Firms are prepared to incur higher costs if there is the potential to 
recover them through the additional opportunities that attractive places afford.
Having said that, the results shows that the benefits-stream created in 
Volos covers these costs in the second year of operation. In Thessaloniki this is not 
achieved until the sixth, and in Iraklio the eleventh, year. The small cost of 574 
million drachmas in Xanthi, however, will only be covered by the fifteenth year, while 
in the case of Patra the extensive cost will only be covered in operational year 24, 
and in Komotini in year 27. It is clear then that the attractiveness of projects, or 
the acceleration caused by the initial investment, are certainly affected by factors 
external to the project, most notably their location in the economic map of the 
country. Volos, being in a good strategic position in the centre of mainland Greece, 
covers cost in a fraction of the time they need to occur. Thessaloniki and Iraklio 
seem to cover the costs at more or less at the same pace they occur. Both are 
regional capitals with extended economic hinterlands, Thessaloniki serving all 
Macedonia, and Iraklio dominating the large island of Kriti. The case of Patra is 
unfortunate. The large accumulated costs of the project cannot be offset by the 
average economic acceleration it has stimulated.
The cases of Komotini and Xanthi are two opposites that may happen in 
remote regions. In Xanthi too small an investment has not created the impact
289
needed to cover even its very moderate outlays. In Komotini the initial investment 
has proved to be far too high. It was an investment of the same order of that for 
Thessaloniki, for a town twenty times smaller. Although results for the region may 
be encouragingly positive the project’s cost effectiveness seems to fall behind the 
standards set elsewhere.
The second part of the full salaries’ analysis assumes a SDR of 2% per annum 
as explained above. Thus, assuming full salaries and setting the SDR ‘on’, Iraklio 
appears totally insensitive with costs still recovered by year 11. Volos and 
Thessaloniki prove equally insensitive. These three examples have the feature that 
there is little if any lag between the timing of costs occurrence and cost recovery. 
In other words they provide a rapid economic acceleration to the recipient regions. 
Under these assumptions Patra shifts costs recovery to year 32 (from 24), 
showing that the benefits occurred considerably later than the investment. Costs 
recovery for the small investment in Xanthi remains at year 15, while the discount 
rate of 2% pushes back the recovery at Komotini to 33 years.
If social salaries are assumed, that is if the social coefficient is set ‘on’, the 
picture changes dramatically. With the SDR ‘off’, Volos proves to be the only 
project to cover its costs at a faster pace than their occurrence, that is by year 
six. Thessaloniki shifts to year 16 and Iraklio to year 18. Thessaloniki then proves 
more sensitive than Iraklio to the effect of the social coefficient, since it shifts the 
period of recovery (6 to 16) 2.7 times, while the shift in Iraklio is only 1.6 times (11 
to 18 years). Increased sensitivity to the changed social coefficient shows first, 
that returns (or benefits) are more salary oriented than land-value oriented, and 
second, that the employment generation rate of return can be slow and over the 
long term.
Patra, with the social coefficient ‘on’, shifts its costs recovery period to 61 
years (2.5 times greater than without the coefficient). This shows that, however 
substantial any employment effect may be, initial delays push the costs recovery 
time far into the future. Even better employment effects result in the two distant 
but neighbouring regions of Xanthi and Komotini. Xanthi needs 47 years to recover 
costs (a shift of 3.1) and Komotini some 71 years (a shift of 2.6). The shows that 
although Xanthi seems to be recovering costs faster due to initial land sales, 
Komotini is creating employment at higher rates and is thus less sensitive to the 
social coefficient.
If, in addition to the social salaries coefficient, the SDR is set ‘on’ then the 
costs recovery periods may be influenced. Volos, however, remains at 6 years, that 
is costs recovery still is achieved prior to the cost generating period. Iraklio, under
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these circumstances, manages to match Thessaloniki, due to land gains and 
accelerated employment, in producing a 20 years repayment period. Patra 
unfortunately moves to a distant 89 year period. Xanthi needs 67 years to cover 
the small initial outlay, and Komotini is beyond hope in need of 112 years to recover 
costs. To continue comparison of Xanthi and Komotini, it shows again that even if 
employment trends are better in Komotini, the high start-up costs structure of the 
project is a great burden when discount rates start operating.
The final part of the pay-back evaluation method seeks the social interest 
rate needed for a repayment (in terms of social benefits) period of sixteen years. 
The sixteen years period was selected as being a socially reasonable average of the 
various repayment periods of the projects considered.
If full salaries are assumed and the SDR is ‘off’, Volos fulfills the requirement 
on the basis of a massive 58.2% annual discount rate, Thessaloniki achieves 23.6%, 
Iraklio 10.8% and Xanthi only 2.5%. These four could be regarded from one point of 
view as socially acceptable as they all are above the 2% social discount rate. Patra, 
however, requires a negative rate (subsidy) of 6% and Komotini a negative annual 
rate of 14%. Patra’s delays and Komotini's experiment are seemingly socially 
unacceptable, needing vast social subsidy to recover their basic costs in 16 years.
If the social salary is used, Volos survives requiring a 20.6% annual discount 
rate while Thessaloniki stands at zero. Iraklio requires a marginally negative 3.0%. 
Even this last example could be thought as acceptable in a sense. Patra, however, is 
down to minus 16%, and this is somewhat better than Xanthi at minus 19% and 
Komotini at minus 25%. The more developed potential of employment generation in 
Patra tends to recover the lost time compared to the limited potential of remote 
regions.
Figure 7-14 shows the effects that the SDR has on the periods needed by 
each project to pay-back costs up to the eighth operational year. For full salaries 
Patra and Komotini seem to be able to pay-back expenditures in a reasonable 
period of time only under zero discount rate. For these two examples a small 
positive SDR is enough to make the pay-back period likely to be regarded as 
overlong. Xanthi survives due to a beneficial land sale in early period. But when 
social salaries are used Xanthi loses this advantage and joins Patra and Komotini. 
The projects seem to form two groups. The first shows better performance and 
consists of Volos, Iraklio and Thessaloniki in order of success. These are the older 
projects that were mainly developed in the seventies. The second group (Xanthi, 
Patra and Komotini) were accelerated in the eighties. The national and international 
economic conditions of the two periods are not unimportant in this respect.
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Figure 7-14 : Pay-back year sensitiuities to uariations in the social discount rate for Industrial 
Hreas, using full salaries and social salaries
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A first conclusion from the above ‘pay-back’ years analysis is that 
investment in remote areas is difficult to recover fast. If the initial investment is too 
large for the regional potential, or even if it is too small to have some substantial 
range of impact, difficulties are likely to ensue. Finally, delays in construction and 
organisation are often irrecoverable as regards cost-effectiveness measurements. 
This is not to deny that the regional employment effects are usually positive, but it 
does indicate that in some cases such spending is not socially optimal.
7.5.7 The full life-cycle evaluation of the Industrial Areas
a. Calibration of the method
The basic idea of this method is to define the costs and benefits that have 
occurred by the time each project reaches its full operation stage, and then to 
project the subsequent benefits stream either to infinity or to a more realistic 
finite horizon. The main difficulty with type of approach is that it involves 
projections of different magnitudes for different future time periods for each 
Industrial Area.
The projections of benefits, and specifically those resulting from new 
employment creation, pose difficulties because the influences of wider forces, 
regional, national and even international, need to be understood. The availability of 
markets, the state of technology used and more generally the nature of 
international competitiveness of the accommodated manufacturing all are relevant 
to future employment prospects. To the extent that the Industrial Area can only 
represent a small portion of regional manufacturing, it is possible that the Industrial 
Area might well achieve rapid rates of growth benefiting land-use planning and 
producing new jobs while manufacturing generally in the region is in decline. As time 
proceeds the new jobs component could be more or less dependent on only 
intra-regional relocation. In order to operationalise the model a standard and 
consistent proportion of externally attracted growth has to be assumed. This 
fraction varies from project to project and is defined by field research. The extent 
to which employment growth in the comprehensive national Industrial Areas 
Programme exceeds the national growth rates gives a hint of the level of 
inter-regional relocation that helps regional policy but the overall effects might be 
small and national growth may well be different. Given these difficulties the 
projections of benefit streams made for the years after 1992 simply follow the 
1984-1992 trends.
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The projections of costs also pose difficulties and these arise because 
different stages of project maturity necessitate different ways of handling 
expected future cost streams. This can only be done arbitrarily for the ‘younger’ 
projects and should follow some average experience based on the relevant parts of 
the life cycles of ‘older’ projects.
The scope of the method is to compare the net present value (NPV), the 
internal rate of return (IRR) and other indices of each project through a generally 
applicable model. The logic of the full life-cycle cost-benefit analysis can be seen in 
Figure 7-15. Here the cost-benefit streams are divided into three groups, 
according to the bearer and their timing. These are respectively the net central 
costs that accumulate to the full operation stage (FOS) date, the net 
social/regional costs or benefits to the FOS date, and the net social/regional 
benefits that are expected after the FOS date until the end of the evaluation 
period. Both the FOS date and the full life-cycle period are defined subsequently.
The total development costs stream is the sum of the costs of land 
purchases and infrastructure provision and these are shown in Figure 7-16. 
Inspection of these graphs shows that some types of development costs for some 
projects have already been completed. For analytical purposes assume that the 
mature operation stage (MOS) be the year of the completion of the development 
works. This should occur some years after the land purchases stop. In order
to project the likely full development costs in each Industrial Area where these are 
not yet complete the following method was employed. An index was constructed of 
how much investment in infrastructure is poured onto a certain value of bought 
land. This land development index is calibrated on the experience of land purchases 
and relevant infrastructure costs in the Industrial Areas where this has already 
occurred. The land development index for Thessaloniki is 1.625, that is 
infrastructure costs 1.625 times the value of land. For Volos it is 2.09, Iraklio 5.33, 
and for Komotini it is 6.5. There is an explanation for the increased index for the 
more peripheral regions. First, land is cheaper in general in the periphery. Second, 
such land is usually more poorly served by existing basic infrastructure which in 
turn has to be provided in full. Development of the land purchases then usually 
proves more costly in more peripheral regions.
Utilising these ideas an estimate can be made for the incomplete project of 
Patra. A ratio of 3.5 is assumed and this lies between that of Volos and Iraklio. Thus 
the development of the 1700 million drachmas worth of land bought that up till now 
amounts to some 4750 million drachmas of infrastructure spending which is 
expected to reach some 5900 million drachmas by the completion of the MOS in
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1995. The same method estimates that the completion of the infrastructure 
provision in Xanthi will cost some six times the value of the land bought. Thus it shall 
exceed the 330 million drachmas spent by 1991 and reach some 1000 million at 
the MOS in 2006. Thessaloniki can be regarded as having finished the infrastructure 
provision since 1984 (MOS). Komotini’s infrastructure was complete by 1988 
(MOS). Volos, with the late land purchases of some 250 million drachmas in 
1987-88, given its own land development index, needs some additional 500 million 
drachmas for extra infrastructure development. This would raise the 
infrastructure cost from the stabilised 2400 million drachmas to some 2900 million 
by 1994 (MOS). Finally, Iraklio, should complete the infrastructure spending in 1993 
(MOS).
Given these estimations the central total development costs the projects 
reach the MOS benchmark and stop increasing. Of course for a full stabilisation of 
the net central cost to occur land sales have first to settle down. The following 
assumption has been adopted in this respect. For each Industrial Area after the 
respective MOS year any land sales are to take place within an assumed period of 
ten years. This time period then defines the FOS of each project. The assumption is 
based on the notion that opportunities for firms to relocate are always increasing 
in space. Any comparative advantage of a newly constructed Industrial Area might 
be expected to last say for ten further years after firms first started to locate 
there. It should be noted that most land is sold before the full completion of the 
infrastructure provision, so ten years after the MOS stage the chances are that all 
the land has been sold. If after ten years there is still land unsold it can be assumed 
that it is defective in some way. Even if it is subsequently sold it is likely that it would 
be for the secondary uses of existing firms rather than for new relocations and 
consequent employment.
The net central costs at the FOS are estimated as the total development 
costs that are fixed after the MOS (by definition) minus the stream of returns from 
land sales projected to reach the FOS.
But the really important question is to what extent do the above costs 
create regional and social benefits? To approach this question the following 
procedure was adopted. Some costs and benefits are constructed to be linked to 
the growth of the Industrial Area and these extend to the FOS date. Following from 
this there are costs and benefits that are tied to the maintenance of the Industrial 
Area operation itself. These extend from the FOS date to the end of the evaluation 
period of the project.
In terms of regional/social costs, state aid to the newly establishing or in
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situ expanding firms is regarded a cost that extends to the FOS date and not after. 
The second component is the running cost of the Industrial Area itself. This 
comprises a projection of the actual running costs trend up to the FOS year which 
then remains at a constant level for the life of the project.
As for regional/social benefits, land use returns are calculated up to the 
FOS year. This is because, after the last establishment joins the Industrial Area, no 
further land use benefits occur in the region or elsewhere as a result of the 
project. Increases in property values also occur only until the FOS year in that no 
further additional demand for space is initiated in the region due to the project.
The benefits from salaries are assumed to reflect the social benefit 
component only. This assumption means that the benefits’ stream estimate is at a 
minimum as was discussed earlier. Salary benefits are calculated incrementally, 
benefits are based on the new employment created in each year until the FOS. 
Where employment projections are required to reach the FOS year these are 
developed from the previous employment trends within the Industrial Area together 
with land sales projections and their estimated employment per unit land. The 
benefits due to salaries based on studies and infrastructure construction expire at 
the MOS year of complete infrastructure provision. Benefits of salaries included in 
the running costs apply until the FOS year.
The regional benefits after the FOS stem only from the estimated basic 
employment. Benefits for this period derive from the sustenance due to the 
employment. This comprises the ‘saved’ unemployment benefits, the part of taxes 
paid due to salaries that finance other beneficial social projects, and other social 
benefits related to the sustenance of employment, such as savings or investments, 
better education, lower crime, etc. (The theory that theft increases social welfare, 
if decreasing marginal utility of capital/property is assumed, is not accepted in this 
analysis!). All the above benefits are compounded to some 40% of the regional 
salary. These benefits are assumed to accrue until the end of the evaluation period 
of the project. The full evaluation period is assumed to be 100 years from the 
project's operation date. In reality the remaining years from the FOS to the end of 
the evaluation period vary and are of the order of some 70 years. (A full evaluation 
period of 60 years is also tested finally).
The net social/regional benefit (after FOS) is constructed as the benefits 
from salaries less the project running costs over the long term period. The overall 
assessment is produced as follows:
The net central costs and the net social/regional (pre-FOS) costs and benefits are 
compounded to the FOS year with the terminal value formula:
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x [ (  l + i ) t - i  ] / i
where X is the average annual stream of each cost or benefit, t is the number of 
years concerned and i is the SDR.
The net social/regional benefits (after FOS) are discounted to the FOS year using 
the present value formula:
X [ i - ( i + j ) - t ] / j
where the terms are as above.
Initially the SDR is set to zero to show the purely mechanistic results of each 
project. The choice of the appropriate discount rate was then treated following 
the rationale as described in the ‘pay-back’ method above. This involves a 
compromise between social time preference and social opportunity cost and is 
again assessed as a 2% SDR (a 6% SDR is also tested). A full sensitivity analysis using 
different discount rates from zero to eighteen percent was produced.
b. The resulting costs and benefits calculated over the full life-cycle
First, the central balance (net central costs) are assessed. The components 
of the net central costs’ paths are illustrated in Figures 7-17 to 7-22 for 
Thessaloniki, Volos, Iraklio, Patra, Komotini and Xanthi respectively. All use a zero 
SDR to show unbiased monetary trends (standardised 1988 prices). It should be 
noticed that the development costs stop at the MOS, while the net cost starts 
decreasing from that point due to land sales until the FOS year. Central costs 
terminate at the FOS year.
It can be seen from the graphs and from Table 7-8 that for Thessaloniki 
the net central cost at the FOS is some 8364 million drachmas. For Volos it is 1444 
million, Iraklio 2565 million, Patra 5658 million, Komotini 3434 million and for Xanthi 
the net central cost is 1113 million drachmas. In the light of these results it would 
appear that the Industrial Area of Thessaloniki is an expensive project for the 
central authorities. This is also most certainly the case for Patra and to a lesser 
extent Komotini. The project in Volos on the other hand looks like an extremely 
economical one and the same can be said for Iraklio.
Second, the regional/social balance is assessed. The net regional/social 
costs’ or benefits’ paths up to the FOS are also shown in Figures 7-17 to 7-22 
for the same sample of projects. The results are again shown at zero SDR and can 
also be seen in summary form in Table 7-8. Thessaloniki at 3062 million drachmas, 
Volos 929 million and Xanthi some 27 million all show a net benefit. The other 
Industrial Areas produce net social costs up to the FOS and these mainly derive 
from the large cost of state aid. The actual figures are for Komotini -229 million
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Figure 7-17: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social 
benefits for the Industrial Brea of Thessaloniki
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Figure 7-18: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social 
benefits for the Industrial Brea of Uolos __ _________
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Figure 7-19: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social
benefits fo r the Industrial Rrea of iraklio
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Figure 7-20: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social
benefits for the Industrial Brea of Patra
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Figure 7-21: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social
benefits for the Industrial Rrea of Komotini
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Figure 7-22: The composition ouer time of a. the net central cost and b. the net regional/social
benefits for the Industrial Rrea of Xanthi
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drachmas, Iraklio -668 million and Patra some -754 million.
The projected benefits stream after the FOS is defined as the benefits from 
salaries minus the Industrial Area running costs. These are based on the estimated 
FOS employment of each project and the level of regional salaries. For the 100 
years of operation tested here, it can be seen in Table 7-8 that Thessaloniki 
produces the largest net benefit overall and this amounts to some 198762 million 
drachmas. Volos is ranked second with 157172 million, Iraklio follows at 78961 
million, Patra is next with 73807 million, Komotini only manages 45715 million and 
Xanthi comes last with 14539 million drachmas.
The above net values do span long period of time and thus it does make 
sense to use a SDR. The value as discussed before is 2% and the results that this 
level produces are given in Table 7-9. First, the net present values at the FOS are 
calculated. The ranking of the NPV at the FOS for each project produces the same 
result as for the non-discounted calculations. The problem with these results is 
that, although they relate to the same logical point in the life cycle of each project, 
they do refer to different years in reality. Thus the NPV of each project is 
accordingly discounted to a selected and consistent year (1992) producing 
comparable results in same year money terms. Again for this the NPV ranking is the 
same as before but the quantities are smaller.
A further index is constructed to show another aspect of the projects’ 
performance. This is the net present value of benefits divided by net central costs 
(NPV/NCC). This index signifies for a given level of central deficit how much net 
social benefit occurs. The index is sometimes formulated as the net benefit over 
investment, but here, given that only part of the investment is actually recovered, 
interest is focused on the actual deficit or net transfer of resources to the region. 
The index is stable when comparing Industrial Areas for the FOS year and for 1992 
and is clearly not affected by the variable length of discounting taking place. 
However the index does produce a different ranking for the projects to that 
previously observed. It brings Volos into the first place, with net benefits 54.25 
times the size of the central net transfer to the region. Second in rank comes 
Iraklio, with 15.74 times. Thessaloniki is in this case only third with a leverage of 
14.24 times. Komotini follows with a ratio of 8.61 in front of Patra and Xanthi with 
multipliers of 7.34 and 6.04 respectively.
Table 7-10 further explores the sensitivities of the choice of appropriate 
SDR this time using a rate of 6 percent which may be the highest possible social 
opportunity cost, always cleared of inflation. The NPV of the Industrial Areas 
change in money terms again, and the ranking shows one difference for the 1992
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Table 7-8: Full life-cycle costs and benefits for each Industrial Rrea,
using zero discount rate
Constant Prices (1988). in million drachmas.
Timing
Net
Net central social/regional 
benefit benefit Employment
(until FOS) (until FOS) (at FOS)
Operation 1981 
XANTHI FOS: 2016 -1113
Horizon 2081 
Salary: 1.0573
Operation 1978 
KOMOTINI FOS: 1998 -3434
Horizon 2078 
Salary: 0.9667
Operation 1979 
PATRA FOS: 2005 -5658
Horizon 2079 
Salary: 1.4094
Operation 1971 
IRAKLIO FOS: 2003 -2565
Horizon 2071 
Salary: 1.1794
Operation 1969 
VOLOS FOS: 2004 -1444
Horizon 2069 
Salary: 1.4015
Operation 1969 
THESSALONIKI FOS: 1994 -8364
Horizon 2069 
Salary: 1.2595
27
-229
-754
-668
929
3062
573
1628
1954
2587
4339
6205
Full
Net regional Project 
benefit net 
after FOS benefit
Rank
15625 14539 6
49378 45715 5
80219 73807 4
82195 78961 3
157686 157172 2
204064 198762 1
Operation: Year of project's first operation 
FOS : Full operational stage
Horizon : End of evaluation period (100 operational years)
Salary : Variable full regional salary ( in the evaluation the social part of this is used, that is 40%)
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Table 7 - 9 :  Full l i fe -c y c le  costs and b e n e f i ts  o f  each In d u s t r ia l  R rea,
using a social d iscount r a t e  o f  2%
Constant Prices (1988), in million drachmas. 
Present Ualues a t FOS uear
Net central 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net social 
/regional 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net regional 
benefit 
after FOS
Full
project
net
benefit
Rank
NPV/NCC 
index Rank
XANTHI -1590 39 11160 9609 6 6.04 6
KOMOTINI -4172 -278 40370 35920 5 8.61 4
PATRA -7327 -976 62080 53776 4 7.34 5
IRAKLIO -3545 -924 60280 55812 3 15.74 2
VOLOS -2063 1328 112627 111892 2 54.25 1
THESSALONIK -10716 3924 159361 152569 1 14.24 3
Present llalues at 1992
Net central 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net social 
/regional 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net regional 
benefit 
after FOS
Full
project
net
benefit
Rank
NPV/NCC 
index Rank
XANTHI -1253 30 8795 7572 6 6.04 6
KOMOTINI -3895 -260 37689 33534 5 8.61 4
PATRA -6396 -852 54193 46944 4 7.34 5
IRAKLIO -3154 -822 53632 49656 3 15.74 2
VOLOS -1818 1170 99256 98608 2 54.25 1
THESSALONIK -10403 3809 154705 148111 1 14.24 3
FOS : Full operation stage 
NPV : Net present value 
NCC : Net central cost
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Table 7 -1 B: Full life-cycle costs and benefits o f each Industrial Area, 
using a social discount ra te  o f 6%
Constant Prices (1988), in million drachmas.
Present llalues a t FOS uear
Net central 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net social 
/regional 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net regional 
benefit 
after FOS
Full
project
net
benefit
Rank
NPV/NCC 
index Rank
XANTHI -3544 86 6472 3015 6 0.85 6
KOMOTINI -6316 -421 28318 21581 5 3.42 4
PATRA -12873 -1716 40119 25530 4 1.98 5
IRAKLIO -7285 -1898 36176 26993 3 3.71 3
VOLOS -4597 2959 65319 63681 2 13.85 1
THESSALONIK -18355 6721 104345 92710 1 5.05 2
Present Ualues at 1992
Net central 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net social 
/regional 
benefit 
(until FOS)
Net regional 
benefit 
after FOS
Full
project
net
benefit
Rank
NPV/NCC 
index Rank
XANTHI -1853 45 3385 1576 6 0.85 6
KOMOTINI -5176 -345 23208 17687 4 3.42 4
PATRA -8766 -1168 27320 17385 5 1.98 5
IRAKLIO -5224 -1361 25938 19353 3 3.71 3
VOLOS -3212 2067 45636 44491 2 13.85 1
THESSALONIK -16826 6161 95653 84987 1 5.05 2
FOS : Full operation stage 
NPV : Net present value 
NCC : Net central cost
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base. There is a shift of Patra to fifth place with Komotini moving to fourth. (The 
switch actually occurs at a SDR of 5.88%). The reason for this is that Patra 
reserves the bulk of its benefits for the later stages in its life-cycle compared to 
the early rapid growth of Komotini. Interestingly with an SDR of 6% the ranking 
according to the NPV/NCC index is much the same as that based on the NPV, with 
the only exception being the switch of Thessaloniki and Volos for first place. It will 
be recalled that in the case of the 2% SDR example there was marked variation in 
the rankings produced by the NPV and the NPV/NCC measures.
Consequently, a full sensitivity analysis for discount rates ranging from zero 
to 18% is shown in Figure 7-23. This shows that Thessaloniki generates higher 
NPV than Volos from zero up to some 14.8% of SDR. Above this level Volos produces 
the highest NPV until it becomes zero and beyond. Patra and Iraklio seem to have 
much the same sensitivity to discount rates and are overtaken in terms of NPV by 
Komotini at 5.9 and 6.9%. Komotini maintains its third ranking behind Volos and 
Thessaloniki until its NPV becomes zero. It does manage to produce a smaller 
negative NPV than Thessaloniki at higher discount rates. Xanthi is last ranked and 
produces a negative NPV after only 7.9% SDR. Patra and Iraklio are also overtaken 
at some 11 % SDR by Xanthi, but at these levels all three have negative NPV.
Figure 7-23 also gives details of the IRR in each of the six Industrial Areas. 
This is the marginal efficiency of capital investment, or put another way, the 
interest rates at which the NPV of each project becomes zero. Net present values 
beyond the IRR are negative. This occurs precisely at 17.7% for Volos, 15.7% for 
Thessaloniki, 13.9% for Komotini, 10.6/Tor Iraklio, 10.2% for Patra and finally at 
7.9% for Xanthi.
A similar IRR can be produced from completely different types of projects. 
Komotini and Thessaloniki may have similar IRR but the slopes of the paths followed 
to them are much different as can be seen from the illustration. The slope shows 
how early or late in the life of a project the main benefits have occurred. A less 
steep slope at increasing levels of SDR means that the bulk of the returns have 
been produced early in the life of the project. A steeper slope reflects a project 
with returns more evenly spread over time or arising later in the life of the project. 
The latter type of project is much favoured as regards NPV if lower or even zero 
SDR are used as is often the case with public schemes. It is not difficult to deduce 
from two paths originating from the same point on the horizontal interest rates 
axis (IRR) that the one with the steepest slope produces a higher NPV at lower SDR.
Finally, an alternative test for a full life period of sixty operational years 
instead of the assumed one hundred was also carried out. This, of course,
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Figure 7-23: Net present ualue sensitiuity to uarying social discount rates for each Industrial Rrea 
a. full spectrum of sensitiuities b. focus on the internal rates of return (million drachmas)
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Table 7-11: Break-euen year and present ualues of net benefit o f the Industrial Rreas, at uarious periods and SDR
( in millions of drachmas, standardized for 1988)
Industrial Year of Year of Year of Years needed Years needed Result for Result for
Area operation FOS Break-even for Break-even 
from year of 
operation
for Break-even 
from FOS
60 years 
of operation 
(NPV 1992)
100 years 
of operation 
(NPV 1992)
XANTHI
SDR=0 1981 2016 2021 40 5 4924 14539
SDR=2% 1981 2016 2025 44 9 2160 7572
SDR=6% 1981 2016 2051 70 35 -968 1576
KOMOTINI
SDR=0 1978 1998 2004 26 6 21026 45715
SDR=2% 1978 1998 2007 29 9 14690 33534
SDR=6% 1978 1998 2018 40 20 11885 17687
PATRA
SDR=0 1979 2005 2011 32 6 30445 73807
SDR=2% 1979 2005 2015 36 10 17651 46944
SDR=6% 1979 2005 2032 53 27 2168 17385
IRAKLIO
SDR=0 1971 2003 2011 40 8 30612 82195
SDR=2% 1971 2003 2015 44 12 18018 49656
SDR=6% 1971 2003 2021 50 18 4096 19353
VOLOS
SDR=0 1969 2004 2005 36 1 60134 157172
SDR=2% 1969 2004 2005 36 1 37527 98606
SDR=6% 1969 2004 2006 37 2 16407 44491
THESSALONIKI
SDR=0 1969 1994 1996 27 2 89928 198762
SDR=2% 1969 1994 1998 29 4 65602 148111
SDR=6% 1969 1994 2003 34 9 33972 84987
FOS= Full Operational Stage SDR= Social discount rate 
NPV= Net present value
decreased the NPV the projects deliver. For the sixty operational years, at zero 
and 2% of SDR all projects’ NPV are positive and ranking is the same with the one 
hundred years appraisal. At the highest 6% though, faster accelerated Komotini 
gives higher NPV than Patra, while Xanthi gives negative NPV. Details are given in 
Table 7-11.
The same table shows the years needed for coverage of the full projects' 
outlays, or the break - even year of their life-cycles. It is tested for zero, 2% and 
6% SDR and is measured in two ways. First, in years needed after FOS, that is after 
the full operation stage, and second, in years needed after the first operation 
date. Here Volos breaks even in one to two years after FOS for zero to 6% SDR 
respectively; Thessaloniki in 2 to 9 years, Iraklio in 8 to 18 years, Komotini in 6 to 
20 years, Patra in 6 to 27 years and Xanthi in 5 to 35 years. If break-even is 
calculated from first operation date, all regions break even earlier than the sixty 
years limit and for all SDR up to 6%, with the exception of Xanthi, which at 6% 
would need 70 years.
7.5.8 Conclusions from the benefit - cost appraisal
Some preliminary judgements about the cost effectiveness of the 
performance of the six Industrial Areas sampled has already been made on the basis 
of the first ‘x’ operational years pay-back methodology. The last part of the 
analysis permits some more general judgements to be made when considering the 
full life-cycle of the projects. All of the Industrial Areas sampled produce a positive 
NPV when their costs and benefits are calculated over their full life cycles. Using a 
2% SDR, returns on central financial transfers to the receiving region range from 6 
to 16 times that provided, except in the case of the Industrial Area in Volos where 
the return is a massive 54 times that expended. Even with the higher 6% SDR all 
Industrial Areas maintain a positive NPV from their cost and benefit streams. Net 
present values start becoming negative at discount rates of 7.9% for Xanthi and 
not until at 17.7% for Volos, for the standard 100 operational years evaluation.
Volos is a model example of an Industrial Area from this evaluation stance. It 
produces both high NPV and can endure high discount rates. This means that it can 
be thought of as a most profitable social investment. Thessaloniki does manage to 
produce the highest quantity of benefits but these prove more costly to the 
operator and also provide lower returns on capital expended. Iraklio also appears to 
come out well from this type of evaluation. As regards the index which measures 
the net present value of benefits per unit of net central costs, it is second only to 
Volos at the lower interest rates as it shows rapid growth in the early stages. This
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is just what peripheral regions need given the present limited availability of public 
funds. Patra shows a larger potential to realise benefits in the later development 
stages so producing a much larger NPV than either Komotini or Xanthi and matching 
Iraklio. However this is achieved at double the cost of Iraklio. The opposite is the 
position with Komotini which has rapid early growth and proves to be the least 
sensitive of the Industrial Areas to rising discount rates. This is so much so that it 
even overtakes Iraklio as regards NPV at discount rates above 7% and Patra above 
6%. These effects do however seem to ease at later stages. The project at Xanthi 
did give a push to the region in the early stages but seems not to show much future 
potential. It is somewhat sensitive to the social discount rate but, notwithstanding 
this, the NPV it produces is by far the lowest. At the higher 6% SDR the NPV of 
benefits may be positive but they are smaller in magnitude than the net transfer to 
the region and in this sense and in these circumstances Xanthi is the only project of 
those considered here that should be regarded as unsuccessful, but only failing the 
more strict sixty-years, 6% SDR test.
From this analysis it can be seen that of those Industrial Areas which are 
peripheral (excluding Thessaloniki) the ones located near larger agglomerations 
eventually have greater potential. Those near smaller cities seem to produce rapid 
early growth but generate lesser potential over the longer term (Komotini, Xanthi). 
It would appear that the simulation of agglomeration economies by the Industrial 
Area seems to be adequate for a good start but the wider economic forces of 
polarisation and centralisation prove difficult to overcome in the longer term. Still 
though, the projects are profitable in societal terms, some very much so, and of 
course help provide some modest solutions to the employment and land use 
problems of the peripheral regions as demonstrated by this research.
7.6  Conclusions on the evaluation of the effects of the 
Industrial Areas policy
This part summarises the main outcomes of the multiple analyses carried out 
in this chapter on the effectiveness of the policy of the Industrial Areas.
From the time - series analysis it was shown that the five regions with older 
established Industrial Area projects were growing faster than eleven younger 
Industrial Area regions. Even the latter are growing somewhat faster than the 
average for Greece, and Greece is growing faster than the non-industrial Area
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regions group. Second, the counterfactual that the time series provided showed 
that the Industrial Area regions, though growing faster, they decreased their 
speed during the development of the policy. While it would be misleading to assume 
that the policy was unsuccessful, the method's results need careful interpretation. 
Factors external to the model that change with time, such as regional economic 
circumstances and policy timing, along with national and international, are not 
considered.
The cross sectional evaluation procedure more precisely examined the role 
that the Industrial Areas play within the recipient regions. First, it was found that in 
most cases the Industrial Areas clusters grow faster than their respective regions 
and play a leading role in the regional employment growth. Second, had the 
Industrial Areas not been in these regions, the regions would be largely worse off in 
employment terms. In only a few cases, especially in fast growing regions and/or 
periods, did the Industrial Areas not play a leading role. This might be explained by 
the tendency in periods of rapid expansion for firms to avoid establishing in the 
Industrial Areas because of delays and obedience to rules that may be involved. 
Much 'occasional' employment in 'booming' regions/periods tends to disappear in 
recession times, while firms in the Industrial Areas tend to be more stable. There is 
an indication of better competitiveness of these firms and this acts as a regional 
'insurance policy’ for the periods of decline.
As regards the industrial specialisations that are attracted to the Industrial 
Areas, taking advantage of them, it can be seen that they are rather of the heavy 
industry type, certainly by Greek standards. The labour intensive, and fast growing 
sectors do not seem to be preferentially benefiting from the Programme. This may 
be due to the low level of facilities and services offered at the moment, even in large 
and thriving Industrial Areas. The answers of the firms in the field survey give the 
clues to the above, and to the way the Industrial Areas can create and sustain 
growth for the years to come to the benefit of both the regions and the country.
Finally, the cost-effectiveness of the Industrial Areas was analysed in the 
cost-benefit analysis section. Projects have different costs often not only due to 
their different sizes, but also to the land prices of each place and time period and 
the efficiency of their construction proceedings, that vary. Analysis showed that 
the Industrial Areas form two groups. The first shows better performance than the 
second, and consists of Volos, Iraklio and Thessaloniki. They happen to be the older 
projects that were mainly developed in the seventies. The second group (Xanthi, 
Patra and Komotini) were accelerated in the eighties. It becomes clear that the 
attractiveness of projects, or the acceleration caused by the initial investment is
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still affected by factors external to the project, that is the location in the 
economic map of the country. It appears that investment in remote areas and ones 
near smaller agglomerations may be difficult to be recovered fast and the potential 
long term effects may be as high. This is likely to be so especially if initial investment 
is too large for the regional potential, or if considerable delays occur, or even if 
investment is too small to have a substantial range of impact. In most cases the 
projects prove acceptable to the discount rates set, but in some cases, as it 
proved, far from the socially optimal way.
In the light of all the above analyses it could be said that rather positive 
effects can be accredited to the Industrial Areas policy. It can be seen though 
that, even when the national trends are discounted for, the acceleration given to 
the regions receiving the Industrial Areas policy was faster in the period 1978 - 
1984, rather than in the later periods. The effects of regional policy seem to be 
more profound when the efforts are concentrated in well specified locations rather 
than if an almost-nationwide uniform policy is adopted. Thus, there are reasons to 
believe that a 'blanket' regional policy may not only be unable to enhance the 
positive differential growth rates in recipient regions, but also the total absolute 
effect and the cost-effectiveness might well be reduced. Precision, consistency and 
quality rather than quantity seems to be more effective in this respect.
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Chapter 8 : An overview of the Industrial Areas policy, 
evaluation and suggestions
8.1 Overview of the policy in the light of regional
development theory
8.1.1 The theoretical foundations of the Industrial Areas setup 
As pointed out in chapter one, postwar Greece suffered from extreme 
centralisation of economic and industrial activities. It was soon understood that it 
was of vital importance to keep the peripheral areas alive economically.
In chapter three the theoretical background of the initial development 
efforts was presented. The policy makers in the fifties and sixties, using a two- 
sector neo-classical 'supply' based development model, after having characterised 
the traditional sector of agriculture and stockfarming as 'low productivity' and 'non 
exporting' were faced by a dilemma. The 'modern' sector of peripheral 
manufacturing remained of low productivity and non-exporting, even after the 
initial and continued support with incentives. As a consequence it was realised that 
in this way little if any labour shift towards this 'modern' small scale manufacturing 
sector was to occur. What was opted for instead, was the creation of large scale 
industry and the adoption of a more effective development model. The model 
selected was based on a strategic dispersal of resources and industry, and one 
which was founded in the theory of cumulative causation and the growth poles 
strategy.
Thus, the policy makers in the late sixties organised an ambitious plan named 
the Industrial Areas Programme. The Programme was based on the provision of land, 
infrastructure, locational and technological incentives, all located in few strategic 
peripheral regions. With the initial stimulation by the state, new propulsive 
industries were expected to establish, and a cumulative process was expected to 
start. The Programme has made considerable progress, even though it has had a 
rather slow implementation, and has proved to be wider in scope than the initial 
'decentralisation' setup. The Industrial Areas themselves numbered twenty by
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1988, from the five that were initially planned.
For the policy makers though, the overall effect of the Industrial Areas 
Programme for the regional - and national- economic development perhaps fell short 
of the levels expected when the projects were planned. Thus, in 1988 a theoretical 
reorientation took place. This reflected a move from the older growth pole 
strategy, to a policy for a generalised industrial space provision, mainly aiming for 
an accommodation scheme for local industry. The main idea (Vliamos 1988) is that 
through this mechanism the hinterlands of each growth pole would be smaller, and 
the resultant respective intra-regional disparities that would evolve, would be on a 
smaller spatial scale. It was anticipated that such provision would mobilise the local 
indigenous potential and would reduce any resultant 'backwash' effects.
8 .1 .2  A theoretical evaluation of the scheme
On theoretical grounds, the Programme was perceived and designed being 
based on the concepts in vogue in the late fifties. Since then, evaluations of past 
development practice that have been undertaken in the wider world brought new 
advances in development theory and practice. In the light of more recent theories, 
it can be seen why the Industrial Areas development policy, while significant and 
positive overall, offered only a fraction of its potential, both at the intra-regional 
and inter-regional levels. Important reasons surely are the problems of their 
finance, construction and organisational delays. But there are more, and some of 
these are considered next.
The policy in many cases did not manage to create poles that had the ability 
to generate the awaited 'spread' effects to their hinterlands which is the ultimate 
goal of the growth pole theory. Several reasons account for this divergence from 
expectation. The first is the result of external economies. The awaited localisation 
economies, which occur because of geographical concentration of plants and 
cooperation especially of the same or complementary industries, were rather slow 
to emerge. There are no signs of such economies in all but few of the older sites. 
Second, the agglomeration economies (Kaldor 1970), which result from the supply 
of infrastructure and the availability pools of skilled labour again were limited, 
perhaps to even fewer sites, possibly only Thessaloniki and Volos. However, there 
were attracted to the regions some larger plants that did experience economies of 
scale, but these mainly arose because of diminishing costs of mass production. Such 
economies were though, as managers said, often counterbalanced by additional 
transportation and communications costs.
Finally, the expected internal economies due to endogenous technical
318
progress (Friedman 1972, Berry 1974) proved to be less significant for the 
regional economies, although several modern, smaller firms have found suitable 
accommodation in some Industrial Areas. Later theories (Klaassen 1987) support 
the notion that the volume of innovations and inventions increases with the size of 
agglomerations. A typical size of an urban /  regional agglomeration that could offer 
a 'full grown' services sector, which is regarded an important precondition for the 
so-called 'take off' into the accelerated cumulative growth, was assessed at
275,000 by Klaassen. None of the Industrial Areas in Greece, with the exception of 
Thessaloniki, is adjacent to as large an agglomeration as this.
The less developed state of many of the peripheral regions in Greece 
produces agglomerations at but a fraction of the above mentioned size. Almost all 
are in need of an induced, 'simulated-fully grown' institutional and socio-political 
framework and a distinct orientation to new technology utilisation to have a real 
chance for development. It was shown in the theory that cumulative effects mainly 
derive from a globalised rather than regional division of labour. The considerable 
immobility of production factors can only partially be counterbalanced by re- 
locational incentives. Should subsequent operational attraction be based on 
incentives and low wage promises? Beyond the functional infrastructure and the 
experience of external economies, the real attractions of a model Industrial Area 
are the practice of new technology and the existence of higher productivity. The 
competition among firms, that seems as effective in the production of best quality 
products, as perhaps their potential integration. The efficiency of economic 
integration and physical connection to attractive agglomerations nearby that offer 
full and comprehensive services, not for the entrepreneurial activities -as these 
should be offered on site- but for the skilled and specialised labour that is to be 
attracted and/or persuaded to stay. All the above were more or less absent in the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the Industrial Areas as propulsive poles for 
regional development.
The suggested reorientation of 1988 assigns the Industrial Areas to play a 
role of a generalised industrial space provision policy, expecting positive response 
by the local potential. But if the scope of the Industrial Areas as a regional policy 
still is regional development and the promotion of demographic balance, then it 
seems likely that, with the new nationwide framework, the peripheral regions will 
indeed remain peripheral. Considering the number of the agglomerations to be 
selected to serve as growth poles for a country, Klaassen suggested that from all 
possible 'nuclei' those should be selected, which are most likely to react rapidly. It is 
now well understood that the greater the number of centres selected, the weaker
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will be the impact, for three main reasons.
The first and obvious point is that the limited financial assistance from the 
centre has to be divided amongst more places and its intensity is bound to reduce. 
The second and more important, is that industry of national and international 
marketing scope will take advantage of the Industrial Areas preferably in the most 
favourable locations, that by all means will remain the central ones. The more 
peripheral regions will tend to be left to their own fate. As Friedman (1972) 
emphasises, improved 'communications' affect the mobility of factors in a way that 
the central cumulative effect is intensified. The incentives for location in peripheral 
Industrial Areas will tend to prove only a national subsidy, or 'compensation' to any 
capital that may decide to take advantage, and depend on this.
The third reason is that there are only a limited number of industries in 
search of a new location at any one time. It is possible that at no one time there 
may be enough mass of industry to stimulate growth in all Industrial Areas and 
especially in all peripheral geographical departments. Thus, the parallel development 
of many projects may, expectedly, cause irrecoverable financial outlays. It would 
appear that generalised industrial space provision policy by a central agent can 
only be seen as a socially expensive and perhaps questionable land use policy, but 
not a regional development one. Except if, as Brugger (1986) suggests, central 
governments tend to reduce only some 'convenient' regional disparities. Would, 
then, every single region be happy to 'receive' its own costly but empty Industrial 
Area? There would seem to be little point in this. A different structure for planning 
for Industrial Areas, to be suggested later, may give a viable solution.
8.2 Evaluation of the policy through measurements of 
e f fe c t iv e n e s s
8.2.1 The employment impact of the Programme
Initially, a shift share analysis of employment in the 51 regions of Greece was 
carried out using secondary data of seven economic sectors. This provided 
information on the all-sectors economic performance of the regions and their 
competitive effect. An index (Rman) of manufacturing-specific performance was 
constructed to compare the actual regional performance with the regional 
performance had the regional manufacturing grown at national levels. Initially it was 
shown that manufacturing is certainly most important for the country. While
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employment in manufacturing in Greece grew by a relatively modest 5.1% in the 
decade 1978-1988, or an average annual growth of 0.5%, it was the second 
largest new jobs contributor, after the Trade and Tourism sector. The results of 
the analysis led to two findings.
First, that the all-round competitive effect is very much related to the 
manufacturing specific performance. It was found that in 16 of the 20 Industrial 
Area regions the Rman index is co-directional with the competitive effect of the 
regions. The higher rates of manufacturing growth are related to positive regional 
competitive effect, and lower manufacturing growth rates to lower general 
regional performance. In other words a better than average performance in 
manufacturing very often gives regions a positive all sectors regional growth effect.
Second, compared to all regions of the country, the Industrial Area regions 
had higher percentages of manufacturing-specific results and competitive effect. 
Some 14 out of the 20 -mainly peripheral- regions containing an Industrial Area 
benefitted from more than proportionate growth in manufacturing (positive Rman). 
The relation can be regarded as compatible to the notion that the Industrial Areas 
strategy helps the recipient regions to maintain and expand their manufacturing 
capacity above national levels.
Another analytical procedure used, was a chronological estimation of the 
regional manufacturing growth trends before and after certain points in time. The 
period 1969 to 1978 could be named the 'off' policy period, the period 1978-1984 
being the ’transitional’ policy 'on' period and after that, until 1988, was the 'on' 
policy period. It turned out that for Greece as a whole the average annual growth 
rate in manufacturing employment during the policy 'off' period of 1969-78 was 
3.3%, while for the consequent transitional policy 'on' period (1978-1984) it was 
0.3% to become 0.8% during the policy 'on' (1984-1988).
The net of national growth of the sixteen-region Industrial Area cluster, was 
next assessed. First, using a method unweighted for sub-sectoral mix, a net growth 
rate of 0.6% was reported for the policy 'off' period of 1969-1978, that became 
2.0% during the transitional policy 'on' and 0.8% during the policy 'on' (1984- 
1988). Second, using a sub-sectorally weighted method, the net of national growth 
for the Industrial Areas was assessed to 0.9% during policy 'off', 2.0% during 
transition and 0.6% during policy 'on'
Interestingly, the non-recipient regions, shifted from -0.4% net of national 
(weighted) annual growth at policy 'off' to -0.9% during the transition and to - 
0.3% at policy 'on1.
This would appear to show that the policy during the transition helped the
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recipient regions, while during the 'on' period, the policy actually worsened the 
growth of the recipient regions, rather in favour of the non- recipient ones. On the 
other hand though, throughout the period the employment growth of the Industrial 
Area regions’ cluster was at a higher level than the average national and beyond 
comparison with that of the non-industrial Area regions. This widened the resultant 
employment differentials in favour of the recipient regions.
Next, a more sophisticated method utilised the fact that the Industrial 
Areas-policy affects the different sub-sectors in manufacturing at different 
intensities, that is some sub-sectors are more sensitive to the policy and some less. 
To overcome the effect of the above as regards their sensitivity to the policy, the 
original regional mixes were biased equally through the Industrial Area-mix weights 
for all regions and time periods to produce samples reflecting the intensity and 
responsiveness to policy. Employment data obtained through the field research 
were utilised. Subsequently, the average annual growth rates of the samples were 
extracted and compared among regions, groups of regions and time periods. The 
analysis showed that while those sub-sectors supported by the Industrial Areas 
policy may not be the fastest growing nationally, the policy (on) did manage to 
increase growth rates at a faster pace than the general manufacturing. This is 
based on the somewhat more encouraging -compared to the previous methods- set 
of net of national growth rates of 0.3%, 1.8% and 0.7% for the respective policy 
’off’, transition' and 'on' periods that is produced by this method. But still the 
overall benefit that the time series based methodologies produce remains not clear 
enough.
Thus, a new method, cross-sectional rather than time-series based was 
used. The procedure was based on measuring the differential characteristics of 
employment growth, of the Industrial Area established firms compared to those of 
their respective region, in various ways. The method was run twice, for the period 
1978 - 1988 for five regions, and for the period 1984 - 1988 for sixteen regions, 
each having an actively operating Industrial Area.
The results for the first analysis showed that in a 'five-region' terrain the 
Industrial Area cluster accounted for 7.6% of the total employment in 1978, that 
became 8.6% in 1984 and reached 9% by 1988. As regards growth rates, the 
Industrial Area cluster grew at 4.0% annually and the 'region' at 2.3% for the 
decade 1978-1988. It was assessed that the 'region' without the Industrial Areas 
policy injection would have grown at 2.1% percent, the difference from the 2.3% 
being the Industrial Areas effect.
The results for the 'sixteen-region' terrain showed that the participation of
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the Industrial Areas' cluster increased from 6.2% to 7.4% from 1984 to 1988. The 
annual employment increase rate in the Industrial Areas, being 6.4%, is considerably 
higher than the respective ’regional' (the policy terrain) rate at 1.6%. The 'region' 
without the Industrial Areas' effect would have grown at only 1.3%.
The cross-sectional method did then demonstrate the importance of the 
Industrial Areas Programme for regional economies.
8.2.2 The total factor productivity results
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is that part of productivity over and above 
the constant returns to scale. TFP is the sum of external and scale economies 
(VRS) and technological levels (TEC). Measurement of these factors was made for 
the nine consecutive years 1981-1988 and TFP was produced as an annual 
average for the whole period.
The analysis showed that for the whole country TEC is positive (beneficial 
technological levels) in only 38% of all regions (16 of 42) and only eight Industrial 
Area regions of the twenty or 40%. A small technological advantage can be found 
in the Industrial Area regions. Positive VRS (beneficial external and scale economies) 
are experienced in 57% or 24 of all 42 regions. From the Industrial Area regions 
60% were found with positive VRS. Again here there is a small advantage in the 
Industrial Area regions. Finally, the TFP for the whole country is positive for 50% or 
21 regions, while 12 from the 20 departments with an Industrial Area, or 60%, had 
a positive average TFP. This implies substantial benefits of the Industrial Areas policy 
and is shown much clearer if a comparison of the TFP results between the Industrial 
Area regions and the non-industrial Area regions is made. Only 41% of the non- 
industrial Area regions had positive TFP, while the Industrial Area regions had 
positive TFP by 60%, for 1981-1988.
It can be thus supported that, whether the penetration of the Industrial 
Areas in the industrial structure of the Industrial Area regions is high or low, the 
actual existence of the Industrial Areas is coinciding with better total factor 
productivity. Technological advantages were less pronounced, mainly occurring in 
regions with medium sized cities. There are then reasons to believe that the 
existence of Industrial Areas offers external economies and some technological 
advantage to the recipient regions. These results seem sufficient to suggest that 
the Industrial Areas effectively raise the productivity levels of their own regions, 
each to a larger or smaller extent. Subtly as it may be, they may be claimed to 
cause relevant spill-offs, rise the level of labour skills in the region, rise the level of 
competition and subsequently the quality of products and regional competitiveness
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and create local job multiplier effects.
8.2.3 The field study results
The Industrial Areas Programme consists of twenty defined land spaces, for 
industrial use with provision of infrastructure, operating in various places in Greece. 
The total area of the Industrial Areas Programme was in 1992 some 42.7 square 
kilometers. From aggregate data about the Industrial Areas Programme it turns out 
that by 1992 the general average space occupancy rate was 35.9 percent. The 
rate of establishing firms was 28 new firms annually between 1982 -1988, but 37 
for the period 1988 to 1992. The average size of the participant firms in 1982 
was 41 employees, in 1988 it was 40, while in 1992 it became 33. Thus new smaller 
firms kept opening at higher rates in the latter period. The net employment result 
was strongly positive, and a basis of more and potentially more modem and flexible 
firms has been created.
In employment terms, there was a total increase of 8100 jobs from 1982 to 
1992, or an average increase of 810 jobs per year. An average annual increase of 
6.75% was maintained for the six consecutive years of the period 1982 to 1988, 
this dropping to 2.14% in the recession period of 1988 to 1992. This is by far 
higher than the national rates of increase in manufacturing for each period. Thus, 
the Industrial Areas Programme was effective in attracting some employment to 
selected developing areas while restructuring to generally smaller sized plants took 
place.
The pricing of the industrial land sold to the entrepreneurs was mostly 
considered to be advantageous. Many respondents, though, commented they had 
to wait for considerable period of time for the infrastructure to be completed, 
notwithstanding cases where basic infrastructure is not yet ready. The Industrial 
Areas offer infrastructure that at the moment varies considerably in range and 
quality among the different sites. Field research showed that only a few, older sites 
provide comprehensive and functional infrastructure while the younger have 
deficiencies of various degrees. The common situation of low capacity or quality of 
infrastructure and services seems to have caused unwanted externalities for the 
firms located in many Industrial Areas, compared to those located in the urban 
agglomeration.
As for the actual location of the sites, comments made by firms in several 
cases considered Industrial Areas to be inconveniently located. In fact, for the 
three cases of Patra, Volos and Iraklio where a nearby port is available, the 
Industrial Areas are located eight to fifteen km far from the coast, and at
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considerable altitude 100 to 300 metres above sea level. Poor public 
transportation linkage, according to the firms' views, accounts for the Industrial 
Areas remaining unconnected to the life of the nearby localities, as well as 
producing a negative externality of labour transportation cost. While in most cases 
the roads on-site are good, the connecting roads are often old, narrow or 
congested. In contrast, the connecting roads for the Volos project are good. In the 
opinion of the established firms, in all cases, roads have main priority against the 
train for desired improvement. Comments were pessimistic as regards the chances 
of creating a reliable and cost-effective railway service.
Telecommunications quality was also found to vary considerably among sites. 
In the distant regions of Xanthi and Komotini firms mentioned operational and 
entrepreneurial problems. As regards electricity, supply proved to be more reliable. 
An interaction effect can be clearly discerned. The larger industries tend to 
establish in areas with proven efficacy of infrastructure and in return the state 
invests and better maintains the infrastructure feeding these substantial clusters 
of demand.
The selection procedure for new establishments in the Industrial Areas does 
not seem to be much concerned with the levels of technology to be used. What 
seems more important, according to the local administration answers, is the amount 
of employment to be created. There is no centrally organised technological 
guidance or help scheme. Such efforts are left to other central public bodies, or 
the local actors’ and firms' initiatives themselves. However, the technological levels 
of the firms established in the Industrial Areas were found to be higher than those 
in the surrounding region. In most cases this was due to the use of private 
technological consultation by the firms. Information and capital prove to be the 
firms’ main necessities in the implementation of latest technology, so justifying the 
relevant theories.
It does not appear, interestingly, that the more dense the Industrial Areas 
the more interfirm cooperation that emerges. Proximity within the Industrial Areas 
plays little role as it seems. From the comments that firms made it is competition 
rather than cooperation among smaller firms that is engendered by these locations. 
Large firms were more positive on cooperation possibilities in perception and also in 
practice.
The marketing destinations external to their own regions of the firms 
established in the Industrial Areas vary from some 50% to over 90% of production. 
This shows a high competitive potential of these firms. In general the Industrial 
Areas administration provides only limited help as regards the firms' marketing.
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When firms were asked what kind of help would expect from the Industrial Areas, 
technological consultation came third, help in marketing second and employment 
training first. It is not that firms are not interested in technology though. When 
their financial assistance preferences were put forward, some 59% of the 
respondents indicated new technology subsidies as their first choice, a rival policy 
of export subsidies achieving 25% of first choices, and employment subsidy only 
16%.
Finally, while a principal aim of the Industrial Areas Programme is to help and 
promote local economic development, in most peripheral regions people were of 
varying opinions of how the Industrial Areas would affect their region. There were 
some cases where critical conflicts with certain local vested interests had emerged. 
Local interaction varied considerably between different sites at different times and 
on different issues. Perceptions of the regional level implications were that some 
industrialisation and new employment creation surely had occurred. Some industrial 
consciousness was thought to have emerged, and certainly some increases in 
female employment achieved. But, there was little direct perception of social life or 
education level improvements. It seems that realising the social benefits from the 
Industrial Areas is a subtle procedure. In none of the regions possessing community 
manufacturing businesses, (of the textile and handicraft type mainly, as in Iraklio, 
Volos and Komotini), any of them are established in the Industrial Areas
8.2.4 The costs and benefits of the Industrial Areas Programme
To facilitate a cost benefit analysis the Industrial Areas Programme annual 
cash flows from its commencement in 1968 to 1991 inclusive were used for a 
sample of six Industrial Areas. These were the surveyed Industrial Areas of Volos, 
Patra, Iraklio, Komotini and Xanthi, plus the flagship project in Thessaloniki. The 
various costs and benefits were grouped into a ’central' and a 'regional /  social1 
balance framework. The distinction was made according to whether the effects are 
administered by the Industrial Areas provision agent ('central'), or experienced in 
the policy recipient region or society in general ('regional/social').
In the central balance the costs were the Industrial Areas provision costs 
while revenues come from the land sales. The deficit of these costs is covered 
mainly by the Programme administrative body, ETBA, with some support from the 
Greek State and the European Community. In the social and regional balance, costs 
involve the running expenses of the projects, the Industrial Areas specific locational 
incentives and any 'regional' environmental costs that occur in the recipient 
regions. The basic benefits comprise of the new employment creation in all phases
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of the Programme, including the prevailing multiplier effects and estimated through 
the applicable regional salaries. Besides benefits experienced in central and 
recipient regions due to the land use potential, a de-congestion factor due to 
export of industry into the Industrial Areas and benefits due to any environmental 
relief, together with increased values of property and other social benefits are 
taken into account.
A methodology was developed for estimating the employment generation 
considering relocation percentages and other generally accepted calibrations have 
been used to generate the multipliers and other mechanics of the model. Two 
evaluation procedures were carried out. The first was one of the ’pay back' type 
and the second was a full-life cost benefit evaluation. An evaluation structure was 
constructed, based on the logical flow and timing of the various occurring costs, in 
accordance to any social costs and the various benefits, allowing for a sensitivity 
analysis relating to the social discount rate.
The payback method showed that the benefits stream created in Volos 
would cover the costs in the second year of operation, in Thessaloniki in the 
seventh and in Iraklio in the tenth year. In Xanthi this situation would only be 
achieved in the fifteenth year, while for Patra the extensive cost was to be 
covered only by operational year 24 and in Komotini year 27. From this first test it 
comes clear that the effectiveness of projects, besides their implementation cost 
effectiveness, is also affected by factors external to the projects such as the 
location in the economic map of the country. This is the case for Komotini and 
Xanthi. In the case of Patra the large accumulated costs of the project cannot be 
quickly offset by the modest economic acceleration it has stimulated.
The full life of project evaluation provides the following results. Initially for 
one hundred years of operation, with the social discount rate set to zero, 
Thessaloniki generates the largest net benefit, at some 197331 million drachmas (1 
million drachmas equivalent to £4000 at 1988 prices). Volos follows at 156865, 
Iraklio at 79267, Patra at 73807, Komotini follows at 45715 and Xanthi comes last 
with only 14539 million drachmas. With net of inflation discount rates of 2%, 4% 
and 6% the net present values of benefits become considerably lower, but remain 
positive for all projects. The net present values become zero at the internal rate of 
return, that is the marginal efficiency of capital investment. This occurs at 17.7% 
for Volos, at 15.7% for Thessaloniki, at 13.9% for Komotini, at 10.6% for Iraklio and 
10.2% for Patra and finally at 7.9% for Xanthi. With a second test for sixty years 
of operation the above net present values are analogically lower and the project of 
Xanthi does not pass the most demanding 6% test.
327
From these results it can be seen that Volos has proved a paradigmatic 
example of an Industrial Area, giving both high net present value of benefits and 
being endurant to higher discount rates. This means that it also is a much 
'profitable social investment'. Thessaloniki generated the largest level of benefits, 
but proved more costly to the operator. Iraklio proved also to be a quite beneficial 
example. Patra showed a large long term potential but has not given solutions to 
the existing employment problems of the region. The opposite happens with 
Komotini, having experienced a fast initial acceleration. Xanthi gave some rapid 
development to the region at an early stage, but does not seem to show much 
potential for the future.
As this type of analysis shows, in all cases the Industrial Area projects prove 
socially beneficial to the set discount rates, but in some cases it seems that this is 
achieved not in a socially optimal way.
8.3 Views and suggestions deriving from the evaluation
8.3.1 On the general planning of the Programme
It has become evident that the Industrial Areas Programme has offered 
considerable employment to the selected recipient regions and also some external 
economies to firms that locate therein. In addition, it is evident that the levels of 
technology and the competitiveness of the firms established in the Industrial Areas 
usually are ahead of those in the rest of the region. But, it has to be said, that 
these positive effects are not as strong as they might have been. This is thought to 
be due to two general reasons.
The first is that many Industrial Areas do not offer as yet adequate facilities 
to accommodate leading edge industry. There are considerable deficiencies in the 
infrastructure of many of the present Industrial Areas, as found in the field study. 
In addition, a lack of proximity to services such as banking, health and safety and of 
course local government and development agents is disturbing. In such cases 
serious externalities are posed to smaller, mainly local firms, while the larger and 
more modern ones, as well as those being attracted from abroad, have a wider 
locational choice at the national level.
The second is that financing pressures on the Programme operator (ETBA), 
in part due to the increasing range of the Programme, have perhaps made the 
selection criteria for the establishment of firms even softer than they were
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designed to be. In this way, the expensive, strategically located and often unique 
industrial space of the Industrial Areas is in cases ’wasted’ on non-competitive 
activities. This also poses quite heavy costs to the society and the economic actors 
at regional and national levels.
Thus, given that considerable effort is made to obtain resources for the 
Programme by ETBA, there is a strong case for directing them towards 
enlargement, improvement and refinement of existing Industrial Areas, and much 
less for creating new ones for reasons to be explained next.
This research on the Industrial Areas has shown that only the mature 
Industrial Areas well populated by firms have significant economic spill-overs to their 
regions or the wider economy. The same can be said as regards their costs payback 
and their overall benefit to the society. Thus, there is a need for the Industrial 
Areas to be competitive location options at national, if not international levels, 
utilising the most modern infrastructure and offering all the relevant services and 
facilities. The development and expansion of the existing sites will make more 
affordable the most modern modes of infrastructure and also the promotion of 
technology through training schemes and consulting research institutes. This shall 
make the existing Industrial Areas attractive in themselves and less dependent on 
locational incentives.
The above structure appears more effective overall than centrally running 
perhaps even fifty industrial sites, many of which would generate only rather small 
effects on the local economy and the regions. While the idea of development of 
more industrial sites across the country is useful and needed, and not only for land 
use improvement but also for economic development, such plans could possibly be 
more effective if carried out by agents other than the central (state) development 
agent (ETBA). Local agents such as local government or local industrial clubs could 
be more suitable and effective. The precision in spatial planning and economic timing 
of these latter agents might secure better management and more clear realisation 
of benefits. This latter option would still be eligible for state financial support.
A compromise, and perhaps near optimal solution might be the development 
of Industrial Areas by ETBA in cooperation with such local agents, following though 
the integrated and planned initiatives of the latter.
8 .3 .2  Restructuring and Specialisation
The Industrial Areas Programme has produced a considerable record of 
industrial expansion, but also has encouraged a significant restructuring and 
modernisation of the productive basis of the recipient regions. The results of the
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evaluation and research conducted in this study indicate that a larger number of 
smaller and newer firms has succeeded the fewer, larger, older units. This new 
larger base consists of more modern, flexible and technologically advanced firms. 
The perception is that, given the opportunity, it can expand its employment to 
much higher numbers. Effectiveness of this restructuring is based on the new firms' 
competitiveness, this being based on their spatial comparative advantage and the 
state of technology used. However, while better technology utilisation was evident, 
there were some cases of considerable dissatisfaction caused by locational 
disadvantages that need to be addressed, and resultant lack of competitiveness.
Initially the Industrial Areas Programme was perceived in a mode to attract 
large industries to peripheral, possibly other than optimal locations and provide 
them with the land, infrastructure, and financial incentives in order for strategic 
and demographic regional development objectives to be met. As a future and longer 
term strategy it might be the case that the Industrial Areas would be more 
productive if an effort was made for sectoral specialisation of each Industrial Area. 
In such a case research institutes and specialised staff would cluster, and 
innovation and localisation economies could be facilitated. The cooperation among 
firms, besides the competition between them, would raise their overall competitive 
status. Up to a certain extent, such specialisation is already informally taking place.
Of course, a legal regulation that would lead firms to certain Industrial Areas 
according to their specialisation might be too restrictive of local initiatives on 
locationally 'wrong' sectors and be probably not advisable. But if research centres 
and technological consultation are organised and provided in each Industrial Area in 
the sector to be favoured, this is likely to have the following effects: First, 
operation of such competent technological research and information centres would 
prove an important incentive for the sectorally relevant firms to establish in the 
'correct' Industrial Area. Second, it would be more cost-effective for the policy 
maker than the provision of several institutes on the same sector in several sites.
Which one Industrial Area would be the correct one for each - say 
specialised sector? The Industrial Areas specialisations really should follow the local 
industrial skills and traditions, for two reasons. First, due to existence of 
experienced skilled labour in the sector in question, and second because there 
probably is already some considerable comparative advantage for the region. This is 
not the case clearly for declining or abandoned sectors. There, restructuring and 
re-specialisation should be the policy, in sectors that are relevant to the existing 
skills, but using new technology and attempting to reproduce the previous 
comparatively advantageous position. Whatever the sector, experience shows that
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such specialisation combined with use of advanced technology and supported by 
research and the existence of skills, tend to raise productivity and competitiveness.
It must be said however that specialisation is the opposite of diversification. 
It can be strongly argued that specialisation with all the described positive effects, 
also means vulnerability. However the Industrial Areas are but a small part of the 
regional economies and as a result there is almost always an in-built component of 
regional industrial diversity.
8.3.3 Local interaction
As analysed, the Industrial Areas policy was initially planned as an industrial 
decentralisation strategy mainly, rather than to facilitate new local investment 
creation. In the early period an appeal to Greek capital in general was made. The 
Industrial Areas objectives were constructed around the perception of attracting 
industry and not stimulating the local entrepreneurial potential and skills. Incentives 
would compensate the 'external’ capital for its potential lower productivity having 
relocated. But as it appears from the theory and experience elsewhere, the 
attraction of local capital and entrepreneurial activity in order to achieve local spin 
offs and indigenous growth is perhaps a more important priority.
A paradoxical inconsistency no doubt is that a principal decentralising policy 
like the Industrial Areas Programme has had, and still has, a rather strongly 
centralised decision making character. The problems that have often plagued the 
fast and fruitful development of the Industrial Areas have often derived from the 
above problem. Lack of information flows to the local actors have made them in 
some cases reluctant to adopt the centrally designed development policy. Lack of 
feedback from the local actors has often led the central decision making bodies to 
solutions other than the optimum. Local actors in some cases have been frustrated 
to see resources that were wasted or opportunities that were missed by the 
projects, because the central administration was not well informed.
No less important, the local morale concerning this large and costly 
development effort is in some cases lower than it should be. Public and business 
opinion at the local level, understandably due to the above reasons, has sometimes 
not perceived the full magnitude of the investment correctly and furthermore that 
it was primarily meant to specifically assist their localities.
Field survey research discovered that the relations between the on-site 
Industrial Area administration and the established firms were not always what they 
might be. These relations can be improved with more effort by the local Industrial 
Area administration to contact firms, inform them about their plans and make firms
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to feel and be more responsible for the whole Industrial Area, of course by receiving 
and working on the relevant feedback from the firms themselves.
More decentralisation of the decision making process regarding the 
Industrial Areas orientations is then a necessity. Better communication between 
the local government, the local development agencies (still much tied to the central 
government) and the local Industrial Areas administration is a serious priority for 
the development strategy and the Industrial Areas Programme itself.
If new Industrial Areas are to be created by ETBA radical changes in the 
modes of cooperation with local actors should be made in the direction of promoting 
common decision making. This will help to obviate the inefficiencies of the past and 
promote a higher expectation of even better results. On the other hand, the local 
factor should be expected to show the development initiative and more actively 
participate in the development cost, seeing some of their ideas capitalised upon, 
rather than passively accepting, or discarding, the central policy. Additionally, ’free­
rider* insatiable demand for Industrial Areas will be reduced this way and some 
relevant political pressures will be released.
8 .3 .4  Orientation to technology and efficiency
From both the theoretical setup of the Industrial Areas and from the 
practice followed to date, as demonstrated by the field study, the state of 
technology in the industry to be assisted was never a leading priority. The 
technology strategy that would make the industries competitive is not yet seen by 
the Industrial Areas planners. The Programme was oriented towards replication of 
agglomeration and scale economies rather than inducing higher technology and 
increased productivity. The conditions, described in the theoretical part of this 
research, for local implementation and possibly improvement of leading edge 
technologies were not set down and of course have not been met in the large 
majority of the sites.
The real attractiveness of an Industrial Area in modern terms can only be 
one based on the development of high technology practice. This can only be done 
by the policy makers through serious and continuous investment in training and 
research and development procedures, beyond investment in infrastructure. 
Development of local, specific and efficient structures of techno-financial 
assistance for the innovative firms plus a consistent cooperation with international 
organisations and schemes will greatly help these efforts.
The markets where the Industrial Area industries could place their products 
were at the time of the planning of the Industrial Areas Programme vague. Effort
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was made for the Industrial Areas to be located near existing railway stations and 
motorways (Konsolas 1970) so that with the minimum infrastructure provision cost 
by the state the locating industries would be able to minimise their transportation 
cost. Real land use planning with wider criteria, even if it would in cases mean a few 
extra kilometres of railway or road, was not at the time considered. Studies that 
would show the optimal product-routes that would actively provide locational 
efficiency to the Industrial Areas were also omitted. And of course the above 
deficiencies could have been avoided if more cooperation with the local agents had 
been made during the period of the planning of the projects. As mentioned early in 
the Thesis, the economic repercussions of certain phases of the recent political 
history of the country, like period 1967-1974, do have important implications for 
the present times.
A dramatic example of the above effect, which is discussed in detail in the 
main text, is the location of the large Industrial Area of Patra. Location near Rio 
would have helped to solve some of the eminent transportation problems of the 
Industrial Area. However such a location was not selected and a motorway that 
would link the Industrial Area to Rio, circumventing Patra by the south, is for so 
many years now needed. The result is problems both for the Industrial Area and for 
the city of Patra itself. This example provides one more reason to suggest that the 
existing structure of Industrial Areas needs more improvement to be properly 
efficient, before new centrally conceived sites are put in the pipeline.
8.3.5 Resources and environment
A resources policy is nowhere mentioned in the formulation of the Industrial 
Areas Programme. Development of a policy is vitally needed that would set the 
balance of local slowly renewable resources, like water in Greece. Relevant 
investments have to be made, since often drilling for water for industrial use causes 
water shortages to the nearby localities. In addition, while Greece has a strongly 
negative energy and payments balance, a policy towards soft energy sources is not 
adopted yet in the Industrial Areas. Wind generators could have been used in some 
of the Industrial Areas, at least for the site lighting, or in certain cases for 
desalinisation of water for industrial use. Iraklio in Crete, for example, is an Industrial 
Area without water. Furthermore, while solar energy in Greece is more than 
abundant the Industrial Areas have also neglected it.
Policy should also effectively regulate and audit the emissions and waste 
disposal sites and treatment. While officially regulated by the Programme, the 
implementation of these activities in the Industrial Areas is generally rather vague,
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possibly due to an equally vague level of auditing. At least within the Industrial Areas 
there should be a proper and publically visible level of auditing and compliance.
8.4 Final conclusion
The Industrial Areas Programme that was launched in Greece twenty five 
years ago has managed to attract and develop a considerable amount of industry 
at planned and controlled locations, strategically arrayed in the peripheries of the 
country. Evidence can be found that this industry is performing better and is 
growing faster than the regional, non-industrial Area industry. Equally, there are 
signs that the Industrial Area industry is making the recipient regions more 
productive than the non-recipient due to assimilated agglomeration economies. 
There are also hints of better technology utilisation. These seem to be proven for 
many, but by no means all cases, through the total factor productivity 
methodology.
A field study in five representative sites, involving structured questionnaires 
answered by fifty five firms and the local administrations, showed that the 
institution is well into operation. The degree of development amongst the Industrial 
Areas sites varies cbnsiderably, however, while various infrastructural inefficiencies 
persist in many cases partially explaining the above variable results. One further 
serious deficiency often mentioned is the lack of services on site, and these are 
certainly causing operational problems. But still, the younger age of the attracted 
firms gives the Programme considerable growth potential. New firms' orientation to 
new technology is significant and relevant financial assistance in this respect was 
often sought.
Finally, a benefit - cost analysis of the Programme, based on data for six 
Industrial Areas, two large, two medium and two small, showed that implementation 
inefficiencies prove costly to the Programme operator and to society in general. All 
projects proved to be beneficial, but again to varying extents, when tested at 
varying discount rates.
Overall, it has been found that attraction of investment ’foreign' to the 
region has been a prime interest. Such investments may prove after some time to 
have located sub-optimally and thus be less competitive with respect to their 
competitors located elsewhere. Risk of close-downs is only partially avoided due to a
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moderately favourable spatial micro-climate in the Industrial Areas. If firms are to 
deviate from a satisfactory operational environment elsewhere, it should be 
because the conditions in the destination Industrial Areas are in all respects 
excellent. Interaction with the local government and the entrepreneurial and 
business community at the local level has probably been one of the weaker points of 
the Programme as a whole, while of course there have been some cases of success 
in this respect.
Based on the above evaluation, this study would finally suggest a policy 
orientation for the Industrial Areas on the following lines for improved effectiveness 
and efficiency towards the aim of regional development in Greece.
First, assistance funds should be shifted from supporting distant relocations 
to the Industrial Areas, to enhance the competitiveness of local potential (located, 
or about to locate). This is because local investment and ownership of enterprises in 
the Industrial Areas safeguards the local understanding of the enrollment of the 
Industrial Areas and commitment in local development.
Second, public funds should not specifically set out to compensate capital 
for operating in unfavourable environments, but on the contrary should create a 
favourable and fully operational Industrial Area environment, attractive in itself. The 
efficiency of the existing Industrial Areas should primarily be improved with 
investment in modern and comprehensive infrastructure, this in priority to any 
expansion plans. In addition, the need for on-site services provision seems to be 
critically important for the creation of efficient industrial nuclei. The above two 
priorities should provide lasting operational advantages more effective than 
financial locational incentives.
Third, the technological competence of the establishing firms should be a 
most important concern for the Programme. The policy should directly target the 
creation of suitable technology transfer and implementation structures in all 
Industrial Areas, effectively and specifically supporting the matter. These 
structures would consequently help the wider recipient regions to upgrade and 
develop. Sectoral attraction procedures should target the local specialisations that 
are profitable at the moment and have continued comparative advantages.
Fourth, the political structure of decision making bodies would appear to 
work better if more effectively deconcentrated to the regional /  local level. 
Proximity to the problem, better communications and flexibility of the local decision 
making bodies seems to promote better understanding of the local development 
needs and more effectively come to solutions. If new Industrial Areas are to be 
planned, local cooperation and responsibility should be secured before rather than
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sought after the development of the projects.
Finally, the need of effective policy orientation to environmental protection, 
energy saving and economic use of resources prevails as sine-qua-non prerequisite 
for regional development and the future economic well being of the nation.
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Appendix One
The research questionnaires
1. The questionnaire of the central administration of the Industrial Areas.
2. The questionnaire of the local administrations of the sample Industrial Areas.
3. The questionnaire of the sample firms.
Note: The following questionnaires are translations of the original questionnaires, 
that were in Greek. The layout is kept the same.
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Part 1. Employment
1 .What is the total number of the employed in all the Industrial Areas today? 
1992:______________________ persons
1978:_____________ 1982:___________  1988:______________  (Q 1)
2. What is the total number of the established firms in operation in the
Industrial Areas today? 1992:___________________firms
1978:  1982:___________  1988:________________  (Q 2)
Part 2. Area
1. What is the total area of all the Industrial Areas in operation, today?;
Total Area of Industrial Areas:____________ sq.km.
Net industrial space_______ _____________  sq.km
Total space sold to firms__________________ sq.km
Total space of firms in operation___________ sq.km.
Indication prices of land, per strem (=1000m2)
1984_______ 1988_______ 1992______ (Q 3)
Part 3. Financing
1 .Costs and financial sources of the up till now offered infrastructure within 
the Industrial Areas Programme (totals): (Q 4)
Periods _____ to 1981, 1982 to 1992
C o s t s : _____________ mil.drs  mil. drs
Financial sources:
ETBA:___(total)  mil.drs  mil. drs
Greek State:  mil.drs  mil. drs
EC:___ (total)  mil.drs  mil. drs
Other source:  mil.drs  mil. drs
2. What is the annual total running cost of the Industrial Areas? (for 1991)
 mil.drs Who cover the running cost?
ETBA:  mil.drs
Established firms ________________ mil.drs
Others:________   mil.drs (Q 5)
Part 4. Responsibility
1 .What are the main responsibilities of the director of the division of "Regional 
Development and Industrial Infrastructure" (nABY) of ETBA bank as regards the 
Industrial Areas?
a .____________________________________________
b .____________________________________________
c .____________________________________________
d .____________________________________________  (Q 6)
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2. To which Ministries has the central administration of the Industrial Areas 
(ITABY) to report?
(Q7)
Part 5. Selection. Technology
1 .Is there a technological help /  consulting department for the new applicant 
and for the existing firms within the Industrial Areas ? YES NO
If YES: What is the number of the relevant staff?__________
How many consulting sessions with firms does it have weekly?_______
(Q8)
2. What are the basic principles of the selection procedure of the firms
applying for establishment?
a ._____________________________________________________________
b ._____________________________________________________________
d.JZZZZZZZZIZZIZIZZIIZIZIZIZZZZZ(Q9)
3.How do you evaluate the following characteristics of the applicant firms? 
(mark: 1=not important, 5=very important)
Work places:___________________________________ ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
Export Potential: __________________________  ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
State of Technology to be used:_________________ ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
Production ties with other established firms  0  2 3 4 5 )
Profitability of the firm:________________________  (1  2 3 4 5 ) ( Q 1 0 )
Part 6. Local Interaction
1. Do you have indications of local government support towards the Industrial
Areas?
Comment:_______________________________________________________________
(Q11)
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Part 7. Central Policy
1. In your opinion, what are the THREE sectors in the central policy for 
regional development that need further more attention?
a. Financial incentives policy
b. Regional planning policy 
g. New Technology policy
d. Policy for staff specialisation & expertise
e . _____________________________________
(Q 12 )
Part 8. Evaluation
1. Comment on the following:
a.The Industrial Areas attract the technologically advanced firms in the country.
b.The Industrial Areas keep in business non-competitive firms.
c.The Industrial Areas increase the competitiveness of the country’s manufacturing.
Comment:______________________________________________________________
( Q 1 3 )
For IIABY-ETBA  ___________________________  ..../ 7 /  1992(Q1 4)
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Part-1 General
1. Industrial Area o f : ___________________________  (Q 1)
2. Date of legislative foundation:   (Q 2)
3. Date of operation:   (Q 3)
4. Infrastructure provided within the Industrial Area:
Internal Road Network: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Water Supply: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Sewage: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Sewage Treatment Unit: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION/ NO
Solid Waste Collection: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Pollution Control Unit: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Street/Area Lighting: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Electricity (med.voltage): YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Electricity(high voltage): YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Telephone lines: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Motorway connection: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO
Railway connection: YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO (Prox:___ km)
Bus line connection: YES /  NO (Proximity:___ km)
Sea Port in Industrial Area : YES /  NO (Proximity:___ km)
Airport: Proximity:________ km
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION YES /  UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO (Prox: km)
Bank YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO (Prox: km)
Post Office YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO (Prox: km)
First aids/Health centre YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION /  NO (Prox: km)
Exhibition Centre YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION / NO
Food /  Cafeteria YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION / NO
Sports Grounds YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION / NO
Training Institute YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION / NO
Research Institute YES / UNDER CONSTRUCTION / NO (Q 4)
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5. Costs and finance sources of up till now infrastructure provision: (Q 5)
Period:  to 1981, 1982 to 1992
Costs:  drs  drs
Financial sources: ETBA:  drs  drs
Greek State:  drs  drs
E.C.:  drs  drs
Other source:  drs  drs
6. What is the annual running cost of this Industrial Area (for 
1991)____________ drs
Who finances the annual running costs?
ETBA  drs
Established Firms  drs
Others  drs (Q 6)
7. What are the present magnitudes regarding this Industrial Area?
Total Area of Industrial Area ____________ m2
Net Industrial Space:_____________ ____________ m2
Total Land Sold: ____________ m2
Total Land of Operating Firms ____________ m2
Land prices (current) per 1000m2 in 1974_____  1978______
1984_______ 1988_______ 1992______ (Q 7)
8. List of established firms giving date of establishment. Employment for every 
year, (or for those years available) (Q 8)
9. What are the main five responsibilities of the Industrial Area's local 
administrator?
a .____________________________________________
b .____________________________________________
c .____________________________________________
d .____________________________________________
e .____________________________________________  (Q9)
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Part-2 Selection. Technology
1. Is there a consulting department for the applicant firms in this Industrial
Area?
YES NO, but integrated in other region. NO
If YES: What is the number of the relevant staff?________________
How many consultations they have per week?_____________ (Q 1 0)
2. What are the basic lines of the selection procedure for applicant firms to 
establish?
( Q l l )
3. How are the following firms' attributes evaluated? (put in order of 
importance)
Work Places:  ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
Export Potential:   ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
State of T e c h n o l o g y : _________________ ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
Production Linkages with existing F i r m s ___________ ( 1 2 3 4 5 )
Profitability of F i r m : _________________ ( 1 2 3 4 5 ) (Q1 2)
4. Were there any applicant firms to whom establishment was denied, in period 
1990-1992? YES NO
If YES , how many ?________________
What are the TWO main reasons of applications' decline?
a ._______________________________________________
b .-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  (Q 13 )
5. Compared with other competitive firms in the region, would you consider 
technology used in this Industrial Area, as :
LOWER EQUAL HIGHER MUCH HIGHER (Q 1 4 )
6. What efforts does this Industrial Area make for adaption of technological 
innovations by the resident firms?
Cooperation with scientific/academic institutions? YES NO
If YES of what kind?______________________________________  (Q1 5)
7. Does the Industrial Area offer technological consultation to the established
firms?
YES NO
If YES, number of specialist s ta ff.________________
Average hours of consultation per week:___________________ (Q1 6)
8. What are the TWO most important reasons for firms' closures in the 
Industrial Areas?
a .____________________________________________
b .____________________________________________  (Q1 7)
Part-3 : Local Interaction
1. What percentage of all the establishments belongs to local interests?
0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100% (Q 1 8)
2. Do you have evidence of local governments support to the Industrial Area? 
(mark 1 =none, 5=very strong)
Adjacent infrastructure provision?___________  (1 2 3 4 5 )
Financial support?_______________________ (1 2 3 4 5 )
Advertising, moral support?________________(1 2 3 4 5 )
Other Support?_____________________________(1 2 3 4 5  ) ( Q 1 9 )
3. Do you have elements of opposition? YES NO
If YES, give TWO reasons they put forward.
a ._________________________________________________________
b .__________________________________________________________ (Q 20)
4. Are there any community manufacturing enterprises in the region?
YES(how many?)___________  NO
If YES, how many in the Industrial Area?__________
Why the rest are not in the Industrial Area?
Comment:______________________________________________  (Q 2 1)
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5. Are there any re-specialisation /  training projects run in the Industrial
Area?
YES NO
If YES, how many people attended in 1991?_____________________  (Q 22)
6. How often does this Industrial Area receive organised educational visits by 
academic institutions?
Once a week Once a month Four-per-Year Once a Year Never (Q 23)
7. What facilities of the Industrial Area are used by other than the established 
firms or the public? Mark intensity of external use.
(1=rare use, 5=constant use)
a_________________________________________  (1 2 3 4  5 )
b .________________________________________  (1 2 3 4 5 )
c .________________________________________  (1 2 3 4 5 ) (Q 24)
Part-4: Estimations
1. Do you believe that the Industrial Area has helped the local municipalities in 
any of the following? Mark intensity of following Industrial Area's effects.
(l=none, 2=little, 3= moderate, 4=much, 5=very much).
a. Demographic Balance (1 2 3 4 5 )
b. Local wealth creation (1 2 3 4 5 )
c. Active social life (1 2 3 4 5 )
d. Level of local education and training (1 2 3 4 5 )
e. Female employment (1 2 3 4 5 ) (Q 25)
2. How important is the role of the Industrial Area in diversifying the region's 
economic basis?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q 26)
3. To what extent you believe that the Industrial Area helps the region's 
self-relied growth?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q 27)
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4. To what extent does the Industrial Area attract technologically advanced 
firms to the region?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q 28)
5. Do locals believe in self relied development? Have they come to believe that 
the region can develop a substantial productive basis?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q 29)
360
L©MD@IM ie y © @ L  ©F ECONOMICS
STATE SCHOLARSHIPS FOUNDATION ©F ©REECE
( OICY )
Firms' Questionnaire
i  <§ s © s r e Ihi
Regional development in Greece: an evaluation o f the 
effectiveness o f the Industrial Areas Programme
1©§<§§1 refs e®wdli!ii@iE©dl 
NIKOLAOS G. VAGIONIS
1 9  9 2
361
Part 1: Firm's Identity
1. Name of Firm, legal form:
2. Is the Firm branch of a larger Group? Which? Greek? Multinational?
3. Year of Firm’s establishment:____________
4. Year of Firm's location in the I.A.(*) :______
5. Owners of this Firm. Give percentages:
Greek State:...........................................
Local government/community...........
Private Greek banks............................
Greek private capital............................
Foreign capital......................................
Other.. .  (__________________) .  . .
T o t a l ..................................................
6. Number of employees: 1978______1984_______ 1988_______ 1992.
7. Annual sales value : 1978______ 1984_______1988_______1992_
8. Sector of industry, specialisation :
Name of Person answering, position. 
Date:__/ __ / __
(*1 I.A. stands for Industrial Area throughout the questionnaire
1 0 0 %
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Part 2: infrastructure
a.Transoortation
1. What percentage of your employees that use for their transport to work. 
Public Transport: up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more
Private cars? up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more
Company Bus? upto20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or m ore(Q l)
2. Do you regard the public transportation's quality connecting your I.A. with 
the employees' residences as adequate?
NOT AVAILABLE POOR MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT (Q 2)
3. As regards your final products, to what percentage they are carried to
demand points, using transportation
Road: up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more
Sea: up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more
Train: up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more
Air: up to20% 20-40% 40-60% 60%or more (Q 3)
4. Evaluate the Railway connection of the I.A. and availability 
(Code: 1=Not available, 2=Poor, 3=Medium, 4=Good, 5=Excellent) 
-Railway proximity to the firm's grounds (1 2 3 4 5 )
-Speed and efficiency of cargo handling (1 2 3 4 5 ) (Q 4)
5. Evaluate the roads connection and availability 
(Code: 1=Not available, 2=Poor, 3=Medium, 4=Good, 5=Excellent) 
-Roads within the I.A. (1 2 3 4 5)
-Connecting roads with strategic points. (1 2 3 4 5)
-Speed of connecting roads (1 2 3 4 5) (Q 5)
6. How would you spend a total of five hypothetical financial tokens for Road 
development or for Railway connection or improvement ?
Roads: ( 0  1 2 3 4 5  ) Railways: (0 1  2 3 4 5  )
Comment:___________________________________________________ (Q 6)
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b.Land
I.How would you assess the price of the land you bought, given the 
infrastructure provided, in comparison with other possible sites within this 
Geographical Department?
CHEAP ADVANTAGEOUS COMPETITIVE EXPENSIVE (Q7)
c.Telecommunications
1. How many external lines does your company have? ____________
How are they spread among:
a Telephone________ b.Fax:________  c.Telex:________
d:Computer data transfer:_________  e:Other:__________(Q 8)
2.Have you applied for more lines? YES NO 
If YES how long ago? ____________
Give average number of fails for long distance calls 
0 1 2 3 4 or more
Assess lines clarity: POOR MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT (Q 9)
3. Do you experience entrepreneurial and/or organisational drawbacks due to 
telecommunication lines limitations?
NONE SMALL SERIOUS VERY SERIOUS (Q 10)
d.Power Supply
1 .What is your monthly consumption of electricity?__
Do you produce electricity for yourself? YES NO 
If YES,how much?________ KWH
2.a.How many times a year you experience power failure/cuts?
1-2 3-5 6-9 10 or more
Estimate average annual total of hours of power failure:
0-8 hrs 8-16 hrs 16-24hrs 24-48hrs 48hrs or more
b.Have you installed electricity generators for emergency use? YES NO 
If YES, of what kind?___________________________  (Q 12)
KWH
( Q 1 1 )
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e.Marketing
1. Is your firm’s main market within the I.A.'s region? YES NO 
Give approximate percentage of your sales in :
-This Region  %
-Athens  %
-Rest of Greece ______ %
-Abroad  %
TOTAL............................1 0 0 %  (Q1 3)
2. Is there assistance by the I.A. as regards products marketing? YES NO 
If YES, Have you ever used it? YES NO
If YES, evaluate POOR MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT (Q 1 4)
f. Safety
1. How would you assess the safety/security organisation within the I.A.? 
(Code: l=Not available, 2=Poor, 3=Medium, 4=Good, 5=Excellent)
-Fire safety facilities (1 2 3 4 5 )
-Night security reliance (1 2 3 4 5 )
-Emergency seminars (1 2 3 4 5 )
-Emergency drills (1 2 3 4 5 ) (Q15)
2. Evaluate the efficiency of the existing First Aids Station in the I.A.
NOT AVAILABLE INEFFICIENT MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT (Q 1 6)
g.Facilities
1. Is there a Conference/ Social Events /  Exhibition space? YES NO 
If YES: How many days is it used annually?
0-3 4-10 10-20 20-40 40 and over
Estimate any annual benefits (cost savings..) for your company due to this.
If NO: How much money would you expect such a centre to save from your company’s 
marketing and public relations budget, annually?___________________(Q1 7)
2.a. Are there sports grounds in the I.A.? NO MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT
b. Is there care of the landscape? NO MEDIUM GOOD EXCELLENT
If NO would you wish to pay your share for such provision? YES NO (Q1 8)
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Part 3. Technology in Industrial Area
a.lnformation.
1.Does this I.A. offer consultation regarding technology and innovations 
information? YES NO
IF YES. Do you make use of it? YES NO
Estimate the annual cost savings for your firm from this____________
IF NO, Does your firm receive external consultation on new technologies? YES NO
If YES, what is the annual cost for your firm, if any____________ (Q 1 9)
2. Do you attend conferences on technological issues?
NO 1 /  YEAR 2 /  YEAR 3 or more /YEAR
Would you find it helpful if I.A. organised sectoral conferences on technological 
issues, with speakers from Universities, other Firms (i.e.those producing, or importing 
technology )etc.?
NOT INTERESTING GOOD VERY IMPORTANT (Q20)
b.lnnovations
1. What you consider the TWO greatest necessities in adopting latest 
technology production methods?
-Information 
-Capital/ Finance 
-Markets for more production 
-Job losses
-Adequately trained staff
-Other:_______________________________ ( ) (Q21)
2. Do any of your competitors in the region, but out of the I.A., use more 
advanced technology in production methods? YES NO
If YES what are the TWO most basic reasons?
-Multinational branches ( )
-More capital ( )
-Larger scale production ( )
-Proximity to the centre ( )
-Other___________________________  ( ) (Q22)
366
3. How many years ago was your latest upgrade in:
-Production Method 1 2-3 4-6 7,or more years
-Data processing 1 2-3 4-6 7,or more
-Internal firm communications 1 2-3 4-6 7,or more
-Telecommunications 1 2-3 4-6 7,or more
-Office equipment 1 2-3 4-6 7,or more (Q23)
c. Technology Orientation
1. Put in order of importance to your firm, the following policies, if undertaken 
by the State:
-Subsidies for annual employment growth ( 1 2  3 )
-Subsidies for firm's exports ( 1 2  3 )
-Subsidies for new technology installation ( 1 2 3 )  (Q24)
2. Put in order of importance to your firm, the following policies, if undertaken 
by the I.A. administration:
-Marketing of products guidance/help (1  2 3 )
-Workforce training in relative skills ( 1 2  3 )
-Technological innovations guidance ( 1 2  3 )  (Q25)
3. Put in order of importance to your firm, the following policies, if undertaken 
by the State:
-Venture capital provision, exchanged with equity share: ( 1 2  3 )
-Soft Loans...................................................................................... ( 12  3 )
-Grants for research on development of new technologies........( 1 2 3 ) (Q26)
d.Local Technology Production
1. What percentage of your production equipment is imported?
-upto 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% (Q27)
2. Have you made modifications to these equipment to better fit your needs?
YES NO
Does this firm make any efforts to improve technology used, or to innovate 
production methods with research and development? YES NO
If YES, to what extent? OCCASIONALLY STAFF_______
CONTINUOUSLY______STAFF________ (Q28)
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3. Development Law 1262/82 and 1892 /90  support financially R&D 
departments. What more is needed? Choose ONE:
MORE INFORMATION ( )
MORE FINANCIAL SUPPORT ( )
MORE EXPERTS IN REGION ( )
OTHER ( ) (Q29)
e. Safety of Workforce
1. Are there safety of workforce seminars held by the I.A. ? YES NO 
If YES, has your firm participated? YES NO
If NO, would you share the cost for such seminars? YES NO (Q30)
f.Anti-Pollution Measures
1. Is there air-pollution measurement within the I.A.? YES NO
Do you think it is necessary? YES NO (Q 3 1)
Part 4 : Local Characteristics
1. Do you think that the local governments in the geographical department 
support the I.A.?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q32)
2. Do you think that this geographical department has developed advanced 
industrial skills that help productivity of investments?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q33)
3. In your firm, what % of staff lived here before being employed in this firm?
-upto 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% (Q34)
Part 5 : Evaluation of Industrial Area
1. a.Would this firm have located in this Geographical Department if there was 
not the I.A.? YES NO
b.How important was the existence of the I.A. in your location decision?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q35)
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2. Do you feel you have operational and entrepreneurial advantages after 
locating in the I.A?
NOT AT ALL LITTLE CONSIDERABLE VERY HIGH (Q36)
3. Do you cooperate with other firms in the I.A.?
Vertical production links ( )
Joint raw material orders ( )
Joint security costs ( )
Other linkages___  (Q37)
4. Do adopted innovations spread among similar firms within the I.A.
environment faster than in other locations?
YES NO (Q38)
5. Do you regard that this I.A. has effectively attracted local/external
capital?
Local NOT AT ALL LITTLE CONSIDERABLE VERY MUCH
External NOT AT ALL LITTLE CONSIDERABLE VERY MUCH (Q39)
6. Do you think
a.that the region has improved its financial position due to the I.A.?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH
b. that the poorest areas have gained?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLY VERY MUCH (Q40)
7. How important is the role of the I.A. in diversifying the region’s economic
basis?
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE CONSIDERABLE VERY HIGH (Q41)
8. Give in free format some suggestions you may have for the more efficient 
operation of this Industrial Area.
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Appendix Two
The result data from the firms' questionnaire
1. The semi processed results of the firms’ responses, by question
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Semi-processed data from the firms questionnaires. Result data by question. 
Responds by indiuidual firms are aueraged for each Industrial Rrea MR)
Q.1: Modes o f employees transportation to Industrial Rrea
IA Employees Public Transp. Company Bus Private Car
Iraklio 752 11% 15% 74%
Patra 1244 4% 55% 41%
Uolos 1853 2% 49% 48%
Kanthi 375 2% 47% 52%
Komotini 880 2% 50% 49%
Percentages based on number of employees of surveyed firms in each area
Q.2: Evaluation o f the public transportation connecting the Industrial Rrea
IA Not available Poor Medium Good Excellent
Iraklio 6% 78% 17% 0% 0%
Patra 0% 90% 10% 0% 0%
Uolos 21% 71% 7% 0% 0%
Hanthi 33% 33% 0% 33% 0%
Komotini 0% 60% 40% 0% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.3: Modes o f products transportation
IA Road Sea Rail Air
Iraklio 65% 35% 0% 0%
Patra 84% 16% 0% 0%
Uolos 91% 9% 0% 0%
Hanthi 92% 8% 0% 0%
Komotini 88% 10% 2% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.4: Evaluation o f ra ilw ay connection (1 -5)
IA Availability Proximity Handling
Iraklio No -  —
Patra No —  —
Uolos Yes 2.21 1.64
Hanthi No —  —
Komotini No _  —
Key:
1: Not available 
2: Poor 
3: Medium 
4: Good 
5: Excellent
Q.5: Evaluation o f Roads (1 -5 )
IA Within Connections Connect. Speed Key:
Iraklio 4.33 1.33 1.44 1: Not available
Patra 3.80 1.70 2.20 2: Poor
Uolos 4.36 4.07 4.21 3: Medium
Hanthi 3.33 3.67 3.33 4: Good
Komotini 4.40 2.40 2.10 5: Excellent
Q.6: Hypothetical spending o f five financial tokens on Roads or Railways
IA Roads Rail
Iraklio - n/a
Patra 4.60 0.40
Uolos 3.86 1.14
Hanthi 5.00 0.00
Komotini 3.60 1.40
Q.7: Land prices in the Industrial Rreas
IA Cheap Advantageous Competitive Expensive
Iraklio 11% 56% 33% 0%
Patra 0% 60% 30% 10%
Uolos 7% 57% 36% 0%
Hanthi 0% 100% 0% 0%
Komotini 0% 60% 30% 10%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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Q.8: Number o f telephone lines
IA Employees Lines Empl. /  line Lines/firm
Iraklio 752 138 5.45 7.67
Patra 1244 76 16.37 7.60
Uolos 1853 97 19.10 6.93
Hanthi 375 26 14.42 8.67
Komotini 880 52 16.92 5.20
Q.9: Quality o f telephones
IA Poor Medium Good Excellent Long distance success %
Iraklio 33% 56% 11% 0% 37%
Patra 30% 30% 40% 0% 63%
Uolos 29% 43% 29% 0% 58%
Hanthi 0% 100% 0% 0% 31%
Komotini 50% 50% 0% 0% 22%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.1B: Problems due to telecommunications
IA No Small Considerable Serious
Iraklio 22% 39% 33% 6%
Patra 40% 20% 30% 10%
Uolos 14% 64% 21% 0%
Hanthi 67% 0% 33% 0%
Komotini 0% 20% 80% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.11: Electric energy consumption (monthly)
IA MWH MWH/firm MWH/100 empl
Iraklio 1075 60 143
Patra 4553 456 366
Uolos 5503 393 297
Hanthi 281 93 75
Komotini 1364 137 155
Q.12: Electricity prouision reliability (annual)
IA Power Cuts Total Hours Generators
Iraklio 9 16.67 11%
Patra 7 7.80 60%
Uolos 3 7.71 29%
Hanthi 9 6.00 33%
Komotini 11 42.00 40%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.13: Firms' destination m arkets
IA Same Region Athens Rest Greece Abroad
Iraklio 53% 9% 22% 16%
Patra 8% 31% 44% 18%
Uolos 13% 31% 41% 14%
Hanthi 23% 39% 26% 12%
Komotini 16% 21% 32% 32%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.14: Assistance in m arketing by the Industrial Rrea
IA Yes No Use
Iraklio 0% 100%
Patra 0% 100%
Uolos 0% 100%
Hanthi 0% 100%
Komotini 0% 100%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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1.15: Eualuation o f site safety and security (1 -5 )
IA Fire Safety Night Security Drills Seminars
Iraklio 1.11 1.33 1.00 1.00
Patra 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00
Uolos 2.57 1.29 1.14 2.71
Hanthi 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Komotini 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
.16: Efficiency o f firs t aid /  health centre
IA Not available Inefficient Medium Good Excellent
Iraklio 0% 61% 33% 6% 0%
Patra 50% 40% 10% 0% 0%
Uolos 7% 93% 0% 0% 0%
Hanthi 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Komotini 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
;rcentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
.17: Existence and use o f conference/exhibition hall
IA Existence Days Used Participation
Iraklio yes 3 17%
Patra no - -
Uolos no - -
Hanthi no - -
Komotini yes 5 80%
Key:
1: Not available 
2: Poor 
3: Medium 
4: Good 
5: Excellent
Q.18: Landscape care, sports grounds
IA
Iraklio
Patra
Uolos
Hanthi
Komotini
Not available 
100% 
100% 
71% 
100% 
100%
Medium
29%
Good Excellent
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.19: Technological help auailable in the Industrial Area
Would pay share 
64%
40%
79%
100%
60%
IA Use? ExternalTechn. Help
Iraklio 0% 72%
Patra 0% 80%
Uolos 29% 64%
Hanthi 0% 100%
Komotini 0% 90%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Cost/firm (mil) 
0.90 
4.06 
2.02 
7.20  
5.33
Q.20: Conferences on technologg ( potentially in Industrial Area ?)
IA Attending annually No Interest Good V. Important
Iraklio 1.22 6% 44% 50%
Patra 1.00 30% 30% 40%
Uolos 1.29 0% 79% 21%
Hanthi 1.00 0% 33% 67%
Komotini 1.70 0% 20% 80%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.21: Latest technology necessities
IA Information Capital Markets Job Losses Specialists Other
Iraklio 35% 53% 35% 6% 47% 6%
Patra 10% 40% 50% 0% 50% 30%
Uolos 43% 29% 64% 0% 0% 14%
Hanthi 33% 100% 33% 0% 33% 0%
Komotini 50% 60% 40% 0% 50% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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Q.22: Rre C o m p e tito rs  using m o re  ad va n c e d  te c h n o lo g y ?
IA
Iraklio
Patra
Uolos
Kanthi
Komotini
NO
94%
50%
64%
67%
70%
I f  VES uihy? (15 firm s, 2 votes each)
Multinationals More Capital Larger Scale Near to Centre 
33% 23% 20% 13%
Other
10%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area 
Q.23: Rge o f firm's la test upgrade (in years)
IA Production Data Process. Telecommun. Internal Comm. Office Equipment
Iraklio 2.6 3.0 4.7 4.2 5.4
Patra 3.3 3.5 4.7 5.6 4.1
Uolos 2.7 2.9 3.8 4.6 3.8
Hanthi 5.3 6.0 3.3 5.0 4.3
Komotini 6.1 5.2 5.0 5.6 5.2
Figures are average of responds in each area
Q.24: Firms' preferences amongst potential s ta te  subsidies on
IA Technology Exports Employment
Iraklio 50% 22% 28%
Patra 70% 30% 0%
Uolos 58% 21% 21%
Hanthi 100% 0% 0%
Komotini 20% 50% 30%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.25: Type o f help th a t the firms mould require from  the Industrial Rreas
IA Technol. consultation Employment trainning Marketing
Iraklio 22% 67% 11%
Patra 20% 60% 20%
Uolos 21% 29% 50%
Hanthi 33% 33% 33%
Komotini 20% 30% 50%
jrcentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
.26: Firms' favourite  pattern  o f state  financial support
IA Subsidy for technology Capital for shares Soft loans
Iraklio 28% 28% 44%
Patra 20% 30% 50%
Uolos 64% 0% 36%
Hanthi 67% 0% 33%
Komotini 10% 20% 70%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area 
Q.27: Proportion o f imported machinery
IA Imported
Iraklio 64%
Patra 73%
Uolos 80%
Hanthi 83%
Komotini 84%
Q.28: Change--to -fit  technological
IA YES NO
Iraklio 83% 17%
Patra 80% 20%
Uolos 71% 29%
Hanthi 67% 33%
Komotini 40% 60%
Research and Development
No R&D Partial R&D Full R&D
39% 39% 22%
40% 20% 40%
43% 7% 50%
67% 0% 33%
60% 0% 40%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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Q.29: P e rc e iu e d  n e c e s s itie s  fo r  re s e a rc h  and d e v e lo p m e n t
IA Information Finances Specialists Other
Iraklio 28% 50% 11% 28%
Patra 60% 10% 20% 40%
Uolos 43% 29% 14% 29%
Hanthi 0% 67% 33% 0%
Komotini 30% 20% 40% 20%
Q.38: Seminars on safe ty  o f work held in the Industrial Area
IA Available Participation Willing to share cost
Iraklio no - 50%
Patra no - 60%
Uolos yes 21% 36%
Hanthi no - 100%
Komotini no - 80%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.31: Pollution measurem ent in the Industrial Area
IA In operation It Should be
Iraklio no 61%
Patra no 100%
Uolos no 93%
Hanthi no 0%
Komotini no 60%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.32: Local support to the Industrial Area
IA No Little Considerable Very much
Iraklio 72% 28% 0% 0%
Patra 40% 50% 10% 0%
Uolos 14% 43% 43% 0%
Hanthi 33% 33% 33% 0%
Komotini 60% 40% 0% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.33: Regional labour skills (productiuity)
IA No Low Considerable Very high
Iraklio 22% 39% 33% 6%
Patra 60% 30% 10% 0%
Uolos 7% 14% 64% 14%
Hanthi 33% 67% 0% 0%
Komotini 60% 30% 10% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.34: Percentage o f local employees in the Industrial Area
IA Employees Locals Percentage
Iraklio 752 632 84%
Patra 1244 809 65%
Uolos 1853 1557 84%
Hanthi 375 289 77%
Komotini 880 722 82%
Percentages based on number of employees of surveyed firms in each area
Q.35: Firms relocated into the region. Importance o f Industrial Area
IA Relocated No Little Considerable Very high
Iraklio 6% 33% 28% 33% 6%
Patra 70% 0% 10% 80% 10%
Uolos 71% 14% 14% 21% 50%
Hanthi 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Komotini 60% 10% 30% 50% 10%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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Q.36: Locational /  operational advantage in Industrial Rrea
IA No Little Considerable Very high
Iraklio 22% 33% 44% 0%
Patra 0% 21% 64% 14%
Uolos 40% 30% 30% 0%
Hanthi 33% 67% 0% 0%
Komotini 20% 60% 10% 10%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.37: Cooperation amongst firms in Industrial Rrea
IA Yes Production Raw materials Security Other
Iraklio 61% 44% 17% 0% 6%
Patra 60% 30% 10% 0% 40%
Uolos 71% 43% 7% 7% 21%
Hanthi 33% 0% 0% 0% 33%
Komotini 70% 60% 0% 0% 30%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.38: Innouations are spreading fa s te r uiithin the Industrial Rrea
IA Yes
Iraklio 0%
Patra 10%
Uolos 29%
Hanthi 0%
Komotini 30%
Q.39: Rttractiueness o f Industrial Rrea to local and external capital
IA No Little Considerable Very high
Iraklio 0% 28% 67% 6%
Patra 30% 70% 0% 0%
Uolos 0% 21% 71% 7% (local)
Hanthi 67% 33% 0% 0%
Komotini 20% 60% 20% 0%
Iraklio 22% 78% 0% 0%
Patra 20% 80% 0% 0% (external)
Uolos 0% 36% 64% 0%
Hanthi 67% 33% 0% 0%
Komotini 10% 70% 20% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.48a: Regional economic benefit
IA No Little Considerable Very high
Iraklio 11% 50% 39% 0%
Patra 10% 50% 40% 0%
Uolos 0% 50% 43% 7%
Hanthi 33% 67% 0% 0%
Komotini 0% 20% 80% 0%
,48b: Poor parts benefit
Iraklio 22% 56% 22% 0%
Patra 10% 60% 30% 0%
Uolos 7% 50% 36% 7%
Hanthi 33% 67% 0% 0%
Komotini 10% 50% 40% 0%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
Q.41: D ifferentiation o f regional production basis
IA No Little Considerable Very high
Iraklio 6% 22% 61% 11%
Patra 10% 50% 40% 0%
Uolos 0% 14% 86% 0%
Hanthi 0% 67% 33% 0%
Komotini 0% 20% 60% 20%
Percentages based on number of surveyed firms in each area
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